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KASHMIR PROBLEM AND INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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Preface and Acknowledgement

Concept Note:

An attempt has been made in the present International Seminar Proceedings to analyze the contemporary issues and challenges in India's adversarial relations with its close neighbor Pakistan in an Indian perspective. India's relations with Pakistan have been aptly described by former India's Prime Minister, Sh. Inder Kumar Gujral as 'tormented one'. Pakistan has been one of the major concerns for India's foreign policy for many decades. The relations between India and Pakistan have seen great uncertainty and ambiguity for both the countries have adopted divergent approach for their respective national interests. India and Pakistan are the two largest countries in South Asia wherein there exists a very low level of engagements. These two South Asian regional powers remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance in maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

Since independence, India and Pakistan have failed to come out of mutual suspicion and discord of each other. It has its implications on the decision-making process and policy formulation of both the countries. It has also promoted the image of each other as an enemy with minimal hope for constructive politico, strategic and economic engagement. Both India and Pakistan have so far failed to develop cordial relationship from the long-term perspective with each other due to various issues which includes border dispute, cross border terrorism and clash of interests over Afghanistan etc. The relationship between the two sides has been marked by suspicion, hatred and distrust. Tense and hostile situation which existed since 1947 has resulted in three wars and many crises between them. They have made significant efforts in past to resolve some of the key issues by holding peace talks and even by concluding various agreements. But this situation could not last long owing to suspensions in the peace process which had further enhanced suspicion and mistrust on both sides. By adopting antagonistic approach towards each other, both sides have failed to develop consensus on the need to develop the atmosphere of peace and security as key to achieving mutual interests. Misperception developed in the minds of policy makers of both states regarding different issues. The hostile attitude towards each other has severely undermined the prospect of socio-economic development of both countries. It argues that lasting security

and other development pursuits of both India and Pakistan would considerably rely upon cordial and cooperative relations between these two neighbours.

India's Predominant Position in South Asia and beyond:

India enjoys strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic connections with the neighboring countries of South Asia. Among the countries of South Asia, India is the largest which accounts for 70 per cent of population, nearly 80 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and about 75 per cent of the regional economic output. India shares boundary with all the South Asian neighbours. Since India plays a crucial role at the global stage so it becomes imperative to maintain stability in its relations with its neighbours. From the geo-strategic and geo-political point of view, India's relations with the South Asian neighbours have been guided by – first, its desire to protect the sub-continent from the adverse external forces that might destabilise India's security environment and secondly, its desire to ensure that geographical proximity and ethno-religious affinities do not lead to instability on or near its border, particularly as they inevitably may affect its domestic, ethnic, religious and political relationships. This could even give rise to secessionist demands within the country.

India enjoys a predominant position in South Asia and beyond owing to its large size, economic capabilities, military powers and geographical standing. India has a huge stake in not only playing a pivotal role in the region but

also keeping it free from external powers' presence and interference. According to Stephen Blank, a well-known expert who has written extensively on Asian security, India is definitely an extra-regional power. The U.S. Quadrennial Review published in 2010 has described India as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Bhabani Sen Gupta has argued in favour of India playing a crucial role in the region when he said that, "The Indian elephant cannot transform itself into a mouse. If South Asia is to get itself out of the crippling binds of conflicts and cleavages, the six will have to accept the bigness of the seventh. And the seventh, that is India, will have to prove to the six that big can indeed be beautiful." India shares a land border with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and a maritime border with Sri Lanka and Maldives. India accounts for 72 percent of the land surface in South Asia. The economic potential and military capabilities of India have made the country a primary regional force in South Asia to be reckoned with. India is being referred to as the 'key to the development and progress of SAARC. India's responsibility in shaping and directing the cooperation drive was recognized by extra-regional powers. The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. However, Pakistan has blamed India for playing dominating behavior in the region of South Asia in the past and present which creates an environment of insecurity for the latter. India started to deter, coerce or influence Pakistan.

India's Political Relations with Pakistan:

The political understanding between India and Pakistan has witnessed more ups and downs ever since their independence. The political environment between the two neighboring countries continues to be marred by mutual distrust and suspicion. Despite significant potential, the relationship between the two has seen no significant improvement. The healthy relations is very beneficial in various areas of interests including security, economic, energy and socio-cultural aspects. The two South Asian regional powers, India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance in maintaining close relation for the mutual cooperation.

Underlying Key Issues Constraining India-Pakistan Relations:

This section of the proposal will discuss the key issues that prevent Pakistan and India from reaching their full potential of bilateral engagement which definitely would have both regional and global significance. **There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue, terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues and China issue.** These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well. Besides, it will also affect the process of their rise and the peace and stability in and outside the region.

Kashmir Issue:

Kashmir has been and continues to remain the main cause of friction between India and Pakistan. That's why many have termed it as a 'nuclear flashpoint'. Kashmir issue has gained both regional and global significance. The geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the Kashmir has made India and Pakistan to believe that the control of Kashmir is so important, thereby making it difficult for both sides to come to the terms on resolving the issue which has cost thousands of lives. It is surrounded by a number of foreign countries such as Tibet in its east and Pakistan, China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its west. The southern part is bordered by Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Such a geostrategic location makes the Kashmir valley very important from strategic angle for both India and Pakistan. Having fought three wars over the Kashmir issue in 1947, 1965, and 1999, there is still no hope of resolving it in the near future.

India and Pakistan have totally different perception about Kashmir issue. From the Pakistan perspective, Kashmir issue is more of an ideological rather than a territorial dispute, whereas India perceives Kashmir as a symbol of its secularism and composite nationalism. The strategic importance of controlling Kashmir from the Indian point of view can be reflected from the statement of Indian's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he asserted that "India without Kashmir would cease to occupy a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia. Its northern frontiers...are connected with important three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Thus, strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India~ it has been so since the dawn of history."

While from the Pakistan point of view, the occupation of Kashmir is of security significance. As Liaquat Ali Khan, the former Pakistani Prime Minister has noted that “Kashmir is very important, it is vital to Pakistan’s security. Kashmir, as you will see from the map, is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on our head, then I am always at the mercy of India. . . The very position, the strategic position of Kashmir, is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.”

Therefore, the proposal argues that resolving the Kashmir issue will not bring peace, security and prosperity in the region. It also sends a wrong message to the international community that Pakistan is not concerned about stability and security in the region.

Terrorism Issues:

Terrorism has been another major issue of concern in India’s bilateral engagement with Pakistan. One of the key challenges India faces at present, is the one posed by terrorism from beyond its borders. India is seriously challenged by the menace of terrorism in multiple forms for the past many decades. It is facing the most unique, difficult and gruesome faces of terrorism. No other country in the world is so deeply entangled in this problem as India face at present. Eradicating the menace of terrorism poses a serious challenge to international community in general and in particular to India. It has been facing this problem for the last many decades and has lost thousands of innocent lives fighting the menace. Terrorism poses a serious threat not only to peace and security but also hinders economic development of our country.

Afghanistan Issues:

Indian interests clash with Pakistan over Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have been trying for strategic influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is seriously concerned about India’s efforts to expand its strategic influence in Afghanistan post 9/11. India’s long-term strategic interests entail the re-establishment of a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. Taking account of the ground realities, India has effectively pursued proactive diplomacy and has to a large extent been successful in creating pro Indian lobbies in Afghanistan. India firmly believes that an unstable and fragile Afghanistan would pose a serious threat to India’s national security. Pakistan expresses apprehension over the growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan in the socio-economic development and military build-up. This has resulted in close political understanding between New Delhi and Kabul.

Afghanistan is central to India’s closer economic and security engagement with Central Asian Republics and Persian Gulf. India is closely working with the international community to bring lasting socio-economic and security stability in Afghanistan which continue to face lots of domestic problems. India seeks to build indigenous Afghan capacity and institutions covering multi-dimensional sectors. Reconstruction work and development programmes have been designed to support the priorities of Afghan government and people. India has made significant investment in mineral, industrial, agricultural and other sectors of Afghanistan to help in building sustainable economy.

China as a Factor in Indo-Pak Relations:

China looms large on India’s relations with Pakistan. India has in recent years gained significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military powers but Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India’s progress in this direction. In fact India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan policies toward each other. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic and advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. Pakistan in particular viewed India as a potential challenger leading to use China to counter Indian power in the region.

The close strategic partnership between the two countries has been based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. Pakistan’s search for a country that can help sustain a sufficient military capacity for itself against India coalesces with China’s intention that “a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping India preoccupied on two fronts, thereby safeguard their national security interests.”

Beijing is fuelling that arms race between the two South Asian rivals. It has in the past and even today helped Pakistan in maintaining conventional military balance of India

Challenges Ahead of Indo-Pak Relations

From the above analysis, it can be observed that the Kashmir issue and the problem of cross border terrorism pose a serious challenge to India's bilateral engagement with Pakistan. It is an unprecedented threat to overall development requiring political will and commitment on the part of the both sides on a sustained basis. It is imperative for both South Asian neighbours to engage in dialogue and discussion with each other if they want to attain peace and prosperity in the region. With the formation of the new government in both countries, there is a dire need for common understanding between the two sides over the need to closely engage with each other for mutual benefits. Both sides will need to maintain transparency in their policies with each other in order to bridge the gap of distrust and hostility and to maintain regional peace and trust-worthy bilateral relations.

The key challenge before India and Pakistan would be as to how in spite of the conflicting geo-political and geo-strategic interest, both side have cast aside their difference on a series of issues and concerns of the past and make way for cooperation in the areas where their interests converge. For instance, economic cooperation offers tremendous scope for cooperation wherein Pakistan has a lot to gain. Bilateral trade between the two countries can prove to be an effective tool in order to increase mutual dependency for sustainable and stable bilateral relations. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif have huge responsibility of restoring peace process between India and Pakistan. Besides, the present government of both countries will need to explore opportunities and areas where their interests converge.

When will the time come for both India and Pakistan to realize the need to reduce the trust deficit that continues to serve as the key roadblock to constructive bilateral engagement? From the geo-strategic, political, economic point of view, it is imperative for both the countries to have close and cordial relations. Establishing cordial relations between these two can contribute a lot in making this strategically important region prosperous. However, it is very difficult to make a prediction of how the relations between India and Pakistan would look alike in the coming years or so. But one thing is sure, for bilateral relations between any two countries to improve, it becomes imperative for a positive response from them. India and Pakistan will need to first change the perception about each other as strategic rival. In doing so, Pakistan has to change track on its 'Kashmir first' policy and shifting gear to a process of building co-operation and confidence in other areas. Similarly, India too, has to show a big brotherly attitude and offer some liberal concessions to the Pakistan without compromising any security needs. Such a positive attitude will reduce tension and ease the way for cordial relationship between the two countries. Ayesha Siddiqi, a well-known scholar from Pakistan has very rightly pointed out two factors which hinder the prospect for peace between India and Pakistan – first, outstanding political/territorial disputes between the two countries; and second, historical perceptions of each other, especially Pakistan's perception of India.

The two countries have maintained a patchy ceasefire over the LoC in Kashmir since 2003. Current spate of ceasefire violations began in January, 2013; by the close of year such incident could be around 200, far exceeding last year's total of 117. Things came to a crisis situation in September, 2013 when, just short of high-profile talks between Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of 68th UNGA session, militants of unknown identity killed eight Indian security personnel and a civilian. The attack was deliberately timed, and follows a pattern of attempts by vested interests to frustrate the bilateral peace process. Dr Singh, despite domestic electoral compulsions, could not be provoked to the level of calling off the talks. However, the bilateral was grossly de-scaled... from a breakfast meeting to a display of glass of water. Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate at the time advised Dr Singh to skip his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.¹ Pakistan and India are neighbouring countries whose future is entwined and dependent upon each other. It is up to the two countries to find a way that leads to peace and prosperity of not only the two countries but also of the region.

International Seminar objectives:

- 1. To examine various issues, and challenges between India and Pakistan.**
- 2. To explore factors responsible for tension and peace between these countries.**
- 3. Military history is not of war only for it should not be a source of fresh bitterness.**
- 4. Lack of political will to search amicable solution to India- Pakistan problem out of Military scenario.**

5. **Increasing Military expenditure in view of HDI.**
6. **Projection of Warm neighbors vs. Cold friends.**
7. **International players willing to mediate the peace process.**
8. **To study retrospective and prospective linkages in terms of strategic, economic and cultural cooperation between these countries.**
9. **To analyze the governmental role for development of strategic, economic and cultural relations.**
10. **To suggest yardsticks for further strengthening the bilateral strategic, cultural and economic relations between these countries.**

Sub Themes of the International Seminar:

1. India – Pakistan Relations -Issues and Challenges.
2. Key Issues –Kashmir Problem, Article-370, Terrorism, Afghanistan and China Factor
3. Factors responsible to changes political and security relations between these countries.
4. Retrospective and prospective linkages in terms of security, political, economic and cultural relations.
5. Policy of the both governments regarding bilateral relations

Since the independence of the two South Asian neighbours, India and Pakistan in 1947, relations between the two has witnessed inflexible, conflictual, distrustful and very risky political standoff in global context in general and in South Asia particular. Moreover, both are closest and bordering neighbors with close literary, social and cultural bonds but remained at great distance from each other. There are many reasons and factors behind such turbulence situations and unstabilized political environment but Kashmir issue remain the primary factor that has hindered the prospects for peace between the two sides. However, India and Pakistan have always been caught in enduring conflicts, but in recent time, there are certain changes took place due to the change in the leadership and misadventures/infiltration/proxy war in Kashmir valley as their relations seem to be bitterer than ever before which give the space to international organizations to intervene in their disputes and state of affairs. In such situation, Kashmir is being seen as decider factor to Indo-Pak relations. In the recent past, both sides have made several attempts to restore peace and understanding, but have failed. Shimla agreement, Agra agreement and Lahore declaration are some of significant efforts which have been made in the direction to improve their relationships.

In such context, the present volume attempts to touch upon several key issues especially Kashmir problem, China's factor and other. It also tries to explore the future of Indo-Pak relations while examining attempts made in the direction to normalize their relations.

We express our gratitude to the *Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi* for providing the grant for the International Seminar. Without financial support from the ICWA, this Seminar Proceedings would not have seen the light of day. The completion of this proceedings was made possible through the support of people whom we would like to acknowledge. We would like to acknowledge the unwavering support of

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Dr.Sanjay Kumar
Dr.Ravinder Nirwal
Dr.Neelam Kumari

About the Special Issue of Shodhmanthan

India and Pakistan since their independence have shared a long history of conflict. The two countries have witnessed few ups and more downs in their overall engagement during the last many decades. Both have a clash of interests at the geo-strategic and geo-political levels. As a result of which these two countries have always found themselves to be on the opposite sides. Besides, both have suffered from a security dilemma regarding each other's military strength. The relations between Pakistan and India directly have an impact on regional security and stability. There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue, terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues and China issue. These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well.

This book is a collection of contributions by scholars and experts from various University and colleges of India. The present book is an attempt to analyse underlying key issues and challenges in India's relations with its immediate neighbour, Pakistan, in the light of the recent development. The book argues that better ties between the two most significant neighbors in the South Asian region, Pakistan and India, symbolize enhanced cooperation in the South Asian region on the whole. This book is a comprehensive collection covering various facets of India relations with Pakistan encompassing political, economic and strategic issues.

The book is likely to generate immense scholarly and public debate on issues and challenges in India's engagement with its immediate neighbour Pakistan. The book would be of great interests to scholars, experts, policy makers and all those interests in the study of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the context of the development that have taken place in the recent past.

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DYNAMICS OF CHINA-INDIA-NEPAL TRIANGULAR RELATIONS

Lt Gen Jaiveer Singh Negi

AVSM, YSM, VSM**

Deputy Commander-in-Chief SFC, New Delhi.

Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine the dynamics of the triangular relations between China, India and Nepal. It analyses the dynamics of competition and cooperation between China and India over Nepal. It also throws light on the Nepal as a strategic bridge between the two big powers - China and India. China has recently intensified its efforts to woo Nepal and engage with it. To improve relations with Nepal, China has intensified its efforts at the political, economic and strategic level with the tiny Himalayan nation.

Nepal was and still is trapped between competing interests of China and India. Nepal is being expected to play a geopolitically strategic role between India and China. Many analysts are of the observation that Nepal is strategically important to both India and China in that they see Nepal like a buffer and therefore wish that this remained in function for their multifaceted relationships. Nepal being a buffer is very natural when it is situated between two big and powerful countries. That's why interims of military and economically big countries always have wanted to control a weak and poor periphery country to get regional leadership hegemony.

Nepal is situated between two rising global powers, China and India, both of which are nuclear powers. Given its geopolitical sensitivity and geo-strategic equilibrium, Nepal should define its foreign policy in line with the objectives and principles of the national security policy. And as such foreign policy is an extended form of national security and the national interest. Nepal should at least be able to accrue certain economic benefits from being located right next to these two huge and emerging economies in the world.¹ If Nepal follows appropriate relations with China and India, based on national interest, it will be a beneficiary of their economic growth. If it follows policies of alliance to one and opposition to the other, they will interfere in Nepal, making it a playground for their interests. Nepal cannot follow a national security policy of military supremacy; instead it must follow a policy of equidistance and equi-proximity according to principles of national sovereignty, peaceful co-existence and non-interference in internal affairs. It is, therefore, very important to build warm, cordial and intimate diplomatic relations with both China and India, and also with other friendly countries, which will help national unity, territorial integrity and sustainable peace in Nepal.

Nepal has traditionally been a buffer zone between two Asian giant neighbors, India and China. For both the countries, Nepal is an important country because of its geo-strategic location. Both India and China's paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. Both sides converge on the need for a stable Nepal. Without Nepal's stability, India and China will not be stable. As both the countries are competing regional powers in Asia, they are not only protecting their interests in Nepal but also are seeking to enhance their sphere of influence to the extent possible. Having said, their interests in Nepal are economic and politico-strategic in nature.

From 1951 to 1996, Nepal, generally tried to maintain a balanced relationship with both India and China. However, geography and traditional cultural, political, and economic ties made Nepal's relationship with India closer than her relations with China. To counterbalance these ties to India, Nepalese monarchs sometimes played

the so called “China card.”² This way, China as a factor looms large on India-Nepal relations. In fact this factor has been one of the main irritants to their bilateral relations.

Unlike China, India has been closely involved at nearly every juncture of Nepal’s modern political history. Even today also India seeks to maintain its presence in Nepal from the strategic viewpoint. However, the recent events have demonstrated that to achieve true and long-term stability in Nepal which is vital from a security perspective for both China and India there must be a high degree of convergence and coordination between China and India. The narrow geographic space Nepal occupies as a sovereign state between India and China can be thought of as being both very consequential and quite inconsequential. It is consequential in the sense that, from a security standpoint, excessive and to that extent, unhealthy, jockeying and competition by China and India in Nepal and the instability that must follow would not bode well for either country in the face of this geographic reality. It is however inconsequential, in the sense that genuine cooperation between China and India in the Nepalese theatre can be relatively easy to achieve, and there are multiple ways to do so, the China-Nepal-India railway being just one example. The main argument here from a Nepalese perspective is that sustained cooperation between its two neighbors on the question of Nepal would almost certainly constitute the key ingredient of the country’s long-term stability and prosperity. The genuine cooperation and partnership between the three countries must be the basis of the process to ensure stability in Nepal and therefore security for both China and India.¹

Former Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna has made a useful remark in Beijing in April 2010 that India and China, ‘must always remember that the two countries are each part of the other’s immediate periphery [and] that... both seek a secure and peaceful environment that allows them to focus on domestic growth prospects [and that we must] encourage progress in our neighborhood [so] that we will be more secure and stable’. His statement point to a slightly reduced degree of Indian concern, for example, in the face of Nepal’s desire to expand cooperation and connectivity with China and thereby wider regions. It would appear that some sections of the Indian strategic community are also thinking along these lines.

The present chapter argues that the Sino-Nepal relations are poised to be significantly affected by an evolving China-Nepal-India triangular relationship on account of Nepal’s geographic position. Effective consolidation of this triangular relationship is vital to ensure political stability in Nepal and therefore security for both China and India.

Nepal as a Bridge or a Transit Point between India and China

The vision of Nepal serving as a land bridge for the expansion and diversification of bilateral trade between China and India is of considerable importance from the Asian region as a whole. Nepal becomes a dynamic bridge between the emerging world economies and reaps the benefits totally depends on how sensitively Nepal’s political actors handle the relations and how considerately the neighbors reciprocate Nepal’s gestures while maintaining its own security concerns.² In this regard, former Prime Minister of Nepal, Dr. Babu Ram Bhattarai on his first address to parliament as Prime Minister on 28 August 2011 had stated, “We should abandon a ‘Buffer State Policy’ between two giant neighbors China and India” and added “Instead, Nepal should act as a ‘friendship bridge’ between the two countries.”³

Nepal as a bridge makes a lot of sense when it shares borders with both India and China. A long and narrow stretch of Nepal, with multiple transit points, provides an excellent transit buffer to link China’s Tibetan territory and its east-west highway network with the densely populated Indian planes of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.⁴ As mentioned above, Currently Nepal has only one highway smoothly connecting Kathmandu with a Tibetan border of Khasa.

Several other multi-lane feeder highways linking Kathmandu with Tarai (southern plains), and another land route Rasuwa via Kerong are under construction. Given the fact that the travelling distance between the northern and southern borders is not more than 300 km, Nepal can comfortably link two giant neighbors through her land territory. According to China's Xinhua news agency, the Lhasa-Shigatse extension of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway project will be completed a year ahead of schedule, in 2014, which is encouraging. Since China is making heavy investment on its western frontier, commonly known as China's silk roads, and also into the resource-laden Central Asian countries, Nepal's connectivity could be of great strategic importance for India to counterbalance towards such move. In fact, India views Nepal corridor as a step towards fulfilling India's ambition to play a central role in Asian trade, investment, energy, security and geopolitics.⁵

While indicating former Prime Minister's assertion of transforming Nepal as a vibrant bridge between China and India, former Chief of Protocol, Mr. Gopal Thapa argues that,

“Prime Minister failed to offer any plausible or convincing logic behind the irrelevance of the time-tested Yam theory that has remained a cornerstone of Nepal's foreign policy for more than two centuries. His proposal had no explanation of whether Nepal has enough national resilience to act as a bridge durable enough to withstand the weight that these two gigantic neighbors may bring to bear on her, if she were to offer herself as a bridge between them”.⁶

While addressing the Afro-Asian summit in Djarkata, Gyanendra, the former king of Nepal said, ‘*Nepal is ready for acting as an economic transit point between two Asian economic giant India and China.*’ The motive behind this is how Nepal could be benefitted being a transit point between these countries. To provide a transit point Nepal need to work a lot on it. India and China will extend their support to build infrastructure. There is border dispute between India and China and both countries looking for the power and want to take regional leadership in the South Asian Region. But when question comes to the trade, both countries have good business ties. Nepal's position being in between India and China have huge chances to provide a transit point this will makes the distance short and reliable and saves cost.

Nepal not only could be transit point between India and China but also with Bangladesh and Central Asian countries. To get more benefit Nepal's leadership has to work excessively on this issue by making appropriate economic policy. The former Indian ambassador to Bangladesh has wrote, ‘*transit facility would considerably save both time and money.*’ Eastern side of Nepal is close to Bangladesh border which looks like a chicken neck. To cross the border Nepal has to cross the India. Thus, Nepal could be the transit point for the north-eastern part of India.

Dr. Hu Shisheng, Deputy Director of the Institute of South, South Asian and Oceanic Studies in the China's Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is of the view that, ‘Nepal shares border with China's Tibet. Apart from that, geo-economical element also plays a vital role. Nepal could play the role of a ‘golden bridge’ between the two emerging economic giants (India and China). In the future, if South Asia is linked to China through Nepal, the entire population inhabiting the region will be immensely benefitted. In this scenario, Chinese and Indian population will be highly obliged to Nepal.’⁷

Pre-requisite to Transforming Nepal into a Transit State

Development of land-locked Nepal as a transit state between India and China holds tremendous potential for Nepal's economic prosperity and this could be developed as a strategic leverage of Nepal vis-à-vis both its giant neighbors. Internal developments hold the key to transforming Nepal from a buffer to transit state. Should Nepal

want to reap the benefit of being a transit state; it will need to adopt pro-active policy in the direction. Infrastructural development is a pre-requisite to develop Nepal into a transit state. Nepal's northern parts still lacks operational roads and railway connection. It still suffers from poor international communication system, cargo handlings, vulnerable infrastructure and mismanaged traffic mechanism at home. To reap benefit of being a transit state between India and China, Nepal should think about constructing its own immediate domestic infrastructure. Constructing highways, renovating border cities, developing communication, transportation and storage facilities and administration of internal freight movement should be its top priorities. Additionally, developing institutional capabilities, protecting the economy from cutthroat competition, controlling cross-border smuggling, advancing technology, enhancing diplomatic ties and formulating compatible trade and industrial policies is essential in the new transit regime. To be sure, Nepal has to follow the East Asian model of development, with a strong government promoting and regulating economic growth.⁸

India-China Competition for Strategic Influence in Nepal

The attempt to expand the sphere of influence by India and China in Nepal is

an old anecdote. The growing competition in Nepal can be seen both in geo-political and geo-strategic terms. Nepal is one of the epicenters of competing interests in an impending global paradigm shift. Located between two global economic and strategic powerhouses, Nepal can greatly benefit from developments taking place in India and China today. India being a traditional partner wants to uphold its traditional leverage in Nepal; whereas China wants to puncture this relationship and seek its own space in different layers of administration, security agencies, army and not the least among the people. India wants to see that China does not keep its footprints in the region across its border in Nepal. China, too, does not want India's presence whatsoever in Nepal's northern region bordering Tibet.⁹ Nepal had to respond to China's security interests related to the issues, for which Nepal is continuously under pressure from China as well.

The Chinese government in particular is cording and enticing Kathmandu in an attempt to impact policy making by announcing diplomatic and security offers, huge economic packages and development projects. However, Chinese assertiveness is argued to go beyond the issue of Tibet to encompass its wider South Asian strategy. For the very reason, Chinese policy towards Nepal has been marked by much ambiguity.¹⁰ Chinese and Indian strategies reflect their respective desires to expand their relative influence over Nepal at each other's expense. Both powers display a lack of satisfaction with the current status quo and have pursued strategies that are aimed at maximizing their share of regional power.¹¹

The foreign policy rivalry between India and China appears not only to influence investment and trade decisions but also to penetrate issues related to stability, governance and political institutions. Nepal's 1,415 Km and 1,715 Km long border with China and India respectively justifies the geographical set up for the contest. However this view will be complemented with an analysis of geo-economic competition over access to hydropower, water and other natural resources.¹² Other than Tibetan issue, the purpose of China's policy is to flex its muscles in line with its economic might. Critics opined this turn as a policy to rattle India's interests, as for instance, Beijing's project of \$ 1.9 billion railroad from city of Lhasa to the Tibet Nepal border, which may eventually reach Kathmandu and results in increase of Chinese trade, aid and infrastructure projects in Nepal.¹³

India considers Nepal to be historically, culturally and geo-politically as part of Delhi's sphere of influence. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has visited Nepal twice, last year in August 2014, and again in November 2014, has become the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in the last seventeen years. To reaffirm

India's commitment towards Nepal, India has extended a credit line of US\$ 1 billion for infrastructure building and hydro power projects in Nepal. So far as China is concerned, Nepal has always occupied an important place in China's foreign policy endeavours. High level official exchanges of visits between China and Nepal in the last few years testify China's increasing influence in Nepal. For instance, Nepal's vice president Parmanand Jha paid an official visit to Lhasa in September 2014, while Beijing and Lhasa received Nepal's deputy Prime Minister Bam Dev Gautam in October. What is worth mentioning is the high profile visit of Lobsang Gyaltzen who is the Chairman of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to Kathmandu in October. India is concerned about Nepal's increasing overdependence on China, and what could be discomfoting is the Nepalese perception of a rising China which continues to be favourable and friendly.

In fact, to mould Nepalese perception about China, during the visit, the Chinese Foreign Minister announced that the official aid to Nepal will increase five-fold in the current fiscal year which is aimed at the development of the infrastructure in the landlocked Himalayan state. Additionally, under its 13th five year plan, China intends to extend Qighai-Tibet railway line to Kyirong in Nepal by 2020. Interestingly, the railway line was extended from Lhasa to Shigatse in August 2014 and Kyirong land port between Tibet and Nepal was already open in October 2014. This extension will bring Chinese Troops closer to the Indian border and is certainly seen as a serious security Concern to India.¹⁴

Recently, the power play between China and India for influence in Nepal has turned electric, as China has signed a US\$1.8 billion agreement to develop the 760-megawatt (MW) West Seti Project hydropower plant in Nepal. The deal marks the Asian giant's entry into a lucrative sector in the Himalayan nation — water and power — that has been dominated by India for years. It comes in a time when several other major hydropower projects, mainly developed with Indian investment, have stalled for various reasons, including protests by Maoists against the awarding of deals to foreign companies labeling it as “unfair share” of hydropower projects in Nepal. In the beginning of 2012, the Maoists burned the project office of the Upper Karnali Project (900MW), which was awarded to GMR of India.¹⁵ Overall, the competition between the two Asian giants has its implications in Nepal at the political, economic and strategic level.

India-China Convergence of Interests in Nepal

The geo-strategic setting of Nepal has attracted the attention of other countries particularly India and China towards it. Whatever happens inside Nepal is of major importance for its immediate neighbours. If China and India's are in competition for strategic influence in Nepal, there are also scopes for cooperation between the two sides in Nepal. Since their paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. Any disturbances in Nepal would have spill over impacts on both countries. Similarly, both countries are competing regional powers in Asia and their interest regarding Nepal is to extend their own sphere of influence and contain the other's. Apart from their economic and trade interests, another common interest of both these countries is to contain the super power influences in the region.

There is consensus on both sides in India and China that stability of Nepal is in their best interest. China has stated its interest in working with India to develop Nepal on a trilateral basis. China's ambassador has stated that “China is also willing to work with India to jointly support Nepal to realize stability and prosperity, and promotes mutual beneficial cooperation among our three countries”. While these statements may be partly rhetorical, they also serve to undermine the image of Nepal as a hot-bed of competition between its neighbours.¹⁶

Tibet is of vital importance to China, which is why Beijing wants peace and stability in Nepal whereas, due to the historical, socio-economic and cultural relationship between Nepal and India, political stability and economic

development is a major concern for India as Nepal and India shares open and porous borders. Thus de-stable Nepal is a direct security imperative to India. Both side share common concerns with Nepal, like security, water resources, development, trade and tourism.

China-Nepal-India Trilateral Cooperation

The recent years has witnessed the proposal for a trilateral cooperation between China, India and Nepal. Prachanda came out with this trilateral cooperation proposal first in October 2010, again in November 2012 and finally in April 2013, after his China visits. To this proposal, Chinese response was neither positive nor negative. Nepalese media came out with mixed reactions. There is a strong domestic support to this proposal in Nepal. India's response to the proposal is lukewarm; it is felt that India should not join the trilateral cooperation and should maintain the status quo for the time being.

There are two distinct views on India's response to the proposed trilateral cooperation. While one view considers the possible security implications of the proposed trilateral concept, the other view looked into the economic rationality behind the concept. It was argued that given the porous border between India and Nepal and the close proximity between the two countries, presence of large number of Chinese workers or security personnel to safeguard the Chinese commercial projects in Nepal would have security concerns for India. New Delhi had a strong believe that the trilateral cooperation will offer significant room for China to expand its influence in South Asia, marginalizing India's pre-eminent position in the subcontinent. The other views hold that instead of focusing too much on the security implications, it is important to acknowledge the economic rationality behind the proposed trilateral concept. Given the strong support in Nepal to the proposed trilateral cooperation, India can consider certain joint ventures especially in the hydropower sector. India cannot stop Chinese from moving ahead in Nepal. Hence, it is better for India to participate in the trilateral arrangement and be a part of the projects, instead of allowing Chinese to be their own. Private sectors, which do not have security implications, should be encouraged to take part.

The trilateral cooperation between China, Nepal and India holds immense scope for these countries in the long run. It was agreed that the trilateral cooperation centers around the belief that Nepal can act as a catalyst to bring India and China into a collaborative relationship within the bounds of a trilateral framework and thereby, promote and facilitate a discourse of cooperation between two of the fastest growing economies of the world. It was also agreed that specific and concrete projects or programmes would be initiated at the earliest to give immediate impetus to the concept of China-India-Nepal Trilateral Cooperation. The hydropower potential of Nepal will never bear fruit unless there is trilateral economic cooperation between China, India and Nepal. Sadly, instead of using its diplomatic clout to get India to expedite trilateral cooperation, it has chosen to sign an accord to engage in bilateral trade cooperation using the Lipu Lekh pass with India at the expense of Nepal and with total disregard for Nepal's territorial integrity.

Possibilities for cooperation in energy projects were also discussed, including the idea of a trans-country power trade agreement in which electricity could be traded freely between China, India and Nepal through a regional grid connected to the three countries.

China-India Rivalry and Nepal's Policy Options

The ongoing rivalry between China and India is not a new phenomenon but has existed for the last many decades. Nepal's strategic location between India and China has played a significant role in attracting international influence. The nation's neighbors are no exception. China has challenged India's perception of Nepal as its sphere

of influence. Nepal has balanced the competing interests from India and China with care, keeping each superpower vying for favoritism. Religious, political and cultural ties Nepal enjoys with India and China keep political provocations from ever reaching a crescendo.

Caught between the dragon and the elephant, Nepal has to balance both the Indian and the Chinese strategic and security interests. The best interest of Nepal is in nurturing a relationship of trust and confidence with both India and China. The concept of rising China, shining India and changing Nepal create new opportunities for all sides to strengthen the age old friendship for the benefit of the people of all three countries in the new century. But close geographic proximities and historic cultural ties must be nurtured by sincerity in mutuality of interests and benefits based on respect, trust and confidence.

