

Wittgenstein ON Grammar

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The paper deals with the logical status of the concept “grammar” in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

According to the early Wittgenstein, “distrust of grammar is the first requisite of philosophizing.”¹ For the “school-grammatical” form of propositions disguises their logical form. The latter is revealed by an ideal notation which follows the rules of logical Syntax or “logical grammar”.² Subsequently, Wittgenstein used the term “grammar” to denote both the constitutive rules of language and the philosophical investigation or tabulation of these rules.³ In philosophy the logical questions are really grammatical⁴ and they are based on the rules concerning the use of words. Here, the word “use” stands for “grammar”. By grammar, Wittgenstein means the grammatical behaviour of words and the grammatical structure of sentences. So, he says : our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation shed light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away.⁵

Wittgenstein is not using the term “grammatical” in the restricted sense. He is using it in an extremely broad sense, to mean simply linguistic. That is, he is investigating the use of words. In other words, Wittgenstein speaks of “the grammar of” particular words, expressions, phrases, propositions, sentences and also explicates the grammar of mental states and processes. By saying it, we are clearly corresponding linguistic expression, which has a grammar. The word “grammar” means a certain way of use. “Grammatical rules” are standards for the correct use of an expression which determine its meaning. That is, to give the meaning of a word is to specify its grammar.⁶ The word “correct” does not mean true. It can be understood to obtain right meaning or right or contextual use of words in accordance with linguistic rules. The sense of proposition is determined by the grammatical rules. It actually determines the sense.⁷

Grammar is a rule-guided activity. Understanding the grammar involves a mastery of techniques concerning to the application of rules. Following a rule is a fundamental to our language-game.⁸ Whether a sentence expresses a grammatical rule depends on its role or function within our linguistic practice. As a result, an “empirical proposition” is distinguished from the “grammatical proposition”. It is a distinction between the *rules* of language-games, and the grammar of words *moves in* our language-games. It is made in accordance with rules. Grammatical propositions must be distinguished from empirical statements to the effect that a community follows certain linguistic rules, for example, “All Englishmen use these signs in this way,”⁹ and from propositions about the framework conditions which makes rules practicable.

Rules play a linguistic role. It sometimes plays a critical activities. Sometimes the activities are institutionalized, for example, education, dictionaries. The word “institutionalized” spells out the teaching of language, the explanation of particular words, the correction of mistakes, the justification of uses and the acquisition of higher linguistic skills. A rule is grammatical one. Our investigation on

rule is also a grammatical. Grammatical rules may distinguish between correct and incorrect use, but they do not determine either. Rule codifies practice. The said practice reduces the difference between correct and incorrect to that between conformity and nonconformity. Against this, Wittgenstein rightly insisted that the use of 'X' correctly does not mean the same as to use 'X' as most people do.¹⁰ This causes many to commit linguistic mistakes. For example, unusual using 'sobriquet' instead of 'nick-name' or inappropriate referring to policemen as "cops" in court. The expression "linguistic mistakes" includes syntactic slips malapropisms and wrong choices of words.

Wittgenstein adopts a new kind of linguistic practice. The said practice is logically based on the philosophical perspectives. It keeps an "account book of language". It consists of grammatical "investigations", "notes", "analyses", "remarks" or "reminders".¹¹ It reminds us the way we use the words. One reason for doing this is that "*Essence* is expressed in grammar". Grammar determines "what kind of object something is". For example, "Green is colour". It is a grammatical proposition.¹² It specifies the specific meaning. Here the philosophy of grammar constitutes a form of representation. But the apparent structure of reality is nothing but a "shadow" of grammar. There is no difference between "contingent" and "essential" rules. Both kinds of rules are rules in the same sense. Both deal with rules for the use of words. Philosophical grammar is special not in dealing with special rules, but in its aim, namely of resolving philosophical problems. It differs from the school grammar. Philosophical grammar has a wider, fundamental conception of grammatical rules.¹³ In this context, the school-grammarian is different from the philosopher-grammarian. For example, "one cannot know that *p* unless it is true that *p*". Here the job of philosopher-grammarian is more concerned with rules than the school-grammarian. This shows that there is a spectrum of grammatical rules ranging from the philosophically significant. For example, the use of words "north-east". In detail it states the following: 'the words "north-east" must be followed by a terrestrial place designation except "North Pole" or "South Pole"', to philosophically relevant cases, *i.e.*, 'the words "it is true that ..." should not be used with an adverb of time.'¹⁴ Here grammar takes the care of philosophical analysis.

