



Plato on Freedom

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It has been held by some scholars¹ particularly who have been groomed in modern liberal tradition, that in the notion of ideal city as developed in *Republic*, there is little or no space for freedom. Taking evidence from *Republic* (551b-558c) they lampooned him as someone who strangled democracy and freedom.² However, a close and integrated study of *Republic*, *statesmen* and *Law* would reveal that Plato was nowhere indifferent or hostile to the idea of freedom as such. Though it is a fact that he was dissonant to the type of freedom as advocated by the modern exponents of democratic liberal tradition, it would be wrong to conclude that he is an enemy of freedom. As a matter of fact, the concept of freedom plays an important and crucial role in his socio-ethicopolitical thought.

In *Republic* Plato through the mouth of Socrates asserts that to be just is beneficial. In other words, a just man is truly free. Refuting the claims of Thrasymachus that the tyrants who rule the city and do what he wants to do is really happy, stronger freer than the weak (*Republic* 343c -344c),³ Socrates holds that both the unjust city and unjust men are weak and powerless as they are driven by dissension. On the contrary the just man is more happy, wiser and more powerful. Here, the point of difference between Socrates and Thrasymachus however on the question whether a just man or the unjust one is truly free. The discussion was further animated when Glaucon tried to reformulate Thrasymachus position that people obey the law and try to become just as prudence but not willingly. In other words, he holds that people obey the law and behave justly either due to the fear of punishment or with the prospect of some rewards ipso facto, no one is willingly just and people prudently escaping punishment are truly free.

Socrates tried to respond to the above claims of his interlocutor Thrasymachus and Glaucon by his doctrine of tripartite soul and the comparison of a city and soul. Justice in the soul is condition of inner order and harmony where reason with the help of spirit regulates the appetite to ensure the inner order of the self (Republic 422a-b) and does not allow any part of the soul to distract from their assigned job. Unnecessary meddling of one part with other would lead to injustice. The meddling tendency belongs to the appetite representing the menial class and not to the other parts representing the ruling class .It seems that Plato understands the inner freedom of just individual in political terms.

Socrates advocated that the ideal city can be realised only when philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers. The *Republic* aims at developing the ideal city through the guidance of these philosopher kings. We should not forget that the basic structure of *Republic* is to draw a systematic analogy between the operation of the society as a whole and the life of any individual soul .It is a fact that philosopher knows the 'good' in its truest sense .It is to be remembered that the most crucial feature of *Republic* is the cave Simile(*Republic* 514 a -519d).This metaphor describes the effects of education on the human soul .After being freed from the bonds which kept the prisoner in the world of shadows they turned to face the world of objects and finally see the sun. The very gist of the simile is that ignorance and false belief constrain the mind much as chains constrain the body .We are generously free only when we see the truth , that is when we grasp for ourselves the form of the good. As the prisoners overcome their ignorance they could be able to comprehend the good .Similarly we must first free ourselves from the influence of appetites, the 'leaden weights' which keep us in the world of becoming (*Republic* 519 a- b) .So it is clear that the education should not aims at putting the knowledge into the soul but turning the soul towards right desires.

As far as the injustice is concerned for Plato it is a kind of inner slavery. For example an oligarchic ruler would value wealth over anything else and reduce reason and spirit to a periphery .But he allows reason only to count his money and plans how to make more money and spirit to honour nothing but wealth (*Republic* 533c). It is quite apparent that in democracy people do seem to be happy enjoy freedom of speech and expression and full of varieties. Socrates however rejects this kind of freedom as democracy does not care who is there in power. It lacks rational direction .The ruler in democracy act not willingly but in ignorance .He does not have control over his desire and guided by opinion only (*Republic* 565 b) .In fact the excessive

freedom of democracy would lead to tyranny in which a single man will control the whole city .Plato asserts that the tyrannical ruler would be the symbol of injustice and the unjust man is far worse than the just one (*Republic* 580 a-c) .So the contrast between justice and injustice is that between those who are free or they are ruled by reason and those who are totally unfree as they are slaves to appetite.