These instances of interference and rivalry bring both opportunities and challenges to Nepal. The biggest challenge so far is to balance the relationship between both India and China. Since for Nepal, both neighbors are equally important. India has been historically and culturally the most important neighbor for Nepal whereas recent posture of China as an emerging economic superpower is equally important for Nepal to boast its economic performance and investments. Thus, for Nepal, maintaining equidistant relationship between these two big neighbors is one of the most challenging foreign policy imperatives and interestingly there are signs of optimism and potential benefits as well.¹⁷

Nepal should clearly prioritize its national interests and adopt a policy in managing its relationships with India and China, that best preserves and promotes her national interests. As the country has recently undergone political transformation, the key national interests could be to ensure security, internal stability, economic development, and establishing a sound democratic mechanism. In order to preserve its long term security, it is necessary for Nepal to understand the sensitivity of India and China in terms of their security related issues and adopt policies wisely, following a middle path, that respects the interests of both neighbors without endangering its own sovereign and independent position. Maintaining a balancing relationship with both the Asian giant's is one of the main components of Nepal's policy towards the neighbours. At the other end of the spectrum, there is always one or the other country which Nepal considers crucial for its own survival given its delicate land-locked positioning between India and China, the two emerging Asian superpowers.

Roadmap for Future

Nepal is modernizing and opening up its economy like never before, India has to be in sync with the changing times. The best way to do it is not to resist the inevitable but to make things all the more difficult for the rival. In the changed circumstances, while India does not have the luxury of shaping Nepal's foreign policy anymore, New Delhi is still not without an option. India can counter China in Nepal by ensuring that the Nepalese diplomatic space is opened to other foreign powers to achieve a strategic balance.

Nepal cannot afford to use the China versus India card as pendulum diplomacy to suit their domestic political game plan. Nor can they afford to sit back passively and submit to their merciful discretion of the two giant neighbors. Time has come for Nepal to change the mindset, and be transparent about their needs and concerns, and take up a proactive approach to regional diplomacy.

Given Nepal's potential in being a busy corridor, the country needs to be environmentally sensitive and far-sighted from the beginning and avoid building polluting motor vehicle dependent highways. Instead, they should strive to go for futuristic electrically-operated high speed train services. This may sound expensive and unrealistic at present, but it ought to be the wave of the future. It is also worth noting that China is committed in connecting Lhasa to the Nepal border town by extending its railway system. It only shows Chinese eagerness to link this railway system to the Indian network on the Nepali borders with a gap of only about 300 km in between.

Conclusion

Nepal's neighbors India and China have always had an important influence on Nepal's economic and political context. Nepal has limited options to maneuver in its foreign relations and needs to focus on making the best of its geographical constraints through positive engagement with China and India. However, the regime competition between India and China is also a challenge to the political elite in Nepal because of the democratic stalemate and no clear defined political agenda which makes it very hard to deliver growth and services and creates a situation where more and more people are longing for a return to an absolutist solution.

China and India have a vital stake in the peace, and political stability of Nepal. Likewise, Nepal's peace, prosperity, economic development, democracy and democratic institution consolidation efforts are in a great measure contingent upon Chinese and Indian cooperation, assistance, goodwill and understanding. Hence, it is quite natural for Nepal to seek to win India's confidence through the demonstration of consistent, credible and mature behavior. Chinese influences have grown over the years, not only in Nepal but also in the entire South Asian region.

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INDIA -U.S.A. AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS AFTER 26/11

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Introduction

The incidents of 26/11 no doubt cast a huge and deep shadow over the gaining understanding between the two South-Asian rivals. Nevertheless, Washington seems to follow a close relationship with both countries to serve its respective interests. If on the one side, India is demanding for bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice and elimination of the safe havens for terror in Pakistan. Then United States on the other hand, U.S. still considers Pakistan has a role to play in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and in Pakistan border. Moreover, Pakistan as usual is demanding for help to reduce the Indian role in Afghanistan, get Delhi to make concessions on J&K, and restore a measure of parity between Delhi and Islamabad on a range of areas including nuclear and other high-technology cooperation.

After the events of 9/11, no doubt, both India and United States have developed some understanding on the need for intelligence cooperation, but there appears lack of understanding between the two countries over the Pakistan problem. This has given the opportunity for Pakistan to exploit the situation in its favor rather than acting for the solution of the problem.

India-Pakistan Relations After the Mumbai Attack

The Mumbai incidents have only aggravated the already not so good relations between India and Pakistan. Since then understanding between the two countries has come down to a much lower level. The attack was carried out with a well planned by ten perpetrators from Pakistan in which 164 innocent people were killed and injuring more than 300 peoples. The attack created havoc in the financial centre of India and the State capital of Maharashtra. The rationale behind the attack seems to be to create instability in the financial status of India.

The Indian government claimed that all the perpetrators belong to Pakistan, while Pakistan was not ready to accept, asking for evidence that shows that they belong to Pakistan. Since the Pakistan government was not ready to accept what India had to say, so there is no question of taking action against those involved in this heinous activity. Angered by the response of Pakistan, India cancelled any forms of dialogue with Pakistan. This way, the events put a brake to ongoing composite dialogue that is meant for resolving the bilateral problems including the Kashmir issue. This had only strengthened India's position that unless there is a positive response from Pakistan regarding cross border terrorism to India there can be very little hope for a composite dialogue. Pakistan must seriously take the issue and ensure that they are not involved in such activities and that their territory is not used for such illegal activities by the perpetrators. India's positive response to Pakistan demand for peaceful dialogue after the Mumbai events would require Pakistan to take stringent action against those involved in such heinous activities. This would help ensure that India is ready for composite dialogue.

The events no doubt brought United States close to understanding on the need to tackle the state supporting terrorism. But still there lacks understanding on how best to achieve this when United States does not view Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism but instead consider it as a partner in combating terrorism. The need for

Pakistan support in tackling the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan did not allow for stringent action against Pakistan. However, one area that has witnessed significant improvement is in sharing of intelligence.¹

India-U.S.A. Relations after the Mumbai Attack

Ashley Tellis participated in one of the recent RAND study in which he points out that, “The Mumbai attack demonstrates that jihadist organizations based in Pakistan are able to plan and launch ambitious terrorist operations, at least in neighboring countries such as India. Put in the context of previous terrorist attacks in India by Pakistani-based or local jihadist groups, it suggests a continuing, perhaps escalating, terrorist campaign in South Asia. Beyond India, the Mumbai attack reveals a strategic terrorist culture that thoughtfully identified strategic goals and ways to achieve them and that analyzed counterterrorist measures and developed ways to obviate them to produce a 9/11-quality attack. For 60 hours, the terrorists brought a city of 20 million people to a standstill while the world looked on. The attack put into actual practice LeT’s previous rhetoric about making the Kashmir dispute part of the international jihad. In so doing, LeT has emerged, not as a subsidiary of al-Qaeda, but as an independent constellation in the global jihad galaxy. Indeed, with al-Qaeda central operational capabilities reduced, the Mumbai attack makes LeT a global contender on its own.”² His point reflects the seriousness and the need to tackle the problem comprehensively and cooperation among the like minded nations.

From both the Indian and American perspective, the events of 26/11 really bought in urgency to tackle the issue of terrorism at the global level. Both New Delhi and Washington stand to gain considerably from improving counterterrorism cooperation owing to the fact that unlike Pakistan, India is very much eager and sincere to root out terrorism that would increasingly pose problems for the international community. However, this would require removing the lingering distrust that stems largely from U.S. reluctance to include terrorist organizations base in Pakistan that has been the main concerns for India’s security. The events provided a golden opportunity for both countries to wipe away the past understanding and look forward to closely working to strengthening counterterrorism cooperation that includes sharing of intelligence,³ cyber-terrorism, etc. The question that needs to be asked to the American officials is that whether the time has not come for the Washington to come out strongly to ensuring that terrorism is not used to advance its foreign policy goals. India would look forward to receiving strong commitment from United States in meeting the challenges posed by the terrorist violence abetted by Pakistan. This is not to say that United States stop engaging close relations with Pakistan, which according to United States hold the key to achieving the objectives of eradicating terrorism from Afghanistan-Pakistan border.⁴

In a bid to strengthen India’s bilateral partnership with the U.S. in the field of counter-terrorism, Indian Home Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram visited USA on September 2009 that was aimed at identifying areas for mutual cooperation with focus on procurement of advanced technology and sharing of information and best practices in investigation and prevention of terrorist attacks.⁵ Really, the seriousness to tackle the issue of terrorism and its related activities has improved significantly between India and United States in recent times.

US Af-Pak Strategy

U.S. President Barack Obama after sixty days of inter-agency review had announced a “comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that is aimed at disrupt, dismantle and defeat of al-Qaeda both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The strategy reflects two aspects-one that there is a seriousness to deal the issue before it escalate into a bigger one that posed a significant challenges to the international community and United States in particular. Secondly, it reflects the close linkages between terrorist organisation residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁶

The Af-Pak strategy launched in March 2009 would be comprised of both military and civilian approach. When more number of military forces will be dispatched for this purpose, at the same time there will be release of more civilian oriented funding based on the assumption that such objective could not be achieved by military force alone.⁷

Many commentators have raised the arguments in this context that coercive action must be taken against terrorist residing in Afghanistan. This would require pressurising Pakistan to act sincerely against terrorist residing in Af-Pak border. What is quite challenging for United States is ensuring Pakistan that combating terrorism is also in the interests of Pakistan. This is because of the fact that there is a clash of interest between U.S. and Pakistan. Pakistan doesn't seriously consider combating terrorism as a key to their Progress, development and survival. It is very important that U.S. pressurise Pakistan to come out with full commitment vis-à-vis violent insurgency in Baluchistan, North Western Frontier Province and FATA. The situation in Pakistan has reached a level of non-ignorance from which there is always a possibility of moving towards a failed state or rogue state.⁸

Unlike in the past, this time U.S. administration under the leadership of Barack Obama has put a condition to the money that will be transferred to Pakistan. The money transferred will be based on result-oriented. To ensure accountability, the U.S. administration has argued for transparency about where and how the money is utilised.⁹

However, the success of U.S. Af-Pak strategy is most likely to be delayed given the fact that Pakistan, who is a key ally in the fight against terrorism, seeks a strong Taliban in Afghanistan to offset the rising Indian influence there. Pakistan has not given up the hope of creating anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan for their interests. Pakistan does not want to see India expanding its influence in Afghanistan, which according to Islamabad would help the Kashmir issue to turn in their favour. This is the missing link between the United States and Pakistan that has only favoured Pakistan and a setback for India. It was during the visit to Islamabad by the U.S. Director of Intelligence Mr. Mike McConnell in 2008, a Pakistani General has told, "we must support the Taliban so that there is a government friendly to Pakistan in Kabul. Otherwise India will reign." With such stand, it is less likely that Pakistan would take steps sincerely to dismantle Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaeda. Based on this, Pakistan has criticized India for over involvement in Afghanistan.¹⁰ It is up to U.S. Administration on whether it comes under the pressure of Pakistan to stop India playing a key role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan or pressuring Islamabad to take stringent action against Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Recent Developments-U.S. Pressurising Pakistan

In one of the recent developments, U.S. President Barack Obama has put the Pakistan President in a dilemma. In his letter to the Pakistan President Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, U.S. President Mr. Barack Obama has sent a clear and stringent message to Pakistan either they continue to use insurgents as a tool or receive military and economic assistance from the U.S. This is in response to the growing seriousness of the security situation in an around Pakistan and Afghanistan. From the Indian point of view, it is good to learn that U.S. has continued to pressurising Pakistan to ensure that it no longer pursue a policy of supporting terrorism as a foreign policy tools.

U.S. President Obama has called upon Pakistan to be stringent and remain committed in its dealing with terrorist organisation operating in an around Pakistan. The list includes Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistan Taliban and other. This is further tightened by the interaction between U.S. National Security Advisor, James Jones with the Pakistan officials. During his interaction, James Jones has made it clear to Pakistan that, 'if Pakistan cannot deliver, he (U.S.) may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's Western and Southern borders with Afghanistan'.¹¹ He further added that no matter how many

troops the President commits to Afghanistan, the strategy will founder unless the safe haven inside Pakistan is dealt with.¹²

U.S. President Mr. Barack Obama is seriously concerned about the threat posed by the growing extremist activities in an around the Af-Pak region. Eradicating the menace of terrorism in this region has been the top most priority of U.S. President for the time now. This is reflected from what he has said that, “This is no idle danger...no hypothetical threat... In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. The danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and Al-Qaeda can operate with impunity... And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear armed Pakistan because we know that Al-Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.” It seems that the U.S. President Barack Obama is convinced that the success of eradicating the menace of terrorism lies in pressuring it to act into it with full commitment. It was during his speech at the U.S. military Academy at West Point, U.S. President Barack Obama has said, “we will act with full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But the same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.” That is why U.S. President Barack Obama is keen to pursuing a policy of pressuring Pakistan to act against terror on the one hand and extend every help to Pakistan so as to ensure that the main objective is achieved.¹³ India shall not be annoyed by this developments because it is not in the intention of India that United States totally ignore Pakistan but it shall be in the interests of India that United States keep itself engaged with Pakistan and at the same time ensuring that Pakistan has stop using the extremists as a foreign policy tools against India.

Resumption of Dialogue

Given the geo-political imperatives of the war on terror and the increasing pressure from intellectual within and outside the country, India has to finally shift its stance of not talking to Pakistan to resuming a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan. The need for close dialogue with Pakistan was reflected in what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said in his May 24 press conference that, “It is my firm belief that India cannot realise its full potential unless we have the best possible relations with our neighbours and Pakistan happens to be the largest neighbour of ours.”

By not talking with Islamabad, India could achieve nothing; instead Pakistan was going closer to its relations with U.S. It is against this backdrop, after a gap of almost eight months, India and Pakistan announced the resumption of dialogue in a joint statement issued at Sharm-el Sheikh. The statement delinks the composite dialogue process from Pakistan’s action against terror and includes a reference to Balochistan, leading to an uproar in India. Many in India have charged Prime Minister Singh for bowing to Pakistan under the pressure of United States. However the main idea behind the change in such stance is not to freeze negotiation in the event of terrorist strikes.

The resumption of the dialogue is good for both India and Pakistan and also to international peace and security. At the same time, Islamabad needs to understand the fact that unless they react to the actual problem, the composite dialogue is not going to bring any positive result.¹⁴

In a speech to the Research & Analysis Wing on January 21, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Pakistan, Satinder Lambah, spelt out the government’s policy dilemma. “Engagement,” he said, “does not always assure us of a desired response, nor does it guarantee success. However, rejecting the process of engagement will not enable us to achieve our long-term goals.”

In relation to Pakistan, India's principal goal today is the permanent neutralisation of terrorist organisations which operate with differing levels of support from the establishment of that country and launch attacks on Indian targets. The second key long-term goal is the establishment of normal relations with Pakistan. In his speech, Mr. Lambah made the only public reference the Government of India has cared to make in all these years to the back-channel negotiations which took place with Islamabad from 2004 to 2007. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's measures to improve relations with Pakistan were based on the principle that "borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making them irrelevant," Mr. Lambah said, adding that a lot of progress had been made. "The ball is in Pakistan's court. We will be willing to pick up the threads."¹⁵

Conclusion

Although there is a good sign of the resumption of dialogue between the two South Asian rivals, which is good for both sides to reduce trust deficit and the world at large. At present, understanding between India and Pakistan is at an all time low. The main question that comes to one's mind is how long it would last when one party is not really serious about ensuring a lasting peace, security and stability in the region. Pakistan on the other hand needs to understand the situation and make sure that they too remain committed to ensuring lasting peace and security in the region. The United States objective of eradicating the menace of terrorism would also remain unfulfilled unless it takes into account India's problem relating to terrorism abetted by outsiders.

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CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES

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Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a strategic project of China to acquire a dominant global status through the implementation of economic, energy and connectivity related projects in countries of Asia, Africa and Europe. Currently, China is preparing extensively for the “Second Belt and Road Forum”, likely to be held in Beijing in April 2019.¹ This has set the stage for evaluating the journey and progress of the mega Chinese initiative. This paper mainly aims to analyze China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has been highlighted as a flagship project of BRI in the recent past. In doing so, the paper analyses, Chinese, Pakistani and other discourses on the subject.

I BRI and CPEC

When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia in September 2013 and Southeast Asia in October 2013, he for the first time talked about the initiative of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. In March 2015, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, issued the document titled “Vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century maritime silk road” (Vision document hereafter).² Initially the initiative was referred as “One Belt and One Road (OBOR)”. Subsequently, this was renamed as Belt and Road initiative (BRI). However, the initiative is still known as yi dai yi lu (N&^Nī) in Chinese language.

The plans for an economic and trade corridor between China and Pakistan preceded China’s BRI. In July 2013, the project was first announced during the visit of Pakistan’s PM Nawaz Sharif to Beijing. However, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was officially launched in April 2015 when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan. The Vision document issued by the Chinese government in March 2015 noted: “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore require closer cooperation and greater progress.”³ In other words, CPEC was not treated as a part of BRI, although close relationship was noted in the official Chinese document.

However, various official statements/documents as well as Chinese media publications especially since April 2015 treated CPEC as a part of the BRI. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei, noted on April 20, 2015:

“The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is located where the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road meet. It is, therefore, a major project of the “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese side is ready to take President Xi’s visit as an opportunity to advance the building of the Economic Corridor with the Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure and industrial cooperation being the four key areas to drive development across Pakistan and deliver tangible benefits to its people.”⁴

Further, the Joint Statement between Pakistan and China on “Establishing the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership” signed on 20 April 2015 noted:

The two sides highly appreciate the progress to make China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) an important project of 'the Belt and Road'. Pakistan welcomes the creation of Silk Road Fund by China and its utilization for CPEC-related projects....the two sides agreed to promote a '1+4' pattern of economic cooperation featuring a leading role of the CPEC and four key areas including the Gwadar Port, Energy, Transportation Infrastructure and Industrial Cooperation".⁵

The first edition of the Belt and Road Forum was held in the suburbs of Beijing in May 2017. The Forum talked about on bilateral, triangular, regional and multilateral cooperation in the context of BRI. The CPEC was highlighted as a flagship project of BRI. In 2018, the project was even referred by as one of the pivotal components of Chinas BRI by experts from Pakistan.

While explainin "Progress of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2016", on 29 December 2016, Chinese official media - Xinhua reported:"The CPEC, proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in 2013, is a 3,000-km network of roads, railways and pipelines linking Kashgar in northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and southwest Pakistan's Gwadar Port. The economic belt is also a major part of China's Belt and Road Initiative."⁶

The CPEC has focused on four key areas including the Gwadar Port, Energy, Transportation Infrastructure and Industrial Cooperation. Pakistan's energy sector is one of the main focuses of the Corridor. The Projects in the CPEC are funded by China and are estimated to be between US \$ 46 to 62 billion. However, lack of transparency in financial matter pertaining to CPEC in general and the rate interest of the Chinese loan to Pakistan in particular have triggered debate regarding 'debt trap' in academic and policy discourse.

The importance of connectivity cannot be overstated. India shares international community's desire for enhancing physical connectivity and believes that it should bring greater economic benefits in an equitable and balanced manner. However, it needs to be noted that connectivity projects should be inclusive, sustainable and transparent. Above all it must respects sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries. The government of India has consistently opposed CPEC as it goes through territory illegally occupied by Pakistan and claimed by India.

II

Perspectives on CPEC from China

In China, CPEC has been highlighted as major and pilot project of BRI which will benefit peoples of both countries, Mr Yao Jing, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan noted: "CPEC is a long-term and systematic project to promote economic cooperation through collaboration on Gwadar port, energy, transportation infrastructure and industrial cooperation.... CPEC will bring solid benefits to our two peoples."⁷

However, it is noteworthy that some Chinese experts have contextualised this project in strategic sense. They argue that the strategic position of South Asia is rising and attracting more attention. Since the beginning of the 21st century, this region has become increasingly important with the fast changes and adjustments in international power structure. They analyse CPEC in this context. It is of no surprise that Chinese scholars have used the terns such as 'New Springtime' in China South Asia relations and 'rediscovery of the strategic status of South Asia' in recent past. Experts like Li Qingyan notes "CPEC serves as a new platform for regional integration complementary to China's Opening to the West". In his opinion, main challenges for the CPEC include: (a) resistance and competition from concerned stakeholders including India, (b) The United States' own plan regarding South Asia's integration and its suspicion regarding success of the CPEC, (c) Concerns of other regional stakeholders, like Iran and Bangladesh about the CPEC.⁸

Further, benefit to China's domestic economy remains a major driver for BRI as well as CPEC. These projects offers opportunities for China's economic restructuring, industrial upgradation as well as "going global" strategy. It is logical that the vision document noted "In advancing g the Belt and Road Initiative, China will fully leverage the comparative advantages of its various regions, adopt a proactive strategy of further opening-up, strengthen interaction and cooperation among the eastern, western and central regions, and comprehensively improve the openness of the Chinese economy."⁹In February 2017, Yang Jiechi, a top China leader, confirmed that BRI "adheres closely to China's regional development strategy, new urbanisation strategy and opening up strategy and will provide a strong boost to China's all dimensional opening up".¹⁰Similarly, CPEC is expected to benefit Xinjiang Region of China.

Some Chinese experts have even suggested stopping the project. Zhang Yunling, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said: "Any transnational projects involve concerns of different countries. We need to coordinate that to strike a balance to be acceptable to all parties. If we can't reach that balance, maybe we can stop it for some time".¹¹

III

CPEC and Perspectives from Pakistan

Initially, the CPEC was seen as a window of opportunity for many in Pakistan. Some Scholars from Pakistan noted: "The CPEC aspires to put Pakistan on a new trajectory of high growth through infrastructure development and subsequently transfer part of its labor-intensive industries to other countries".¹²However some other experts from Pakistan including some economists strongly argued against such hypothesis. Dr. Kaiser Bengali, a senior economist stressed that "CPEC is not a game changer, its game over". He emphasised on the shortcomings of Chinese model of investment. He noted:

...since Chinese companies are tax-exempt they will bring everything from China and hence they will have no reliance on Pakistani businesses to fulfil their demands. This has shattered the dreams of many local companies that planned to expand their production facilities in anticipation of receiving orders from these Chinese companies."¹³

Dr. Bengali substantiated his arguments by giving example of cable operators in Pakistan which are struggling to sustain their existing sale figures after implementation of related projects in CPEC. **Further, he emphasised that the environmental cost of CPEC will also be big as several coal-powered projects based on imported raw material have been launched in Pakistan.**¹⁴

It is also important to note that the announcement of the CPEC and the route designated under the CPEC triggered controversy in Pakistan. "It was argued that the route of the Corridor was manipulated to serve the interests of existing and established industrial zones in Punjab, which ultimately benefitted the then ruling party, Pakistan Muslim League(Nawaz)"¹⁵

While analyzing challenges for the CPEC, it has been argued that the project is "highly dependent upon Pakistan's internal security situation and how it manages its relations with India".¹⁶ Apart from violent extremism and terrorism, the role of Baloch and Sindhi ethno-nationalist groups have been cited as a major challenge for the economic corridor.

A recent study from Pakistan has highlighted that the CPEC enthusiasts are primarily Pakistani political leaders belonging to the former ruling party (PML-N) government officials and journalists, who built the narrative for CPEC as a 'game changer.' The study suggests that the CPEC opponents come in two groups.¹⁷The first group opposes the CPEC because "they think it would lead to the exploitation and 'stealing of Pakistani resources.' They argue that the CPEC is China's instrument to expropriate Pakistan's economic resources and is likely to lead

to cultural, social and political subjugation. . . .Moreover, they fear that an influx of Chinese goods and services will crowd out local producers and enterprises that will lose out as the CPEC materializes”. This group completely rejects the idea that CPEC will create win-win situation for both sides. Dr. Mubashar Hasan, a reputable Pakistani leftist politician, said that the CPEC is an ‘instrument of Chinese imperialism’ and will adversely impact Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty.¹⁸ The study suggests that the second group consists of Pakistani, Indian and international contributors who argue that the BRI and the CPEC, in particular, are China’s instruments to ‘contain’ India and, is the real objective behind the CPEC.¹⁹

Finally, it is important to note that Pakistan had withdrawn its request to include the US \$14-billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam in the CPEC framework after China placed strict conditions including ownership of the project, said Mr Muzammil Hussain, Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority. Briefing the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Pakistan on the status of the mega water and power project, Mr Hussain noted “Chinese conditions for financing the Diamer-Bhasha Dam were not doable and against our interests”.²⁰ This statement tells the real story and seriously questions the ‘game changer’ narrative built by some people in China and Pakistan.

IV

AnalysisSome Important Recent Reports

The Nikkei Asian Review and The Banker examined how BRI projects are unfolding in eight countries of Asia and Europe: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, India, Poland, Laos and Pakistan.²¹ They also collaborated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Reconnecting Asia Project to aggregate key BRI infrastructure projects worldwide. Main findings of the Special Report are: (a) Besides Pakistan, concerns about owing unmanageable debts to Beijing have been raised in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Laos. (b) After initial fanfare, projects sometimes experience serious delays. (c) China’s takeover of a troubled port has raised questions about a loss of sovereignty in Sri Lanka.

Another report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) based on Reconnecting Asia database suggests that Chinese projects are less open to international participation. Out of all contractors participating in Chinese-funded projects within the Reconnecting Asia database, an overwhelming 89 percent are Chinese companies. These findings explain some difficult practical and political realities. Infrastructure projects have short and long-term implications for Chinese exports. In the short term, these projects are aiding Chinese exports of construction-related goods. Chinese exports to Pakistan, for example, increased 77 percent between 2012 and 2015. Chinese producers of steel, concrete, and other construction materials as well as Chinese engineering and construction firms stand to get benefit from these projects.²² In other words, China was able to get a market for its surplus capacity products.

A report from the South China Morning Post has highlighted that China will benefit more than Pakistan due to lack of Pakistani input in the project. The lack of Pakistani input into the CPEC adds to concerns that its benefits might not be as widely distributed as initially thought. Further the report suggested that it runs the risk that Pakistan will be left paying interest on loans to Chinese banks way into the future.²³

Conclusion

In the era of economic slowdown in China, the CPEC and the whole BRI creates a perception that the initiative has been launched to create new markets and get economic benefits by building infrastructure and industrial corridors as well as building transportation and communication networks in the region and beyond. Similarly, CPEC envisages creating new markets for Chinese companies. The role of India has also been an issue of debate.

It may be stressed that India will not accept CPEC as the project impinges India's core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The debate in Pakistan and China built around the 'game changer' narrative is losing its ground. Some empirical evidences have raised serious questions over this narrative. The fact remains that Pakistan had withdrawn its request to include the US \$14-billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam in the CPEC framework. It answers a number of questions regarding CPEC and the Chinese model of investment. Further, the evidence from Sri Lanka has added more concerns regarding Chinese projects and its strategic dimensions in South Asia. The evidences also suggest that all major international projects must be consultative and include views of all stakeholders when a project is being planned and implemented.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

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Introduction

The present paper attempts to put in perspective issues and challenges in India's adversarial relations with its close neighbor Pakistan from an Indian perspective. India's relations with Pakistan have been aptly described by former India's Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral as 'tormented one'. Pakistan has been one of the major concerns for India's foreign policy for many decades.¹ The relations between India and Pakistan have seen great uncertainty and ambiguity as both the countries have adopted divergent approach for their respective national interests. India and Pakistan are the two largest countries in South Asia wherein there exists a very low level of engagements. The two South Asian regional powers remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance to maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

Since their independence, India and Pakistan have failed to come out of mutual suspicion and discord of each other. It has its implications on the decision making process and policy formulation of both countries. It has also promoted the image of each other as an enemy with minimal hope for constructive politico, strategic and economic engagement.² Both India and Pakistan have so far failed to develop cordial relationship from the long-term perspective with each other due to various issues which includes border dispute, cross border terrorism, clash of interests over Afghanistan, etc. The relationship between the two sides has been marked by suspicion, hatred and distrust. Tense and hostile situation which existed since 1947 has resulted in three wars and various crises between them. They have made significant effort in the past to resolve some of the key issues by holding peace talks and even by concluding various agreements. But this situation could not last long owing to suspensions in the peace process which had further enhanced suspicion and mistrust on both sides. By adopting antagonistic approach towards each other, both sides have failed to develop consensus on the need to develop the atmosphere of peace and security as key to achieving mutual interests. Misperception developed in the minds of policy makers of both states regarding different issues. The hostile attitude towards each other has severely undermined the prospect of socio-economic development of both countries.³ It argues that lasting security and other development pursuits of both India and Pakistan would considerably rely upon cordial and mutually cooperative relations between these two neighbours.

India's Predominant Position in South Asia and Beyond

India enjoys strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic connections with the neighbouring countries of South Asia. Among the countries of South Asia, India is the largest which accounts for 70 per cent of population, nearly 80 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and about 75 per cent of the regional economic output. India shares boundary with all the South Asian neighbours. Should India play a crucial role on the global stage then it becomes imperative to maintain stability in its relations with its neighbours.⁴ From the geo-strategic and geo-political point of view, India's relations with the South Asian neighbours have been guided by – first, its desire to protect the sub-

continent from the adverse external forces that might destabilise India's security environment and secondly, its desire to ensure that geographical proximity and ethno-religious affinities do not lead to instability on or near its border, particularly as they inevitably may affect its domestic, ethnic, religious and political relationships. This could even give rise to secessionist demands within the country.⁵

India enjoys a predominant position in South Asia and beyond owing to its large size, economic capabilities, military prowess and geographical standing. India has a huge stake in not only playing a pivotal role in the region but also keeping it free from external powers' presence and interference.⁶ According to Stephen Blank, a well known expert who has written extensively on Asian security is of the view that India is definitely an extra-regional power. The U.S. Quadrennial Review published in 2010 has described India as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.⁷ Bhabani Sen Gupta has argued in favour of India playing a crucial role in the region when he said that, "The Indian elephant cannot transform itself into a mouse. If South Asia is to get itself out of the crippling binds of conflicts and cleavages, the six will have to accept the bigness of the seventh. And the seventh, that is India, will have to prove to the six that big can indeed be beautiful." India shares a land border with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and a maritime border with Srilanka and Maldives. India accounts for 72 percent of the land surface in South Asia. The economic potential and military capabilities of India have made the country a primary regional force in South Asia to be reckoned with. India is being referred to as the 'key to the development and progress of SAARC'. India's responsibility in shaping and directing the cooperation drive was recognized by extra-regional powers. The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails.⁸ However, Pakistan has blamed India for playing dominating behavior in the region of South Asia in the past and present which creates an environment of insecurity for the latter. India started to deter, coerce or influence Pakistan.⁹

India's Political Relations with Pakistan

The political understanding between India and Pakistan has witnessed more ups than downs ever since both countries have gained their independence. The political environment between the two neighbouring countries continues to be marred by mutual distrust and suspicion. Despite significant potential, the relationship between the two sides has seen no significant improvement. The relationship between the two sides is perceived to be beneficial in various areas of interests including security, economic, energy and socio-cultural aspects. The two South Asian regional powers, India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance to maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

Several key issues have not allowed the development of close ties between India and Pakistan. Once the 2001-02 crises between India and Pakistan ended in April 2003 when former Indian Prime Minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee offered bilateral talks to his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Zafarullah Khan Jamali¹⁰ and the latter announcement of a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC). Since then, both sides are seriously thinking of resolving the bilateral disputes including the Kashmir issue, resulting in both sides agreeing to resume the composite dialogue. Both sides held a series number of talks at the official level and non-official level. Discussion on the bilateral disputes between the two countries improved after the replacement by Mr. Manmohan Singh as the new Prime Minister of India in 2004.

In a bid to resolve the long standing bilateral disputes, both sides reached an agreement on five broad areas- no change in the current division of Kashmir into Pakistan and Indian areas, creation of soft border along the Line of Control that would ensure greater freedom of movement of people and goods, greater autonomy and self-governance for both India and Pakistan administered parts of Kashmir, the establishment of a consultative mechanism across the LoC and lastly, demilitarisation of Kashmir.¹¹

At the New Delhi summit held in April 2005, General Pervez Musharraf in a sharp departure from its past stand recognised that borders cannot be redrawn though the LoC could not become the permanent border between the two countries. Moreover, the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the summit meeting declared that the peace process was not irreversible.¹²

This was the period where both military and non-military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) improves. For instance Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests—brought into effect in 2005, establishment of a Communication Link between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coast Guard—brought into effect in 2005. Both the rail services between Attari and Lahore, and air linkages between the two countries were resumed in 2004. This was followed by the resumption of Samjhauta Express, which runs between Delhi and Lahore in 2005, and the first bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarbad also started this year. Joint Economic Commissions and Joint Business Councils were reactivated in 2004. Moreover, Foreign Ministers of both countries agreed to a series of Kashmir-specific CBMs to facilitate crossing the LoC in 2008.¹³ Nevertheless, the effort did not so far pay-off owing to continuing Pakistan aggressive attitude toward India and its involvement in terrorist violence in India.