Wittgenstein himself distinguishes between the "depth grammar" and "surface grammar"¹⁵ of words. Wittgenstein draws this kind of differences in his *investigations* very carefully. But, the traditional philosophy does not find such a distinction. It focuses on auditory or visual features of words. The surface grammar deals with surface-structure of sentence whereas depth grammar deals with in-depth-meaning of words used in sentence. The depth grammar is meant for the direct application of words. It is like a looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles. All are looking more or less alike. Modern philosophy is more concerned with an analysis of depth-structure of handles whereas traditional philosophy is less concerned with the surface role of handles of a locomotive. It overlooks the great verities of functions of handles of a locomotive. The "depth-structure" is concerned with depth grammar. It deals with various meaningful forms of expressions.

By "surface grammar" Wittgenstein means, "grammar in its normal or ordinary sense". Wittgenstein believes that grammar in its normal sense is misleading. So, he warns as against the "trouble some features of our grammar".¹⁶ and "grammatical illusions."¹⁷ Again, he says: "We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike."¹⁸ The surface grammar of "I have a pain" is the same as that of "I have a pin". It is that of "expectation" is that of state. That of "to mean" is that of an action verb like "to say". But their depth-grammar is altogether different. The words have different combinatorial possibilities. The propositions are different moves in language-game, with different logical relations and articulations. But it would be wrong to think that this indicates a contrast between fundamentally different kinds of grammatical rules. The perspicuous and its violation of rules produce *patent* school-grammatical nonsense. The violation of complex rules produce *latent* philosophical nonsense. We must logically regard for depth grammar. Disregard for depth grammar yields *patent* nonsense like "I meant for passionately". Philosophical investigations check to such non-sense. That is to say: "to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."¹⁹ The metaphor of depth grammar is misleading. Depth grammar is discovered through logical or linguistic analysis. Metaphysical propositions are nonsense. It is nonsense in the same as humdrum violation of grammar. That grammar is *flat*. That is, there are no meta-logical rules.

Wittgenstein in his *RFM* says that to conceive the “must” of a logical demonstration as a physical compulsion. It can create only misunderstanding. The surface grammar misleads us. The depth grammar points out that there is another use of language in operation. That is, what is being referred to is not so much a mental picture as a whole *story*, the image itself being a function within the story. To this, Wittgenstein says : “.... but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all, only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture.”²⁰ This section highly deals with the depth analysis of the actual status of grammar of words. The actual given meaning of words has been discovered by the depth grammar. “What has to be accepted, the given, is-so one could say-*forms of life*.”²¹

In *BB*²² Wittgenstein gives some examples in order to explain the distinction between the surface grammar and the depth grammar. The propositions like “I have a beautiful hat”, “I have a terrible toothache” appear to be similar in their surface grammar but their uses are quite different. The difference lies with depth grammar. Compare the two sentence. That is : “Is this my hat?” and “Is this my toothache?”. The question : “Is this my hat ?” has a sense. It is meaningful. The question : “Is this my toothache?” is nonsensical. Similarly the sentence, “It is 5 O’clock here” is meaningful whereas the sentence : “It is 5 O’clock on the sun” is a meaningless one. Compare the following sentence :

“A new born child has no teeth.” –

“A goose has no teeth.” –

“A rose has no teeth.” –

That last sentence at any rate-one would like to say-is obviously true ! It is even surer than that a goose has none. – And yet it is none to clear. For where should a rose’s teeth have been?²³ In the earlier lines of the same philosophical section Wittgenstein says : the sentence, “The Earth has existed only in the last five minutes”, or “The Earth has just sprung into being now”. The ideas and observations sound the situation to acknowledge the sense of grammar.