When Plato speaks about justice in the *Republic* he uses the language of freedom with all its favourable overtones .But this does not establish that he developed a systematic doctrine of freedom .However, in Plato's exposition of freedom one may find two major difficulties .The first is that those who act against the demands of reason are not doing what they really want .He considers himself as a tyrannical man .This kind of fellow is compared with a drug addict , who is not able to resist his passion .It could be conceded that if the picture was accurate the tyrannical man would not be free. But clearly the tyrant admired by Thrasymachus is nothing like this .Tyrant's main concern is to satisfy his appetite and he aptly uses his intelligence to achieve his goal .Also similar reference may be made about oligarchic man described in the *Republic* .For example, it could be said that the oligarchic man is free when he pursues his goal by accumulating money and thus he is free when he endeavors towards this.

The second objection is that Plato mixed up two distinct arguments viz firstly, the just man is completely free to direct his own life and that of his community in accordance with the demands of reason and secondly, philosopher is free to contemplate the truth .Though it seems that in both the cases appetite plays a role of constraints from which we should seek liberation but they apparently point to two different conclusions .Just man is free to lead his life along with other in the most satisfactory way .In otherwords , we can say that the philosopher is free to overcome the hassle of this life to contemplate the reality of forms .This objection *RepublicIX* seeks to prove that the life of the just man is more genuinely pleasant than that of the unjust (580 c-586e) .The above arguments stem from the idea that the philosopher's life has truer pleasure than those of other lives. But it seems that the lacuna lies with the fact that the pleasure of philosophy has any relevance to the claim that the life of justice is pleasantest .According to Annas there is a gap here which is due to the failure to distinguish different kinds of rationality .⁴The just man through the exercise of practical rationality achieve the greatest satisfaction of which he is capable where as the philosopher on the other hand achieves pleasures unknown to others because he puts emphasis on theoretical rationality.

However, Plato responded to these criticisms by holding that there is no distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom .In creating a rational order within the soul, reason will have to curb some desires altogether while others it will allow to a moderate degree .In this way all parts of the soul will attain the truest satisfaction of which they are capable (*Republic* 586e).But this, does not mean that goodness of the soul consists in any form of gratification.

Since the philosopher could comprehend the form of the good, only he can create order within his own soul and thereby genuinely virtuous. Others may have a secondary virtue based on true belief about what is good .Similarly the philosopher is free not because he has some faculty of free choice, but because his decisions are a response to a true vision of the good.

Here, we got to notice that there are fairly large connections between Plato's account of freedom and those given by some recent philosophers. They have pointed the difficulties in the traditional account of moral freedom as the ability to do what one wants to .They refer to notice the problem that drug addicts ,kleptomaniacs want to do what they want -at least they act on their desires but would not normally be regarded as free. The reason for this is that they do not identify with the desires in question .The drug addict may wish that he did not have his desire and struggled to get rid of it .Frankfurt in this context speaks of the notion of 'second order' desires to describe such situation .⁵The addict of brown sugar does not confine to only first order of desire rather he may have second order for, not to desire brown sugar .

Because the first order desire on what he acts is not similar to the second order desire, we can say here that the addict is not free . Frankfurt felt that this notion needs some elaboration specifically apart from the first and the second order of desires, there could be desires of third or ever higher orders .Thus there is no obvious reason to identify person with his or her second order desires as opposed to desires of some other order .For that reason Frankfurt presented the concept of 'decisive' identification or commitment "when a person identifies himself decisively with one of his desires the commitment resounds throughout the potentially endless arrays of higher orders" .If someone 'without reservation or conflict', wants to be motivated by a particular desires , "the fact that his second order volition to be moved by that desire is a decisive one means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires or volitions of higher order."⁶ Other philosopher who came across the state of difficulty by distinguishing between desires and what Taylor calls ⁷ strong evaluation i.e., evaluation which involve discrimination of right or wrong , better or worse higher or lower , which are not rendered valid

by our own desires , inclination or choices but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged .On such perspective the person is recognized with his or her potent evaluations .Thus an action to be free two condition must be satisfied (a) it must be the product of some desire which we actually have and (b) that desire itself must be in accordance with other evaluational system .For example, the addict who acts on his desires for brown sugar is not free if he turn downs that desire as harmful.