Since 2004, Pakistan and India started the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP), which emphasizes an eight-point agenda such as peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The CDP without any doubt has opened up the dialogue, leading to more transparency and confidence building measures, but has failed to make a real impact in resolving deep-seated mistrust.¹⁴

At this critical juncture, the 26/11 Mumbai incidents have only aggravated the already not so good relations between India and Pakistan. Since then political understanding between the two countries has come down to a much lower level. Angered by the response of Pakistan, India cancelled any forms of dialogue with Pakistan. This way, the events put a brake to ongoing composite dialogue that is meant for resolving the bilateral problems including the Kashmir issue. This had only strengthened India's position that unless there is a positive response from Pakistan regarding cross border terrorism to India there can be very little hope for a composite dialogue. Pakistan must seriously take the issue and ensure that they are not involved in such activities and that their territory is not used for such illegal activities by the perpetrators. India's positive response to Pakistan demand for peaceful dialogue after the Mumbai events would require Pakistan to take stringent action against those involved in such heinous activities. This would help ensure that India is ready for composite dialogue.¹⁵

Under pressure from the international community, India-Pakistan peace process has gained momentum since minister-level talks were restarted in early 2011. Since then considerable progress could be seen in India's engagement with Pakistan. In response to New Delhi's decision to export electricity to energy-starved Pakistan, Islamabad had not only allowed Indian officials to visit Pakistan to investigate the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, but also granted most-favoured nation status to India.¹⁶

Economic Dimension of India-Pakistan Relations

India and Pakistan are the two largest economies in South Asia which account for 90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 85 percent of the population of the region. Despite the fact, India-Pakistan economic and trade relations has remained so far very limited with neither country falls in the category of top trading partners of each other. This can be reflected from the very fact that as of 2007/8, the share of total trade in goods between the two sides was less than 0.5 percent of their combined trade with the rest of the world. The reasons for the abysmally low level of bilateral trade can be attributed to border disputes and political tensions, but also of inward-looking import-substitution growth strategies.¹⁷ The antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan, have resulted in lack of constructive economic engagement. Despite sharing the 11th longest international border in the world miniscule the bilateral trade between India and Pakistan has remained as low as US\$ 2.6 billion in 2013. The longest international border share is between the United States and Canada, accounting for 8893 km. The bilateral trade between them is US\$ 632 billion (for more details refer to Table 1).

Table 1: Trade Volume between Neighbouring Countries of the World

Rank	Countries	Border Length (in km)	Trade as of 2013 (in US\$ billions)
1	US-Canada	8893	632
2	Russia-Kazakhstan	6846	28.5
5	India-Bangladesh	4096	6.6
6	China-Russia	3645	88
9	China-India	3380	65.8
10	US-Mexico	3141	506.7
11	India-Pakistan	2900	2.6

Source: Chandrani Sarma, “Indo-Pak Trade and Political Balance”, *ISAS Insights*, National University of Singapore, No. 271, 21 November 2014, p. 2.

The two-way merchandise trade between India and Pakistan had witnessed a leap from paltry US\$250.86 million in 2000-01 to US\$2666.13 million in 2010-11 (Refer to Table 2 and Figure 1). The main items of export from India to Pakistan are cotton, organic chemicals, food products including prepared animal fodder, vegetables, plastic articles, man-made filament, coffee, tea and spices, dyes, oil seeds, etc. While the main items of import by India from Pakistan comprises of copper and copper articles, fruits and nuts, cotton, salt, sulphur and earths and stones, organic chemicals, mineral fuels, rubber plastic products, wool, etc.

India’s share of total Pakistan export has been less than one per cent during the last one decade since the turn of twenty first century. While Pakistan share of India’s total export has also remained the same except during the financial year 2006-07 and 2007-08, it was a little over one per cent. The result of such a paltry trade volume is a result of Pakistan government insistence that expanded economic and trade ties would be conditional upon the resolution of the issues over the Kashmir. The current trade volume is almost nothing when the combined population of India and Pakistan is even more than that of China. This is something both sides should seriously look at and closer cooperation would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

According to a study carried out by Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) using gravity model, the potential of formal trade between India and Pakistan is roughly 20 times greater than recorded trade. This means that at 2008 trade levels total trade (exports plus imports) between India and Pakistan could expand from its current level of a little above US \$2 billion to as much US\$42 billion if the ‘normal’ relations estimated by the PIIE gravity model for trading partners were to hold for the two countries. However, achieving a formidable trade volume would require increase political understanding and also there is a need for both to discuss on trade barriers such as high tariff and nontariff barriers, inadequate infrastructure and transportation facility. **Once the political understanding and the trade barriers are erased, there are huge scope for economic and trade progress.**¹⁸


The share of top five export items from India to Pakistan accounted for 70 per cent of the total exports (as shown in Table 3). While, the share of top five import items from Pakistan to India accounted for 65 per cent of the total exports (as shown in Table 4).

**Table 2: India-Pakistan Merchandise Trade From 2000-01 to 2013-14
(in US\$ millions)**

Year	India's Exports to Pakistan	Growth Rate (%)	India's Imports from Pakistan	Growth Rate (%)	Trade Turnover	Balance
2000-01	186.83	101.01	64.03	-6.14	250.86	122.8
2001-02	144.01	-22.92	64.76	1.14	208.77	79.25
2002-03	206.16	43.16	44.85	-30.74	251.01	161.31
2003-04	286.94	39.18	57.65	28.54	344.59	229.29
2004-05	521.05	81.59	94.97	64.75	616.02	426.08
2005-06	689.23	32.28	179.56	89.06	868.79	509.67
2006-07	1,350.09	95.88	323.62	80.23	1,673.71	1,026.47
2007-08	1,950.53	44.47	287.97	-11.02	2238.5	1,662.56
2008-09	1,439.88	-26.18	370.17	28.54	1,810.05	1,069.71
2009-10	1,573.32	9.27	275.94	-25.45	1,849.26	1,297.38
2010-11	2,039.53	29.63	332.51	20.50	2,666.13	2,081.11
2011-12	1,541.56	-24.42	397.66	19.59		
2012-13	2,064.79	33.94	541.87	36.26		
2013-14	2,274.26	10.15	426.88	-21.22		

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.


Figure 1: India-Pakistan Merchandise Trade From 2000-01 to 2010-11 (in US\$ millions)



Source: Refer to Table 1.

India and Pakistan still use tariff and nontariff barriers to protect their domestic producers even after reforms have led to overall economic liberalization. The other trade barriers are related to poor trade logistics and inadequate infrastructure. Besides, there persists a problem of restrictive visa regime.¹⁹ Scholars and industry experts from both sides have put forth several recommendations to ease trade. They include travel/visa issues should be made simpler, regulatory framework should be put in place to facilitate investments across the countries etc. In addition, there is also a need for both countries to open more points of trade through the land route.²⁰ Close economic engagement would benefit both sides. Pakistan in particular would benefit significantly as India offer a lucrative market for Pakistan products. This has been pointed out time and again by various experts and officials from Pakistan. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar stated in a speech at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) that more trade with India would enhance Pakistan’s prospects for peace and prosperity, and “put in place the conditions that will enable Pakistan to better pursue its principled positions” on territorial issues.²¹

Figure 2: India’s Trade with SAARC Countries



Note: Others include Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives.

Source: Loknath Acharya and Ashima Marwaha, “Status Paper on India-Pakistan Economic Relations”, prepared by FICCI, February 2012, p. 10.

Table 3: Top Five Export Items from India to Pakistan (in US \$ millions)

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2012-13	2013-14
1	52	Cotton	471.93	467.30
2	23	Residues And Waste From the Food Industries; Prepared Animal Foder.	293.52	311.78
3	29	Organic Chemicals	273.07	271.55
4	7	Edible Vegetables, Certain Roots and Tubers	144.51	218.68
5	39	Plastic And Articles Thereof	110.73	163.90

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Table 4: Top Five Import Items from Pakistan to India (in US \$ millions)

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2012-13	2013-14
1	74	Copper And Articles Thereof.	149.53	6.09
2	8	Edible Fruit And Nuts; Peel Or Citrus Fruit Or Melons.	92.55	100.15
3	52	Cotton	60.38	44.03
4	25	Salt; Sulphur; Earths And Stone; Plastering Materials, Lime And Cement	53.54	44.27
5	29	Organic Chemicals	38.90	26.88

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

From figure 2, it can be observed that India's trade with Pakistan has been lower than that of other SAARC members.

Underlying Key Issues Constraining India-Pakistan Relations

This section of the chapter would discuss the key issues that prevent Pakistan and India from reaching their full potential of bilateral engagement which definitely would have both regional and global significance. There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue, terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues and China issue. These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well. Besides, it will also affect the process of their rise and the peace and stability in and outside the region.²²

Kashmir Issue

Kashmir has been and continues to remain the main cause of friction between India and Pakistan. That is why many have termed it as a 'nuclear flashpoint'. Kashmir issue has gained both regional and global significance. The geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the Kashmir has made India and Pakistan to believe that the control of Kashmir is so important, thereby making it difficult for both sides to come to the terms on resolving the issue which has cost thousands of lives. It is surrounded by a number of foreign countries such as Tibet in its east and Pakistan, China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its west. The southern part is bordered by

Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Such a geostrategic location makes the Kashmir valley very important from strategic angle for both India and Pakistan. Having fought three wars over the Kashmir issue in 1947, 1965, and 1999, still there is no hope of resolving it in the near future.

Efforts have been made in the past to resolve the key issue but without any significant results due to the divergent stand adopted over the dispute by both sides. Also, it was the Pakistan involvement in proxy war to destabilize India which has only hardened New Delhi's position on Kashmir issue. With both sides not in a position to come to the terms on Kashmir issue and the possibility of issue escalating into a nuclear war has made Kashmir as the "world's most dangerous place."

India and Pakistan have totally different perception about the Kashmir issue. From the Pakistan perspective, Kashmir issue is more of an ideological rather than a territorial dispute, whereas India perceives Kashmir as a symbol of its secularism and composite nationalism.²³ The strategic importance of controlling Kashmir from the Indian point of view can be reflected from the statement of Indian's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he asserted that "India without Kashmir would cease to occupy a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia. Its northern frontiers...are connected with important three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Thus, strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India~ it has been so since the dawn of history."

While from the Pakistan point of view, the occupation of Kashmir is of security significance. As Liaquat Ali Khan, the former Pakistani Prime Minister, has noted that "Kashmir is very important, it is vital to Pakistan's security. Kashmir, as you will see from the map, is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on our head, then I am always at the mercy of India... The very position, the strategic position of Kashmir, is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India."²⁴

The prolonged Kashmir issue that has not shown any fruitful prospect for resolution has only sent a wrong message to the international community that resolution is the key to progress in bilateral ties between the two South Asian powers. This is not true in real sense because Pakistan on its part has not shown any eagerness to improve ties with India through discussion and instead they were engaged in illegal activities of proxy war that seriously threatens India's security.²⁵ The resolution of the Kashmir issue would require both sides to make certain changes to their policies of the past. They need to adopt a positive approach in lieu to the changing scenario to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Their rigid stand and not showing any flexibility in their respective stand has only worsened the possibility of bringing fruitful solution.

The resolution of the Kashmir issue would require understanding and reduction of mistrust between the two countries. To ensure understanding, normalization of the conflictual situation has to be erased from their minds. Both sides must engage in economic and other cooperation that would no doubt bring close understanding between the two countries. Peace must be restored between the two countries. For which Pakistan on its side must abandon its support for militancy, ensure that it is not engaged in any kind of proxy war against India that has a serious consequences in the border region. India on its part must ensure that there is good governance in the state of Jammu and Kashmir that listens to the grievances of the citizens and work for the prosperity of the state. Lack of good governance has given way to agitation of the local people.

Pakistan in particular has not shown any political commitment in the past; instead they have promoted separatism and encourage militancy in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The militancy supported by Pakistan has led to increased violence in Kashmir. It seeks to resolve the issue by force and through the outside support rather than dialogue, while India on the other hand seeks to resolve bilaterally through consensus. Whenever India agreed to

enter into a fruitful dialogue, but it was the Pakistan double standards stand that circumscribed the possibility of any success. For instance, the summit meeting between former Prime Minister of India and Pakistan, Mr. Atal Bihar Vajpayee and Mr. Nawaz Sharif respectively at Lahore in February 1999 was not able to bring out fruitful result due to alleged invasion by the Pakistan military into the Indian Territory. This was followed by the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 that comes just after the General Pervez Musharraf visit to India for the Agra summit in 2001. These events did not allow the climate to be created for the successful solution of the dispute.²⁶

Also, Pakistan military leadership obsession with the Kashmir dispute has also been one of the main determinants to creating a climate suitable for resolution. Too much of military influence and the resulting weakness in political leadership has not allowed for the Pakistan government to assert its political will for peace with India. Start from General Zia-ul-Haq to General Musharraf and even today there witnessed no change in their stand on Kashmir problem. It was General Zia-ul-Haq who began to call Kashmir as the core dispute and all other relations with India would be dependent on the solution of the core dispute. This was followed by what former Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf has said that ‘even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, Kargils would happen.’²⁷ Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Shaukat Aziz during his visit to Hongkong has declared that until the Kashmir issue is resolved, economic relations with India could not fully restored. Such stand precludes the possibility of any resolution. For the sake of Kashmir, Pakistan wants to normalize the relations with India and nothing else.²⁸ Therefore the paper argues that the resolving the Kashmir issue will not bring peace, security and prosperity in the region. Also it sends a wrong message to the international community that Pakistan is not concerned about stability and security in the region.

Terrorism Issues

Terrorism has been another major issue of concern in India’s bilateral engagement with Pakistan. One of the key challenges India face at present is the one posed by terrorism from beyond its borders. India is seriously challenged by the menace of terrorism in multiple forms for the past many decades. It is facing the most unique, difficult and gruesome faces of terrorism. No other country in the world is so deeply entangled in this problem as India face at present. Eradicating the menace of terrorism poses a serious challenge to international community in general and in particular to India. It has been facing this problem for the last many decades and has lost thousands of innocent lives fighting the menace. Terrorism poses a serious threat not only to peace and security but also hinders economic development of our country.

India’s main concern has been the terrorist violence which emanates from territory under Pakistan’s control. The Ministry of External Affairs in its *Annual Report 1998-1999* has underlined the fact that,

‘Our concerns regarding Pakistan’s continued, and active involvement in instigating and sponsoring terrorism in J& K and other parts of India, were made clear to them on several occasions during the year – and reiterated during the composite dialogue, and conclusive evidence to this effect was also presented. It was emphasised that our resolve to defeat cross-border terrorism and to safeguard our security interests was total. We have advised them that abandonment of this activity, and full respect for their commitments under the Simla Agreement, including avoidance of provocative acts across the LOC and hostile propaganda, were essential steps.’²⁹

India urges Pakistan to act seriously to defeat and stop the alleged extremist infiltrations into Indian territory. While, Pakistan repeatedly denies such charges and holds Indian government itself responsible for its failure to check cross border incursions. Pakistan must seriously take the issue and ensure that they are not involved in such activities and that their territory is not used for such illegal activities by the perpetrators. India has time and again

sought a firm and abiding commitment from Pakistan that it will not allow its territory and territory under its control to be used for the aiding and abetting of terrorist activity directed against India and for providing sanctuary to such terrorist groups. India has consistently stressed the need for Pakistan to fulfill its oft-repeated assurances, given to us at the highest level, that territory under its control would not be allowed to be used for anti-India activities in any manner that would seriously threaten our country's national security. It is critical for the security of the region that Pakistan undertakes determined action to dismantle the terrorist networks, organizations and infrastructure within its own territory.³⁰

India has time and accused Pakistan for large scale terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of our country. For instance, India cannot forget the memories of the well planned terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly complex on 1 October 2001, Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001. This was followed by bomb explosion in Mumbai in July 2011 and a similar explosion near the New Delhi High Court in September 2011.³¹

Afghanistan Issues

Indian interests clash with Pakistan over Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have been vying for strategic influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is seriously concerned about India all-out effort to expand its strategic influence in Afghanistan post 9/11. India's long-term strategic interests entail the re-establishment of a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. Taking account of the ground realities, India has effectively pursued proactive diplomacy and has to a large extent been successful to create pro Indian lobbies in Afghanistan. India firmly believes that an unstable and fragile Afghanistan would pose a serious threat to India national security. Pakistan expresses apprehension over the growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan in the socio-economic development and military build-up. This has resulted in close political understanding between New Delhi and Kabul.

Afghanistan is central to India's closer economic and security engagement with Central Asian Republics and Persian Gulf. India is closely working with the international community to bring lasting socio-economic and security stability in Afghanistan which continue to face lots of domestic problems. India seeks to build indigenous Afghan capacity and institutions covering multi-dimensional sectors. Reconstruction work and development programmes have been designed to support the priorities of Afghan government and people. India has made significant investment in mineral, industrial, agricultural and other sectors of Afghanistan to help build sustainable economy.

Pakistan only ambition in Afghanistan is achieving its long cherished goal of strategic depth, which is in sharp contrast to India's interests of ensuring lasting stable security in Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to see puppet regime such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that would work according to their interests. Pakistan believes that if India continues to expand its influence in Afghanistan then it would derail its prospects of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan. Strategic depth in Afghanistan would give Pakistan an edge to deter India from two fronts. Also, it would seek to use the state of Afghanistan as a launching and training pad for terrorism.

Instead of working sincerely with the NATO forces to restore lasting peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan seeks a strong Taliban in Afghanistan to offset the rising Indian influence there. Pakistan is involved in back door support to Taliban which hold the key to the survival and sustenance of the latter. Pakistan military and Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) believes that their support to Taliban and its associates is central to achieving gaining influence in Afghanistan.³²

Pakistan has not given up the hope of creating anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan for their interests. From the security perspective, Pakistan strongly believes that a strong and Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan will result in a secure western border. If there we no friendly government in then Afghanistan would

pose a security threat to Pakistan.³³ Therefore, Pakistan does not want to see India expanding its influence in Afghanistan, which according to Islamabad would help the Kashmir issue to turn in their favour. This is the missing link between the United States and Pakistan that has only favoured Pakistan and a setback for India. It was during the visit to Islamabad by the U.S. Director of Intelligence, Mike McConnell in 2008, a Pakistani General has told that “we must support the Taliban so that there is a government friendly to Pakistan in Kabul. Otherwise India will reign.” With such stand it is less likely that Pakistan would take steps sincerely to dismantle Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaeda. On the basis of this, Pakistan has criticised India for over involvement in Afghanistan.³⁴ If Pakistan continues to remain intact with the past stand taken in Afghanistan then it would pose a serious roadblock to restoring peace in the Kabul.

To deceive the international community about its covert intentions, Islamabad has blamed New Delhi’s positive intentions in Kabul of trying to destabilize their country and to undermine Pak-Afghan relations. Islamabad strongly believes that long-term Indian presence in Afghanistan would be detrimental to Pakistan’s multi-dimensional interests. Instead what India is doing is good for Pakistan because a stable Afghanistan that does not pose a threat to it would help Pakistan a secure western border. Whatever may be the apprehension raised by Pakistan, the Afghan Government led by Karzai has welcomed India’s hard effort in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.³⁵ Against the interests of Pakistan, the Afghan officials have blamed Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI involvement in aiding and abetting of extremists and terrorists. When Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked on 14 July 2008 Karzai, without wasting time, accused the ISI of being behind the terrorist attacks which rocked Afghanistan and caused heavy casualties and destruction.³⁶

China as a Factor in Indo-Pak Relations

China looms large on India’s relations with Pakistan. India has in recent years gained significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military prowess, but Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India’s progress in this direction. In fact India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan policies toward each other. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic coordination, advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. Pakistan in particular viewed India as a potential challenger leading to use China to counter Indian power in the region.

The close strategic partnership between the two countries has been based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. Pakistan’s search for a country that can help sustain a sufficient military capacity for itself against India coalesces with China’s intention that “a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping India preoccupied on two fronts, thereby safeguard their national security interests.”³⁷

Beijing is fuelling that arms race between the two South Asian rivals. It has in the past and even today helped Pakistan maintain conventional military balance between India and Pakistan by equipping the latter with JF-17 aircraft and JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms and ammunition. It has also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fuel Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.³⁸ China’s strategy of providing advanced arms and equipment requirements for Pakistan will continue to remain a case of serious national security concerns for India. Pakistan continues to be the major beneficiary of China’s unending support to acquire nuclear materials and technology. Arms-control advocate Gary Milhollin has very rightly pointed out that, “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear program, there is no nuclear program.”³⁹ According to Robert Ross, China

continues its support for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile technology because “China views a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power.”⁴⁰

In response to China’s stance on Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has allowed China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enter into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Lt Gen KT Parnaik, heading the Northern Command has warned that China’s military presence in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was too close for India’s comfort. “It poses military challenges to India and not only along the Sino-Indian border but also along the LoC.” He further added that “We hear many people who are concerned about the fact that if there were to be hostilities between us and Pakistan what would be the complicity of the Chinese. Not only because they are in the neighbourhood but the fact that they are actually stationed and present on the LoC.” Besides, “The Chinese Links with Pakistan through PoK lend strength to the China-Pakistan nexus which has been of great security concern for us. It jeopardises our regional and strategic interest in the long run... the Chinese footprints are too close for comfort.”⁴¹

Challenges Ahead of Indo-Pak Relations

From the above analysis, it can be observed that the Kashmir issue and the problem of cross border terrorism pose a serious challenge to India’s bilateral engagement with Pakistan. It is an unprecedented threat to overall development requiring political will and commitment on the part of the both sides on a sustained basis. It is imperative for both South Asian neighbours to engage in dialogue and discussion with each other if they want to attain peace and prosperity in the region. With the formation of the new government in both countries, there is a dire need for common understanding between the two sides over the need to closely engage with each other for mutual benefits. Both sides will need to maintain transparency in their policies with each other in order to bridge the gap of distrust and hostility and to maintain regional peace and trust-worthy bilateral relations.

The key challenge ahead of India and Pakistan would be as to how in spite of the conflicting geo-political and geo-strategic interest, both side have cast aside their difference on a series of issues and concerns of the past and make way for cooperating in the areas where their interests converge. For instance, economic cooperation offers tremendous scope for cooperation wherein Pakistan has a lot to gain. Bilateral trade between the two countries can prove to be an effective tool in order to increase mutual dependency for sustainable and stable bilateral relations.⁴² The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif have huge responsibility of restoring peace process between India and Pakistan. Besides, the present government of both countries will need to explore opportunities and areas where their interests converge.

Conclusion

When would the time come for both India and Pakistan to realize the need to reduce the trust deficit that continues to serve as the key roadblock to constructive bilateral engagement? From the geo-strategic, political, economic point of view, it is imperative for both the countries to have close and cordial relations. Establishing cordial relations between these two can contribute a lot in making this strategically important region prosperous.⁴³ However, it is very difficult to make a prediction of how the relations between India and Pakistan would look alike in the coming years or so. But one thing is sure, for bilateral relations between any two countries to improve, it becomes imperative for a positive response from them. India and Pakistan will need to first change the perception about each other as strategic rival. In doing so, Pakistan has to change track on its ‘Kashmir first’ policy and shifting gear to a process of building co-operation and confidence in other areas. Similarly, India too, has to show a big brotherly attitude and offer some liberal concessions to the Pakistan without compromising any security

needs. Such a positive attitude will reduce tension and ease the way for cordial relationship between the two countries. Ayesha Siddiqi, a well known scholar from Pakistan has very rightly pointed out two factors which hinder the prospect for peace between India and Pakistan – first, outstanding political/territorial disputes between the two countries; and second, historical perceptions of each other, especially Pakistan’s perception of India.⁴⁴

The two countries have maintained a patchy ceasefire over the LoC in Kashmir since 2003. Current spate of ceasefire violations began in January, 2013; by the close of year such incident could be around 200, far exceeding last year’s total of 117. Things came to a crisis situation in September, 2013 when, just short of high-profile talks between Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of 68th UNGA session, militants of unknown identity killed eight Indian security personnel and a civilian. The attack was deliberately timed, and follows a pattern of attempts by vested interests to frustrate the bilateral peace process. Dr Singh, despite domestic electoral compulsions, could not be provoked to the level of calling off the talks. However, the bilateral was grossly de-scaled... from a breakfast meeting to a display of glass of water. Narendra Modi, the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, had advised Dr Singh to skip his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.⁴⁵ Pakistan and India are neighbouring countries whose future is entwined and dependent upon each other. It is up to the two countries to find a way that leads to peace and prosperity of not only the two countries but also of the region.

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INDIA-CHINA EQUATIONS AND PAKISTAN FACTOR

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Pakistan's congenital enmity with India, which was partly responsible for laying foundations of its unique 'all weather' friendship with communist China – with whom India has had rather complicated equations – has ensured that Pakistan remains one of the most important factors determining the trends and tenor in China-India Equations. At the same time though India's own stature has had its influence on these two neighboring countries and the two have been held in certain restraint in their anti-India postures. As a result, while their anti-India sentiment may have kept an atheist ruling regime of the People's Republic of China up-and-close to the successive military or civilian rulers of the Islamic republic of Pakistan, their axis have not been able to evolve into an explicit military alliance and India has never been articulated as their 'declared' common enemy. Except for a decade after the 1962 war with China, India has always maintained dialogue with both of them and managed to minimize negative influence of Pakistan in determining China-India mutual policies and perceptions.

Also, unlike India-Pakistan equations that have remained rather emotive and complicated, China-India equations have become pragmatic and improved over period of time thereby restricting the influence of Pakistan in China-India equations. To begin with, China and India were either too euphoric about their brotherhood during 1950s followed by simply not being on talking terms during 1960s and early 1970s. Since then, even their piecemeal *rapprochement* during 1980s and 1990s had been much too tangled in several external and domestic influences. It is only in more recent years therefore that China and India have demonstrated growing understanding of their own and begun to appreciate their limitations. So much so that India has successfully freed herself from the older India-Pakistan hyphenation and strengthened China-India hyphenation whereas Pakistan has slid into the quagmire of Afghanistan-Pakistan hyphenation. Nevertheless, China and India have also failed to make any major mutual concessions and Pakistan continues to benefit from their trust-deficit and remains a factor of considerable influence in China-India equations.

China-Pakistan Axis

To begin with China presents a puzzle of dichotomous policies of seeking peace with India while at the same time arming and abetting Pakistan. There could be definitely various other factors that may have compelled each of these three actors yet the following can be cited as some of the important contradictions in China's policies towards India making Pakistan factor a perennial force that has played a critical role in complicating China-India equations. It is on this basis alone that one can make an objective assessment of the nature of China-India interactions and initiatives and crystal gaze their future direction.

Firstly, Beijing's suspected supplies of sensitive military and nuclear technologies to Pakistan has been the basis of its attempt to promote a China-Pakistan axis of patron-client relations thereby using Islamabad as its bulwark in South Asia. This was bound to have direct implications for China-India relations. As is vindicated by historic events, this China-sponsored Pakistani edge in its nuclear and missile technologies was to make Pakistan the single most disturbing element in the China-India equations.

Secondly, between India and Pakistan, Beijing's attempts to sustain such a 'special relationship' with Pakistan while at the same time advocating 'good-neighbourly' ties with New Delhi again cannot be sustained. This is

simply because while promoting adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, China cannot fool anyone and Beijing has often been perceived in India as one important actor fueling most of the problems in India-Pakistan relations. This has had a clear impact on New Delhi's perceptions about Beijing's intentions.

Thirdly, given that all three (China-India-Pakistan) are now nuclear weapon states, China's nuclear thinking has drawn much interest in India. Especially, China's nuclear doctrine of No First Use (NFU) has come to obtain dubious interpretations. Going by China's behavioural patterns and its analysis by experts, the use of nuclear weapons on what the Chinese consider their sovereign territories, does not, in Beijing's perceptions, seem to breach their NFU doctrine.¹ Since China sees Taiwan and Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territories, China's continued silence on such insinuations make Indians ever more skeptical of Chinese intentions.

Fourthly, China's dual policies of joining various non-proliferation regimes of Western powers while making India's entry subject to that of Pakistan has become another major irritant in China-India interactions. If anything China remains the last reluctant major power to support India's entry into these forums while at the same time it continues to flaunt all these regimes while formally swearing by all their norms. India finds itself adhering to all these principles yet staying out of these regimes and decision making forums, thanks to China.

And finally, much to the discomfiture of New Delhi, China's rise as the next global power has made the Chinese sanguine about growing and repeated disaffections amongst India's power elite. The Chinese have been known for their grand and global visions and now they seem to see themselves as capable of actually implementing them. As a result, China is often seen as rather assertive in its India policy. Moreover, while China has begun to accept the sanctity of multilateral forums, it still seems not ready to redesign its bilateral policies to conform to its multilateral diplomacy which has disappointed New Delhi.

Thanks to these aforesaid contradictions in China's India policy as also between its declared policies and actual behaviour and between its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, China has ended up providing critical stimulus to the so-called India-Pakistan nuclear and missile competition. China has done so by supplying technologies to Pakistan and stimulant to New Delhi, as a result of which India and Pakistan have continued to be engulfed in repeated tensions which Beijing sees as tying down India to sub-continental crisis-management crisis.

The Pokhran-II Episode

Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998 provide an apt episode to analyze these dichotomies in Beijing's policies that betray its thin veil of neutrality and bonhomie which have largely remain on the surface and only recently begun to take roots, if at all. To begin with, the Chinese side had displayed calm for nearly 24 hours after India's first two explosions on May 11, 1998. But following India's second series of three more explosions on May 13, 1998, and more so following the leakage of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's letter to President Bill Clinton which described China's nuclear arsenals as also their proliferation to India's western neighbour as the main reason for India going nuclear, Beijing was to unleash its tirade and described India as trying to emerged as 'hegemone' in South Asia.² This reminded most China watchers of Mao's denunciations of Nehru during early 1950s. This also made one think as to whether the initial silence was at all a friendly gesture or was it that, typical to their methodology, the Chinese were only taking time to come up with their policy position vis-à-vis India's *Shakti* series. It is interesting that Beijing was to place whole blame on New Delhi saying little about Pakistani nuclear tests, or role of Pakistan or about the future of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile relationship.

This feeling of China privileging Pakistan was to be further reinforced by events that followed the Pokhran-II where China was seen extremely active in the passing of resolution 1172 by the UN Security Council and later in

convening another meeting of the P-5 Foreign Ministers in London on June 4, 1998 always singularly denouncing New Delhi. China was to issue a bilateral Joint Statements on South Asia with President Bill Clinton when later visited Beijing on June 27, 1998 and was to bring this up in all another Joint-Statements including one when President Jiang Zemin visited Kazakhstan. The same was true of China's *White Paper on National Defence* which was issued in Beijing in July 1998.³ All of these criticised India for having unleashed a nuclear competition in the South Asian region. The vehement tenor of these comments made it appear as if Pakistan had thought of nuclear weapons only during the fortnight between Pokhran-II and tests in Chagai tests of May 28-29, 1998. The Chinese design in this campaign was not lost on New Delhi.

However, during the immediate period following the Pokhran-II, there is no denying the fact that Sino-Indian goodwill did suffer a set back during these accusations and counteraccusations. The military commanders meet scheduled for late May 1998 were delayed until early June and the annual meeting of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on Boundary Question (JWG) scheduled for Beijing was finally held after a gap of 19 months; during April 1999. Also, the China Commodity Fair scheduled to be held in Mumbai was cancelled by Beijing and Air India flights between New Delhi and Hong Kong came down from four-days-a-week to two-days-a-week. India also decided to putt off a visit by a flotilla of Indian Navy that led by INS Delhi was scheduled to anchor on China's shores on a goodwill visit during September last year.¹ It is possible to assume that many of these interactions would have been much more fruitful and friendly had this mutual acrimony not been flared up by China-Pakistan axis.

From rhetoric to pragmatic policy

There is always an element of rhetoric and public relations exercise in China's policies. This has often witnessed China-India equations experiencing a roller-coaster ride of harsh and friendly noises. So following its anti-India tirade in the wake of Pokhran-II, Beijing was to soon begin to appreciate the reality of having to deal with two nuclear weapon states on its southern periphery. As the first thing, this new reality was seen to upset Beijing's perceived smooth rise of China as the next global power of the 21st century world. Thanks partly to the assessments of China's strategic experts, the challenge to China's uncontested rise had been perhaps least anticipated from its southern frontiers. Accordingly, India was being dealt with their time-tested double-edged policy of slow-moving CBMs while simultaneously China had continued aiding and abetting Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. Likewise, their harsh posture in the wake of Pokhran-II was to be followed by new emphasis on their 'neutrality' in India-Pakistan relation which was strongly demonstrated in fourth India-Pakistan war during May-June 1999.

The first indication of change was to come from China's sudden slowing down of its global anti-India rhetoric. This was gradually replaced by a business-like approach with well thought focus on bilateral relations.¹ China soon indicated a possible change in its Pakistan policy which was the single most important shift in China's India policy.² This had immediate positive response from India. Historically, India has always sought security-in-peace and not peace-in-security, and Indian leaders have never been found wanting in taking positive initiatives in streamlining its China-India relations.³ Secondly, India's policy initiatives vis-à-vis China has to be viewed in their long-term perspective. Thirdly, India has clearly conveyed that its nuclear policy has been evolved in such a manner so as to subserve Indian's foreign policy objectives and not the other way round where India's foreign policy becomes hostage of India's nuclear doctrines. Thus, compared to the initial fire-fighting approach from both sides, their interactions were to return to their planned, integrated and piecemeal approach that stresses on areas of agreement rather than conflict.

As the first step in reviving their mutual understanding, interactions like those in trade and commerce and other experts were to presage resumption of China-India official dialogue from early 1999. Their bilateral trade represents one most apolitical pillar that has proved to be the one most reliable as also most agreeable CBM for enhancing normalisation in their ties. The fact it was only briefly that their bilateral trade was to get affected in the post-Pokhran-II phase of polemics. According China's State Statistical Bureau statistics for 1978-1997, while China's total international trade in these twenty years had gone up by 14 times, its trade with India went up by 16 times. This was to be visible in the post-Pokhran-II period as well where their trade was to go up by 5.2 per cent for the year 1998.⁵ When compared to China's recent negative growth in China's trade statistics vis-a-vis East Asian countries as also Pakistan, shows rather encouraging signs for China-Indian ties. At least in trade and commerce Pakistan has never been able to wield any major influence in China-India ties.