In distinguishing the sense of surface grammar from the sense of depth grammar Wittgenstein states the status of linguistic picture in his later philosophy. So, he aptly says : “in every case ... there is a picture in the foreground (the surface grammar), but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture (the depth grammar) is not essay to survey”.²⁴ Here Wittgenstein puts emphasis on pragmatic examination of linguistic function than the theoretical study of linguistic form. In this context a researcher must see how language functions. This means that the boundary of sense is drawn around the criteria of “use”, “purpose”, “employment”, “practical consequence”, etc. Now, the question is “ What is the purpose of drawing this boundary ? An appropriate answer is available in Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*. To this, Wittgenstein’s answer is as follows :

“It is not every sentence-like formation that we know how to do something with, not every technique has an application in our life; and when we are tempted in philosophy to count some quite useless thing as a proposition, that is often because we have not considered its application sufficiently.”²⁵ “The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.”²⁶

According to Wittgenstein, the form of metaphysical utterance makes it look like an empirical proposition but it is really a “grammatical” or conceptual one. A metaphysical statement (pronouncement) is like “ a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.”²⁷ The difficulty crops up due to the misunderstanding of the “depth grammar”. The metaphysical utterance makes it look like an empirical proposition but it is really a “grammatical” or conceptual one.

Wittgenstein’s great logic on grammar provides a piece of linguistic prescription through the description of grammar to dissolve rather than solve all sorts of confusions arise in philosophy especially in the domain of meaning. Considering the logical aspects of the “Aspect-change” in the *PI*, Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the two usages of the word “see”. In one usage, it means “similarity” and in other usage, it means “difference”. When two similar things are present to us, one may notice the similarities that present in them and another may notice the difference that are present in them. Wittgenstein calls it “aspect-change” or “change of aspect”.²⁸ According to him, one would not like to say : “I see this *as* a face”, but rather : “I see it *so*”. This means the *as* of the “as something” is implicit, in the *so*, the *as* is already contained. In this context grammar has a great role

to point out the distinction or difference. That is to say, it is the something which appears to be now as this and on another occasion as something else. This means that one can see different aspects of the something, to some extent different as – structures. The difference is demarcated by the application or use of grammar, *i.e.*, depth grammar. So, Wittgenstein says : ‘I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I *see* that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently I call this experience “noticing an aspect.”’²⁹

Direct description deals with visual experience and indirect description means interpretation. Seeing and interpretation belong together. “Seeing” is termed as surface-grammar and within it depth-grammar lies. We explore it through interpretation. So, interpretation is termed as depth-grammar. Here, one would like to say : “The echo of a thought in sight.”³⁰

Basing on above exposition, Wittgenstein further makes a distinction between “continuous seeing” of an aspect and the “dawning of an aspect”³¹, and by using “picture-face” example he tries to explain the “picture-rabbit” and “picture-duck”. Here, interpretation says : If I say : “I see a picture-rabbit” then it has sense. But if I say : “Now I am seeing it as picture-rabbit” it makes little sense. But if somebody says : “He is seeing figure as a picture-rabbit” then it is right because, in this case, somebody tries to explain what I have seen. Here the picture is the same; there is only change in the *aspect*. Change occurs within grammar. Only depth grammar can bring out the various aspects of change of seeing of an object. It means that there are different ways of seeing as there are two different ways of grammar, *i.e.*, the surface grammar and the depth grammar. By using Jastrow’s example of “duck-rabbit head”, Wittgenstein makes a distinction between “seeing” and “seeing as”. This distinction is based on perception. Perception is “seeing”, but “seeing as” is not part of perception.³² “Seeing an aspect” is interpreted as an activity that is “half visual” and “half thought”.³³ By means of an analogy Wittgenstein explains the distinction between “seeing an aspect” and “experiencing the meaning of a word”.