The assumption behind the modern writings on freedom is that there is a distinction between what one wants to do and what one should do with bringing in any concept of self. Plato also does not have any concept of self as such, nevertheless, it may be argued that he referred to the rational element if the soul and holds that its desires are really real .This is quite evident in *Republic VIII* where the inferior city is shown to be more vulnerable to chaos .Similarly the inferior soul is more prone to the inner debilitated state. They have utter inability to act as unity, in other words, Plato here seems to assert that only those persons who act in accordance with a consistent set of values are genuinely free.

Here a question may come to our mind whether only those people governed by higher part of the soul are truly free and the man who is governed by the lower part incorrigibly condemned to a life of bondage .As a matter of fact, Plato holds that every soul has potentially a spark of good. (*Republic 505e-506a*) No doubt that the soul of a bad person is necessarily a disorganized one. Nevertheless, it has some good desires which are in conflict with the bad one .Thus, anyone's life regulated by the apprehension of good is unified *ipso facto* truly free .Here Plato is trying to make use of Socratic assertion that an unexamined life is not worth living. Notwithstanding the fact that we want the good .Accordingly Plato designed the method of Elenchus for all the people to pass through this method in which all their false beliefs are to be contradicted.⁸ By using this method Plato wants to convey a message across that each of us has propensity towards the good and those who have mistaken values must be in a state of inner discord .By the above assertion Plato seems to have claimed that unjust person cannot do what he really wants to do hence ,he is not free .

A large number of philosophers agreed on the point with Plato that we act freely only in so far as we are rational .It is certainly axiomatic that who acts freely merit praise or blame, punishment or reward. But if no one acts wrongly is genuinely free ,it seems that no one really deserves blame or punishment .Plato does not seem to be bothered by this accusation, since he

never means it in the sense that responsibility is a necessary condition of freedom. He categorically rejects the retributive theories of *punishment* (*Protagoras* 324 b-c; *Laws* 934a-b) and argues that the purpose of punishment is to 'cure the offender'. (*Gorgias* , 476 a -479 c ; *Republic* 380a-b , 409e -410a, 445 a, 591a - b; *Law* 731 b-d, 735d-736a ,843d ,853b -855 a, 862b, 863a, 933e - 934c ,941d- 942a ,957e .) Here 'cure' is understood by some scholars as 'cure in medical treatment'. Moreover ,it can be argued that Plato would rather see punishment and blame as elements in a comprehensive system designed to train citizens in virtue .¹⁰In both of these interpretation it would not be regarded wrong doers as exempt from blame or punishment merely because they are unfree in the sense we have been discussing .(*Laws* 860c-864b) It is clear that the bad man who is seriously dominated by appetites does not act freely and so needs treatment in Plato's view .Hence, although Plato believes that the wicked are unfree he can still regard such people as responsible in the sense that they can take the blame or are liable to punishment.

It is a well known that the Athenians enjoy fully not only their freedom of speech but also the freedom of action, i.e. everyone can act as he likes .It is also generally accepted view that this freedom Plato does not support .¹¹ However, it is not right that Plato rejects all the freedom. Plato does not reject the freedom which is controlled by knowledge .¹²In other words; the freedom that Plato criticizes is the freedom without knowledge, i.e., the freedom to do whatever one wants to do which is based on wrong *doxa*. On Plato's belief freedom consists not in the unrestrained , indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure which leads to slavery but in a disciplined, ordered life directed to the perfection of human happiness .¹³ True freedom and happiness in

Plato cannot be embodied by such an irrational opinion .¹⁴According to Plato ,such a life based on wrong *doxa* can be described as a life of cattle ,which grazing, copulating ,try to fill their more greed which cannot be filled .¹⁵It is observable that Plato regards as the ultimate cause of dissolution of democracy excessive craving for freedom ,not economic (562b-c). In the *Republic*,Plato points out that the transition from democracy to tyranny is fulfilled when people pursue to the excess and greed of freedom and the neglect of everything else (562c)¹⁶.This excessive freedom for Plato comes from wrong *doxa* as to what freedom is .The consequences of this *doxa* about freedom lead the many to believe that they cannot do anything if they want ,and that all pleasures are equal (551b-c).Consequently their actions are inclined to be unlawful, irresponsible, so as Guthrie puts , "becomes a kind of supermarket of constitution ,where each

can choose his favourite".(Republic 557 d.4-9 Therefore ,it can be held that Plato firmly believes that the freedom based on wrong *doxa* ,not being controlled by knowledge ,leads to an end of freedom itself .¹⁷