China's neutrality in Kargil conflict

What speaks volumes of China's renewed commitment to China-India ties is Beijing's posture of neutrality during the India-Pakistan war in the Kargil sector in 1999. This posture of neutrality was seen as the most important catalyst in making the Clinton-Sharif deal of July 4, 1999 which was credited for bringing about an earlier-than-expected conclusion of this conflict in Kargil. For once China seemed to play the India factor in India-Pakistan relations thereby convincing the Pakistani leadership on the futility of continuing to back-up its losing armed intruders. China refused to oblige Pakistan to internationalise Kashmir issue this time round. This neutrality must be viewed in the context of the continued suspicion amongst Indian intelligentsia and that this was especially strong in view of New Delhi's not-so-friendly ties with Beijing following Pokhran-II. Besides, the fact that these three countries share a rather complicated history and geography and their trilateral China-India-Pak security ties have to be kept in mind while trying to gauge the overall character and contribution of Beijing's neutrality that for the first time, seemed to undermine the perennial 'Pakistan factor' in China-India relations.

To recall China's role in earlier India-Pakistan wars, the communist party was at the peak of their fight against China's *Kuomintang* regime during the first Indo-Pak conflict of 1948. Therefore, this conflict may not have interested Mao Zedong who was nearly year away from founding his communist China. Yet, going by his later criticism of Nehru's bourgeois liberal democracy, which he thought was only a transition stage towards heralding a new era of communism in India, his view on India were neither sympathetic nor very positive. A more considered response of Chairman Mao was provided during the second India-Pakistan war of September 1965. First of all, this war came too soon after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. This interlude of three years had seen China and Pakistan building friendship against their perceived common enemy, India. Accordingly, following their border settlement agreement of March 1963 where Pakistan conceded over 5,000 sq. km. of Indian territory in Kashmir to the Chinese, China had gradually come to be one of Pakistan's major supplier of military equipment and technologies. The Pakistani Generals later prided themselves with Chinese reliability and believed that Beijing had, in fact, issued New Delhi some sort of a dead-line for coming to cease-fire with Pakistani armed forces.⁹

It was during the third India-Pakistan war of 1971 that China called India adventurist, expansionist and aggressor and both General Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto publicly declared that, if need be, China could militarily intervene in support of Pakistani. Once again, China did not actually intervene yet it provided Pakistan weapons and equipment and even allowed Pakistani Air Force flights eastwards to over-fly from its territory.¹ All this did provide weight to Pakistani statements about China's possible intervention which had to be viewed in the backdrop of the problematic China-India relations. Moreover, the China-US entente during the early 1970s and Pakistan's role in the historic trip by Henry Kissinger to Beijing had made things all the more complicated for India. It is in this

backdrop that India signed the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship of August 1971. But again, this Indo-Soviet treaty made Beijing suspicious of India's intentions and policies and only further strengthened China-Pakistan axis against India. And though Kargil war of 1999 saw China restrained yet recent implosion of terrorism in Af-Pak theater has once again provided a glue to China-Pakistan axis in the name of building counter-terrorism capacities in Pakistan.

Limitations of 'Pakistan Factor'

Rise of China has ensured greater scrutiny and glare on China's foreign policy initiatives making it conscious of costs of attaching itself too closely to countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya etc. After the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan from late 1980s followed by the collapse of former Soviet Union, Pakistan had gradually lost its original place of pride as 'frontline' state which had impacted upon Beijing's foreign policy calculations. Yet, Pakistan continued to be relevant bulwark against rising India though China was also now trying to have direct relations with India and its posture of neutrality in Kargil war that was partly explained as neutrality in favour of Pakistan whose forces had intruded into India territories in Kashmir.¹¹ And here, in the changed post-cold war China-India equations, the following can perhaps be cited as major limitations of the perennial 'Pakistan factor' in China-India equations.

First of all, Pakistan has repeatedly defied Beijing's advice on its foreign and defence policies and initiatives. One vivid example of this was Islamabad's decision to conduct its nuclear tests during May 1998 despite the opposite advice from Beijing. Pakistan's continued and successful nuclear and missile tests have always embarrassed Beijing with the United States (as also other concerned countries) repeatedly asking them to strengthen their export controls and to abide by their commitments to various technology control regimes. Both China and Pakistan have been accused of stealing nuclear and missile technologies respectively from US and the Netherland facilities. This has made Chinese leaders skeptical of being seen as close to Pakistan leadership.

Secondly, Pakistan has also continuously failed to curb activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups who have been reportedly involved in ethnic problems China's Xinjiang province. Reportedly, some these Chinese Uyghur Muslims have also been found amongst the intruders in Kargil. Besides, China has meanwhile evolved its own state-to-state ties with the Central Asian republics thus blocking all other possibilities of Muslim fundamentalists operating in Xinjiang from outside. This today leaves only the Pakistan that has come to be projected as the main culprit. With the capture and death of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan during May 2011 has only made things worse. Given its own fragile internal ethnic fabric, China would not like to be seen as supporting regimes hosting any *jihad*-like activities.

Thirdly, at a larger platform of international politics, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during late 1980s has ended Pakistan's unique status as the frontline state for bleeding the Soviets white. This meant that it no longer enjoyed the same special equation with Washington DC and, by extension of same logic, with Beijing. Instead, Islamabad's continued involvement in Afghanistan has only further discredited its profile. China, meanwhile, has built a new strategic partnership with Russia as also achieved greater acceptability amongst other neighbouring countries which has further facilitated a greater balanced approach and eroded the power of Pakistan factor in China-India ties.

Fourthly, amongst more immediate factors, the existence of conflict-ridden asymmetric nuclear triangle – of China-India-Pakistan – has also visible in all the Chinese engagement with Pakistan. This was witnessed their increasing emphasis on regional stability and harmonious world. It is often suggested that Beijing's leverage in restraining Pakistan's adventurist policies has been eroding and how Pakistani proliferation network has also brought China under scanner. This aspect was never before stressed so much in responses by major powers.

Fifthly, in the backdrop of India's increasing proximity with the United States, China's repeated diplomatic stand-offs with United States have resulted in growing US presence across Asian conflict zones. China has to increasingly accommodate this great powers indulgence with India which increasingly circumscribes Beijing's ambitions to carve out its own sphere of influence in Southern Asia. This has seen China feeling neglected and irritated by India yet the two have continued to engage each other and their increasingly bonhomie in multilateral forum has gradually marginalized the old 'Pakistan factor' in their mutual equations.

And *finally*, one apt example of this changing profile of India was the international response to the Kargil war of 1999. For the first time, the world opinion was clearly one-sided; endorsing India's policy of restraint that triggered a U-turn in China's policy of using Pakistan as its bulwark in South Asia. This was not only unprecedented but also largely unexpected. Therefore, any objective assessment of Indian victory in the Kargil war of 1999 must endorse the contribution made by China posture of neutrality in facilitating both in maintaining restraint and in achieving an early termination.

Nature & implications of China's neutrality

Amongst the first indication of China's commitment to posture of neutrality during the Kargil conflict of 1999 was come during the sudden air-dash by Pakistani Foreign Minister who went to consult leaders in Beijing at the very eve of his visit to New Delhi. The fact that this visit was put up in a hurry as also the fact that this visit by Sartaj Aziz was soon to be followed by a pre-planned visit to Beijing by India's Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, was a major reason for restraint on the Chinese leadership. In contrast to visit by Sartaj Aziz, the visit by Jaswant Singh was projected as a major event and the Indian Foreign Minister sought to make an important contribution to the tenor of China-India ties which had not been going very well following India's nuclear explosions during May 1998.

Jaswant Singh sought to allay all fears and misunderstanding by underlining that New Delhi does not consider China as a threat, potentially or otherwise. And to gauge the effect he made on the Chinese, Premier Zhu Rongji was to describe Jaswant Singh's visit as very successful in the Chinese eyes. Mr. Jaswant Singh was later quoted having said that "India is not a threat to the People's Republic of China and we do not treat the People's Republic of China as the threat to India."¹² This was duly reciprocated by his Chinese counterpart who was also quoted saying that "India is an important neighbour of China and the development of good neighbourly friendly co-operation with India is one of China's basic national policies."¹³ This seemed to have put China-India ties on the even keel thus further facilitating continuation of Chinese neutrality in Kargil. It was this changed tenor of China-India ties that contributed to the lackluster performance of Prime Minister's Nawaz Sharif who visited Beijing during 28 June- 3 July, 1999. Jaswant Singh was to have his immediate second post-Kargil meeting with his Chinese counterpart on July 24 during the annual meeting of the Asean Region Forum in Singapore where the two agreed on six joint initiatives in their bilateral cooperation and the Chinese side reportedly went as far as to endorse India's "stabilising role" in South Asia, thus reflecting the new tenor of China-India bonhomie.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the single most important event that finally established the credibility of the Chinese posture of neutrality during the Kargil conflict remains the Chinese response to the visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. And, going by Islamabad's traditional dependence on Beijing, this single gesture was shake the faith of Pakistani elite forever. This visit seemed was Islamabad's last hope to recover its lost ground in taking China's help to internationalise Kashmir question.¹⁵ To estimate Islamabad wish-list, in addition to supporting Islamabad's versions of the Kargil conflict, Pakistan expected China to push this issue at the forthcoming session of the UN

General Assembly or even to take up this issue at the UN Security Council. This was because Pakistan by this time was losing its game both amongst international opinion-makers as also militarily on the ground in Kargil. And it is precisely for this reason that the Chinese were to refused oblige Pakistan. In his meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji told Sharif to seek political solutions by reviving the Lahore Declaration of February 1999. Providing expression to China's policy of neutrality, Premier Zhu Rongji described Kashmir as "historical issue involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements" which he said required to "be solved only through peaceful means" and the initiatives for this were expected to come from New Delhi and Islamabad.¹⁶

New framework of China's India policy

The above discussion on China's response to Pokhran-II and the Kargil conflict clearly shows that just like India's China policy, China's India policy also has its in-built limitations. And, if anything, Beijing's bulwark 'Pakistan factor' has over years evolved from being its major strength to becoming its major limitation. Due to a combination of various factors like historical legacies, existing assets and liabilities as also their current compulsions, China remains relatively higher in India's list of foreign policy priorities compared to India's place in China's list of priorities. Similarly, in line with China's so called 'Middle Kingdom' syndrome, China's leaders have always sought to compare themselves with big powers and the communist China's leaders had always seen themselves in league with leaders from the United States and former Soviet Union (now Russia). As a result, rise of China has obtained it many more leverages thereby shrinking the relative important of Pakistan though China has in no way deserted Pakistan. Likewise, Beijing's policy towards India, that was traditionally one of propping up India's smaller neighbours to keep New Delhi tied down to South Asian region has also evolved.

Following India's decision to exercise its nuclear option, China's recent initiatives towards India clearly show an attempt at re-defining the very framework of its foreign relations. Even in the sensitive nuclear issue, China has made a clear shift away from seeking their roll-back or total elimination of India's nuclear programme to stressing more and more on containing their negative fallout for Beijing. But, in making this historic shift, India has also facilitated China in coming to terms with this new ground reality by making following overtures:

Firstly, even after India's decision to go nuclear, India had continued to swear by and work towards building a nuclear weapon free world. New Delhi believes that it is a non-nuclear environment that best serves its security interests and, therefore, its decision to exercise its nuclear option has only meant change in its means while the objectives remain the same i.e. working towards a nuclear weapon free world.

Secondly, even after demonstrating capability to design and develop a whole range of fairly sophisticated nuclear devices, New Delhi has announced its commitment for doctrines of "No First Use" and "minimum deterrence" which has also partly weakened China's radical anti-India forces. Pakistan's First Use Doctrine and exponentially growing nuclear arsenal does not repose confidence even in China.

And finally, recent years have seen a marked a gradual change in reactions from all major powers including the United States. They all seem to recognize India's distinct position compared to Pakistan and after 2008 clear waiver from Nuclear Suppliers Group all other technology control regimes may be opening doors for New Delhi. This distinction in India's nuclear position has put Pakistan on margins of international relations. China may not like this change but has gradually begin to accept it as basis for China-India equations.

Conclusion

To conclude, therefore, rise of China as also gradually emergence of India have overtime redefined the original Pakistan factor in China-India equations. Though China's meandering in reassuring Pakistan of its pivotal position

in China's South Asia policy sometimes sends confusing signals yet the big picture projects gradual erosion of Pakistan factor in increasingly autonomous nature of China-India relations. Without doubt, Kargil conflict of 1999 had provided the watershed for this transformation and thought China may be tried to retreat from its strong posture of neutrality off and on yet China has gradually and grudgingly drifted in favour of building state-to-state equations with emerging India. But this does not mean that China has neglected Pakistan; only India's expanded interactions have begun to cast a shadow on the significance of Pakistan for China's India related policy and postures.

Increasingly, both China and India have begun to realize their similarities of past history, present situations and future challenges. For India, it is understandable that even in the best of circumstances Beijing could not have diplomatically let India's nuclear tests let go uncensored. But China is also the only country that could best understand India's predicament because China itself had to once fight for same rights and principles. Beijing perhaps shows greater understanding of how it is the nature of China-India equations that will largely determine the future of Asia and larger world. Both being ancient sister civilizations, with a 2,000 year old history of diplomatic interactions, India and China should be able to gauge their difficulties.

And now with the expanded leverages and visibility come greater responsibilities that can become their opportunities only if they learn to coordinate their policies and expand their cooperation. Howsoever slowly, their expanding mutual understanding is clearly driven by their national interests and this portends only further marginalization of the proverbial 'Pakistan factor' in China-India equations.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SECURITY DIMENSIONS AND CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

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Introduction

The present chapter attempts to put in perspective the political, economic and security dimensions of the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It would also discuss the issues and challenges that prevent both countries from reaching their full potential of bilateral engagement which definitely would have both regional and global significance. India enjoys strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic connections with the neighbouring countries of South Asia. Among the South Asia countries, India is the largest which accounts for 70 per cent of population, nearly 80 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and about 75 per cent of the regional economic output. India shares boundary with all the South Asian neighbours. The changing environment also demands India to maintain stability in its relations with its neighbours.¹ From the geo-strategic and geo-political point of view, India's relations with the South Asian neighbours have been guided by – first, its desire to protect the sub-continent from the adverse external forces that might destabilise India's security environment and secondly, its desire to ensure that geographical proximity and ethno-religious affinities do not lead to instability on or near its border, particularly as they inevitably may affect its domestic, ethnic, religious and political relationships.²

India's relations with Pakistan have been aptly described by former India's Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral as 'tormented one'. Pakistan has been one of the major concerns for India's foreign policy for many decades.³ The relations between India and Pakistan have seen great uncertainty and ambiguity as both the countries have adopted divergent approach for their respective national interests. India and Pakistan are the two largest countries in South Asia wherein there exists a very low level of engagements. The two South Asian regional powers remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance to maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

Since their independence, India and Pakistan have failed to come out of mutual suspicion and discord of each other. It has its implications on the decision making process and policy formulation of both countries. It has also promoted the image of each other as an enemy with minimal hope for constructive politico, strategic and economic engagement.⁴ In the post 1947, both countries have witnessed enduring divergences over a range of issues resulting in adoption of divergent approach to serving its interests. Both India and Pakistan have so far failed to develop cordial relationship from the long-term perspective with each other due to various issues which includes border dispute, cross border terrorism, clash of interests over Afghanistan, etc. The relationship between the two sides has been marked by suspicion, hatred and distrust. Tense and hostile situation which existed since 1947 has resulted in three wars and various crises between them. They have made significant effort in the past to resolve some of the key issues by holding peace talks and even by concluding various agreements. But this situation could not last long owing to suspensions in the peace process which had further enhanced suspicion and mistrust on both sides. By

adopting antagonistic approach towards each other, both sides have failed to develop consensus on the need to develop the atmosphere of peace and security as key to achieving mutual interests. Misperception developed in the minds of policy makers of both states regarding different issues. The hostile attitude towards each other has severely undermined the prospect of socio-economic development of both countries.⁵ It argues that lasting security and other development pursuits of both India and Pakistan would considerably rely upon cordial and mutually cooperative relations between these two neighbours.

Despite successive efforts by the Indian government, Pakistan's attitude of cross border terrorism along the Kashmir border and anti-Indian stance have derailed the prospects of dialogue and resumption of the peace process. The bilateral dialogue process which started in 2004 was stopped following the Mumbai attacks of 2008. It couldn't last long as the peace process resumed in 2011, but very little improvement could be seen in bilateral relations.⁶

Historical Analysis of India-Pakistan Relations During the Cold War Era

India and Pakistan have a history of unique relations. The diplomatic relations developed soon after their inception but lacked the character of cordial and friendship engagement. The historical relations between the two sides has been characterised by prolonged conflict and rivalry; discord, mutual distrust and suspicion.⁷ The historical animosity that carried over into the post 1947 period, the bloody partition and the accession of Kashmir to India remains a constant cause of political, ideological and military hostility between them.⁸

The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh was in dilemma on whether to accede to India or to Pakistan. But when the tribal raiders with the support of Pakistani soldiers attacked the state and were about to capture the airfield of Srinagar,⁹ the Maharaja asked for help from India. The then Indian Prime Minister Nehru agreed to provide the necessary military support and assistance in return for his acceptance of Kashmir's legal accession to India. Maharaja Hari Singh had no choice but to comply.¹⁰ Finally, Hari Singh took a bold decision to accede to India instead of Pakistan and an Instrument of Accession was signed on 26th October 1947. Upon the accession, the Pakistan Government declared it as fraud and was never ready to accept it. India and Pakistan together made a series of attempts to resolve the bilateral dispute through direct negotiations. The leaders of the two sides was in communication with each other between August 1953 and September 1954. However, the discussion couldn't bring any fruitful results as both adopted a different stand on the issue.¹¹

Pakistan instead of engaging in peaceful dialogue, started creating border violations on a large scale along the Indian side of the border on May 1965. India took the issue seriously as it posed a serious threat to the peace and stability in the state, and even complained to the Security Council about heavy concentration of Pakistani troops along the Indian border.¹² In response, India launched operation Meghdoot and captured 80 per cent of Siachen Glacier. Then in 1971, India and Pakistan fought another war leading to the creation of independence of Bangladesh. In 1972 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan Prime Minister Z A Bhutto met in Simla and signed an agreement for the release of 90,000 prisoners of 1971 war.¹³ Under the Simla agreement, both sides have agreed to settle their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations or through other means mutually agreed upon between them. The agreement ruled out the possibility of any third party involvement, especially on the disputes which are being negotiated within the rubric of the eight baskets mechanism.¹⁴

Since 1980s, the relations became more suspicious and soured owing to several factors such as the Siachin Glacier conflict, militancy in Kashmir, cross border terrorism, etc. Pakistan offer of military hardware and training to the militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. Their support hold the key to carrying out terrorist act not

confined to just the Kashmir region but also in various sections of our country.¹⁵ In December 1988, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi resumed talks to discuss on different issues not confined to just border issues but also the prospect of bilateral trade between the two sides. The change in leadership brought some hope in the relations between the two neighbours. Both sides also pledged not to attack each other's air space and to notify the other in advance of military exercises.¹⁶

India's Political Relations with Pakistan

The political understanding between India and Pakistan has witnessed more ups than downs ever since both countries have gained their independence. The political environment between the two neighbouring countries continues to be marred by mutual distrust and suspicion. Despite significant potential, the relationship between the two sides has seen no significant improvement. The relationship between the two sides is perceived to be beneficial in various areas of interests including security, economic, energy and socio-cultural aspects. The two South Asian regional powers, India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance to maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

The change in global politico-strategic environment in the aftermath of Soviet disintegration didn't usher any remarkable change in the relations between the two South Asian neighbours. In fact, the relations between the two sides have seen more low points than high points in the changed scenario. To start the relations on a positive note in the immediate years of the end of Cold War, India and Pakistan hold bilateral talks during the Jakarta Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement on September 1992. On this occasion, Prime Minister. P.V. Narsimha Rao said, "After going into all the details of the setbacks that we came up against, we still feel that we have to continue our efforts, not always expecting immediate or instantaneous success but realising that the effort itself is worth making irrespective of the immediate results." In response, Pakistani Prime Minister said, "We should continue discussing things."¹⁷

A series of bomb blasts in Mumbai on March 1993, brought a setback to the bilateral talks for the start of healthy relations in the changed post Cold War era. Preliminary investigations make it clear that the blasts were orchestrated by the ISI of Pakistan, in response to events in Ayodhya. To reduce the damage done by the blasts, Islamabad brought up the issue of Kashmir and even refused to hold talks with India unless the "core" issue, Kashmir, was taken up first and resolved.¹⁸

Several key issues have not allowed the development of close ties between India and Pakistan. The military officers of both sides met in 1996 at Line of Control (LoC) to wind down border tensions. The same year bilateral official diplomatic talks were held to discuss on border issues. In the year 1997, Pakistan proposed to discuss terms for a non-aggression treaty and for restraints on nuclear and missile capabilities. In the early 1999, the leaders of the two sides realised the necessity for holding a composite dialogue for discussion on bilateral issues before they can be peacefully resolved.¹⁹ Their political commitment did bring positive results when the foreign secretary level talks were held in New Delhi in March 1997. However, real breakthrough came in May 1997, when Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif at Maldives whereby they agreed to release prisoners from each other's countries, enter into hotline agreement, establish working group to address various outstanding issues.²⁰

The victory of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan's elections in February 1997 and the declaration of the Gujral Doctrine was a plus point in the direction of India-Pakistan relations. The doctrine encouraged India to be cooperative in its dealing with the smaller neighbours. Commenting on Gujral Doctrine, I.K. Gujral said in March 1997 that,

“I am willing to make concessions on anything, except the sovereignty or secular character of our nation. That is non-negotiable. There will not be another partition of India.”²¹

During the tenure of the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif rounds of foreign secretaries talks were held in Islamabad in March 1997. Both sides agreed to set up a joint working group to discover modalities for bilateral talks and final mechanism to address all the issues in an integrated manner. For the first time both sides agreed to an eight point agenda to resume dialogue including the most contentious one - Kashmir dispute. The other issues were Siachin, Wullur Barrage, Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. However, as expected, all efforts proved futile as Pakistan insisted on addressing Kashmir agenda first.²²

The relations suffered a severe blow in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by the two neighbours and sensitized the Kashmir question by linking it with the nuclear tests. However, the seed for improvement was borne out of the meeting between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif at New York on September 1998 during the UN General Assembly session. It was agreed that two foreign secretaries would meet in Islamabad from October 1998 to focus on Kashmir and peace and security, including confidence building measures, etc.²³ As regards the nuclear tests, Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee has made a statement to the Lok Sabha on 27 May 1998 that, “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self defense, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion.”²⁴

Both sides have reached an understanding in New York in September 1998, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly Session to start a bus service between Delhi and Lahore.²⁵ Prime Minister Vajpayee made a historic visit to Pakistan after a gap of almost a decade. He was accompanied by several cabinet colleagues.²⁶ The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, K. Raghunath and his counterpart, Shamshad, wherein both sides agreed that they shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and enhance effective implementation of CBMs. Under the Declaration, both parties were convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment. It also emphasized that peace and cooperation would serve the vital interests of the people on both sides of the border.²⁷

The effort made by the leaders of the two sides got shattered by the Kargil conflict initiated by Pakistan conflict and was well responded by India through the Operation Vijay. The withdrawal of the Pakistan's forces from Kargil was followed by military coup in the state. It reflects Pakistan Army involvement in Pakistan's politics and its disinterest in finding political solution of the Kashmir problem.²⁸

The series of move aimed at improving close ties between India and Pakistan got a massive blow when the terrorist attack the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 and the Kaluchak massacre in Jammu on 14 May 2002. After the twin incident, both countries came very close to waging the fifth war with much more devastating potential than the earlier once.²⁹

The 2001-02 crises ended in April 2003 with Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee offered bilateral talks to his Pakistani counterpart Zafarullah Khan Jamali³⁰ and the latter announcement of a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC). The situation influenced both sides to seriously think of resuming the composite dialogue. Both sides held a series number of talks at the official level and non-official level. Discussion on the bilateral disputes between the two countries improved after the replacement by Mr. Manmohan Singh as the new Prime Minister of India in 2004.

In a bid to resolve the long standing bilateral disputes, both sides reached an agreement on five broad areas—no change in the current division of Kashmir into Pakistan and Indian areas, creation of soft border along the Line of Control that would ensure greater freedom of movement of people and goods, greater autonomy and self-governance for both India and Pakistan administered parts of Kashmir, the establishment of a consultative mechanism across the LoC and lastly, demilitarisation of Kashmir.³¹

Considering the security scenario that prevails in the South Asia in general and India in particular, it was India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who made peace offer in Srinagar on April 2003. Following which, rail and diplomatic links between the two sides were restored. In addition, decision was also taken to opening up of the bus route between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and between Manabao and Kokhrapur.³² Besides, New Delhi took the initiative of 12 point confidence building measures on October 2003.

It ranges from resumption of civil aviation and rail links to sporting links; provision of visa camps in both the countries in various cities, etc.³³

To take advantage of the developing scenario, both sides have agreed to launch the peace process in January 2004. The decision augur well for a promising trade, improved people to people contact, a ceasefire on both sides of the borders and the implementation of number of confidence-building measures in disputed Kashmir. In addition, it also opens up serious back channel negotiation on the Kashmir dispute.³⁴ Both sides started the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP), which emphasizes an eight-point agenda such as peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The CDP without any doubt has opened up the dialogue, leading to more transparency and confidence building measures, but has failed to make a real impact in resolving deep-seated mistrust.³⁵

At the New Delhi summit held in April 2005, General Pervez Musharraf in a sharp departure from its past stand recognised that borders cannot be redrawn though the LoC could not become the permanent border between the two countries. Moreover, the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the summit meeting declared that the peace process was not irreversible.³⁶ Former Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh has in early 2007 reiterated the need to develop close connections between the two countries, "I sincerely believe that the destiny of the people of South Asia is interlinked. It is not just our past that links us, but our future too. India cannot be a prosperous, dynamic economy and a stable polity if our neighborhood as a whole is also not economically prosperous and politically stable. Similarly, our neighbors cannot prosper if India does not do so as well. There are enormous opportunities for promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in South Asia. To exploit these opportunities, the nations of South Asia have to work sincerely to control the scourge of terrorism and extremism ..."³⁷

This was the period where both military and non-military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) improves. For instance Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests—brought into effect in 2005, establishment of a Communication Link between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coast Guard—brought into effect in 2005. Both the rail services between Attari and Lahore, and air linkages between the two countries were resumed in 2004. This was followed by the resumption of Samjhauta Express, which runs between Delhi and Lahore in 2005, and the first bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad also started this year. Joint Economic Commissions and Joint Business Councils were reactivated in 2004. Moreover, Foreign Ministers of both countries agreed to a series of Kashmir-specific CBMs to facilitate crossing the LoC in 2008.³⁸ Nevertheless, the effort did not so far pay-off owing to continuing Pakistan aggressive attitude toward India and its involvement in terrorist violence in India.

The year 2006 witnessed the resumption of peace process when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met General Musharraf on the sidelines of the Non Aligned summit in Cuba. During the May 2008 foreign ministers and foreign secretaries level talks between India and Pakistan, both sides reviewed the 'composite dialogue' and the 'peace process'. To development closer understanding between the two, they agreed to increase the frequency of movement of people and goods across the border through rail, road and air.³⁹

At this critical juncture, the 26/11 Mumbai incidents have only aggravated the already not so good relations between India and Pakistan. Since then political understanding between the two countries has come down to a much lower level. Angered by the response of Pakistan, India cancelled any forms of dialogue with Pakistan. This way, the events put a brake to ongoing composite dialogue that is meant for resolving the bilateral problems including the Kashmir issue. This had only strengthened India's position that unless there is a positive response from Pakistan regarding cross border terrorism to India there can be very little hope for a composite dialogue. Pakistan must seriously take the issue and ensure that they are not involved in such activities and that their territory is not used for such illegal activities by the perpetrators. India's positive response to Pakistan demand for peaceful dialogue after the Mumbai events would require Pakistan to take stringent action against those involved in such heinous activities. This would help ensure that India is ready for composite dialogue.⁴⁰

Sensing the need to engage in peaceful dialogue between the two sides, Pakistani Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Quershi has noted that, "We want to...resume dialogue with India because we feel that if we want regional peace, then normal friendly relations between Pakistan and India will play a significant role."⁴¹ The year 2011 provided some breakthrough when the high level meetings between the two sides was held at the level of the secretaries of home, commerce, defence and water resources to sort out the differences. Pakistan responded positively by agreeing to setting up of a judicial commission to visit India for transparent and speedy trial of the 26/11 perpetrators.⁴²

Under pressure from the international community, India-Pakistan peace process has gained momentum since minister-level talks were restarted in early 2011. Since then considerable progress could be seen in India's engagement with Pakistan. In response to New Delhi's decision to export electricity to energy-starved Pakistan, Islamabad had not only allowed Indian officials to visit Pakistan to investigate the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, but also granted most-favoured nation status to India.⁴³

Both sides met again on the sideline of 16th NAM summit in Tehran in August 2012 whereby they discussed about the imperative need for CBMs. Pakistani President invited Dr. Singh to visit Pakistan.⁴⁴ The political relations between Pakistan and India in the aftermath of 26/11 have been marked with periodic diplomatic efforts along with escalating tensions along the Line of Control (LoC). India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi invited his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif at his swearing in ceremony, sending a positive message of the former commitment towards developing cordial relations. Islamabad failed to respond to its successive commitment of putting a brake on terrorist activities along the Kashmir border. To put a pressure to the Pakistan government vis-a-vis cross border terrorism in Kashmir, the present BJP led government has adopted the tough strategy of just not to hold any talks with its counterpart but also isolate Pakistan at regional and global forums. India called off Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan in August 2014 which has without any doubt brought a setback to the already patchy relations. Since 2014 to date, the Line of Control (LoC) and Working Boundary have not only remained tense, but also witnessed repeated violations coupled with hostile statements from both sides of the border.⁴⁵

In July 2015, the Prime Minister of both sides met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Ufa. After the meeting, it was announced that both sides would hold bilateral security talks, and

also sought their commitment to restart the dialogue process which is the need of hour. The high level talks between India's National Security Advisors Ajit Doval and Sartaj Aziz in August 2015 buckled after the latter invited Kashmiri leaders to consult on the talks. By the end of the year, the National Security Advisors, Doval and Janjua met in Bangkok and the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Sartaj Aziz. The terrorist attack of Pathankot in January 2016 brought a serious setback to all sort of efforts made earlier for the resumption of the much needed bilateral dialogue. The relationship got further jolt when India blamed Pakistan for its involvement in Uri attack in September 2016. Diplomatic relations became exacerbated after New Delhi and Islamabad decided to expel diplomatic missions on charges of espionage and declaring persona non grata and asking diplomats to leave within 48 hours.⁴⁶

Given the prolonged conflicts, mutual misunderstanding and suspicion, peace process have suffered setbacks. Effort has been made in the recent past to introduce constructive dialogue process, but couldn't succeed owing to one or the other issue. Thus there is an imperative need for CBMs so that a bridge can be created between them. Experiences of CBMs in other parts of the world reveal that it helped to reduce tensions among states and facilitated the peace processes between them. CBMs are agreements seeking to introduce openness, mutual understanding and communication, designed to reduce the possibility of conflict either through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication; thereby increasing stability in times of crisis.⁴⁷

India-Pakistan Security Relations

Lack of political understanding and the state of the feeling of insecurity among each other has undermined any sort of security relations between the two sides. There are other factors that impinge on security ties are cross-border firing, LoC violations, looming threat of conflict and Pakistan's alleged involvement in cross border terrorism. Besides, the Kashmir dispute, Siachen Glacier issue, Sir Creek and water dispute remain the cause of friction.⁴⁸

India's security relations with Pakistan has over the last many decades been dominated by latter's attempt at seeking to destabilise the security scenario in Kashmir and also in other parts of our country. Despite repeated commitments, the terrorists violence occurs in one way or another in our country. In addition there exists a constant ceasefire violations along the border, have debarred any scope for peaceful security dialogue between the two sides.⁴⁹

Terrorism has been another major issue of concern in India's bilateral engagement with Pakistan. One of the key challenges India face at present is the one posed by terrorism from beyond its borders. India is seriously challenged by the menace of terrorism in multiple forms for the past many decades. It is facing the most unique, difficult and gruesome faces of terrorism. No other country in the world is so deeply entangled in this problem as India face at present. Eradicating the menace of terrorism poses a serious challenge to international community in general and in particular to India. It has been facing this problem for the last many decades and has lost thousands of innocent lives fighting the menace. Terrorism poses a serious threat not only to peace and security but also hinders economic development of our country.