Here is a game played by children : they say that a chest, for example, is a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail. A piece of fancy is worked into it.

And does the child now *see* the chest as a house ? “He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a house”. (There are definite *tokens* of this). Then would it not also be correct to say he *sees* as a house?³⁴

Grammar is autonomous. The distinctions or different analogies which are born in above sense caused due to multiple ways of seeing a thing. Here grammar claims that the change is a change of “organization”. There is not one genuine description rather we have a multiple ways of descriptions. So, grammar provides logic of philosophizing and it helps us to dissolve problems of hermeneutic understanding and the said understanding can be well-learned only to *look* and *see* how the word is used in practice. It is a phenomenon of learning and using language.

In the end, we may say that the logical status of grammar in language is due not to its linguistic form, but to the way it is used, *i.e.*, pragmatic examination of grammar of words. In *OC* Wittgenstein explicitly raises the question of whether “rule and empirical proposition merge into one another”.³⁵ Here, the philosophical grammar comes in advance to take care of an analysis. Analysis is positive in character. Empirical proposition hinges within the framework of language-game analysis. There is no sharp boundary between proposition of logic and empirical propositions. Wittgenstein adds that this “lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between *rule* and empirical proposition” and due to the fact that the concept of a proposition is itself vague”.³⁶ That a division is not “sharp” does not mean that it is unworkable. It is workable within the purview of grammar of language-games. The famous metaphor of the “river-bed of thoughts” distinguishes between “the movement of waters in the river-bed”, “the shift of the bed itself” and “the hard rock” of the river-bank which is not subject to alternation.³⁷ The expression “hard-rock” includes propositions of logic. We mean it by thinking, inferring, language. But we use to mean the propositions relating to the shifting sand of the bank either normatively or descriptively. For example : “The Earth has existed for over a hundred years” must be certain, is more damaging to rationalism than to Wittgenstein’s earlier view. This proves that

Wittgenstein's analysis of grammar is the unique in nature and its status occupies a far-reaching logical consequences in the domain of philosophical analysis.

In philosophical analysis the expression "An Eye On I" deals with two-fold thought-provoking grammars. One is concerned with metaphysics, while other is concerned with grammar of epistemology. The former discusses the philosophical grammar of word "I" and the latter discusses the phenomenal exposition of "I".

In phenomenal sense the word "I" refers to the physical body, *i.e.*, the possessor. In this sense, the word "I" is used in various senses. It seems sometimes to imply the body, *e.g.*, "I am fat"; sometimes to imply a sense, *e.g.*, "I am blind"; sometimes to imply a motor organ, *e.g.*, "I am lame"; sometimes to a mental faculty, *e.g.*, "I am dull". The expression "I am" in me realizes its own existence and its own infinity. The voice of "I" is within me. The possessor of "I" dies. That means the body dies. But in philosophical sense the word "I" is used in the sense of pure consciousness. It is said to be the essence of the self. The expression: "An Eye On I" is used in two senses : one is used in epistemological or phenomenal or empirical or behavioural sense, while the other is used in metaphysical or noumenal or philosophical or spiritual sense.