From all the examination that we have investigated throughout the free speech *-isegoria* or *parresia* -in the democratic bodies, persuasion of freedom, it can be concluded therefore that Plato's criticism of democracy is essentially the very attack on *doxa*, and this attack on *doxa* derives from his underestimated understanding of *doxa* i.e, two characteristics such as fallibility and instability.

From what has been said ,it can be asserted that for Plato who seems to believe firmly that it is possible to acquire knowledge in realm of human affairs ,it is not necessary for philosopher-kings to consult with all the citizens in decision-making which is important .According to Plato ,the relation between philosopher-kings and many is like the position of the doctor in relation to his patient .¹⁸So,it appears as self evident for Plato that just as the patient should obey the doctor who has knowledge so as to recover his health ,so must ordinary demos be subject to philosopher-rulers for both's interests .It seems in *Critto* that what we must consider is not opinions of many ,but that of a man who knows about what is right and wrong ,disgraceful and noble ,good and bad (47c-d) .¹⁹ As Sharples puts ,Plato does not think that the debate based on *doxa* in democratic bodies might lead to new and important insights .²⁰ On the contrary, Plato firmly believes that the culture of *doxa*²¹ based on its fallibility and instability leads not only to man's corruption but also to the destruction of polis .²²

Accordingly Plato conceives that if *doxa's* essential characteristic is allowed to people , its consequences are decisively fatal to polis especially in the area of morality and politics its implications are really serious. As Plato indicates in *Republic* Book VII(538d6-539a3),people who hold such *doxai*,e, everything is no more to than not true will become lawless ,which brings to anarchic state .Plato could not accept this kind of constitution ,of which policies are decided by *doxa* of many i,e extreme democracy , which he experienced .²³ In fact, Plato witnessed that the historical facts such as the decision of Peloponnesian war (431-404BC) in the assembly or the trial of his teacher , Socrates in the democratic court (339BC)prove that the consequences of *doxa's* culture is unsuccessful .From the above mentioned facts ,it could be asserted that Plato's assessment on *doxa* is not positive ,and his critical attitude of freedom democracy reflects this underestimated judgment of *doxa* .This argument might be supported if we regard other

philosophers' views on doxa, such as Protagoras and Aristotle's views that we cannot examine in this chapter detail.

It is obvious that freedom stated in the *Republic* can be attained only by philosophers. The number of truly free citizens in an ideal city for that reason is very little. However, in the *Laws* Plato seems to have given markedly different structure of a state where there is no division of classes, communism of family and communism of property and is backed by a system of check and balance. Hence people from all the classes take part in the government and the state is to be governed by a code of law instead of the philosopher king. Plato intends to argue that the law should be the highest degree. No individual can exercise power on his own and all officials' decisions are subject to scrutiny. He no longer distinguishes sharply between knowledge and true belief. (632 c, 653a) The constitution, accordingly, does not depend on the philosopher kings but on reason as embodied chiefly in its code of law but also in its educational system. In this section it seems that the role of philosopher kings is less important than the constitution of the city. All citizens are strictly coming under the purview of law.

However, experience from older or wiser plays a pivotal role to understand freedom. In *Laws* 693d-701e Plato asserts that to enjoy freedom and friendship in a city together with wisdom, monarchy and democracy must be combined. He is trying to illustrate notion of freedom by indicating firstly two groups namely Persian and Athenians. The Persian ruler gave freedom to their soldiers under the commandship of Cyrus and Darius. Therefore; the soldier had friendly feelings towards their commanders. The kings were never jealous with this approach rather they honoured, such people and everything went well for them. But the consistency could not be maintained by their successors ruler like Cambises and Xerxes who derailed from all sorts of self discipline as a result under them Persians were defeated. In this way the Athenians at the time of Persian invasions were victorious because they willingly enslaved themselves to their ancestral laws and sensed an extreme familiarity and sociability with one another. But their emperor also went into decay as they neglected the traditional rule of music. This led to disturbances in the public life. People started not obeying any law of their ruler. They have lost a sense of obligation to God and man. Excess freedom thus brought about catastrophe in Athens the same way that unmitigated dominance took catastrophe to the Persians.