Pakistan involvement in deteriorating the security scenario in the Kashmir is not new. It offers covert and overt support, backing and giving the direction to the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, it is no more secret that the hand of the infamous Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is behind nearly all the militant and terrorist groups operating in the troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir. The extent of Pakistani involvement is documented by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee, of the United States House of Representatives. In its report dated 1 February 1993, it is mentioned that, "... sponsoring

international terrorism and separatist subversion is not new to Pakistan. Since the 1970's, Islamabad has been training Sikh and other Indian separatist movements as part of (former Prime Minister) Z.A.K. Bhutto's strategy of 'forward strategic depth'. It added that, "Having witnessed the initial impact of the Islamist message in Indian Kashmir, Islamabad began to broaden its horizons and set its sights on bigger goals. Thus in 1986, with growing experience with training, organizing and running the Afghan Mujahedeen and with military supplies available (through the United States, Saudi Arabia and other foreign assistance), Pakistan began expanding its operations to sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism, primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long term programme."⁵⁰ In the Pakistan Frontier Post of 29 May 1991, the noted Pakistani journalist, Mushahid Hussain admits, "The approach which Pakistan has adopted is the 'Afghan Model'; essentially a protracted war, which has made Kashmir a bleeding wound for India."⁵¹ The code name for this operation, christened by Late General Zia-ul-Haque was 'Operation Topac'.⁵²

India's main concern has been the terrorist violence which emanates from territory under Pakistan's control. The Ministry of External Affairs in its *Annual Report 1998-1999* has underlined the fact that,

'Our concerns regarding Pakistan's continued, and active involvement in instigating and sponsoring terrorism in J& K and other parts of India, were made clear to them on several occasions during the year – and reiterated during the composite dialogue, and conclusive evidence to this effect was also presented. It was emphasised that our resolve to defeat cross-border terrorism and to safeguard our security interests was total. We have advised them that abandonment of this activity, and full respect for their commitments under the Simla Agreement, including avoidance of provocative acts across the LOC and hostile propaganda, were essential steps.'⁵³

India urges Pakistan to act seriously to defeat and stop the alleged extremist infiltrations into Indian territory. While, Pakistan repeatedly denies such charges and holds Indian government itself responsible for its failure to check cross border incursions. Pakistan must seriously take the issue and ensure that they are not involved in such activities and that their territory is not used for such illegal activities by the perpetrators. India has time and again sought a firm and abiding commitment from Pakistan that it will not allow its territory and territory under its control to be used for the aiding and abetting of terrorist activity directed against India and for providing sanctuary to such terrorist groups. India has consistently stressed the need for Pakistan to fulfill its oft-repeated assurances, given to us at the highest level, that territory under its control would not be allowed to be used for anti-India activities in any manner that would seriously threaten our country's national security. It is critical for the security of the region that Pakistan undertakes determined action to dismantle the terrorist networks, organizations and infrastructure within its own territory.⁵⁴

India has time and again accused Pakistan for large scale terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of our country. For instance, India cannot forget the memories of the well planned terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly complex on 1 October 2001, Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001. This was followed by bomb explosion in Mumbai in July 2011 and a similar explosion near the New Delhi High Court in September 2011.⁵⁵

The first meeting of the Indo-Pak joint mechanism to combat terrorism was held in Islamabad on March 2007. But, the significant breakthrough came when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in Havana on the sidelines of the NAM summit on September 2006 whereby they agreed to convey information that will help prevent violence and terrorist acts on either side of the border. After years of discussion, Pakistan finally accepted the Indian argument that prevention of terrorists acts alone will not bring any suitable results unless those involved in such acts are punished heavily.⁵⁶

India-Pakistan Relations: Economic Dimension

India and Pakistan are the two largest economies in South Asia which account for 90 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 85 per cent of the population of the region. Despite the fact, India-Pakistan economic and trade relations has remained so far very limited with neither country falling in the category of top trading partners of each other. This can be reflected from the very fact that as of 2007/8, the share of total trade in goods between the two sides was less than 0.5 percent of their combined trade with the rest of the world. The reasons for the extremely low level of bilateral trade between the two can be attributed to border disputes and political tensions, but also of inward-looking import-substitution growth strategies.⁵⁷ The antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan, have resulted in lack of constructive economic engagement. Despite sharing the 11th longest international border in the world miniscule the bilateral trade between India and Pakistan has remained as low as US\$ 2.6 billion in 2013. The longest international border share is between the United States and Canada, accounting for 8893 km. The bilateral trade between them is US\$ 632 billion (for more details refer to Table 4.1).

Table 1.1
Trade Volume between Neighbouring Countries of the World

Rank	Countries	Border Length (in km)	Trade as of 2013 (in US\$ billions)
1	US-Canada	8893	632
2	Russia-Kazakhstan	6846	28.5
5	India-Bangladesh	4096	6.6
6	China-Russia	3645	88
9	China-India	3380	65.8
10	US-Mexico	3141	506.7
11	India-Pakistan	2900	2.6

Source: Chandrani Sarma, “Indo-Pak Trade and Political Balance”, *ISAS Insights*, National University of Singapore, No. 271, 21 November 2014, p. 2.

Going by the past and present state of trade exchange between the two sides, it can be observed that both sides have failed to extract the benefit of their constructive economic engagement. With the improvement of bilateral trade, it can be expected that the cross border terrorism and violence would decrease. Since increased trade relations is in the mutual economic benefit of the two. Both sides may have differences over a number of issues but better trade activities can transform their aspect of political relations. Bilateral trade has the potential to not only removing misperceptions between also open up more avenues for cooperation in the long run. To further promote the present level of trade ties, both sides will need to open more trade routes because the current trade volume is much below the desired one.⁵⁸

The performance of trade exchange between India and Pakistan was quite satisfactory in the immediate years after independence. The exports and imports to and from Pakistan was much better than the present scenario. In 1948-49, 56 per cent of Pakistan exports of goods and items went to India which declined to a much low of just 4 per cent in 1958. In 1948-49, 50 per- cent of India's exports of goods and items went to West Pakistan and 80 per- cent to East Pakistan. However, in 2010 it was just 1 per cent of the total trade of India and little above 1 per cent for Pakistan. Despite the fact that both countries are bestowed with rich natural resources, raw materials, and possesses the same industrial or agricultural basis and are at the same stage of industrialization. One reason for unsatisfactory trade relations can be attributed to the absence of trade agreements between India and Pakistan, nor the joint ventures. To create a conducive climate for better trade relations, India has extended MFN status to Pakistan way back in 1996, but lack of positive response from the Pakistan side has only derailed the prospects. The economic dialogue between the two sides has failed to deliver the much needed results since the 2008 Mumbai terror attack.⁵⁹ Despite repeated commitment, Pakistan so far has not granted the MFN status to India which is a serious violation of the SAFTA.⁶⁰

The two-way merchandise trade between India and Pakistan had witnessed a leap from paltry US\$250.86 million in 2000-01 to US\$2666.13 million in 2010-11 (Refer to Table 4.2). Although, the bilateral trade is yet to reach the actual potential, but the trade volume has increased by more than 9 times during the period between the 2000 and 2011. Total trade between the two countries was US\$ 1.97 billion in 2011, of which India's exports to Pakistan were US\$ 1.66 billion and imports US\$ 313 million. Between 2009 to 2012, the average annual rate of growth of imports from Pakistan has been 23 per cent while that of exports has been just 9 per cent. In the year 2011, India's top 3 items of exports to Pakistan are chemicals, textiles and vegetable products accounting for 68 per cent of total exports to Pakistan. While, India's top 3 items of imports from Pakistan includes mineral products, vegetable products and textiles accounting for 59 per cent of total imports.⁶¹

The main items of export from India to Pakistan are cotton, organic chemicals, food products including prepared animal fodder, vegetables, plastic articles, man-made filament, coffee, tea and spices, dyes, oil seeds, etc. While the main items of import by India from Pakistan comprises of copper and copper articles, fruits and nuts, cotton, salt, sulphur and earths and stones, organic chemicals, mineral fuels, rubber plastic products, wool, etc.

India's share of total Pakistan export has been less than one per cent during the last one decade since the turn of twenty first century. While Pakistan share of India's total export has also remained the same except during the financial year 2006-07 and 2007-08, it was a little over one per cent. The result of such a paltry trade volume is a result of Pakistan government insistence that expanded economic and trade ties would be conditional upon the resolution of the issues over the Kashmir. The current trade volume is almost nothing when the combined population of India and Pakistan is even more than that of China. This is something both sides should seriously look at and closer cooperation would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

According to a study carried out by Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) using gravity model, the potential of formal trade between India and Pakistan is roughly 20 times larger than what has been recorded at present. This means that at 2008 trade levels total trade (exports plus imports) between India and Pakistan could expand from its current level of a little above US \$2 billion to as much US\$42 billion if the 'normal' relations estimated by the PIIE gravity model for trading partners were to hold for the two countries. However, achieving a formidable trade volume would require increase political understanding and also there is a need for both to discuss on trade barriers such as high tariff and nontariff barriers, inadequate infrastructure and transportation facility.

Once the political understanding and the trade barriers are erased, there are huge scope for economic and trade progress.⁶²

The share of top five export items from India to Pakistan accounted for 70 per cent of the total exports (as shown in Table 4.3 and 4.5). While, the share of top five import items from Pakistan to India accounted for 65 per cent of the total exports (as shown in Table 4.4 and 4.6).

The actual potential of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is yet to materialize. This would require concerted efforts on the part of both countries. From the Pakistan side, it is yet to declare the most favoured nation (MFN) status for India. From the Indian side, it will need to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers which pose a serious roadblock to the trade exchange. Besides, there are other reasons such as the inadequate transportation facility equipped with patchy railway and road connections and bureaucratic regulations and restrictions. The bilateral trade as the percentage of India's total trade has been decelerated significantly during the recent years.⁶³


During the period between 2001-2002 and 2010-2011, the total share of Pakistan in India's total exports has increased from 0.33 per cent to 0.99 per cent. In case of total imports of India, Pakistan's share has marginally declined from 0.13 percent in 2001-2002 to 0.09 percent by 2010-2011. However, when looked at from the SAARC point of view, India's trade with Pakistan has remained far below than other economies of the region.⁶⁴

Table 1.2
India-Pakistan Merchandise Trade From 2000-01 to 2018-19 (Apr-Oct)
(in US\$ millions)

Year	India's Exports to Pakistan	Growth Rate (%)	India's Imports from Pakistan	Growth Rate (%)	Trade Turnover	Balance
2000-01	186.83	101.01	64.03	-6.14	250.86	122.8
2001-02	144.01	-22.92	64.76	1.14	208.77	79.25
2002-03	206.16	43.16	44.85	-30.74	251.01	161.31
2003-04	286.94	39.18	57.65	28.54	344.59	229.29
2004-05	521.05	81.59	94.97	64.75	616.02	426.08
2005-06	689.23	32.28	179.56	89.06	868.79	509.67
2006-07	1,350.09	95.88	323.62	80.23	1,673.71	1,026.47
2007-08	1,950.53	44.47	287.97	-11.02	2238.5	1,662.56
2008-09	1,439.88	-26.18	370.17	28.54	1,810.05	1,069.71
2009-10	1,573.32	09.27	275.94	-25.45	1,849.26	1,297.38
2010-11	2,039.53	29.63	332.51	20.50	2,666.13	2,081.11
2011-12	1,541.56	-24.42	397.66	19.59		
2012-13	2,064.79	33.94	541.87	36.26		
2013-14	2,274.26	10.15	426.88	-21.22		
2014-15	1,857.18	-18.34	497.31	16.50		
2015-16	2,171.17	16.91	441.03	-11.32		
2016-17	1,821.87	-16.09	454.49	03.05		
2017-18	1,924.28	05.62	488.56	07.50		
2018-19 (Apr-Oct)	1,179.91		338.65			

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Figure 1.1
India-Pakistan Merchandise Trade From 2000-01 to 2010-11
(in US\$ millions)



Source: Refer to Table 1.


India and Pakistan still use tariff and nontariff barriers to protect their domestic producers even after reforms have led to overall economic liberalization. The other trade barriers are related to poor trade logistics and inadequate infrastructure. Besides, there persists a problem of restrictive visa regime.⁶⁵ The Pakistan government has time and again expressed unhappiness over the fact that their businessmen face nontariff barriers in reaching to the Indian market. Both sides have in the past expressed readiness to address the perceived barriers as well. During the discussion, it was found that the issue of tariff barriers is a result of a general lack of awareness amongst Pakistani businessmen on the regulatory regimes in India. To further ease the way for better trade exchange, both sides arranged interactive sessions between the Indian regulators and Pakistani businessmen in New Delhi. Followed by another session in Pakistan in January 2012.⁶⁶

Another area where both sides need to focus is on trade diversification. So far the trade relations between the two has been accused for the less diversified export base of Pakistan. This can be reflected from the very fact that almost 60 per cent of its exports are accounted for two products - agricultural and textile items. The same is the case for India's exports too.⁶⁷

Scholars and industry experts from both sides have put forth several recommendations to ease trade. They include travel/visa issues should be made simpler, regulatory framework should be put in place to facilitate investments across the countries etc. In addition, there is also a need for both countries to open more points of trade through the land route.⁶⁸ Close economic engagement would benefit both sides. Pakistan in particular would benefit significantly as India offer a lucrative market for Pakistan products. This has been pointed out time and again by various experts and officials from Pakistan. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar stated in a speech at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) that more trade with India would enhance Pakistan's prospects for peace and prosperity, and "put in place the conditions that will enable Pakistan to better pursue its principled positions" on territorial issues.⁶⁹

The South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) since July 2006 has opened up the avenues for free trade of goods and services among the South Asian countries, The prolonged politico-security conflict has undermined the development of closer economic ties between New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan has refused to extend the negotiated tariff concessions to items beyond the positive list to India, thereby restricting exports only to items on the positive list. Despite the initiation of trade via road on October 2008, the progress of trade is still far behind the satisfactory level. In addition to Srinagar-Muzafarabad and Poonch Ralwalkot routes, triple entry permits for LoC crossings were introduced, with effect from 1 October 2008.⁷⁰

Figure 2
India's Trade with SAARC Countries



Note: Others include Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives.

Source: Loknath Acharya and Ashima Marwaha, “Status Paper on India-Pakistan Economic Relations”, prepared by FICCI, February 2012, p. 10.

There was a constant fear among the policy makers of Pakistan that granting the MFN status to India would lead to the flooding of Pakistani markets with Indian goods. In fact, the availability of a large number of Indian goods in Pakistan and vice-versa will increase the competition on both sides of the border and serve the mutual interests of India and Pakistan. India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, but Islamabad was taking time to make a decision on it. To appease Pakistani businesses, India has send a clear message that it will not allow any non-tariff barrier to come in the way of bilateral trade.⁷¹ It was unanimously decided that the two countries will enjoy mutual MFN treatment from January 2013, but failed to materialise owing to political conflict. It is expected that the current government of Pakistan will soon fulfill its promise to grant MFN status given the pressure from business community within the country and international donor agencies.⁷²

Between 2004 and 2007, four rounds of trade talks were held between the two countries seeking to strengthen economic ties. In 2008, both sides have agreed to liberalize their visa regime that would facilitate people-to-people contacts. The bilateral trade have benefited out of the composite dialogue. Exchange of goods via bus and train

between the two countries have become more routine. Bilateral relations of both countries appeared to be on the course towards normalization. However, the Mumbai Attacks brought the economic engagement to the backburner.⁷³

Table 1.3

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2012-13	2013-14
1	52	Cotton	471.93	467.30
2	23	Residues And Waste From the Food Industries; Prepared Animal Foder.	293.52	311.78
3	29	Organic Chemicals	273.07	271.55
4	7	Edible Vegetables, Certain Roots and Tubers	144.51	218.68
5	39	Plastic And Articles Thereof	110.73	163.90

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Table 1.4

Top Five Import Items from Pakistan to India (in US \$ millions)

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2012-13	2013-14
1	74	Copper And Articles Thereof.	149.53	6.09
2	8	Edible Fruit And Nuts; Peel Or Citrus Fruit Or Melons.	92.55	100.15
3	52	Cotton	60.38	44.03
4	25	Salt; Sulphur; Earths And Stone; Plastering Materials, Lime And Cement	53.54	44.27
5	29	Organic Chemicals	38.90	26.88

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Table 1.5
Top Five Export Items from India to Pakistan (in US \$ millions)

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2016-17	2017-18
1	07020000	Tomatoes Fresh or Chilled	55.01	0.05
2	07132000	*Chickpeas (Garbanzos) Dried and Shld	21.68	21.70
3	09024020	Tea Black, Leaf in Bulk	13.68	14.39
4	04021010	Skimmed Milk	11.92	3.79
5	09083110	Large (Amomum)	7.16	4.00

Note: * ITC HS Code of the Commodity is either dropped or re-allocated from April 2018

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Table 1.6
Top Five Import Items from Pakistan to India (in US \$ millions)

SL. No.	HS Code	Commodity	2016-17	2017-18
1	08041030	Dry Dates Hard (Chhohara or Kharek)	125.80	111.30
2	28362020	Disodium Carbonate Light	8.04	4.67
3	09109914	Ajwan Seed (Bishop Seed)	5.25	2.63
4	52094200	Denim	4.31	3.42
5	22072000	Ethyl Alchl And Othr Spirits Denaturd of Anystrungth	3.47	2.46

Source: Export-Import Databank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Economic Engagement in the Post 26/11 Mumbai Attack

Without any doubt, the Mumbai Attacks brought a serious setback to the already not so good economic engagement between the two sides. It further deepened the political misunderstanding which cast a shadow on the

economic relations between the two. The confidence building measures and other initiatives for bring a permanent peace prior to 26/11 went in vain. The Indian government took the issue seriously and reacted severely to the incident. It terminated the secretary level talks on important issues related to security, commerce, etc. Relations in the immediate years after the Mumbai attacks, came to the lowest point but after the lapse of three years diplomatic ties in early 2011 were re-established. However, the revival of the bilateral dialogue eased the way for improved trade relations in March 2011. Initiatives were taken by business communities at both sides to restart the trade ties.⁷⁴

Despite efforts to improve the trade ties between the two sides, the series of security events one after another destroyed the prospects of improvement. The Kargil events of 1999 not only slowed down the trade ties but also brought the relations to a historic low between India and Pakistan. Following which the attack on Indian Parliament by the militants supported by Pakistan in December 2001 further widen the gap between them. Besides, the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008 has brought the trade relations to a standstill. Then after a gap of three years, India and Pakistan decided to resume trade by opening an Integrated Check Post at Attari-Wagah border.⁷⁵

India's share of export to Pakistan in India's total exports has been declined to 0.73% during the period 2010-12 from 1.01% during the period 2007-09. While, the share of India's imports from Pakistan in India's total imports has been declined to 0.09% during the financial year 2010-12 from 0.14% during the period 2007-09.⁷⁶

In the aftermath of Mumbai terrorists attack trade exchange has significantly declined owing to political tension. According to Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, bilateral trade has decreased by almost 60%. Economic dialogue have been terminated and also that the Businessmen in both countries refuse to travel to each other.⁷⁷

The commerce secretaries of the two countries met in the mid of November 2011 in New Delhi to find the way out to the trade normalization which would ease the trade exchange between the two sides. Both sides have finally agreed to phase out the negative list step by step by the end of 2012.⁷⁸ Before doing so, both sides have a Joint Working Group meeting on "Economic and Commercial Cooperation and Trade Promotion" on August 2011 in New Delhi. Followed by a Commerce Minister level talks in September 2011 in New Delhi.

The Pakistan's Commerce Minister visited India after a gap of 35 years between September and October 2011 signifying the political will and commitment to improve economic and commercial relations. The Commerce Ministers express desire to move beyond just normalization of trade to a preferential trading arrangement, under the framework of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). The Ministers agreed to work closely to increase trade from current level of USD 2.7 billion to USD 6 billion. In a very unequivocal message the ministers agreed that "the bilateral trade liberalization process should be uninterrupted and irreversible". The visit was a memorable one as the Pakistan side express their commitment to improve intra-regional connectivity via road, rail, shipping and air.⁷⁹

Both sides will need to understand the very fact that expanding trade relations will be beneficiary to them. In addition to making effort at the bilateral level, both sides must consider using the platform of SAARC to enrich potential benefits of trade and impediments in economic cooperation.⁸⁰

Underlying Key Issues Constraining India-Pakistan Relations

This section of the chapter would discuss the key issues that prevent Pakistan and India from reaching their full potential of bilateral engagement which definitely would have both regional and global significance. There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue,

terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues, etc. These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well. Besides, it will also affect the process of their rise and the peace and stability in and outside the region.⁸¹

Afghanistan Issues

Indian interests clash with Pakistan over Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have been vying for strategic influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is seriously concerned about India all-out effort to expand its strategic influence in Afghanistan post 9/11. India's long-term strategic interests entail the re-establishment of a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. Taking account of the ground realities, India has effectively pursued proactive diplomacy and has to a large extent been successful to create pro Indian lobbies in Afghanistan. India firmly believes that an unstable and fragile Afghanistan would pose a serious threat to India national security. Pakistan expresses apprehension over the growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan in the socio-economic development and military build-up. This has resulted in close political understanding between New Delhi and Kabul.

Afghanistan is central to India's closer economic and security engagement with Central Asian Republics and Persian Gulf. India is closely working with the international community to bring lasting socio-economic and security stability in Afghanistan which continue to face lots of domestic problems. India seeks to build indigenous Afghan capacity and institutions covering multi-dimensional sectors. Reconstruction work and development programmes have been designed to support the priorities of Afghan government and people. India has made significant investment in mineral, industrial, agricultural and other sectors of Afghanistan to help build sustainable economy.

Pakistan only ambition in Afghanistan is achieving its long cherished goal of strategic depth, which is in sharp contrast to India's interests of ensuring lasting stable security in Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to see puppet regime such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that would work according to their interests. Pakistan believes that if India continues to expand its influence in Afghanistan then it would derail its prospects of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan. Strategic depth in Afghanistan would give Pakistan an edge to deter India from two fronts. Also, it would seek to use the state of Afghanistan as a launching and training pad for terrorism.

Instead of working sincerely with the NATO forces to restore lasting peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan seeks a strong Taliban in Afghanistan to offset the rising Indian influence there. Pakistan is involved in back door support to Taliban which hold the key to the survival and sustenance of the latter. Pakistan military and Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) believes that their support to Taliban and its associates is central to achieving gaining influence in Afghanistan.⁸²

Pakistan has not given up the hope of creating anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan for their interests. From the security perspective, Pakistan strongly believes that a strong and Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan will result in a secure western border. If there we no friendly government in then Afghanistan would pose a security threat to Pakistan.⁸³ Therefore, Pakistan does not want to see India expanding its influence in Afghanistan, which according to Islamabad would help the Kashmir issue to turn in their favour. This is the missing link between the United States and Pakistan that has only favoured Pakistan and a setback for India. It was during the visit to Islamabad by the U.S. Director of Intelligence, Mike McConnell in 2008, a Pakistani General has told that "we must support the Taliban so that there is a government friendly to Pakistan in Kabul. Otherwise India will reign." With such stand it is less likely that Pakistan would take steps sincerely to dismantle Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaeda. On the basis of this, Pakistan has criticised India for over involvement in Afghanistan.⁸⁴ If Pakistan continues to remain intact with the past stand taken in Afghanistan then it would pose a serious roadblock to restoring peace in the Kabul.

To deceive the international community about its covert intentions, Islamabad has blamed New Delhi's positive intentions in Kabul of trying to destabilize their country and to undermine Pak-Afghan relations. Islamabad strongly believes that long-term Indian presence in Afghanistan would be detrimental to Pakistan's multi-dimensional interests. Instead what India is doing is good for Pakistan because a stable Afghanistan that does not pose a threat to it would help Pakistan a secure western border. Whatever may be the apprehension raised by Pakistan, the Afghan Government led by Karzai has welcomed India's hard effort in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.⁸⁵ Against the interests of Pakistan, the Afghan officials have blamed Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI involvement in aiding and abetting of extremists and terrorists. When Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked on 14 July 2008 Karzai, without wasting time, accused the ISI of being behind the terrorist attacks which rocked Afghanistan and caused heavy casualties and destruction.⁸⁶

Conclusion

India and Pakistan will need to realize the need to reduce the trust deficit that continues to serve as the key roadblock to constructive bilateral engagement. From the geo-strategic, political, economic point of view, it is imperative for both the countries to have close and cordial relations. Establishing cordial relations between these two can contribute a lot in making this strategically important region prosperous.⁸⁷ However, it is very difficult to make a prediction of how the relations between India and Pakistan would look alike in the coming years or so. But one thing is sure, for bilateral relations between any two countries to improve, it becomes imperative for a positive response from them. India and Pakistan will need to first change the perception about each other as strategic rival. In doing so, Pakistan has to change track on its 'Kashmir first' policy and shifting gear to a process of building co-operation and confidence in other areas. Similarly, India too, has to show a big brotherly attitude and offer some liberal concessions to the Pakistan without compromising any security needs. Such a positive attitude will reduce tension and ease the way for cordial relationship between the two countries. Ayesha Siddiqi, a well-known scholar from Pakistan has very rightly pointed out two factors which hinder the prospect for peace between India and Pakistan – first, outstanding political/territorial disputes between the two countries; and second, historical perceptions of each other, especially Pakistan's perception of India.⁸⁸

The two countries have maintained a patchy ceasefire over the LoC in Kashmir since 2003. Current spate of ceasefire violations began in January, 2013; by the close of year such incident could be around 200, far exceeding last year's total of 117. Things came to a crisis situation in September, 2013 when, just short of high-profile talks between Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of 68th UNGA session, militants of unknown identity killed eight Indian security personnel and a civilian. The attack was deliberately timed, and follows a pattern of attempts by vested interests to frustrate the bilateral peace process. Dr Singh, despite domestic electoral compulsions, could not be provoked to the level of calling off the talks. However, the bilateral was grossly de-scaled... from a breakfast meeting to a display of glass of water. Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, had advised Dr. Singh to skip his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.⁸⁹ Pakistan and India are neighbouring countries whose future is entwined and dependent upon each other. It is up to the two countries to find a way that leads to peace and prosperity of not only the two countries but also of the region.

It can also be observed that trade relations between the two sides are largely influenced by political, security and strategic factors. The trade volumes between them would largely depend erasing barriers to trade such as tariffs and non tariffs barriers and the quality and quantity of trade-related infrastructure.⁹⁰

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS & KASHMIR PROBLEM

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This paper throws light upon the historical chronology of the relations between the countries of India and Pakistan with respect to the unending Kashmir Issue. The paper is research intensive and factual in nature as well as replete with analytical aspects. This gives the paper a substantial spine for being an encyclopaedia of the Kashmir conflict timeline, encompassing the causes and effects of the said issue with reference to the science of warfare. As secondary sources, the Researcher will consider books and articles by several authors, preferably Indian, and their stance on the issue from an analytical perspective. This will give the readers a broader view on the topic. Most importantly, the researcher shall not refer to agenda-based vessels of public information and tainted media sensationalism, as they will provide a highly biased and fabricated perspective of the issue at hand.

INDO-PAK RELATIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

British rule in the Indian subcontinent ended in 1947 with the creation of new states: the Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India and ending the British Paramountcy over the 562 Indian princely states. These Princely States were thereafter left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a predominantly Muslim population ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. He decided to stay independent because he expected that the State's Muslims would be unhappy with accession to India, and the Hindus and Sikhs would become vulnerable if he joined Pakistan.¹

Pakistan made various efforts to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to join Pakistan. In July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah is believed to have written to the Maharaja promising "every sort of favourable treatment," followed by lobbying of the State's Prime Minister by leaders of Jinnah's Muslim League party. Faced with the Maharaja's indecision on accession, the Muslim League agents clandestinely worked in Poonch to encourage the local Muslims to an armed revolt, exploiting an internal unrest regarding economic grievances. The authorities in Pakistani Punjab waged a 'private war' by obstructing supplies of fuel and essential commodities to the State. Later in September, Muslim League officials in the Northwest Frontier Province, organized a large-scale invasion of Kashmir by Pathan tribesmen.² The Jammu division of the state got caught up in the Partition violence resulting in displacement of Hindus and Sikhs from the neighbouring areas of West Pakistan.

On 19 September, the Maharaja approached prime minister Nehru and requested for essential supplies which had been blockaded by Pakistan since the beginning of September and also urgent military assistance. However, India insisted the Maharaja to accede before it could send troops and consequently, the Maharaja signed an instrument of accession on 26 October 1947. It was a provisional accession.³ National Conference, the largest political party in the State and headed by Sheikh Abdullah, endorsed the accession.

Following its failure to seize Kashmir in 1947, Pakistan supported numerous 'covert cells' in Kashmir using operatives based in its New Delhi embassy. In 1965, it decided that the conditions were ripe for a successful

guerrilla war in Kashmir. About 30,000 infiltrators are estimated to have been dispatched in August 1965 as part of the 'Operation Gibraltar'.⁴ However, the 'Operation Gibraltar' ended in failure as the Kashmiris did not revolt and finally the Indian Army ended up fighting the Pakistani Army regulars. The war lasted till 23 September, ending in a stalemate. Following the Tashkent Agreement, both the sides withdrew to their pre-conflict positions, and agreed not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to a loss for Pakistan and a military surrender in East Pakistan. Bangladesh got created as a separate state with India's support and India emerged as a clear regional power in South Asia.⁵ 5,139 square miles of Pakistan's territory was captured by India during the conflict, and over 90,000 prisoners of war held in Bangladesh. India was ready to return them in exchange for a "durable solution" to the Kashmir issue. Accordingly, the Shimla Agreement was formulated and signed by the two countries, whereby the countries resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations and to maintain the sanctity of the Line of Control. The Shimla Agreement also stated that the two sides would meet again for establishing durable peace.

In mid-1999, alleged insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK) infiltrated Jammu and Kashmir. The insurgents occupied the vacant mountain peaks in the Kargil range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir that connects Srinagar and Leh. By blocking the highway, they could cut off the only link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. This resulted in a large-scale conflict between the Indian and Pakistani armies. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing most of the territories⁶ held by Pakistani forces.

Fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war provoked the United States to pressure Pakistan to retreat. The Pakistan Army withdrew their remaining troops from the area, ending the conflict. India regained control of the Kargil peaks, which they now patrol and monitor all year long.

Now in the future or tensions to deescalate, a lot depends on how bilateral talks proceed in the near future. It has taken India and Pakistan almost seventy years, three wars and the real threat of a 'nuclear' war to move from 'modalities to substance' in their discussions on Kashmir. Naturally, therefore, one should not expect immediate headway. However, for the sake of peace and security in the South Asian region, one hopes that both India and Pakistan approach the talks with the utmost sincerity and ensure that their substantive dialogue on Kashmir, which is bound to be contentious, does not lead to the entire dialogue process being terminally ruptured.

1. KEY PRESSURE AREAS

A. The Kashmir Problem

When the British government announced that India's independence was to be granted in August 1947 and that power would be handed over not to one political entity but two – India and Pakistan – it profoundly affected the politics of the princely states. Consequently, the rulers of the princely states had the right to decide if they wished to accede to either India or Pakistan, or preferred to remain independent. However, Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy to India, made it clear to the rulers of the princely states that they must join either India or Pakistan not only as a practical matter but also to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. The two principal factors in this choice were to be the communal allegiance of the people and geographical contiguity.⁷

Kashmir posed a unique problem since the state was contiguous to both India and Pakistan and, hence, claimed by both sides for ideological and geo-strategic reasons. The Pakistani claim was strengthened by the presence in Kashmir of a movement led by Ghulam Abbas and his All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference

which wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. The Muslim Conference's view was challenged by the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference led by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The National Conference espoused a secular ideology and wished to create a secular, democratic but independent Kashmir with close ties to India. But the Dogra ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, had calculated that by not joining either India or Pakistan during the period of the transfer of power, he would emerge as the ruler of an independent Kashmir state.

On August 14, 1947, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded. The following day, the Republic of India was established to the south. The partition of India and Pakistan was perhaps one of the most heart-breaking events of history. Many lives were uprooted and many lost. Its ripples are still felt every day in our culture, in our movies, in our book, and for many of us, in our personal lives as well.

B. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution

In keeping with the conditions of Kashmir's accession to India, local elections were held in 1951, which provided an overwhelming mandate to Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference. Within short time, the Abdullah government's populist policies alienated the powerful Hindu Pandit community in Kashmir which started questioning the legality of Kashmir's "special status" under the Indian constitution and demanded the full and irrevocable integration of Kashmir with India. The rise of Hindu nationalism in Kashmir became a major source of friction between the Indian government and the Abdullah administration. Sheikh Abdullah was finally arrested by the Indian government in 1953 and sent to prison. With Abdullah's ouster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed took control of the National Conference and advocated a closer union with India. When Pakistan entered into a defence agreement with the United States in 1954, India interpreted the move as a hostile act and announced that Kashmir's accession to India was final. The 1949 Cease-fire Line (CFL) thus became the de facto border between the two states thereby bifurcating Kashmir. The Indian portion consisted of three main regions: the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. In 1956, the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly approved the merger of the state with India. In 1957, Kashmir was formally incorporated into the Indian Union. It was granted a special status under Article 370 of India's constitution.

C. Cross-Border Terrorism

The Cold War tensions between India and Pakistan resulted in three wars over Kashmir. However, Pakistan realised that conventional wars would not serve its purpose to bring Kashmir under its fold, and it needed another strategy to counter India. Hence, Pakistan started aiding and abetting a low intensity war against India to liberate Kashmir. Arms and ammunition flow from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) towards Jammu and Kashmir. It is said that President Zia-ul-Haq had put into action a three-phase plan for the liberation of the Kashmir Valley. The plan was codenamed "Topac" after Topac Amru, an Inca prince who fought an unconventional war against the Spanish rule in 18th century Uruguay. In phase one, low level insurgency in India was advocated which included planting people at key positions like police, financial institutions, etc; armed groups to be trained to meet the paramilitary forces; the lines of communications to be disrupted between Jammu and Kashmir; and exacerbation of anti-India feelings. Phase two advocated more intense engagement of the Indian Army in Poonch or Siachen in order to keep them away from the valley, and destroy their base depots, airfields, radio stations and block the Banihal tunnel and Kargil-Leh highway with the help of Afghan Mujahideen from POK. In the third phase, Kashmir had to be liberated from India and an independent Islamic state was to be set up.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the main agency to supply weapons, finance, and guidance to the Kashmiri militants. There are nearly 105 training camps in POK and nearly eight on the Pak-Afghan border,

handled entirely by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. It is said that the money generated through smuggling of narcotics is used to keep terrorism and insurgency alive. India has been both the target and the transit point for the narcotics. It lies in the middle of the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan) and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, Laos) and is also a victim of militancy in Kashmir, the north-east, and, earlier, Punjab. Arms and ammunition are provided from across the border to the Kashmiri militants. However, with greater vigilance by the Indian armed forces on the western borders, Pakistan began to search for new avenues to carry out its activities—like Nepal—to enter India. The Pakistan Embassy in Nepal is reported to be providing financial assistance and transit facilities to the Kashmiri militants. Pakistan has also been cultivating relations with the Muslims of the Terai and India through setting up Muslim organisations which not only impart training and religious education but also foment anti-India activities. The Muslim organisations are funded by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.