The philosophical sense of the grammar of word "I" is the subject. It is beyond everything. The subject is spirit that transcends the body. It can not be touched by death. It is a deathless spirit. "I" is something very real. That is the only real thing. The awareness "I exist" itself is due to the unspent portion of the *prarabda-karma*. *Karma* yields seeds, *i.e.*, *karma*-seeds. *Karma*-seeds comes out of the union of both knowledge-seeds and action-seeds. "I" has the infinite dwells in the finite; and finite dwells in the infinite. The expression "I am" or "I exist" is self-evident. Here the grammar of an "am" in a proposition "I am" means something that is subjectively enjoyed. The transcendental self is philosophical "I". It is self-evident because it is described "as the absolute self is". "Is" means not reality but truth. Truth is believed as self-revealing. The real "I" is pure enjoyment. It is the content of consciousness "I". "I" is symbolized by a contemplated meaning "am". "I" symbolizes truth. It is not easy to catch. It is the pure enjoyment. This enjoying understanding is introspection, *i.e.*, *antadrsti*. Introspection is to speak in the first-person with the consciousness of the "I" as the object is not. It is a spiritual introspection. The subject "I" is never enjoyed by itself. It is a belief on a self-knowing, that "I" which is neither "meanable" nor "unmeanable". It has a meaning function. To the speaker, the meaning function of the word "I" is his actual introspection, but understanding of the hearer is the awareness of a possible introspection. The introspective subject is free from objectivity. It is thus freedom itself.

The word "I" is not "eye". The word "eye" is a noun. It is one of the organs of the body. It helps to see a thing or an object. In other words, the noun "I" is the seer of the body, a pot, etc. The optic nerve centre in the brain perceives the eye. It is an onlooker of the mind. The seer of mind is the individual self. The individual self is ego. Eyes exist in the body. Eyes through eye-ball and eye-ball through pupil enable us to look at the objects. In this sense eye means human eyes. But the pronoun "I" is not a human eye. Eye is an organ of human body, while I is the bearer, doer and the enjoyer of the eye. Human eyes help to perceive object, *i.e.*, universal. This distinction crops up due to an object-subject relation.

On an in-depth study of *Sankara's Advait Vedanta* the above distinction is posed in the following way. It opens a distinction between the "self-of-man" and the "self-in-man". The self is known as *Atman*. It is the Supreme Reality. It is one without the second. It is non-dual. In the words of *Mandukya Upanisad* : "This self is Brahman". It is the "self-of-man". The self is devoid of attributes. It is immutable. It has no changes like origination and destruction. But in the case of "self-in-man", the self is caught up in man's experience. The self-in-man is not the self. The not-self is what is perceived. Having name and form, it is endowed with attributes. It is finite and composite. It is subject to change. When the self which is non-relational comes to be related to the body and the world, it is no more the self-in-body or the self-in-the-world but becomes the self-of-body, or the self-of-the-world. This is called "of relation"; and this "of relation" with the body and the world symbolizes bondage. For attaining liberation what is required is the knowledge of the self. The knower of the distinction between the "self-of-man" and the "self-in-man" is the true knower of the distinction between the metaphysical "I" or the philosophical "I" and the *Chhandogya Upanisad* says

: “The knower of the self goes beyond grief.”³⁸ The enquirer realizes that since he is the self and the self is the Absolute, it follows syllogistically that he is the Absolute. Death cannot affect such a self. The *Svetasvatara Upanisad* says : “Only by knowing him one passes over death; there is no other way.”³⁹ Thus, the philosophical “I” or the metaphysical “I” of Wittgenstein is similar to *Sankara’s* conception of the self which is bodiless. The self which is bodiless called a will-less subject.

The grammar of “An Eye On I” puts emphasis on a will-less subject. That will-less subject is called egoless “I”, *i.e.*, philosophical “I”. But in the case of thinking “I”, the thinking “I” is full of ego. It is called empirical “I” or epistemological “I”. No confusion crops up here. Only the knowledge of proper understanding can acknowledge the distinction or difference between the two expressions of “I”.