It can be noticed from the above fact that Plato's interpretation of freedom is closely associated with a notion that is order .But this interpretation is not inconsistent with the liberal thinkers, who while setting a high values on freedom identified that there must be restriction on what we want to do and they argue for freedom under the law. But this interpretation does not seem to be correct .Because, Plato asserts that during the Persian wars the Athenians were slave to the laws and is equally prepared to say that they were slave to the ruler and to their elder's. This kind of language though seems as paradoxical but actually it seems to imply a lot. Plato wants all citizens to live in complete satisfaction to lawful authority .They must thus, avoid on the one hand the kind of liberty that consists in being able to do whatever one wants to and on the other hand, the arbitrary rule of despots who think only of satisfying their own desires .Moreover, the ideal situation is one they willingly subjugate themselves to a strict code of law.

Again in the laws719-723 Plato asserts that law should be executed by persuasion .Here the ruler should adopt as far as possible persuasive methods to convince the people to feel prompted to act in consonance with the laws .Thus according to Prof.Bobonich and Prof. Hall²⁴ it seems that Plato is trying to hold that the citizen should be owned by rational argument and the rulers are dependent on their free consent .But this observation has been rejected by Prof. Stalley²⁵ He holds that the citizens are to be compelled to obey the law with a threat of punishment if persuasion fails and the preambles of the law is not clear as far as the rational language is concerned .In fact ,the entire educational and social systems are designed to make people obey the laws .Thus, in Plato's notion of persuasion there is no place for opinions other than those embodied in the law code.

It seems that the criticism as put forwarded by the scholar of modern liberal democratic tradition such as Popper, Fite , Crossman etc that Plato is an enemy of open society is mostly based on the above understanding of Plato's notion of persuasion .Nevertheless in the laws there are two important ways in which one can call the citizens free. Firstly they are free from the exploitation and exercise of arbitrary power .Secondly they are governed by persuasion not by force .In fact; they willingly obey the laws .At least they are not slaves who always obey the commands by force.

Thus, it seems that reason is the key factor for freedom and the one who he acts according to the dictates of reason is free from irrational necessity. Internally we may be limited by the purview of unruly passions and desires externally we are limiting ourselves by the irrational

practices of a disorderly city .Only the Philosophers are free in the Ideal state of Republic. Since this is hard to be realized, we may imitate the ideal state of Republic and the just Philosopher. It seems to entail that freedom is not anal and nothing matter. The more we allow us to be governed by the reason the more we are free.

In view of the above fact it is quite evident that freedom does not mean the unconstrained choice or the activity to do whatever one wants to do, but freedom in true sense implies the capacity to recognize truth .In mathematics $2+2=4$ is not a matter of belief or choice ,in this way platonic citizens have no choice whether to accept the laws which govern the city but will be free to the extent that they obey these law willingly because they understand their underlying reasons. Thus, freedom is concerned with a matter of knowledge rather than choice. Thus, the main concern for the Greeks was being a free man or woman rather than a slave and living in a free city rather than one controlled by a tyrant or a foreign power .It is quite evident that rule willingly accepted is better than rule imposed by force.

Besides, Plato adheres ruthlessly to the idea that the Principle of happiness must override the Principle of freedom. And indeed in looking for examples of specific restrictions we find that few are actually mentioned. This is the restriction on the freedom of the guardians to have sexual intercourse with whom they wish. Instead they are to mate only with those allotted to them at certain times by the rulers, who make the allocations in accordance with the aim of making the offspring of the union "as perfect as possible"³⁰ and of keeping the birthrate constant.