The US government acknowledges Pakistan's involvement in aiding international terrorism but it also pronounces the violation of human rights as a problem in Kashmir. Russia and China are concerned about the rising militancy and Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. The spread of fundamentalism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir can spread to China's areas lying close to them and exacerbate its already prevalent ethnic problem in the Xinjiang province.

D. The Afghanistan Issue

India and Afghanistan historically have shared close cultural and political ties, and the complexity of their diplomatic history reflects this fact. India was the only South Asian country to recognize the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the 1980s. India aided the overthrow of the Taliban and became the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan.

India seeks to expand its economic presence in Afghanistan as it wants to improve transport connectivity and economic collaboration with countries in Central and South Asia. India has already invested heavily in such projects that includes setting up Iron ore mines, a 6 MTPA steel plant, an 800 MW power plant, Hydro-electric power projects, transmission lines, roads etc. India and Iran are set to ink a transit agreement on transporting goods to landlocked Afghanistan. The Indian government is investing more than US\$100 million in the expansion of the Chabahar port in south-eastern Iran which will serve as a hub for the transportation of transit goods. Besides as a goodwill gesture, India is also constructing a new Parliament complex for the Afghan government at a cost of INR 710 crores (USD 115 million).

Pakistan supported the anti-Soviet mujahadeen and then the Taliban “to ensure that in the event of conflict with India, Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with support and use of its land and air space if needed. Pakistan sees India's growing influence in Afghanistan as a threat. “Pakistan's fears of encirclement by India have been compounded” by the new Indian air base in Farkhor. This is the first Indian military airbase overseas, and is convenient for transportation of men and material to and from Afghanistan. It is also a move toward protecting India's potential energy interests in the region. Pakistan also competes with India for access to consumer markets in Afghanistan. Pakistan sees Iran's Chabahar port, which India hopes to use as its route for trade with Afghanistan, as a rival that would compete with its new port at Gwadar, which has been built with Chinese assistance.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban has led to increased instability in Afghanistan, from the growth of terrorism to upped opium cultivation. But Islamabad denies any support for the Taliban and says it is committed to fighting terrorism. U.S. military and intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that Pakistan's tribal areas along the Afghan border continue to serve as safe havens for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to stage attacks against Afghanistan.

Experts say Pakistan's cooperation in counterterrorism is vital to winning the war in Afghanistan. But a "transformation of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties can only take place in an overall context of improved Pakistani-Indian relations" that enhances Pakistani confidence in its regional position.

Most policy experts support India's engagement in Afghanistan but recommend a three-way relationship between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan must reassert a neutral policy of pursuing strong relations with both India and Pakistan.

E. The China Factor

China is a key player in providing arms to Pakistan. As Pakistani dependence on US arms reduced after the 1971 War, the Chinese became willing participants in the proposed military collaboration and technology transfers not only to establish military links with Pakistan but also because it helped subsidise their own Research and Development programme. Though Sino-India relations have been moving towards normalisation, China's weapons supply to Pakistan remains a major concern for India.

The Chinese scientists have been visiting Kahuta and China has provided a design of one of its own atomic bombs and enough highly enriched uranium for two bombs. The Chinese technological assistance to the Pakistani nuclear programme is to counter-balance India's dominance in the region. Much to the liking of China, Pakistan's role in engaging India on its western border is not diminishing. China had supported Pakistan on Kashmir which had acted as a second front against India with whom it had a border demarcation problem leading to war in 1962. China has always considered it the sovereign right of any nation to develop its own nuclear weapons. However, after the nuclear tests conducted by India, China reacted strongly and urged the US to take stringent measures against India.

F. Role of USA and Russia

Both the United States and the former Soviet Union have vied with each other for gaining a foothold in the South Asian region. The major powers have played a major role in South Asia; in its politics as well as in its economic development. They have created tensions here, and have also helped in resolving some tensions; they have created problems but have kept them from escalating into unmanageable propositions.

The most notable feature after partition was Pakistan's fear of India's strength which outclasses it in every comparison. Pakistan wanted to counter the Indian threat by building up its military strength and was not averse to maintaining relations with the Great Powers. This was evident when in 1954 it entered into a Mutual Security Pact with the US which changed the whole context of the problems existing between India and Pakistan. Pakistan proved useful to the US in its policy of Containment of Communism in the region. The US gave Pakistan the first high performance jet aircraft, including F-86 Sabres and 12 F-104 interceptors and hundreds of World War I and Korean War vintage tanks. Prime Minister Nehru was against the involvement of external powers in the bilateral regional issues which would otherwise bring the Cold War politics into the region. The US arms aid to Pakistan became a lasting and irritating issue in Indo-Pak relations, and in response, India started purchasing arms from non-American sources.

The Indo-Soviet relations coincided with the deteriorating Sino-Soviet and Sino-India relations. The Tibetan uprising in 1959 led India to buy transport planes and helicopters from the Soviet Union as the Soviets were prepared to accept payment in Indian currency. In October 1960, an Indian delegation went to Moscow to negotiate and finalise the deal for the purchase of aircraft and communications equipment. The Chinese attack on India in 1962, however, placed the USSR in a delicate position as it was difficult for it not to support a Communist

state, Hence, Moscow adopted a neutral position. The US, on the other hand, sent twelve C-130 Hercules transport planes with the crews to help India in transporting its men and materials on the mountainous borders.

Pakistan was agitated by the Kennedy Administration's limited military aid to India during the Sino-India War. President Ayub was convinced that this would upset the Indo-Pak military balance and India might use the arms provided by the US against Pakistan. Pakistan had foreseen the utility of developing relations with China and it declared India as the aggressor against China in 1962. Pakistan treated China as a shield to protect itself from any possible Indian attack. Thus, the Indo-Pak politics took a new turn, with new allies, which brought added tension in the subcontinent.

In 1965, India retaliated the Pak ingression through infiltrators and a full-fledged war erupted which lasted till 23 September. The Indian authorities informed the US about the use of American weapons by the Pakistani forces. Pakistan was under an obligation under the Mutual Security Act, not to use American weapons in aggression against any other country. This led the US government to impose an arms embargo on both the belligerents on September 8, 1965. On the following day, the State Department declared US neutrality in the Indo-Pak conflict.

The neutral stand taken by the US during the September 1965 War further infuriated Pakistan as it had expected the US to use its influence to stop the Indian invasion across the international line which threatened Pakistan's independence.

During the 1965 War, the Soviet Union adopted a neutral stand and offered its good offices for a peaceful settlement between the two warring states. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met at Tashkent on January 3, 1966. The conference lasted from January 4-10, 1966, at which they agreed to create good relations in accordance with the UN Charter, to promote understanding and friendly relations and a total pull-out of troops before February 25, 1966 to their pre-war positions. Russia emerged as a peace-maker at a time when the US was involved in the Vietnam War.

The Indo-Pakistan War started on December 3 which also witnessed the active involvement of the Great Powers. The US sent "Task Force 74" headed by the nuclear powered carrier Enterprise and half a dozen other ships into the Bay of Bengal through the Straits of Malacca. Subsequently, the Soviets despatched a force of six vessels to the Indian Ocean. At one time, it looked as if a direct confrontation between the two external powers would take place in South Asia. For the first time, the two superpowers were directly involved in the Indian Ocean over the Indo-Pak conflict. The crisis ended abruptly when Pakistani forces in Dacca unconditionally surrendered to the Indian forces on December 16.

In 1973, the US decided to modify its policy of arms embargo on Pakistan by permitting the sale of non-lethal equipment and spare parts. In 1975, the US lifted the embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan under the pretext that the Soviet Union had dumped excess arms in India. American fears and assumptions became more intense when India exploded a nuclear bomb in May 1974. This enabled Pakistan to persuade the US to lift the arms embargo. The US had been giving aircraft and airfield equipment to Pakistan under the pretext that India had obtained sophisticated weapons from the former USSR whereas Pakistan had inferior weapons from China and a small quantity from the US.

The US policy towards the region is guided by its own interests. America is opposed to the Indian and the Pakistani moves to go for the nuclear bomb as it could encourage other countries to go nuclear, thus, leading to a breakdown of the existing international nuclear order. The Indian nuclear programme was considered as a weapons

programme and the focus was concentrated on stockpiling of fissionable material that the US claimed India was building.

As matters stand today, the U.S. role in the regional affairs has increased with the passage of time and it is likely to increase in future. There are multiple reasons to claiming so: Indo-Pak talks need a trusted mediator right away to bring them to table for negotiations. Secondly, the apparent presence of ISIS literature and possibilities of likeminded terrorist organizations to team up will be alarming for U.S. policy makers. Thirdly, establishment of Al Qaeda's Indian wing would drag the U.S. into the regional counter terrorism policies in one or other way. Fourthly, U.S. support for India to serve as a regional balance or counter to China would sustain, or even increase U.S. involvement in the region.

2. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL & SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES

Since the late 1980s, as tensions between India and Pakistan flared up, the two sides appeared to be on the brink of war on at least three different occasions~ incredibly, they moved back from the brink all three times. The lack of war, however, did not imply that the LoC was quiet. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, Pakistani troops stationed along the LoC and on the Siachen Glacier, the world's highest battlefield, have periodically resorted to firing and shelling of Indian 'forward positions' and border villages. It is generally believed in India that these unprovoked firings serve two purposes for the Pakistani military: one, to infiltrate armed insurgents into Kashmir under cover of gunfire from across the LoC and, secondly, to scuttle any initiatives for the resumption of bilateral dialogue between the two states. On almost every occasion, the Indians returned the fire.

There are compelling financial, political and strategic reasons for the existence of simmering 'low intensity' tension across the LoC and the Siachen, rather than open warfare. First, a conventional war (let alone a nuclear one) between India and Pakistan today will be economically and financially ruinous for both states given the astronomical rise in the cost of warfare and the state of their respective domestic economies. Given the state of the Indian and Pakistani economies today, exorbitant expenses to the tune of USD 400-500 millions per day would be difficult to meet. Secondly, the 'political cost' that India and Pakistan would have to pay domestically as well as internationally for initiating a war today would be astronomical given that both states possess nuclear weapons.

Finally, Pakistan's conventional military capabilities, in spite of the substantial modernisation it has undergone in the last decade, still remains weak compared to India. Its armed forces have also been badly hit by the stoppage in American military aid since 1990. On the other hand, the modernisation of the Indian armed forces and the maintenance of a steady supply of ammunition, equipment and spares for its Soviet made inventory have been badly hit by the demise of the Soviet Union. The prolonged use of the military in domestic political problems and foreign misadventures has also generated battle fatigue and affected morale within the armed forces. As a result, neither side today would be capable of inflicting an overwhelming defeat on the other side in a conventional war.

3. POLICY OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS REGARDING BILATERAL RELATIONS

There are several disputes involving different actors in Kashmir which make dispute resolution a complicated matter. For instance, in Kashmir there is a dispute between India and Pakistan regarding which state should rightfully possess Kashmir~ a dispute between India and the people of Kashmir regarding Kashmir's future association with India~ a dispute between Pakistan and the people of Kashmir regarding Kashmir's future association with Pakistan~ a dispute between Kashmiri Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists regarding Kashmir's political future~ and a dispute between Kashmiri insurgent groups regarding ideology, strategy and Kashmir's political future.

Finding a settlement framework that would adequately address all these disputes and satisfy the different actors involved would be a time consuming and difficult task. At the very least, three things have to happen before a mutually acceptable solution can even be contemplated. Firstly, India and Pakistan have to formally give up their zero sum territorial claims over Kashmir and stop all military and paramilitary activities in Kashmir. Secondly, Kashmiri Muslims have to give up their claims for independence for Kashmir or for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan and stop all insurgency and terrorist activities. And thirdly, Hindus and Buddhists have to accept overall Muslim dominance and control in Kashmir in exchange for 'safeguards' of their group rights.

Whether these developments eventually materialise or not depends upon the political resolve in New Delhi and Islamabad to settle the Kashmir dispute through compromise, and the ability of the Modi and Sharif administrations to keep the hardliners in their respective countries in check~ the degree of disillusionment among the Kashmiri Muslim population regarding the insurgency and the 'flexibility' of their leaders~ and an overall improvement in the security environment in Kashmir that would allow Hindu and Buddhist refugees to be repatriated and resettled.

For tensions to deescalate, therefore, a lot depends on how bilateral talks proceed in the near future. It has taken India and Pakistan almost seventy years, three wars and the real threat of a 'nuclear' war to move from 'modalities to substance' in their discussions on Kashmir. Naturally, therefore, one should not expect immediate headway. However, for the sake of peace and security in the South Asian region, one hopes that both India and Pakistan approach the talks with the utmost sincerity and ensure that their substantive dialogue on Kashmir, which is bound to be contentious, does not lead to the entire dialogue process being terminally ruptured.

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ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN KASHMIR

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Introduction

The present chapter analyses the critical role and the increasing influence of China both in Indian Administered Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir. It would also highlight Chinese interests in Kashmir and its policy approach towards the Kashmir dispute that has remained the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Further, the chapter discusses the emerging strategic relations between Pakistan and China. It also make an assessment of the growing Chinese influence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) in the recent past and its security concerns for India.

Kashmir is a region where India, China, and Pakistan all have territorial claims.¹ China's role and involvement in Kashmir issue is getting complicated with every passing years. China has over the years developed keen strategic interests in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In fact, it is quite well known that the occupation of Kashmir is divided amidst three states, India, Pakistan, and China. As against the general understanding that Kashmir problem is related to India and Pakistan, but China is equally a part of the problem. It is due to the fact that China at present occupies 42,685 sq. kms of J&K.²

Beijing's interests lies in both Indian occupied Kashmir as well as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Given the rich natural resources present in Kashmir, Beijing seeks the exploitation of rich resources particularly energy and also to upset India's military superiority over the arch rival Pakistan.³ Chinese interests and involvement in Kashmir will definitely have spill over implications on India from the short to the long-term perspective.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir at the time when India got independent from British has a total area of about 2,22,236 sq. Km. However, in 1949 when a cease fire line was drawn, Pakistan went on to occupy about one third of the area i.e. 78932 sq. km (comprising of the whole of Gilgit, Mirpur, Kotli and a part of Poonch). In the post 1962 war with India, China occupied about 64000 sq. kms in Ladakh known as Aksai Chin. Besides, 5,180 sq. km. of Jammu and Kashmir was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan under the March 1963 Sino-Pak Boundary agreement. As of now, only 101,437 sq. km is with India. China deny Aksai Chin to be a part of Kashmir.⁴

By virtue of the occupation of one-fifth of territory, China shares border with Kashmir.⁵ Chinese interests in Kashmir have started to flourish in the post 1962 war. Since then, China has been calling for self-determination in Kashmir. Such a China's policy has to be seen in the context of Pakistan's continued relevance in China's strategic calculus in South Asia. China shares positive sentiments with Kashmiri people⁶ By refusing to issue visa to Lt. Gen B S Jaswal serving in Indian Occupied Kashmir, Beijing has sent a clear message that Kashmir is a disputed territory left over from history. China invested heavily on energy and power generation projects on both sides of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and in Gilgit-Baltistan region. If on the one side China refused to accept Indian side of

Kashmir, then, on the other side, it is continued to be actively involved in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.⁷ In fact, prior to official meeting between India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in Hanoi on 29 October 2010, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu has affirmed that, "China's visa policy toward residents of the India-held Kashmir is consistent and remains unchanged."⁸

China looms large on India's unfriendly relations with Pakistan. It seeks to exploit the lack of political misunderstanding between the two South Asian neighbours to its advantage. Seeing the security scenario in the South Asian region, China has improved engagement with Pakistan thereby making strategic and economic investments in the latter. The idea is to keep the common enemy under strategic pressure for strategic purpose.⁹ The last one decade has seen India gaining significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military prowess, which is never in the interests of China and Pakistan. Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India's progress in this direction. In fact, India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan policies toward each other. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic coordination, advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. Pakistan in particular viewed India as a potential challenger leading to use China to counter Indian power in the region.

The close strategic partnership between the two countries has been based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. Pakistan's search for a country that can help sustain a sufficient military capacity for itself against India coalesces with China's intention that "a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping India preoccupied on two fronts, thereby safeguard their national security interests."¹⁰

Beijing is fuelling that arms race between the two South Asian rivals. It has in the past and even today helped Pakistan maintain conventional military balance between India and Pakistan by equipping the latter with JF-17 aircraft and JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms and ammunition. It has also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fuel Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.¹¹ China's strategy of providing advanced arms and equipment requirements for Pakistan will continue to remain a case of serious national security concerns for India. Pakistan continues to be the major beneficiary of China's unending support to acquire nuclear materials and technology. Arms-control analysts, Gary Milhollin has very rightly pointed out that,

"If you subtract China's help from Pakistan's nuclear program, there is no nuclear program."¹²

In the same line, another strategic affairs analysts, Robert Ross is of the perception that,

"China continues its support for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile technology because China views a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power."¹³

The chapter argues that although relations between China and Pakistan may be getting stronger, but when it comes to Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, China is never interested in the resolution of one of the oldest disputes that exists in the world today. China's interest lies in keeping the issue intact so that India, its strategic rivalry is tied down in a long-term rivalry with Pakistan.¹⁴

Map 1.1

In response to China's stance on Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has allowed China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enter into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Lt Gen KT Parnaik, heading the Northern Command has warned that China's military presence in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was too close for India's comfort. "It poses military challenges to India and not only along the Sino-Indian border but also along the LoC." He further added that "We hear many people who are concerned about the fact that if there were to be hostilities between us and Pakistan what would be the complicity of the Chinese. Not only because they are in the neighbourhood but the fact that they are actually stationed and present on the LoC." Besides, "The Chinese Links with Pakistan through PoK lend strength to the China-Pakistan nexus which has been of great security concern for us. It jeopardises our regional and strategic interest in the long run...the Chinese footprints are too close for comfort."¹⁵

The present chapter seeks to make a critical analysis on the role and influence of China in Kashmir. The last over five decades has seen change and continuity in Beijing's policy approach toward the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. It would also throw light on the more recent developments. In doing so, the chapter seeks to answer for these questions – What is China's interests in Kashmir from a long-term perspective? How does China view the Kashmir conflict? What would be the possible implications to India's sovereignty on Kashmir vis-à-vis Chinese involvement in Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir?

Geo-Strategic Significance of Kashmir for China

China's role and involvement in Kashmir has not occurred in vacuum. The geo-strategic significance of Kashmir has without any doubt attracted the attention of China towards it. One of the key distinctive feature of Kashmir is its geo-strategic location. The very location of Kashmir give China economic and strategic advantage over its long-term strategic rival India. Silk Route holds immense significance for China for it helps to maintain dominant military position over India. Silk Route connects China with Pakistan and passes through Kashmir. Through Gilgit, China can infiltrate deeply into the Kashmir valley of our country. Besides Gilgit, China and Pakistan together can pose a serious threat to the security of our country via Siachen Glacier.¹⁶

Another significance for Kashmir lies in the fact that it shares borders with Afghanistan, a country where acts as a bridge between South Asia and Central Asia.¹⁷

China's Kashmir Policy: Historical Perspective

It is quite pertinent to understand the factors that shaped the China's Kashmir policy in the past decades prior to post cold war era. According to B. Raman, China's Kashmir policy has been consistent with a change in its stance on Indian-held Kashmir. It has diluted its past acceptance of J&K as a de facto part of India.¹⁸ In the immediate years of the independence of India and Pakistan, Chinese stance has been neutral. It hesitated to taking side between India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue. Chinese hesitation were further strengthened when Pakistan joined western alliances. By remaining neutral, Chinese Premier had in 1957 gave a statement that both sides should resolve the issue bilaterally through peaceful means.¹⁹

The situation in which India's relations with China was at its historic low in the 1960s, Chinese leaders and people were supportive to the Kashmiri people in their claim for right to self-determination. In a piece that was published in the People's Daily on 5 September 1965, it was highlighted that,

"...the Chinese people deeply sympathize with the just struggle of the people of Kashmir for their right to self-determination... the Chinese government and people... resolutely support... the Kashmir people's struggle for national self-determination... the Kashmir people will surely realize their desire for national self-determination."²⁰

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 brought about a shift in Chinese policy towards the Kashmir issue. In the post Sino-Indian war, there witnessed a perceptible shift in the Chinese position from maintaining neutral to inclination towards Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue. This was the time when the relations between India and China started to deteriorate. Beijing supported Islamabad's position on the Kashmir issue to demonstrate solidarity with an "all weather" ally during periods of Sino-Indian estrangement and hostility.

During the visit to Pakistan in 1964, China's Prime Minister Zhou Enlai declared its commitment to support for the resolution of Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. The very next year, President Ayub visited China and entered into a joint statement that declares the support for self-determination of Kashmiri people. In a message received from China on 16 September 1965, it is clearly mentioned that the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan should be settled on the basis of respect for Kashmiri people's right of self-determination, as pledged by both countries. It is also stated that by China's non-involvement in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan would mean allowing both sides to peacefully resolving the problem. But, non-involvement absolutely doesn't mean failure to distinguish between right and wrong; it absolutely does not mean that China can approve of depriving the Kashmiri people of their right of self-determination.

Till the early 1980s, China's Kashmir policy has seen constant call for the right of self-determination for Kashmir people.²¹ However, with China seeking to maintain close relations with India for the mutual benefit, Beijing seems to have changed its mind. And as the relations with India got normalised, China shifted its approach from a policy of inclination to neutrality to avoid needless alienation of India, coupled with running the risk of entrapment. For that matter, the Chinese policy got reflected in Deng Xiaoping's June 1980 statement that, "... Kashmir ... was a bilateral issue left over from history between India and Pakistan, and should be resolved peacefully..." This carried forward to the decade of the early 1990s, when China's position became unequivocal that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter.²²

In the past, Pakistan took Chinese protection on the issue of Kashmir, be it in UN or giving moral support. However in the early 90's there was a change in Chinese approach, when it advocated peaceful negotiations between the two sides over the Kashmir dispute.²³ The major concern for Pakistan is in regard to China adopting a neutral position on Kashmir.²⁴ During Chinese President Jiang Zemin visit to India and Pakistan in late 1996, he advocated a direct dialogue between the two countries on Kashmir as well as progress towards better bilateral relations.²⁵ Speaking at a press conference, Mr. Zhu, said, 'China had neither any intention nor will it play any mediatory role between the two countries.'²⁶ Seeking to maintain a balance between India and Pakistan, Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai had in an interview stated that, "We were on friendly terms with India; we took an attitude of non-involvement in the Kashmir issue. We... hope that India and Pakistan would settle the Kashmir issue and other problems in a friendly manner, with Pakistan. Despite, friendly terms with Pakistan, we have not given up our desire for friendship with India."²⁷ The neutral stand taken by China on the Kashmir issue is a result of the fear psychosis of spill over implications of ongoing terrorist violence in Kashmir into its Muslim dominated province of Xinjiang.²⁸

China's Kashmir Policy in the 21st Century

From the beginning of the Kashmir problem to the end of twentieth century, China's Kashmir policy have seen four different forms. The decade of 1950s saw China remained neutral, but, the following decades of 1960s to 1970s, witnessed inclination towards Pakistan's position over Kashmir issue owing to the unhealthy relations between India and China. However, by 1980s, the policy of China return to the previous position of neutrality due to normalization in China-India relations. In the post Cold War period it changed its position and said that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and it should be resolved through peaceful means.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in 2002 declared its official position on Kashmir issue that, "China's position on the issue of Kashmir has been clear cut. We have always maintained that the Kashmir issue is one between India and Pakistan left over by history. China hopes that the two sides should seek new ways to appropriately solve the problem through peaceful exchanges and negotiations and refrain from military conflicts".²⁹

In regard to China's stand on Kashmir and the expanding relations between China and Pakistan, John Garver, has very rightly said that, from the very beginning, China started supporting the Kashmiri people's war of self-determination, a support that was translated in the following years to material support to launch an insurgency inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).³⁰

China's involvement in Kashmir is getting stronger and deeper with every passing years. China's sympathy for Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, and for secessionists in the territory itself, are extremely unwelcome for India. China's Kashmir policy has to be seen within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy. It has adopted a policy seeking to serve its regional and global interests. On the Kashmir issue, seeing the nature of engagement and the understanding it has with both Islamabad and New Delhi, Beijing have supported the former's positions to demonstrate solidarity with it. India's long-term strategic rivalry with both China and Pakistan really influenced Beijing to be supportive towards Islamabad in its dealing with new Delhi over the Kashmir issue. However, when relations with New Delhi gets normalized, Beijing adopted a policy of neutrality to avoid unnecessarily alienating India and running the risk of entrapment.³¹ Overall, China's policy towards Kashmir has ranged between support to Islamabad and maintaining neutrality between the two South Asian rivals.

By virtue of the fact that China shares border with Kashmir, the policy adopted has in one way or another supported the case of Pakistan in Kashmir. China's generous support is based on the rationale that a strong Pakistan in the region of South Asia which is of no threat to Beijing but is necessary to balance India from the long-

term point of view. China shares some sentiments with Kashmiri people. As part of its evolving policy, China invited Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the president of All-Parties Hurriyat Conference in 2009 to showcase its support for the people of Kashmir. To further make the matter really worse, Beijing has invested billions of dollars on different energy and power generation projects on both sides of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and similarly in Gilgit-Baltistan region. While, on the other side, it has refused to accept Indian control of Kashmir and considers it as disputed territory.³²

For strategic reasons, China has so far maintained that Kashmir is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan and rejects Indian claim over Kashmir as an integral part of it. There witnessed change and continuity in Beijing's policy towards Kashmir from time to time and offered different methods of resolving it. Under the so-called China's Kashmir policy, Beijing offer military assistance to Pakistan in its dealing with India which also serves its long-term interests of containing New Delhi from gaining international leverage.

Chinese Involvement in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK): Security and Strategic Concerns for India

Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) comprised of both Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. India's official stand has been made clear to the Pakistanis and the international community that PoK is part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and hence an integral part of India. It has been under the illegitimate control of Pakistan since 22 October 1947.³³ The geo-political and geo-strategic significance of PoK has increased manifold after the establishment of the Karakoram highway (KKH) that connect Pakistan with China via PoK. What makes PoK really significant for China can be reflected from the fact that it shares border with Xinjiang province of the People's Republic of China to the north.³⁴ The KKH offers tremendous opportunities for both countries in terms of trade and transfer of arms and equipment needs including nuclear and missile material from China to Pakistan.³⁵

From the Islamabad point of view, China is the most reliable and capable partners to dealing with the threat of India. Chinese involvement in PoK is quite usual when the former provide the necessary support to the latter's need whether it may be in the case of Kashmir or providing arms and equipment needs to deal with a much stronger Indian side.

Whatever may be the reasons, the Chinese presence in PoK has opened a new chapter to the prolonged strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The growing Chinese presence in the region is a case of serious concerns for our country.³⁶ In 2009 and 2010, India responded sharply to reports of the presence of Chinese soldiers and workers in the region. India's External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj had termed the CPEC project "unacceptable" for it pass through PoK. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval raised eyebrows when he reminded an audience of BSF officers to factor in 106-km-long non-contiguous border with Afghanistan in a clear reference to Gilgit-Baltistan's Afghan frontier. She has unequivocally emphasised that entire state of J & K including Gilgit-Baltistan as an integral part of India in recent press releases. With the recent up-gradation of Karakorum Highway through Gilgit-Baltistan, the collousivity of China and Pakistan and likelihood of two front war especially along PoK and Aksai Chin increases.

The vast improvement in communication infrastructure especially in Gilgit-Baltistan will enable Pakistan to sidestep forces in a much faster rate and quantum compared to India, hampered by external and poorly developed lines-of-communication. This implies that Pakistan will effectively be able to increase force-ratios in theatres to her advantage in a much reduced timeframe.³⁷

By way of increasing its influence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, China desires to secure access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. This would hold the key for its commercial, energy, and military supplies with other countries via the CPEC corridor. Gaining foothold in PoK would bring Chinese naval forces close to India's south-western waters that can prove to be effective in times of crisis with India. That's the reason why India's Ambassador to China, Gautam Bambawale has said that the CPEC corridor 'violates our territorial integrity.' Most importantly, the CPEC project undermines Indian sovereignty as it passes through a Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir.³⁸

India expressed deep concern and reservation over the US\$42 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which passes through Pak-Occupied Kashmir.³⁹ China's growing involvement in PoK through the CPEC not only pose setback to India's sovereign claim over PoK, but, also, its role and presence distorts the balance of position in the dispute.⁴⁰ However, against the rising voice of India, China has compared its developments effort in PoK to that of India's developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh, which according to the former is not part of India. China in cooperation with Pakistan is undergoing the transit and transport project that passes through PoK. They are of the argument that if India can carry out all sort of political, economic and military developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh, China can do the same in PoK.⁴¹

The matter of concern for India is that China in the name of development efforts in PoK is carrying out its military activities in the region. Beijing has stationed its PLA troops in the region, and in particular to the 772-km-long Line of Control (LoC) running between India and Pakistan. Besides, it is also being reported that a unit of PLA soldiers is placed near the Khunjerab Pass with the negative intent of establishing its military edge in India's northern sector is pretty clear.⁴² Pakistan welcomed Chinese involvement in the infrastructure and development activities in the region which serve Beijing interests of putting a pressure on India. On the other hand, by way of opening to China, Pakistan seeks to capitalize on it to counterbalance India in a crisis situation with India.⁴³

India's External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj had stated in response to a question raised in Lok Sabha in December 2014 that,

'... Government has seen reports with regard to China and Pakistan being involved in infrastructure building activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), including construction of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Government has conveyed its concerns to China about their activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and asked them to cease such activities.'⁴⁴

China-Pakistan Engagement: Historical Perspective

Pakistan's decision to develop close relations with China was influenced by the former's self-interest because 'in view of Pakistan sponsored militancy in India and passive hostility of the Afghan Government, Pakistan doesn't want another great neighbour to be its enemy. Until the late 1950s, Pakistan's relations with China was nothing special. However, with the Sino-Indian relations started declining in 1959, Pakistan was driven closer to Beijing. The Sino-Indian War proved a watershed in the Sino-Pakistan relations. In the aftermath of 1962 war, Pakistan was convinced that split between New Delhi and Beijing had come full circle. Hence the circumstances allowed 'Enemy's enemy is my friend' to perpetuate as the mode of discourse and decks cleared for future Sino-Pakistani entente-cordiale. Taking advantage of this discourse, Pakistan under a border agreement on 2 March 1963 ceded a portion of "Azad Kashmir" to China. India protested to both China and Pakistan stating its position that it would not agree to any arrangements or agreements on Indian territory which was under 'illegal occupation of Pakistan.'

The Indian Government alleged that Pakistan had not given away 2050 square miles but 11,000 square miles of territory according to the data of the Survey of Pakistan. The agreement signified serious strategic implications for India and helped China to have a direct access and attack capability on Kashmir by land via the KaraKoram pass and by air via direct Chinese air link to the Gilgit airfield. Islamabad presumed that any attack by India on Pakistan would bring China to its rescue. Pakistan's then Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto declared on 17 July 1963 that, "An attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan~ it now involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in the Asia as well."

However in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, despite assurances to help Pakistan, China did not offer any physical moves and only gave verbal warnings to India. Between 1965 and 1971, Pakistan received USD 200 million worth arms aid from China. Of which, USD 45 million worth of arms were supplied in 1971 alone.