The philosophical expression “An Eye On I” consists of the grammar of words such as “an”, “eye”, “on” and “I”. “An” is an adjective in English grammar. It has a grammatical form of expression. The grammar of “an” occurs before the word “a” or the vowel “a” which forms a word with a combination of letter or letters which gives rise to complete the meaning. An “eye” is a noun. It is one of the organ of a sight. An “on” is a preposition, while an “I” is a pronoun in grammar. “I” has a specific grammar in philosophy. Now, we look at the grammar of “an eye on I”. Descartes’s philosophical eye on “I” is different from the seers eye on “I”. Descartes’s “I” is concerned with *dubito* or doubt. For Descartes’s doubt is the first-stepping stone to philosophise “I”. Basing on the logic of doubt he has formulated three philosophic dictums, namely; *Dubito ergo Sum, i.e.*, “I doubt therefore I exist”; *Ambula ergo Sum, i.e.*, “I walk therefore I exist”; and *Cogito Ergo Sum, i.e.*, “I think therefore I exist”. Descartes has used the word “I” as a thinking being in the sense of existence. “I” stands here as a referring term. It is a pronoun. It refers to the first-person singular expression. Ryle’s celebrated work is *The Concept of Mind* and Ryle in “self-knowledge” context has used the word “I” as an index word. But, Indian seers through their eyes look at the “I” in the sense of self. “See the self” is a spiritual concerned for the *rsis* (seers). Seers have realized the status of self heartily and said that the expression “See the Self” is nothing but based on “*atma va are drstvyah*”. The expression “Know Thyself” has also discussed as a supreme necessity for Socrates. The word “see” is used in two ways. One way of using the word “see” is based on an empirical sense whereas the other way of using the word “see” is based on trans-empirical sense. Seeing Rama refers to the very physical existence of Rama. It (see) is used in empirical sense. In trans-empirical sense, the word “see” is used in the sense of vision. The vision is called spiritual vision. The word “vision” in Indian terminology is used in the sense of “*darsana*”. It is the *darsana* of real Reality. The *darsana* of real Reality; and the realization of that Reality is termed as “*Sat*”, *i.e.*, Self. The vision or *darsana* of the self through the divine eyes is called *Divya-chaksu* or *Prajna-chaksu* or *Jnana-chaksu*. An “eye” on “I” is used in spiritual sense. “Eye” is called *Divya-chaksu*. *Rsis* have a *darsana* of self through their *divya-chaksu*. The *darsana* of that self is called Universal Self or philosophical self or I. That self is egoless and attributeless. That is, *sarva bhutantaratma*. *Rsis* aim at to realize it. In the words of *Mundaka Upanisad*, “*Om* is the bow, Self is the arrow and *Brahman* is its aim. We should pierce the aim with concentration so that the arrow and aim may become one”. That one is Self, the subject of the world. An empirical self which comes under the discussion of epistemology is the part and parcel of philosophical self. There is no doubt about it.

But, Wittgenstein uses the word “I” in two different ways. One of the uses is based on the *Tractatus*, while the other uses is based on the *Investigations*. In the *Tractatus*, the “I” is a transcendental condition, a limit point for the world.⁴⁰ In this sense the world “I” has no content and the said word “I” is not discernible. In the *Investigations*, the “I” is no longer a metaphysical condition, but a grammatical one. The world “I” is *not a name in any sense*. The grammar of word “I” has two prominent uses. Wittgenstein says that in one of its uses, the “I” denotes a possessor, and in its other use it does not. It can be described that “I” which denotes the possessor is the “I” of ordinary language and the other “I” which does not denote the possessor is symbolizing “I” of philosophical description. The philosophical “I” is the origin of the “no-ownership” theory of the self.⁴¹ Evans, a critical philosopher, who interprets the word “I” in a different way. According to him, the word “I” denotes a possessor as the “I” of the *persons-approach*, and it belongs to ordinary language, and the “I” which does not denote a possessor as the “I” of the *self-approach*, and it is not an ordinary language term.⁴²