According to Plato responsible citizens must not simply produce children to satisfy a whim or to please someone. Crossman's view is that sexual union is a self -regarding activity, and therefore outside the sphere of state interference,³¹ where as Plato does not distinguish between self and other regarding activities. Crossman is right: Plato does not consider Sexual union, resulting in the Production of children as self regarding, and it is difficult to see how Crossman could seriously maintain that it is an increase in the birthrate, an increase in the number of physically or mentally deformed, and does so in considerable degree.

Plato sees long term advantage for the community in ensuring healthy and intelligent children. He, therefore, seeks to implement the means to this end in the Republic, and naturally his Citizens will come to accept the conventions, and readily and any other society accepts its Sexual conventions. This Procedure is precisely the same as that followed to justify only other

restrictions. In order to discredit this, there are three Possibilities only open to one: to take the anarchical view that no restrictions are justified; to argue that the means do not secure the end or that the end is undesirable; or to argue that freedom to copulate with whom one chooses, when one chooses, is an inalienable right. Liberal democrats will not take the first way out. They may feel and Possibly rightly, that this is a storm in a tea cup. Since the means will not really serve the end. They cannot consistently object to the end, which is ultimately happiness. But undoubtedly what Popper and Crossman would like to say is that sexual freedom ought never to be interfered with; and this is most implausible, if it is a natural right the ones is on them to convince us that it is. And in reply to the suggestion that Sexual activity, when it leads to children, is 'self - regarding', or cannot 'harm' others, even in theory, we say simply that this is patently not so.

All other restrictions on free activity in the *Republic* are justified in the same manner, by reference to the claims of happiness. The liberal democrats therefore have no case against Plato's restrictions on freedom of action, Provided that it can be shown that their restrictions are necessary for the promotion of happiness. But the *Republic* also restricts freedom of expression by censorship and we therefore love to consider whether this is justifiable.

The censorship in the *Republic* is of a specific nature. Plato is not censoring on aesthetic criteria. His admiration for Homer as a great poet is explicitly *acknowledged*. (*Republic* 387b) The censorship is designed to prevent the Promotion of undesirable behavioral characteristics and attitudes through example. 'We admit that there are men and women who are mad and bad but we cannot have them represented in Poetry or drama, (*Republic* 396a)' to soon reap the fruits of literature in life. (^{Republic 395d}) And likewise musical modes which Promote undesirable behavior must be censored.

If it is accepted that the Principle of freedom is not an ultimate Principle, but that freedom of action may be restricted for some other end, it is difficult to see why freedom of expression should not be curbed for the same end. If a man may legitimately be restrained for performing an action which harms other then presumably he may be restrained from the act of speaking or writing, in so far as that 'harms' others. As already mentioned what Popper means by 'harm' is

not made explicit but in general we may say that a person's view of what constitutes 'harm' can only be decided by reference to his other Principle's; and if this is not accepted, if rather 'harm' be understood in some restricted, Possibly excessively Physical sense, those such as the Liberal democrats, who also believe in the validity of other ultimate principles cannot coherently argue, both that claims of conflicting Principles cannot be judged, and that our judgment is wrong.

Selfish behaviour harms the community; Plato does not want individuals to grow up as selfish People and he therefore restricts those who would continually hold before the community examples of selfishness that are to be regarded as commendable censorship, considered as a restriction and certain types of speech or writing, namely those that Promote enthusiasm for anti-social behaviour, seems no different in Principle from restriction on other forms of other regarding activity. If it is legitimate to restrict actions that harm the community, there seems to be no reason why one should not also restrict speech or writing that either harms the community directly or causes action that is harmful.