Chinese cultivated relations with Pakistan for two reasons - one, Pakistan was looked upon as a link to the Middle East and two, in the regional initiatives, Chinese strategy was to forge closer links with South Asian countries to create a sub-regional balance to counter the Indian pre-eminence in South Asia. Pakistan sought precisely the kind of countervailing authority that China had willingly provided i.e, convince its special friends, that despite its potential resources, China would never behave like a superpower and within the regional context it was able to project an image of a weighty neighbour, particularly in South Asia.⁴⁵

To strengthen the strategic part of the relations between China and Pakistan, both concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement in 1986. Under the agreement, China has committed to support Pakistan in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors and even assist the latter with the enrichment of weapons grade uranium. Besides, it also transferred tritium gas to Pakistan specifically meant to advance the yield of atomic bombs.⁴⁶

In 1989 China built a 27 MW nuclear research reactor in Pakistan and Pakistani scientists were being trained in China. In the early 1990's China built an un-safeguarded plutonium reprocessing facility at Chashma, which was the chief source of Pakistan's weapon grade Plutonium. In 1995 China build another un-safeguarded reactor at Khushab. The same year China transferred 5000 ring magnets to Pakistan, after which it got exposed and there was a worldwide condemnation of China. In 1996, China transferred an industrial furnace with a casting surface in which the bomb core is cast and helps Pakistani engineers install it in Khushab. The commitment and involvement of China in Pakistan's nuclear programme leads one to believe that in the event of an Indo-Pak conflict, Chinese would align with Pakistan, so long as it remained convinced that neither the US nor the USSR would intervene.⁴⁷

In the aftermath of the end of the cold war, if on the one side, there witnessed sharp reduction in Pakistan's strategic relevance for the United States, but on the other sides, Pakistan move closer to China to compensate for this loss. The post-Cold War global strategic developments have its impact on the relationship between China and Pakistan. Both countries enjoy a multifaceted partnership which ranges from political to economic and trade and from defence and security to nuclear cooperation. In 1996, during the state visit of President Jiang Zemin to Pakistan, the two countries decided to establish a comprehensive friendship. They signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to the effect that "neither party will join any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity" of either nation or "would not conclude treaties of this nature with any third party." However, the suitable environment was created when China had equipped Pakistan Air Force with F-7P fighter in

1992. On the very same year, China also supplied to Pakistan 34 M-11 battlefield missiles, a solid-fuel variant of the Soviet Scud-B missile.⁴⁸

The growing significance of relations between the two sides can be acknowledged from the historic speech made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the Pakistan Senate on December 1996 that underlines that,

‘Our two peoples have regarded each other as friends in need and brothers bound by common fate, always sympathizing with and supporting each other. The Chinese Government stand ready to join the Pakistani side in further solidifying this friendly and cooperative relationship.’⁴⁹

As the relationship gets stronger with every passing year and the Beijing’s ensuring security guarantee for Islamabad has only brought significant change in the latter perception towards the former. Pakistan gives strategic importance to its partnership with China. This was very well reflected in the words of Dr Shireen Mazari, “The Peking has not only repudiated to back down on its defence pledges to Islamabad, in spite of Western pressure, but has been about especially responsible for permitting Pakistan a modicum of sufficient defence ability and nuclear development clearly makes China absolutely essential for Pakistan’s survival., Pakistan has become extremely casual about its relations with China.” Despite U.S. imposition of Pressler Amendment upon Islamabad, China continue to extend support to Islamabad nuclear weapons programme. China was closely working with Pakistan over the development of 9300 Mw power plant at Chasma. Moreover, China has been accused for transferring 500 ring magnets for Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.⁵⁰

Pakistan is in no way behind China when it comes to cementing this close strategic partnership. Pakistan is making every effort to ensure that the relationship with China continue to progress unhindered. Pakistan has clout in controlling the Islamic separatist movement in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region.⁵¹ To show its commitment in this aspect, Pakistan not only killed Hasan Mahsum, the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in October 2003 but also agreed to conduct a joint anti-terrorism exercise in the province in August 2004.⁵²

Pakistan attaches significant importance to its expanding relations with China from the futuristic perspective. As was very rightly pointed out by Lt. Gen. Talat Masood in a way that, “China concluded defence cooperation agreement; supplies were subject to almost no limitations, and Beijing does not look for commercial but for strategic gains from this partnership.”⁵³ In support of what the army general has said, Shen Chun Chuan, an analysts from China is of the view that, “The partnership not only benefited Pakistan military China’s continued cooperation has greatly contributed towards enhancing the morale of Pakistan’s military establishment as also expanding military’s influence and role in Pakistan’s polity.”⁵⁴ In fact, Pakistan believes that China provided the much needed force that is crucial to achieving its long cherished aim of capturing Kashmir by pressurising India and if necessary to contain it.⁵⁵

Where the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan is concerned, it serves China’s interest to keep the Kashmir pot boiling, by diverting India’s attention from other issues. Beijing has also equipped Islamabad with JF-17 aircraft and JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms and ammunition. It has also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fuel Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.⁵⁶ China’s strategy of providing advanced arms and equipment requirements for Pakistan will continue to remain a case of serious national security concerns for India. Details of China’s major arms supplies to Pakistan are given in Table 5.1.

Table 1.1
China's Major Arms Supplies to Pakistan

Sl. No.	Years of Delivery	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	No. Ordered/Delivered
1	–	F-6	Fighter aircraft	100
2	–	A-5-Fantan A	Fighter/ground attack	98
3	1993	F-7M Airguard	Fighter	40
4	–	F-7P Skybolt	Fighter	40
5	2005	FC-1	Fighter	150
6	–	Super 7	Fighter	–
7	1986-90	F7	Fighter	75
8	2002	F7MG	Fighter	57
9	1986	Q5- Fantan-A	Fighter/ground attack	100
10	–	FT-7P	Fighter trainer	15
11	–	K8	Trainer aircraft	–
12	–	Hong Ying-5	Portable surface-to-air missile	300
13	–	Anza	Portable surface-to-air missile	450
14	1994-2000	QW-1 Vanguard	Portable surface-to-air missile	560
15	–	HN-5A	Portable surface-to-air missile	–
16	–	Al-Khalid (P90)	Main battle tank-2000	–
17	1978-90	T-59	Main battle tank	975
18	1991-93	T-69II	Main battle tank	450
19	1993	T-85III	Main battle tank	12
20	1990-2002	Red Arrows 8	Anti-tank missile	200
21	–	Type-56	Towed gun 85 mm	190
22	–	Romeo	Submarine	2
23	–	Hainan-Class	Fast attack craft patrol	3
24	–	Huzhun	Hydrofoil	3
25	–	Huangfen	Fast attack craft patrol	-
26	–	Shanghai	Fast attack craft gun	12
27	–	Hegu	Fast attack craft	4
28	–	Huangfen	Fast attack craft	4
29	–	Hainan	Fast attack craft patrol	4
30	–	Huzhuan	Fast attack craft torpedo	4
31	1997	C-801/802	Ship-to-ship missile system	4
32	1997	C-802	Ship-to-ship missile system	32

Source: Srikanth Kondapalli, "Pakistan in China's Security Perceptions", in Swaran Singh (ed.), *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 74-75.

China-Pakistan Strategic Engagement at the Dawn of 21st Century

President Pervez Musharraf during his visit to China in November 2003 said that the China- Pakistan strategic partnership was “deeper than the oceans, higher than the mountains.”⁵⁷ The China’s relations with Pakistan are no more bilateral, but possesses multi-dimensional character.⁵⁸ The deepness of the bilateral engagement between the two sides can be reflected from what Pakistan Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz had said at Islamabad’s Institute of Strategic Studies on 27 September 2005 that,

‘Pakistan and China enjoy all-weather friendship based on complete trust and confidence. Our friendship is rooted in the psyche and ethos of our people. From Khunjrab to Gwadar, the symbols of Pakistan-China friendship dot the landscape. The mega projects that we have undertaken with China’s help are like anchors that hold two countries together in trusted friendship.’⁵⁹

Continuing in the two countries’ anti-India stance, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said in 2010 that “Pakistan and China strongly feel that India should not become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, as it would disturb the balance of power in the region.”⁶⁰ Out of the deepening relations, Islamabad expect China to support in its political and military dealing with India and its position on Kashmir. As committed China is providing Pakistan with the much needed help for its national security needs by way of aid and investment. That’s the key reason as to why Islamabad attaches significant importance to its engagement with its close ally China.⁶¹

The events of 11 September 2001 were, however, a turning point in India-United States relations. Since then, the security understanding between the world’s two largest democracies has improved significantly. The United States offered civil nuclear cooperation to India and rejected similar cooperation with Pakistan. It has also encouraged India to play a significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which detracts from Pakistan’s objective of gaining strategic depth in that country. For Pakistan, this increases the value of the Chinese friendship that today Islamabad considers China to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy.⁶²

In April 2005 China and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourly Relations. The agreement binds the two countries to desist from joining “any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side.”⁶³ Pakistan’s Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad stated in a TV interview that Pakistan would stand behind China if the United States ever tried to “besiege” it. From Pakistan’s perspective, China is a far more reliable partner than the United States, given that the latter in the recent past has been much more committed to strengthening its ties with India.

During President Pervez Musharraf’s visit to China in 2006, Beijing committed itself to equip Pakistan with JF-17 (Thunder) aircraft. On 23 May 2006, Pakistan clinched a \$600 million defence deal with China, which included the construction of four F-22P frigates for the Pakistan Navy (three to be built in Shanghai and the fourth at the Karachi dockyard), upgrading of the Karachi dockyard, and transfer of technology for the indigenous production of a modern surface fleet.⁶⁴ In a move that would further strengthen the already stronger ties with Pakistan, China during the visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in May this year, has agreed to provide 50 JF-17 thunder aircraft equipped with more sophisticated avionics on easy loan terms.⁶⁵

Since the dawn of the current century, the two countries have committed themselves to further strengthening their economic ties. The visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in December 2004 and the subsequent visit by the Chinese Premier in April 2005 to Pakistan paved the way for future cooperation. The two sides signed a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU), after which China provided Pakistan a preferential

credit of \$500 million, out of which \$150 million was for Phase II of the Chashma nuclear power plant. Also, a new Pakistan consulate was opened in Shanghai. The two sides have also taken initial steps towards establishing a free trade area, by cancelling tariffs on 767 items. China-Pakistan trade has expanded rapidly from \$1.4 billion in 2001 to \$5 billion in 2006.⁶⁶ China is engaged in 120 projects with Pakistan such as heavy engineering, power generation, mining and telecommunications, and expects its investment in Pakistan to grow from \$4 billion in 2007 to \$15 billion by 2010.⁶⁷ During the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Pakistan in 2011 the two sides signed agreements for thirty-five new pacts. These pacts may bring \$30 billion investment to Pakistan over the next five years from China.⁶⁸

On the other side, India-China trade volume has improved significantly, from \$2.9 billion in 2000 to \$61 billion in 2010, compared to \$1.16 billion to \$7 billion over the same period with Pakistan.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, China's long-term interest of restraining India from gaining international space is certain to prevail over the short-term interest of expanding trade and other ties with India.

Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan and Proliferation Concerns

By entering into a civilian nuclear agreement, the United States has not strengthened India's missile and nuclear programmes because India has agreed to separation of civilian facilities from that of the military facilities, thereby voluntarily placing all the civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards. By entering into the civilian nuclear initiative, India's interests do not lie in undermining the non-proliferation regime, but to strengthen the regime. India's commitment to preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) is justified by its impeccable record of not transferring any of its nuclear related technology and materials to the third countries.⁷⁰ Regardless, China supported Pakistan in its ambitions of acquiring nuclear and missile programmes by violating international commitments. Even after joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 China has engaged in nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan.⁷¹ Pakistan continues to be the major beneficiary of China's unending support to acquire nuclear materials and technology. Arms-control advocate Gary Milhollin has very rightly pointed out that, "If you subtract China's help from Pakistan's nuclear program, there is no nuclear program."⁷²

By supporting Islamabad in its nuclear weapons programme, Beijing has sent an indirect message to Washington that if you can do this for your partner (India) then why I should desist from doing the same for my long time ally (Pakistan). Shen Dingli, a nuclear security expert and Vice President of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University accused Washington of "contributing to nuclear proliferation" as "New Delhi can now devote its resources and energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons... Wouldn't it be possible for other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy? Pakistan... has a need to develop civil nuclear energy and the right to do so..."⁷³

Pakistan, it may be noted, has an execrable record of nuclear proliferation. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang has repeatedly dismissed such concerns by claiming that "Civilian nuclear energy cooperation between China and Pakistan is completely in line with international obligations of non-proliferation, and is completely meant for peaceful purposes."⁷⁴

It was during his visit to India, retired Israeli Army General, Shalom Harari has alleged Pakistan for nuclear proliferation in the Arab World. He said that,

"Israel recently got information that Pakistan was supporting the nuclear weapons program of Syria by supplying it some of the key components." He further added that "Pakistani and its nuclear scientist A Q Khan were involved in Libyan nuclear program. Khan was involved in the Uranium program by supplying them atomic detonators. Pakistan is actually the main proliferators of atomic bombs in the Middle East to Islamic states."⁷⁵

In future too, the possibility of Pakistan proliferating nuclear components and technological know-how cannot be ruled out. Therefore, China should think twice before moving ahead for any kind of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, because it would face a serious threat to international peace and security.

Conclusion

China looms large on India's relations with Pakistan. India has in recent years gained significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military prowess, but Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India's progress in this direction. In fact India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan policies toward each other. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic coordination, advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. Pakistan in particular viewed India as a potential challenger leading to use China to counter Indian power in the region.

China's position on Kashmir can't be delinked from its ever expanding relations with Pakistan. Although, the China's positions on Kashmir have not always been characterised by pro-Pakistan, but with expanding involvement in PoK, it can be expected that China would support its close ally ahead of India with which both Pakistan and China doesn't enjoy close relations.⁷⁶ By considering Kashmir as disputed territory between the two South Asian neighbours, China seems to reject Indian claim that Kashmir is its integral part.

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HISTORY OF INDIA -PAKISTAN RELATIONS THROUGH CHINESE PRISM

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The advent of Pakistan is believed to have started with the first mongol emperor Babbar's invasion of India. The Hindus were treated as second class citizens; Aurangzeb the last Muslim ruler amongst other predecesors did try to annihilate Hinduism but failed. The Hindu way of life, symbolised by high moral values of tolerance, truthfulness and justice was very much part of the multitude's mental and material being. These eternal and moral values of life which constituted the core of Hinduism therefore sustained itself for centuries of Mongol, Muslim and British rule.

The inception of Muslim League in 1906 and assumption of its leadership by Mohd Ali Jinnah provided a new turning point to the national freedom struggle by demanding a separate State for the Muslims. The resolution adopted by the Muslim League in 1940 for division of India into Hindu and Muslim States confirmed their earlier stand. Rahmat Ali is generally credited to having coined the term 'Pakistan' a name which was later adopted by the Muslim League and other protagonists who favoured the division of India on communal lines. By the time, the Second World War ended, the chances of the Indian sub-continent attaining independence had brightened and so did the carving of the separate state of Pakistan.

With the relinquishment of Britain's Sovereignty in 1947, South Asia, inevitably India and Pakistan became the focus of Super Power interests. Pattern of relations between India and Pakistan was inaugurated in an environment charged with conflict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion. Both India and Pakistan pursued foreign policy conducive to their respective national interests. There was an extreme divergence in foreign policies of the two countries. India's foreign policy attracted 'worldwide attention mainly because large and important country was developing a policy independent of the two power blocs then forming.'¹Nehru was the main architect of India's foreign policy and his voluminous, wide-ranging and often improvised assessment of international affairs yielded tremendous impact. Nehru wanted India to refuse to play the game of power politics and not to join either bloc, to keep it free from military alliance of the great power groups that dominated the contemporary world politics.² However the case with Pakistan's foreign policy was different. According to a Pakistani scholar Sarwar Hasan, the foreign policy of Pakistan has been 'dominated by considerations of security and independence from its neighbour, India.'³

Pakistani leaders, statesmen and even scholars have from time to time tried to project India as the only threat to Pakistan's existence. According to I. H. Qureshi, a renowned Pakistani scholar, 'Pakistan believes that Indian hostility poses a far greater problem to them than Chinese expansion or Soviet threats, neither country having a dispute with Pakistan.'⁴ During 1950s and 1960s Pakistan's leadership and media strained every nerve to raise the bogey of 'Indian expansionism' and 'Indian threat to Pakistan's existence' as the main plank of Pakistan's foreign policy for domestic consumption and to plead for arms and economic assistance from the United States, other Western countries and in late 1960s from China. President Ayub Khan wrote in his autobiography; 'Could she (India) have any objective other than expansionism? The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from Oxus

to Mekong. We could not attribute everything to imperialists. India was not content with her present sphere of influence⁵ similar stances were reiterated by Pakistan's press. A leading daily, Dawn in an editorial commented: "Having gained their independence late and become immediately obsessed with the idea of joining the rank of the World's Great Powers, the Indian ruling circles began to develop colonial ambitions. The idea 'Vishal Bharat' or Greater India, is an ambition to include Nepal, Ceylon, Burma and other parts of South East Asia, where, according to Hindu political thinker, Hindu culture already exists."⁶

Mohammed Ayub Khan even lamented that 'had Pakistan not acted as a buffer state, Hindus would have by this time brought about Afghanistan, Iran and other Middle East Countries as well as Indonesia and Malaya under their domination.'⁷ Thus while projecting India as a potential threat to the countries of South and Southeast Asia including Pakistan as an compliment to Indian 'expansionism' the Pakistani leaders were never tired of selling the idea of perceived Indian threat to Pakistan's security.

The unresolved issues during the partition were resolved between both the countries in trying conditions. The issue of Princely state of Junagarh had become contentious, however after trouble erupted within Junagarh, the Dewan of Junagarh asked for armed assistance from India, complying with the request, Indian troops were sent to Junagarh who restored law and order in the state. Subsequently keeping in view the wishes of the local people, Junagarh acceded to India in November 1947. Pakistan tried to raise the issue in the U.N. Security Council but failed. Despite Junagarh's legal accession to India, "Pakistan still considered Junagarh as a part of Pakistan."⁸

Princely state of Hyderabad followed Junagarh after a rapprochement between Nizam and the government of India, the former withdrew its complaint from the Security Council in September 1948. However in October, November and December 1948, Pakistan tried to revive the question in the Security Council and even tried to participate in it.⁹ By 1949, the question of Hyderabad's accession to India was finally settled but Pakistan made futile attempts to make political capital out of it.

The question of Kashmir has been the main irritant in Indo- Pakistan relations since 1947. Because of its strategic location, Kashmir occupies immense geo-political significance. The State of Jammu and Kashmir assumed its present geographic shape in 1846 when Maharaja Gulab Singh who already had Jammu, Ladakh, and Baltistan, also purchased Kashmir Valley from the British.¹⁰

After partition, Pakistan imposed economic blockade of Kashmir to compel the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. The situation deteriorated when a well organised rioting took place in Poonch area against Maharaja's administration.¹¹ Major-General Akbar Khan, who was the Director of Weapons and Equipment at the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at the time of the events, has written that the invasion into Kashmir was launched with the connivance of the Pakistan army.¹²

The turn of events forced the Maharaja of Kashmir to flee from Srinagar to Jammu and called for military help from India. Indian leaders and Lord Mountbatten approved indulgence of Indian forces only if the Maharaja acceded to India, which he did on 26 October 1947.¹³ Consequently the Indian troops landed in Srinagar and the invasion was ejected. Thus Pakistan's intentions to take Kashmir by force remained unfulfilled. Keeping in view the gravity of the situation, India appealed to the United Nations on 1 January 1948 to call upon Pakistan to respect its international obligations and cease giving support to invaders in Kashmir.¹⁴ Till date, even after more than six decades the issue remains as fresh as it was then.

Kashmir is a major water source for India, China and other neighbouring countries. It harnesses in its fold about 15,000 glaciers including the 70 km long Siachen Glacier, on the India-Pakistan border which is the second

largest glacier in the world. It is the issue of Kashmir which Pakistan exploited against India with the help of China. India had a reasonably good case in the UN, but Pakistan managed to subvert the UNSC system and got support for its invalid claim.

A Pakistani scholar observed that Pakistan's decision to recognise China was marked by enlightened self-interest because 'in view of Pakistan sponsored militancy in India and passive hostility of the Afghan Government, Pakistan did not want another great neighbour to be its enemy.'¹⁵ Until the late 1950s, Pakistan's relations with China had not entered a 'takeoff' stage, however, when Sino-Indian relations started declining in 1959 culminating in armed skirmishes in October 1962, Pakistan was driven closer to Beijing.

The Sino-Indian War proved a watershed in the Sino-Pakistan relations. With a view to win Chinese favours, Pakistani press started blaming India for the confrontation.¹⁶ In the aftermath of Chinese invasion on India, Pakistan was convinced that split between New Delhi and Beijing had come full circle. Hence the circumstances allowed 'Enemy's enemy is my friend' to perpetuate as the mode of discourse and decks cleared for future Sino-Pakistani entente-cordiale.

Taking advantage of this discourse, Pakistan under a border agreement on 2 March 1963 ceded a portion of "Azad Kashmir" to China.¹⁷ India protested to both China and Pakistan stating its position that it would not agree to any arrangements or agreements on Indian territory which was under 'illegal occupation of Pakistan.'¹⁸ The Indian Government alleged that Pakistan had not given away 2050 square miles but 11,000 square miles of territory according to the data of the Survey of Pakistan.¹⁹

This agreement signified serious strategic implications for India and helped China to have a direct access and attack capability on Kashmir by land via the KaraKoram pass and by air via direct Chinese air link to the Gilgit airfield, thereby reinforcing the morale of Pakistan. Islamabad presumed that any attack by India on Pakistan would bring China to its rescue. Pakistan's then Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto declared on 17 July 1963; "An attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan; it now involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in the Asia as well."²⁰

The limits within which Pakistan's relations with China were developing were the remote possibility of India and China coming to an understanding. In this context Pakistan did not foresee the restoration of 'Bhai, Bhai' situation between India and China in the near future for several reasons: firstly, Pakistan conceived that the Chinese could not trust the Indians in a hurry, as India had joined a mutual friendship and cooperation treaty with Russia and which has military stipulations in case of war with either of the signatories. Secondly, Pakistan often felt that India and China would always remain at distance because they were competitively advancing themselves for the leadership of Asia. Thirdly, Pakistan's perception about India was that, she would never offer any real challenge to China, because they felt that India had a slower pace of economic development, 'population explosion', less mechanized armament industry, multifarious socio-economic problems, and absence of national cohesion.

According to veteran politician of Pakistan, Mumtaz Daultana; "The Sino-Indian dispute ultimately affected the drawing of Pakistan foreign policy". On the other hand, Chinese tried and cultivated Pakistan for two main factors; firstly, Pakistan was looked upon as a link to the Middle East and secondly in the regional initiatives, Chinese strategy was to forge closer links with South Asian countries to create a sub-regional balance to counter the Indian pre-eminence in South Asia.

Pakistan sought precisely the kind of countervailing authority that China had willingly provided²¹ i.e, convince its special friends, that despite its potential resources, China would never behave like a superpower and within the regional context it was able to project an image of a weighty neighbour, particularly in South Asia.

Taking advantage of the situation Pakistan enticed China to extend its highway through Karakoram. The KKH in Pakistan is called as N-35 and in China as China National Highway 314 (G-314). It was built by Pakistan and China together, starting from 1959; completed in 1979 and opened to the public in 1986. It runs from Kashgar in China to Abbottabad, Pakistan for 1300 km. An extension to southwest meets the Grand Trunk Road, at Hassanabdal, further connected to Gwadar port and the city of Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

In case of hostilities between India and China, the PLA Navy would find Gwadar port most convenient logistic location on the Indian Ocean. The strategic use of this highway in prior stocking of the port to avoid interdiction by air during active operations and due to the closure of the road in winters would help both China and Pakistan to enhance their operational capabilities.

In the earlier days, Pakistan took Chinese protection on the issue of Kashmir, be it in UN or giving moral support. However in the early 90's there was a change in Chinese approach, it advocated peaceful means of negotiations.²² The major concern for Pakistan is China adopting a position of careful neutrality on Kashmir.²³ During Chinese President Jiang Zemin visit to India and Pakistan in late 1996, he advocated a direct dialogue between the two countries on Kashmir as well as progress towards better bilateral relations.²⁴ Speaking at a press conference, Mr. Zhu, said 'China had neither any intention nor will it play any mediatory role between the two countries.'²⁵

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, when China sent an ultimatum calling for immediate dismantling of Indian posts allegedly violating the Chinese border, angered the Soviets, since the timing of such ultimatum showed China's aim to help Pakistan in the war, coerce and put pressure on India. China even threatened to strike at India and started referring to issues which had already been settled earlier. China pledged its full support to Pakistan, terming India as an aggressor and expansionist.

China was against such moral help by the Soviets to India and therefore as a counter, instigated Pakistan in its resolve to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir which India was against. This old issue was again taken up with the UNSC by Pakistan, this time with a new angle of theft of a Muslim religious relic in Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir. However in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, in spite of all assurances to help Pakistan China did not make any physical moves and only gave verbal warnings to India. Between 1965 and 1971 Pakistan received USD 200 million worth arms aid from China and of this, USD 45 million worth of arms were supplied in 1971 alone.²⁶

In March 1971, the American press while giving wide coverage to events in erstwhile East Pakistan generally concluded that a civil war leading to the breakup of Pakistan seemed unavoidable.²⁷ In the wake of this development, Beijing seized the opportunity to launch a veiled attack on New Delhi to win the sympathy of Islamabad. An article published in People's Daily, on 11 April 1971 justified the action of West Pakistan's military crackdown in East Pakistan as appropriate measure undertaken by President Yahya Khan. It charged India for making 'inflammatory' statements over the situation inside Pakistan. It accused India of plotting international intervention against Pakistan and reiterated Chinese support to Islamabad.

China even condemned USSR for instigating India to resort to aggressive posture against Pakistan. China supported Pakistan for the following reasons. Firstly India's success would be considered a success of Indo-Soviet treaty that would have enhanced the Soviet image and influence in the region thus undermining the Chinese stakes. Secondly, despite a friendly posture by India, which could be regarded as the outcome of tactical considerations on the part of New Delhi in the context of explosive and seriousness of Bangladesh problem, the fundamental contradiction and competition between China and India persisted. Thus any increase in India's prestige and strength resulting from Islamabad's defeat was not regarded by Beijing as conducive for its interests.²⁸

Thirdly, Pakistan was also vital as an outlet for Chinese goods to IOR. Lastly, Pakistan was a vital link in Beijing's strategy towards the Arab and Muslim world with whom Islamabad had cordial relations. It was also reported that during the war a hundreds of lorries loaded with military supplies for the ordnance depots of Peshawar and Rawalpindi were arriving daily in Gilgit from Sinkiang.

The events in East Pakistan were going out of hands and posing a problem for India at a time when relations with US were not very friendly. According to Surjit Mansingh, 'Nixon-Kissinger's South Asian policies were also moulded by their antipathy towards India in general and Mrs. Indira Gandhi in particular.' The high headedness of Yahya Khan seeking a political settlement in East Pakistan and his inhumane actions, forced millions of refugees to enter India and create demographic insecurity and shortage of food of which India was already a victim. When all diplomatic efforts had failed, India turned towards international community including US. The initial foreign reaction was an expression of hope that Pakistan would resolve it in a constitutional way and respect human rights.

There was no reaction from US whose military aid meant to be used against communists was being used to commit genocide in East Pakistan and affecting Indian economy through the 'grand design' of the US. The 2.3 million refugees were costing India USD 200 million a month whereas the 1965 war had costed only USD 70 million. The American opinion was reasonably aroused but the White House remained silent. There were secret meetings carried out between Chinese and the Americans on this issue and India was warned that China would interfere if India attacked Pakistan. Moreover the Chinese and Americans had secretly made an understanding that in case Russia intervened in response to China, then US would help China. India was also told by US, that in case of Chinese intervention, US would remain neutral. What was this, if it was not a 'grand design'?

Pravda while reporting about the Chinese role in Indo-Pak war wrote in December 1971: International observers paid attention to the fact that Pakistan's 10-day notice on a possible beginning of war with India coincided with the stay in Pakistan of a Chinese delegation led by the Minister of Machine Building Industry, Li Sheu-Ching. The notice expired on December 3 and on the same day the Pakistani Air Force made a bombing strike on Indian Airfields.²⁹ In spite of all cooperative measures India gave a decisive blow to Pakistan-US-China nexus and enhanced its supremacy in South Asia.

Nixon Administration's tilt towards Pakistan and its bias against India in 1971 war was first exposed by columnist Jack Anderson. During the 1971 crises of East Pakistan, the Chinese in exuberance of opposing India passed remarks contrary to its global outlook. It sided with Pakistan by encouraging Yahya Khan for a dictatorial attitude on a constitutionally elected government.

After India initiated its nuclear programme in 1944 under Homi Bhaba, United States helped India develop nuclear energy under the "Atoms for Peace" programme in 1950s. The US simultaneously constructed the nuclear non-proliferation order on the foundations of the NPT which was concluded and signed on 1 July 1968 by sixty-two nations. India believed that the treaty carried serious flaws, was discriminatory and refused to sign it.

India conducted its first peaceful nuclear explosion on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. It was an underground explosion; a spin-off of India's peaceful nuclear programme. Mrs. Indira Gandhi had said on 27 May 1974 that a country of India's size could not be technologically dependent on other countries. Pakistan's reaction to India's nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974, both by its leaders and the media, was sharp, critical and full of doubts about India's 'sincerity.' Pakistan's representative to the Disarmament Commission said on 19 May 1974 that: "his country was not surprised at India's nuclear test. We have been warning the United Nations particularly the nuclear weapon powers and the international community for a decade that India's ambitions of nuclear programme

aimed at equipping itself with a nuclear option was being undertaken to carry out a nuclear weapon explosion and stake a claim to the status of a nuclear weapon power.”³⁰

On the other hand India exposed Pakistan’s duplicity in warmly applauding Chinese nuclear weapon tests while decrying and distorting India’s PNE. India also refuted Pakistan’s contention that India’s PNE was a threat to the detente which had emerged on the Indian sub-continent.

There was no strong Chinese reaction to India’s PNE of 18 May 1974. The Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping was quoted as having said that China would not make an issue of India’s recent nuclear test which was regarded as being discouraged by the Soviet Union. The Chinese Vice-Premier to show solidarity further added that the Indian test would not be able to intimidate its neighbours or people of Pakistan. As there was no immediate Chinese reaction to India’s PNE, Bhutto personally called on the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan twice and through him solicited Chinese leader’s immediate condemnation of India on the PNE issue.³¹ When the CTBT negotiations came to an end in 1996, India became its firm opponent as it found that the treaty was neither “comprehensive” nor did it favour a “test ban”. India rejected the CTBT essentially on two basic grounds; first, that it was not nuclear disarmament measure, and second, that it was against India’s national security interests. India further stated that the CTBT should be non-discriminatory with all countries assuming equal obligations; the nuclear weapon states must undertake not to hold any nuclear weapon tests and also subject their nuclear facilities to international monitoring and inspections. By doing this India projected to the world its determination and will for disarmament and to be rightly considered as an important country of Asia to solve the problems of this region.

India being wary of the China-Pakistan nexus and growing assertiveness of China, tested another series of nuclear weapons in 1998, code named ‘Op Shakti’. Having no other option but to move closer to New Delhi the United States in 2000 initiated a ‘strategic partnership’ with India. In pursuance of this partnership, in July 2005 President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a deal, lifting a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India and provided U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy programme, expanding the cooperation in energy and satellite technology.

According to McGeorge Bundy, Chinese nuclear weapons were “the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.” President Kennedy agreed, and believed that China’s nuclear programme was “the whole reason for having a test ban. There was a general feeling that a nuclear-armed PRC would become even more aggressive and harder to deter. China on the other hand appeared “determined to eject the United States from Asia” and was now sure to “exploit their nuclear weapons for this end.”

However, the most important aspect of the China-US nuclear cooperation agreement was extraneous provisions like China’s ties with Pakistan and its own non-proliferation record. An important aspect of the Chinese mind-set is that they strive to coerce opponents to follow a line of reasoning that they craft. Li Bingyan, one of the most brilliant and respected contemporary Chinese strategists says, they work to entice technologically superior opponents into unwittingly adopting a strategy that will lead to their defeat.

Sino-Pak nuclear nexus came to be known when intelligence reports of CIA claimed that Pakistan had acquired designs for nuclear test and ultra-centrifuge technology at Kahuta from China. The suspicion that China is helping Pakistan to reach nuclear capability can be traced back to June 30, 1966, when an agreement was signed by the two countries for ‘economic and technical assistance.’ Arms-control advocate Gary Milhollin aptly noted, “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear programme, there is no nuclear programme.”

Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Ghulam Tariq told reporters that an atomic power station would be built at Ruper in Panna district of East Pakistan with Chinese help. This was the first hint of the nuclear collaboration in the

nuclear field; China agreed to supply heavy water to Pakistan. Cooperation between the two countries in plutonium reprocessing and collaboration on uranium enrichment through the centrifuge method was also reported. When the French government informed the Zia government in 1978 that it was unable to proceed with the Chashma deal unless Pakistan agreed to revise the original agreement providing for co-processing of spent fuel, Pakistan looked towards Chinese for rescue.

Stephen Cohen observed, 'Pakistan had successfully operated world's biggest nuclear espionage ring.' In June 1984, the New York Times quoted US officials as saying that the US was in possession of some evidence to show that Pakistan had acquired a bomb design from China in 1983, similar to that of Chinese fourth type of bomb.³²

In 1989 China built a 27 MW nuclear research reactor in Pakistan and Pakistani scientists were being trained in China. In the early 1990's China built an un-safeguarded plutonium reprocessing facility at Chashma, which was the chief source of Pakistan's weapon grade Plutonium. In 1995 China build another un-safeguarded reactor at Khushab. In 1995 China transferred 5000 ring magnets to Pakistan, after which it got exposed and there was a worldwide condemnation of China after which it promised to stop all proliferation activity. In 1996 China transferred an industrial furnace with a casting surface in which the bomb core is cast and helps Pakistani engineers install it in Khushab. The commitment and involvement of China in Pakistan's nuclear programme leads one to believe that in the event of an Indo-Pak conflict, Chinese would align with Pakistan, so long as it remained convinced that neither the US nor the USSR would intervene.

Various contingencies of this alignment could be; a military threat from Pakistan in conjunction with some collusion from China; a politico-military threat from China in conjunction with some collusion from Pakistan; a combined military attack from China and Pakistan or a nuclear blackmail threat by China through her missiles, located in the mountainous terrain of Xizang. Chinese troops themselves intervening through Aksai Chin and the area ceded to China by Pakistan and threatening the Siachen Glacier area to relieve pressure on Pakistan. China may use the Karakoram all-weather high way to resupply Pakistan with military hardware.

Pakistan succinctly followed India's design by going nuclear on May 1998. However regarding its nuclear policy, it followed neither China nor India with regards to 'no-first-use' pledge, but pledged to refrain from targeting each other's nuclear installations. In 2005 Pakistan had not received a similar deal on nuclear energy from Washington as India. Some experts say that this apparent U.S. favoritism toward India could increase the nuclear rivalry between the passionately competitive nations, and potentially raise tensions in the already dangerous region. However in her opening remarks before the Senate CFR on Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on 5 April 2006 remarked; "this cooperation will not lead to an arms race since nothing under this initiative is being provided which will enhance Indian military capability."

As Blackwill said, "My impression is that the Pakistan is worried this will feed the Indian nuclear weapons programme and therefore weakens deterrence." Other experts say the two countries, both admittedly now nuclear, could be forced to deal more cautiously with each other.

Further caution has to be imposed keeping in mind Pakistan's proliferation risk; the point in case is the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan's Illicit nuclear network revealed in 2004 shocked the world with its brazen trade of nuclear technology. Some experts worry the U.S.-India deal could prompt Pakistan to go elsewhere, for instance to China, for similar terms.