The “I” is simply not an object. “I stand objectively over against every object. But not the ‘I’”.⁴³ In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein speaks of two different uses of the word “I”; its “use as object” and its “use as subject”.⁴⁴ On the one hand, we have statements like “I have grown six inches” and “I have a bump on my forehead”, and, not the other statements like “I see so-and-so”, “I think it will rain”, and “I have toothache”. Wittgenstein says that cases of the kind “involve the recognition of a particular person” and, in addition, “the possibility of error has been provided for”, while in cases of the second kind “there is no question of recognizing a person” and “no error is possible” because we might be inclined to call an error is “no more of the game at all”.⁴⁵

According to Wittgenstein, the “I” is not the name of person. It should not be confused with a person. Again, it is clear from the above exposition that “my name” cannot be substituted for the word “I” even if I am to speaker. An object is given. It is inside the world. The subject is outside the world. The dichotomy brings out an object-subject distinction. The subject can not become the object. Kant calls it an *Unity of Apperception*. The subject-object distinction opens a further distinction between the transcendental self and the empirical self. The philosophical “I” or “self” has the logic for epistemological “I” or “self”, but ultimately both of them are originated from the Great Self.

Now, it is clear from the above discussions that the subject-object distinction philosophically corresponds to transcendental and empirical self respectively. The transcendental self is termed as Universal Self, while an empirical self is treated as individual self. The former self in Upanisadic sense is called *Paramatma* while latter self in non-Upanisadic sense is called *Jivatma*. Both *atma* ultimately belongs to one *Atma*, i.e., *Visvatma*. *Atma* is Self, i.e., *Atman*. It is ever conscious. It is self-luminous. The eternal knower. It is immutable. It is immortal. It is self-proved. It is beyond doubts and denials. In his introduction to the commentary on *Taittiriya Upanisad*, *Sankara* says : “True knowledge of *Brahman* is called Upanisad.” So, it is said that *Atman* is *Brahman* and *Brahman* is Self. In the *Kenoanisad*, the self has been called as the ears of the ears, the mind of the minds, the speech of the speeches and life of lives. In *Brhadaranyak Upanisad*, *Yajnavalkya* in his discussion with his wife *Maitreyi*, points out that whatever exists in the world is Self. Self is *Brahman* and the knower. “Who can know that who knows everyone ? He has the eternal knower by whom can he be known”. Again, in the *Kena Upanisad* we are told : That which cannot be spoken by the speech, but by which speech is made possible; that which cannot be thought by the mind, but by which, they say, the mind thinks; that which cannot be seen by the eye, but by which the eye is made to see; that which cannot be heard by the ear, but by which the ear is made to hear; that which does not breathe, but by which breathe is made possible, know that alone to be the *Brahman*, not this which they worship outside. *Brahman* is known to him: who says he does not know it and it is unknown to him who says he knows it.⁴⁶

The human eye is not similar with philosophical I. But, the relation between the eye and the visual field, as Wittgenstein says, is the relation of the self with object. So, Wittgenstein says : “You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do *not* see the eye. And nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.”⁴⁷ Wittgenstein was very careful in not identifying the self with the body. The self is not part of the world. He says : “The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world-not a part of it”.⁴⁸ It is true to assert that self is not identified with body. The self is not part of world. But it is untrue for Indian seers. According to Indian seers, the philosophical self or metaphysical or empirical self or epistemological or whatever the self we may call, that Self belongs to One Real Self. It is the essence of all things or thoughts and an I, which is egoless, is the eye of all eyes.

The expression “An Eye on I” concludes with a strong logico-philosophico-spiritual assertion that “I” or ‘Self’ is not an observable object. The realization of Self can never be shown. It can never be described in our language, because language used by human being is limited. Sweet fragrance of the beautiful flower can be smelled but it cannot be picked up and shown to others. It is the only truth. So, it is called *Satyasya Satyam*. We realize it when we philosophize it. We must have a forward look, and look at it and realize it through only “An Eye On I”. Here, Wittgenstein’s grammar of words clearly philosophic. There is no philosophical secrecy is maintained by Wittgenstein.

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