FOOTNOTES

1. *The best known of these commentators is, of course, Popper 1966 , who attacked Plato vehemently as an enemy of the 'Open Society and Its Enemies' ,Vol-I:Plato , 5thedn, London ,Routledge .Klosko, George(1986).The Development of Plato's political Theory,London,Methuen.1986,Crossman ,Winspear and Fite.*
2. *We are accustomed to distinguish freedom of the will from Political freedom .Prof R.F Stalley asserts it will become clear that this distinction is not relevant to Plato's account . Meeting of the Aristotelian society ,held in seneta House , University of London , on Monday ,9th February ,1998 at 8:15 PM*
3. *G.M.A .Grube ,Republicrvd. C.D.C Reeve in Cooper, J.(ed) Plato : Complete works ,Indian polis , Hackett. 1997*
4. *Julia .Annas ,^4n Introduction to Plato'sRepublic ,Oxford, Clarendon Press , 1981 ,P-310-313.*
5. *Harry G .Frankfurt ,'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person ; 1971,J.Phil, Ix viii 5-20; reprinted in waston (1982) ,P- 81-95.*
6. *Harry .G .Frankfurt ., 'Identification and whole heartedness" in Schoeman, F.D (ed), Responsibility, Character and Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 1987,pp.27- 45*
7. *Charles .Taylor, Sources of the self , Cambridge , Cambridge university press, 1989,see also Taylor 1976 .Responsibility for self in Amelie OksenburgRorty (ed) The identities ofpersons, Berkeley university of California Press -281-99 reprinted*

- in watson (ed) 1982.*
8. Michael Frede, *Introduction to M.Frede and G.Striker (eds) Rationality in Greek Thought*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996, p.9
 9. Trevor .Saunders., *Platos' Penal code* , oxford, Clarendon press, 1991 and see also, Stalley, R.F (1996) *punishment and physiology of the Timaeus*, *classical Quarterly* ,XLV ,pp 357- 70.
 10. R.F .Stalley , *Punishment in Platoslaws'*, *History of political Thoughts*, 1995, XVI 469-487
 11. Moravcsik regards this unacceptable freedom as Periclean conception of freedom, comparing it with Platonic conception of freedom . He argues that "the most fundamental Platonic concept , that episteme is conspicuously absent from the Periclean scheme", pointing out that "Pericles wants nomos, kalon and eudaimonia, without these being based on knowledge, episteme", See J.M.E .Moravcsik, *op.cit.* pp 1-17, especially p.7
 12. J.M.E. Moravcsik, *Op.cit.* pp 6-17.
 13. J.H Hallowell. *The Moral Foundation of Democracy*. The Univ. of Chicago Press .1954, pp.131-132.
 14. G.Klosko. *Demorotike Arete in the Republic* , *History of Political thought* , Vol.III 3, 1982, p.371
 15. *Republic 586a-b*
 16. A.Fucks, *Plato and the Social Question; The Problem of Poverty Riches in the Republic*, *Ancient Society*, 1977(8), p.67.
 17. J.M.E Moravcsik, *op.cit.* pp.9-12 .Mariomion, *Athenian Democracy: Politicization and Constitutional Restraints*, *History of Political thought*, 1986(7), pp-219-238 , especially on Paradox of democracy in relation to free speech, see p.238.
 18. R.W.Sharples, *Plato on democracy and expertise*", *Greece and Rome..vol-xii*, 1994, p.54 .For Popper's criticism of the relation 'doctor -patient , see K.R Popper , *op.cit.* pp 167-8
 19. M.S.Warman , *Plato and Persuasion, Greece & Rome* , Vol.XXX,1 (1983). P.51
 20. R.W Sharples , *op.cit.* p. 50
 21. The term used "culture of doxa" to refer to the varieties of the way of life based on exchange of doxa, alternation of doxa and discovery of common doxa. Hence , the constitution or the society based on culture of doxa is not static but dynamic .It is not closed but always open to debate.
 22. G .Klosko,, "Persuasion and Moral Reform in Plato and Aristotle", *Review International de Philosophie*, Vol 47, 184, 1993, p.152
 23. J.Wild. *Plato's Modern enemies and the theory of natural Law*, Chicago Press. 1953. pp.58-9.
 24. Christopher.Bobonich., *Persian compulsion and freedom in Plato's law's* , 1992, *classical quarterly* , 41 , 365-388 and Hal , R.W, 1981, *plato* , London,

Routledge ,P-93- 94.

25. *R.F .Stalley , Persuasion in Plato's Law's , the History of political thought,XV,
1994, 157-177*

26. *Crossman, op. cit, chapter 7. (Quotation p. 118.)*