Against this background of Sino-Pak collaboration it is hardly surprising that India has to contemplate the exigencies of both war and peace by evaluating risks, costs and benefits of alternative strategic paradigms. It was evident that India's credible nuclear deterrent was against China's nuclear dilemma in a situation of continued transfer of nuclear and missile technology by China to Pakistan.

Pakistan supported China in its bid to get a seat in the United Nations. Nur Khan was shrewd enough to assure the Chinese leadership of Islamabad's support for Beijing's induction into the United Nations. He said that Pakistan had firmly supported and would continue its efforts "for the right of the People's Republic of China for a seat in the UN". Admission of the PRC into the United Nations in 1971 was a force multiplier and further strengthened the anti-India stance of China and Pakistan.

India has been working hard for its bid to the UNSC permanent membership, after it stood for elections in 1995 and lost heavily to Japan.³³ Keeping in mind its clout in the international arena, the growing importance of India cannot be overemphasised in wake of its size, world's largest liberal democracy, second most populated nation having the third largest army, world's tenth largest GDP in nominal terms and third largest in terms of PPP, large contributor of troops to the UN for the last 50 years and most importantly having galvanised support of most of the nations including the permanent members for securing its seat.

However an informal "*coffee club*", comprising 40-odd member states including Pakistan, has been instrumental in holding back reforms to the United Nations Security Council over the past six years. Most members of the club are middle-sized states who oppose bigger regional powers grabbing permanent seats in the UN Security. Pakistan openly opposes a permanent seat for India.³⁴

Pakistan in connivance with China have a unanimous stance that India should not be given the permanent member status of the United Nations Security Council, as it would disturb balance of power in the region. Breaking away from its traditional backstage diplomacy to thwart India's attempts to secure a permanent seat in the UNSC, China went ahead and attended a closed-door meeting of the 'Coffee Club' countries to oppose recent efforts by the UNGA president to forge a consensus on UNSC expansion. This contradicted the Chinese commitment in the joint vision statement issued during Manmohan Singh's bilateral visit to Beijing where China had stated: 'The Chinese side understands and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations, including the Security Council.'

Both China and Pakistan have a negative historic past with India, and the cause of this negativity has yet not been resolved. China may not want India to occupy a similar seat next to it simply because India is a competitor and US would like India to be its partner in favouring or vetoing UN motions.

Not talking about the effects of Pakistan sponsored terrorism which has affected India for the last three decades; China fears its sensitive Xinjiang region becoming an object of external power play. Since 1991 China has applied all instruments of its power to quell the Uyghur unrest. In essence, China ultimately gained a bit of land, nixed the Uyghur issue, and pushed its economic agenda by making Xinjiang a pivotal link to the Eurasian markets. The success gave birth to a self-serving SCO, lauded as an exemplary multilateral cooperation mechanism, essentially meant to blunt any US-led Asian alliance in Eurasia. When Pakistan is under intense scrutiny about its role in fighting extremism and terrorism, the world has been watching to see how Beijing decides to deal with Islamabad. Despite Pakistan's growing diplomatic isolation, China's support has been steadfast. Its obstructionist stance in bringing the terror masterminds of the November 2008 attack in Mumbai to justice have further strained the ties. Both China and India do not want Pakistan to remain a base for AL Qaeda and its affiliates.

China is considered a more reliable ally who has always come to Pakistan's aid when India has been on the rise, even to an extent that China has conveniently turned a blind eye to Pakistan's strategy of using terror as an instrument of State policy against India. Not surprisingly, Pakistan has given China a "blank cheque" to intervene in India-Pakistan peace talks.³⁵ There are reports of China going the Pakistan way and extending financial and moral help to the Pakistan based terrorists to infiltrate into India for subversive activities.

Kashgar authorities had reported provision of training facilities in Pakistan to one of the terrorist involved in blasts in China. Chinese officials have for years avoided accusing Pakistan in spite of clear evidence that the separatist movement in Xinjiang was fueled by ideological and arms support of terrorists based in Pakistan. Pan Zhiping, director at the Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, in a state run Global Times referred to the role of Pakistan in Xinjiang riots after the July 18 clashes in Hotan. China has, however, expressed growing concern over the safety of its personnel and investments in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has also claimed that groups in its far-western Xinjiang region had links to terror groups in Pakistan.

Fast deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its long-term consequences for regional stability might, some suggest, result in greater cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi to stabilise the shared periphery between the two nations. Turbulence in Xinjiang, such as the riots between Han Chinese and the Muslim Uighurs in 2009, is indeed forcing Beijing to pay greater attention to the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan, given the prospect of Islamist extremism spilling over from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the autonomous regions of western China.

The relationship with Pakistan was that of inherent historical baggage of religious division, territorial claims and proxy war. For too long after independence, our northern frontier policy rather remained confined to action-reaction syndrome in our overall policy towards China and Pakistan. Kargil gave a realisation to Pakistan that without China as the third actor in the great game over the Himalayan heights, it may not be possible to dislodge India from her present position. Pakistan opened up its Gilgit-Baltistan region to substantial presence of Chinese military and civilians under the preface of skilled workmen engaged in building infrastructure. Pakistan killed two birds with one stone and it helped China to somewhat become a third party to Kashmir dispute also somewhat legitimise Pakistan's status in occupied Kashmir.

Pakistan backed trans-border terrorism in the Indian state of Kashmir and the spillover effect of the same in China has had both political and economic drain on the resources of the nation. The predominantly Muslim province of Xinjiang; China has not been left far behind in being affected by the same Islamic fundamentals groomed in Pakistan. Besides this, the geostrategic and geopolitical interests of all three converge in the region of Pamirs and Hindukush chain of mountains.

It is a world in which power; economic, political and military is completely fragmented. Germany and Japan are economic giants but are strategic pygmies. Russia is a military nuclear power but without economic clout. China is an economic power but not a compatible nuclear power with Russia or US, and still building its conventional military balance with US. The United States is certainly the most balanced of all the great powers, but it is in no position unilaterally to determine the structure of a new world order. It needs widespread international support even to lead, let alone dominate.

The structure and linkage in South Asian security reflected the mutual increase in Super power engagement in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and the ramifications of India's security concerns with China. The Sino-US detente, the Indo-Pak and the Sino-Indian normalisation would eventually have some positive impact in the region by removing the external stimuli for regional conflicts but the sources of tension are essentially indigenous. Security threat perceived

by Pakistan is a product of hostility and quest for parity. Often “identity crisis” bedevils Pakistan which turns to the Islamic countries of West Asia, but remains India-oriented and geographically in South Asia. A typical example of this: forget-me-not approach was to point out that Pakistan ‘possesses a pivotal position in the four sub-territorial systems; South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the Arab littoral states on the Asian continent.’

Pakistan wanted nuclear weapons because India had them, India because China had them, China because the Soviet Union had them; and the Soviet Union because the United States had them. India, however, is unlikely to deploy nuclear weapons against Pakistan, because India considers China to be its nuclear competitor. Still, Pakistan is more likely to direct nuclear weapons against India than against any other country. Should India and Pakistan eliminate their mutual fear, at least the latter may not feel it needs nuclear weapons if India is no longer a threat.

Those who celebrated the demise of superpower rivalry must be wondering whether the world in its revised shape is a better place to live in. Hopefully, the future will someday bring about a realisation in Peking, New Delhi, and Islamabad that permanent interests of each in Asia can be furthered best in conciliatory settlements of unresolved problems and not in the perpetuation of coalitions and intrigues.

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A CASE STUDY OF BARAMULLA: TERROR FREE DISTRICT FROM PAKISTAN SPONSORED TERRORIST OUTFITS

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Introduction

Both the nations witnessed violence against each other at the time of partition, only common thing they did is fighting freedom struggle unitedly against Britishers. Pakistani people thought that they cannot live under the majority Hindu population. They relied on two nation theory, which failed and flopped miserably. While India has tried to improve relationship with Pakistan sincerely, Pakistan always tried to betray India. Pakistani aggressions of 1947 on Kashmir, 1965, and 1999 Kargil occupation are some instances of their betrayal. Pakistan has waged a proxy war with India by terror attacks. India so far has shown extreme restraint over such attacks and has not allowed the situation to explode into a fully fledged war. Relations between the two countries are not friendly at all and Pakistani army, ISI and terror outfits are actively involved to create trouble in Kashmir and other parts of India. After the Kargil conflict, there was a Ceasefire Agreement signed in 2003, there have been regular cross border ceasefire violations from the Pakistan side of the border with the trend being as such that since 2009 onwards, there has been a rise in the violations (with the exception of 2014). It has killed and injured security forces as well as civilians on both the sides. Terrorist attacks on security forces since have increased and the attack on the **Uri Army base camp** in September 2016, where 19 Indian soldiers were killed, was also carried by an organization, which has its roots in Pakistan. (Lashkar-e-Toiba, also responsible for 26/11 attacks)

What is Operation All Out

Launched in 2017, Operation All Out is a special offensive designed by security forces to flush out militants from Jammu and Kashmir. Security forces have killed nearly 200 militants since the launch of the offensive. However, the government had announced a ceasefire during the month of Ramzan which concluded on 15 June 2017. The Valley has witnessed the killings of over 55 militants and the deaths of 27 locals so far this year. The situation in Kashmir is considered to be turbulent as nearly 80 incidents of violence occurred there in the last four months. Civilians were often seen thronging to encounter sites to stage protests with the intention of giving the militants an opportunity to escape.

Operation All out 1st and 2nd

Indian Air Force is involved in 'Operation All Out,' operating since January, along with the army, paramilitary forces and state police to eliminate NDFB (Songbijit) militants from lower Assam. The operation has been primarily

launched to eliminate remnants of the group by protracted and sustained actions for an extended period of time. A roadmap for ‘Operation All Out’ was planned to carry out the relentless and well directed operation to decimate the group, instil faith among the local populace and bring normalcy in the region. The troops on the ground have been sensitised about carrying out specific intelligence-based operations and not to cause any inconvenience to the local populace. As a result of the intelligence- based operations, 18 terrorists were neutralized, 539 terrorists/ over ground workers were apprehended along and 175 assorted weapons, 180 hand grenades and 7 IEDs seized.

After the success of operation all out 1st centre decided to use operation all out 2nd in the Jammu & Kashmir. The Centre launched Operation All-Out Part 2 in Jammu and Kashmir to target top 14 commanders of terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen. According to sources, 250 terrorists are active in the state. Under Operation All-Out, a joint offensive of the Army, CRPF, Jammu and Kashmir Police, BSF, and IB launched in the second half of 2017, 39 terrorists, including 23 of foreign origin, have been killed so far this year. The number of terrorists eliminated also includes 14 members of JeM, 11 LeT members and 6 of Hizbul Mujahideen. Udi attack is the main reason behind operation all-out part 2.

Why Operation All-Out?

HizbulMujahideen commander BurhanWani was eliminated in July 2016 which was later followed by a string of protests across Jammu and Kashmir. The law and order was shattered in Jammu and Kashmir for nearly seven months. Exactly almost one year later, in a bid to avenge BurhanWani’s killing, Hizbul and Lashkar came together and attacked Amarnath Yatra on July 10, 2017 in which eight pilgrims were killed and 18 others injured. This was the turning point and “Operation All Out” began. Nearly 140 local young people have joined militancy in Kashmir so far this year and this is the highest number of local militant recruitment in a decade. The top security officials believe that the winter months of 2017-2018 were utilized by the Hizb and Lashkar militants to “re-organise themselves and to re-group as well” and to some extent they succeeded. However, the forces changed their strategy by deciding to target top militant leadership and a hit-list was prepared. Police believes that top commanders were mainly responsible for the recruitment of local youth into militancy.

Demonetization gave a massive support to Operation All-Out.

NIA crackdown on separatists and Demonetization are the two factors that played a major role which led separatists starving of funds. As soon as these separatists became helpless, terrorists were forced to come out of their hideout which gave security forces a big chance to eliminate them. The intensified efforts from National Investigation Agency (NIA) against Kashmiri separatists have led to curb down the terror funding and terror-related activities in the Jammu and Kashmir. Nearly a dozen of separatists have been arrested including Altaf Ahmad Shah, son-in-law of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Nayeem Khan, Shahid-ul-Islam, Farooq Ahmed Dar and Mohamad Akbar Khanday. Geelani’s close aides, Tehreek-e-Hurriyat spokesman Ayaz Akbar and Peer Saifullah were also arrested by the NIA from the Valley. While many others on the radar of central probe agency. Crores of unaccounted money were also recovered which led separatists starved of funds. On the other side, PM Modi led central government announced the demonetization of all 500 and 1000 banknotes on 8 November 2016 in a bid to crack down on the use of illicit and counterfeit cash to fund illegal activity and terrorism. The move stopped the flow of cash into the hands of separatists.

How ‘Operation All Out’ is shaping up in Kashmir

A day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that he will break the backbone of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, security forces on Monday said that ‘Operation All Out’ will continue in the Valley. The decision to

resume ‘Operation All Out,’ in the Kashmir Valley is aimed at neutralising the top commanders of terrorist outfit. If one looks at the list prepared by the Indian Army, it features only the top terrorists who have been categorised as either A+ or A++. Even in the first version of the operation, the Army had listed only the top terrorists. The first operation was a major success as most on the list which comprised a majority from the Burhan Wani gang were eliminated. There are at least 279 terrorists in the Valley and they are being commanded by the 21 mentioned in the hit-list. It is important that we go after the leaders first, as killing those deals a big blow to the terrorist group. Without a leader, terror groups find it hard to function. Moreover, it takes time to find a new commander and this helps the Armed forces in going after the smaller members of the terrorist group. Once a new commander is appointed, it takes him sometime to get used to his new job and also earn the respect and trust of the other terrorists. The Indian Army would use this time to go after the rest and weaken the group further, an official explained. The new list has the names of Altaf Kachroo and Riyaz Naikoo who have been heading the Hizbul Mujahideen. Both have respective groups in the South of Kashmir. While Kachroo has been on the run from 2006, in the case of Naikoo, he has been heading one of the tanzeems of the outfit since 2010. In the run up to ‘Operation All Out,’ the security forces would focus just on the top terrorists. All efforts and intelligence would be focused on them and the Army would want to either take them out or capture them on a priority basis. In the list of 21, the Army had listed 11 from the Hizbul Mujahideen, seven from the Lashkar-e-Tayiba, two from the Jaish-e-Mohammad and one from Anzar Ghazwatul-Hind. On Sunday, the Army managed to kill, Shakoor Ahmed Dar, who was part of the 21.

Category of terrorists

There are three categories of terrorists. The top ones are listed under the A++ Category, while the next is A+. The third category is C. The classification is done on the basis of their rank in the group, the number of crimes committed and also the threat perception. A Category A++ carries a reward of more than Rs 12 lakh. Category A+ terrorists carry a reward of 8 lakh. In the case of a C Category terrorist the reward is between Rs 50,000 to Rs 5 lakh.

Baramulla 1st terrorist free district of Jammu & Kashmir

Baramulla, located in the north of Jammu and Kashmir, became the first district in the state to have eliminated all surviving terrorists. The largest of the 10 districts in the Valley has been one of the hotbeds of terrorism as it adjoins Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and thus offers a strategic location for terrorists to infiltrate into India. Terror attacks and encounter operations by police and security forces were a regular feature here with terror-related incidents being reported from the district nearly on a weekly basis. Baramulla has become the first district of Kashmir with no surviving militant as on date. Jammu and Kashmir Police extends its thanks to the local population for all their support in providing a better security environment in the district.

Terrorist killed from 2014 to 2018

Year	Terrorists killed in Jammu and Kashmir
2014	110
2015	108
2016	150
2017	213
2018 (Jan to June)	100
Total of terrorists killed	681

According to the official figures, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has claimed over 41,000 lives in past 28 years. The casualties include 14,000 civilians, 5,000 security personnel. As many as 22,200 terrorists between 1990 and June 2018. According to the External Affairs Ministry, from 1990 to 2001, with a total of 5178 incidents related to terrorism took place which claimed a life of 9718 civilians, 3053 security personnel. A total of 16714 terrorists were killed.

Would Baramulla be free from terrorist always?

In a region suffering widely and intensely from the impact of cross border proxy war with terrorism as the main instrument for as long as 30 years, there are many factors at play than just the presence of terrorists. Declaration of any part of such a region as terrorist free after a long and hard fought counter proxy war campaign must always be welcomed. However, too much cautionary here is based upon many years of experience fighting this proxy war.

First, counter proxy war does not end on a date or at the killing of a supposed “last” terrorist. It is work in progress to also ensure the dismantling of the infrastructure which produces and nurtures terrorists and terrorism. Second, terrorism has a much wider connotation. It is not just the terrorist who forms a part of it. There are over ground workers (OGWs), leaders, sleeper agents and ideologues in fair numbers who could take just a few days to ensure the induction or recruitment of more terrorists. Third, ‘terrorist free zones’ connote return of normalcy. That is a fallacy because the potential to return to terror is not completely weeded out. Fourth, by declaring an area as terrorist free it is a psychological message of victory. Again that is a mistake because in counter proxy war the definition of victory is quite different and relates to the comprehensive neutralization of potential.

A single successful infiltration by a large terrorist group can take the complexity to where it was, in a matter of days. It would be a serious mistake to ignore the potential of transient terrorism. Baramulla district offers a variety of terrain; high mountains, lakes, revering areas, urban densely packed old town areas and forests. Separatist trends and radical ideology is still rife and sufficient networks exist. The potential for revival of terror is as live as that which existed in South Kashmir.

Conclusion

Today we all are marking 73rd Independence Day as on the same day in 1947 India earned freedom from British rule. But this Independence led to the partition i.e. India and Pakistan and with this partition, the conflict started in both the countries over few princely states including Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh.

Pakistani security forces, Intelligence Agency ISI with the help of financial assistance from West started harbouring terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir and planted some separatists in 1990s. Terrorists groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, al-Badr, HizbulMujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and many others got birth and started spreading bloodshed in Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorists illegally started crossing borders with the help of local separatists and went on rocking Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan in the name of freedom of Jammu and Kashmir bred these terrorists and targeted the innocent civilians as well as the Indian forces. At one side, terrorists were killing innocents and at the other side the separatists were politically supporting all the coward acts of Pakistan’s agenda and terrorism. Separatists supported these terrorists in several ways including financial assistance, providing hiding places, stone pelting etc. Let us compliment those who are involved in the thankless task of counter proxy war. They deserve our gratitude. Yet let us not make the same mistake again. It’s good to remember that elimination of the last terrorist is unimportant; it is the elimination of terrorism which will fetch us the elusive victory we seek against protagonists of proxy war against India.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: KASHMIR DISPUTE

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“In regard to Kashmir, India has repeatedly displayed a strange, almost a suicidal, knack of converting success into festering stalemates.”

- **Jagmohan, Former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir**

Introduction

This chapter discusses in length the Kashmir dispute, which has over the last seven decades remained the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have obtained freedom from the British rule in 1947, prior to 14 August 1947 both these complicated nations were the part of Indian sub-continent. The partition of India and Pakistan laid the foundation for a bitter rivalry between the newly emerged nations on many fronts. With the origin of these new states, there unearthed a fresh rivalry on the war front, for the advantage of territorial dominance. Both nations accused each other for violating LOC ‘line of control’ which has been demarcated to solve the cross border terrorism and forcible infiltration. With mutual hostility of religion and nationalism both these have confronted globally on all fronts.

Kashmir issue continues to serve as the main cause of rivalry between India and Pakistan over the last more than seven decades. Both sides have so far been unsuccessful to come to a bilateral negotiated settlement over Kashmir dispute. Stephen P. Cohen, an expert who closely watches the development and change in the relations between India and Pakistan is of the perception that, ‘Kashmir is the most important single conflict in the subcontinent, not just because its territory and its population are contested, but because larger issues of national identity and regional power balances are imbedded in it.’¹ This has opened the scope for interference by other states in finding a lasting solution to the dispute. Several attempts have been made in the recent past, but failed to borne fruit. The UN in particular has been actively involved by way of appointment of a special representatives or mediators in finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute. Lack of positive response on the part of the conflicting parties have been a problem.²

According to Wesis, ‘The Kashmir conflict represents a self-determination movement for Kashmiris; an irredentist movement for Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir; and a civil insurgency for India.’³ However, from the point of view of Lt. Gen. S. K. Sinha, former Governor of J & K, the ongoing low intensity conflict in J & K is a vicious mix of insurgency, terrorism and proxy war.⁴ There is a common understanding in Pakistan that P, K and S stand for Punjab, Kashmir and Sindh. Pakistan considers the partition process incomplete as long as Kashmir became a part of India. To them the popular slogan is ‘Hans ke lia hai Pakistan, Larkar lenge Hindustan.’⁵

Kashmir figures prominently in Pakistan’s foreign policy approach towards India. Kashmir factor influenced Pakistan to wage a war in 1947-48. Pakistan seeks the annexation of Kashmir by force through ‘Operation Gibraltar’ in 1965 and then in 1971 but failed to extract Kashmir from India. Failure to acquire the land of Kashmir by forceful means, Pakistan have entered into a number of agreements with India such as the Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and Simla Agreement of 1972 to resolve the misunderstanding by peaceful means.⁶

Kashmir dispute will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well. Besides, it will also affect the process of their rise and the peace and stability in and outside the region. Kashmir has been and continues to remain the main cause of friction between India and Pakistan. That is why many have termed it as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’. Kashmir issue has gained both regional and global significance. The geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the Kashmir has made India and Pakistan to believe that the control of Kashmir is so important, thereby making it difficult for both sides to come to the terms on resolving the issue which has cost thousands of lives. It is surrounded by a number of foreign countries such as Tibet in its east and Pakistan, China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its west. The southern part is bordered by Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Such a geostrategic location makes the Kashmir valley very important from strategic angle for both India and Pakistan. Having fought three wars over the Kashmir issue in 1947, 1965, and 1999, still there is no hope of resolving it in the near future.

India and Pakistan have been unsuccessful in the past and present attempt made to alter the status quo in Kashmir. For which, both sides have adopted different political and military strategies seeking to serve their national interests. Till January 2004, over the Kashmir issue, the leaders of the two sides have met on more than thirty-five occasions. Besides, at the highest level, there were at least twelve rounds of talks between 1989 and 1998 before the Lahore and Agra Summits. Neither the meetings at the Heads of State level nor at the Foreign Secretary level could bring any fruitful results.⁷

Efforts have been made in the past to resolve the key issue but without any significant results due to the divergent stand adopted over the dispute by both sides. Also, it was the Pakistan involvement in proxy war to destabilize India which has only hardened New Delhi’s position on Kashmir issue. With both sides not in a position to come to the terms on Kashmir issue and the possibility of issue escalating into a nuclear war has made Kashmir as the “world’s most dangerous place.”

The present chapter traces the historical background to the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. It also discusses the geo-political and geo-strategic significance of Kashmir for the competing countries. Then, it assesses the clash of interests between the two countries over the Kashmir issue. Later, it gives an account of the Pakistan’s Kashmir policies and strategies. Last, but not the least, it highlights the Pervez Musharraf four step proposal on Kashmir dispute.

Background of the Kashmir Dispute

Kashmir dispute has its roots in the developments leading to and following the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The nature of Kashmir problem has undergone a change in keeping with the developments in South Asia, on the one hand, and the changing international scenario, on the other. This was clearly manifested during the cold war period and now in the post-cold war period too. Kashmir is an issue clearly linked to the partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947. At the time of India’s independence, the “princely” state of Jammu and Kashmir had the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan like any of the other princely states at that time. Maharaja Hari Singh, ruler of Kashmir at that time, contemplated keeping off both. Hence, he decided to enter into “Standstill Agreements” with both India and Pakistan. In the process, his ambition of an independent Kashmir was kept alive. To this, Mohammed Ali Jinnah retaliated by imposing a total economic and trade blockade of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan also incited an invasion of Kashmir by Army Regulars in the guise of tribals in late 1947. When invaders closed in on Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for help and acceded to India by signing the Instrument of Accession.⁸ Given Kashmir’s geographical, economic, and socio-cultural links with

contending neighbours, the Maharaja of the princely state of J&K was in dilemma over choosing one between the two. What complicates further is that the Maharaja political future was at stake.⁹ However, Pakistan's coercive tactics compelled the maharaja to move into India's arms.¹⁰

Not able to digest the whole issue of the accession of J&K to India, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, described the accession of Jammu and Kashmir 'fraudulent' and even said 'Pakistan's very existence is the chief casus belli so far as India is concerned.'¹¹ In his enthusiasm to get the Pakistanis out of Kashmir, India's first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, took the matter to the United Nations (UN) in good faith. "*What perhaps went wrong was to ask the Security Council to take action under Chapter VI and not Chapter VII of the UN Charter.*"¹² The UN Security Council ordered cease fire and on 24th January 1948, the Security Council also voted on the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The resolution envisaged the complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) as a precondition to the holding of a plebiscite. The Security Council could not get the Pakistani troops out of POK which further complicated the matters in spite of Nehru's best intentions.

When the relations between the two sides was not going well, the leaders of the two sides met whereby they issued a joint statement that noted,

'Both the Prime Ministers were actuated by a firm resolve to settle these problems as early as possible peacefully and cooperatively to the mutual advantage of both countries... The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite... the next step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator by the end of April 1954.'¹³

Pakistan has not shown any sincerity in resolving the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has rejected any settlement of the dispute along the Line of Control. Instead, she continued to claim the whole of Kashmir Valley and all the Muslim majority areas including the districts of Poonch, Rajouri, Doda and Kargil.¹⁴

The most significant event in India-Pakistan relations was the second Indo-Pakistan war. Pakistan's military junta decided to take India by surprise and attacked Kashmir in the hope of conquering the part of Kashmir still in Indian hands. But this was not to be and ended with the Tashkent Agreement and arms embargo to both India and Pakistan. This was followed by the third round in 1971 which resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan. The Shimla Agreement was signed between the two countries, in which India did not look for punitive peace but hoped to initiate a new policy towards Pakistan, based upon a more relaxed and understanding approach. By the Shimla Agreement, Islamabad sought to gain time in order to make strategic asymmetry between India and Pakistan less worrying than it in fact was.¹⁵

Hence it is clear from the above that the state of Jammu and Kashmir which acceded to India in 1947 did so only after the Pakistani raiders were knocking at the doors of Srinagar and this continues to be an area of conflict between India and Pakistan. Defence, Diplomacy and Democracy seems to have failed leading to a sort of 'Proxy War' being waged between the two countries in the state. Terrorism as a means to destabilise the law of the land is being extensively sponsored by Pakistan. The people of the state have been reduced to a pitiable condition with murder, rape and extortion rampant. The economy is in ruins with people barely being able to eke out a living. In the words of Andrea Benvenuti,

"Since the first Indo-Pak war, Kashmir has been the 'apple of discord' between India and Pakistan. Not only were strategic issues involved, but more so an ideological one. In fact, for India (a state created upon the principle of laicism and multi-ethnicity), Kashmir, a region with Muslim majority, meant a testing bench of its capability of

ruling over different communities. On the contrary, Pakistan, founded as a homeland of the Muslims of the Subcontinent, could not accept the fact that a region with a Muslim majority and territorially contiguous, formed part of Hindu dominated India.”

Kashmir - Location and Its Geo-Political and Geo-Strategic Importance

A close look at the map of Jammu and Kashmir would highlight the geo-strategic importance of the State. Geo-strategically located at the confluence of three major historical empires namely, India, Central Asia and China, the region provides the land bridge between them. It was a natural bulwark against China to the North-East as also a land-link to China as well as the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁶ It was thus natural that both India and the State-to-be Pakistan would vie for this pristine land. Furthermore, the demography of the State was such that the decision facing the Maharaja would not be easy. Whereas the bulk of the population, nearly 75 percent, was in the Valley and mostly Muslim, one could not forget that the majority in Jammu, which accounted for over 20 percent of the state’s population, was Hindu. The rest of the population in Ladakh, Gilgit and Hunza was again Muslim except in Ladakh which had a Buddhist majority. However population was very sparse in these areas.

Table 1.1

Region	Area (Sq. Miles)	Population (2011 Census)
Kashmir Valley	8639	5,350,811
Jammu Region	12,378	6,907,623
Ladakh Region	33,554	290,492
Total	54,571	12,548,926

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 1.2
Religious Demography in J&K - Census 2011

Division	Population			
	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	Buddhist
Kashmir	97.16%	1.84%	0.88%	0.11%
Jammu	30.69%	65.23%	3.57%	0.51%
Ladakh	47.40%	6.22%	-	45.87%
Jammu and Kashmir	66.97%	29.63%	2.03%	1.36%

Source: Election Commission of India, 2014

Kashmir is strategically located in the northern part of our country. From a geographical point of view, Kashmir occupies a very small portion of the larger state of Jammu and Kashmir. It accounts for 6.98 per cent of the total land mass of undivided Jammu and Kashmir. Of a total area of 222,236 square kms for the state of undivided Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmir accounts for 15,520.3 square kms.¹⁷ Being a landlocked territory, it is surrounded on

northeast by the Uygur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang and Tibet (both parts of the Peoples Republic of China), on the South by the Indian state of Himachel Pradesh and Punjab; on the northwest by Afghanistan and on the west by Pakistan.¹⁸ It is surrounded by great Himalayas and origin point of many rivers.¹⁹

Geo-strategically and geo-economically, the Kashmir valley is of paramount significance for both India and Pakistan. The geographical location of Kashmir is such that it is surrounded by a number of foreign countries such as Tibet in its east and Pakistan, China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its west. While, the southern part is bordered by Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Such a geostrategic location makes the Kashmir valley very important from strategic angle for both India and Pakistan. This has made India and Pakistan to believe that the control of Kashmir is so important, thereby making it difficult for both sides to come to the terms on resolving the issue which has cost thousands of lives. Both sides are never ready to bargain on the issue at any cost. They perceive the place key to their national security.

Even now both sides are desperate to acquire Kashmir to strengthen their respective visions of nationhood. Pakistan has never accepted India's control of Kashmir as it still believes today that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan. Kashmir is not merely a territorial dispute but is deeply intertwined in the domestic politics and ideologies of India and Pakistan.

India's first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru while highlighting the strategic importance of Kashmir has underlined that,

“Kashmir's northern frontiers . . . runs in common with those of three countries: Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Security of Kashmir which much depend upon its internal tranquillity . . . is vital to security of India, especially since part of Southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common”.²⁰

India's former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had in his Independence Day address in 2002 has pointed out that,

‘Kashmir is not a piece of land; it is a test case of . . . secularism. India has always stood the test of a secular nation. Jammu and Kashmir is a living example of this. And this itself is Kashmiriyat.’²¹

India-Pakistan Clash of Interests in Kashmir

The leaders of the two South Asian neighbours are locked in a mindless competition over tactical advantage and scoring diplomatic points in Kashmir.²² This has led both sides to adopt contradictory strategies and position over the issue. Both have totally different perception about the Kashmir issue. Pakistan own understanding is that since Kashmir being a Muslim majority state, it should be merged with Pakistan. Pakistan claims Kashmir on the basis of two nation theory, not on law of any kind, as opposed to India which has perfectly valid legal claim international law. In fact, Islamabad at present is engaged in proxy wars, promoted subversion, and sabotage not only in Jammu and Kashmir but in other parts of our country. The options of solving the Kashmir problem on the basis of status quo has been available to Pakistan since a long time but it wants to incorporate all the Muslim areas of the state.²³ From the Pakistan perspective, Kashmir issue is more of an ideological rather than a territorial dispute, whereas India perceives Kashmir as a symbol of its secularism and composite nationalism.²⁴ The implications Kashmir had on the ideological foundations of each state really influenced both sides to take a hard stand, which left very little or negligible scope to compromise on the dispute.²⁵

Once the State of Jammu and Kashmir had legally acceded to India, the geo-strategic importance of the State became an important aspect influencing Indian policy on Kashmir. Unlike in the past, Kashmir gained strategic value in the post 1947 era. The strategic relevance of Kashmir for both South Asian rivals rests in its utility for each

state's defense attitude. From New Delhi's point of view, control over the Kashmir Valley is really significant for the protection of remote Ladakh located next to the Chinese borderland. In any sort of conflict with Pakistan, India could be vulnerable to a fast penetration of Kashmir by Pakistani armour and tactical airpower aiming to sever the territory off from India proper.²⁶ The strategic importance of controlling Kashmir from the Indian point of view can be reflected from the statement of Indian's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he asserted that,

“India without Kashmir would cease to occupy a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia ... Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India~ it has been so since the dawn of history.”

Time and again New Delhi has made it clear that Kashmir is an integral part of India. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, while speaking at Harvard University in 1995 underscored that, ‘Kashmir was, is and will remain an integral part of India and not a millimetre of its land will be given away.’ He further added that, ‘no compromise would be made on Kashmir and supported his stand by stating the fact that no country in the world could afford to lose its territory.’ He further clarify that the only unfinished task in Kashmir was the restoration of the portion of Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan to India.²⁷ Indian leaders, analysts and policy makers have consistently argued that the decision to accede to the Indian Union is final and legal and it cannot be disputed. As regards the UN Resolutions that calls for the will of the people to be ascertained are no longer acceptable because Pakistan has to first withdraw from the territory it occupied through coercive action.²⁸

While from the Pakistan point of view, the occupation of Kashmir holds political, economic and strategic significance. It remains in the heart of every Pakistan that accession of Kashmir to India is a threat to the security of Pakistan.²⁹ Given the ideological connection with Kashmir, Pakistan's official stance is that Kashmir is the main crux of hostility with India. Pakistan's claim over Kashmir is based upon the principle of ‘Two-nation Theory’.³⁰ Since the annexation of Kashmir to India goes against the interests of Pakistan. As a result of which Pakistan calls the accession of J&K to India unlawful and considers it as a disputed territory. In sympathy towards Kashmiris, Pakistan call upon the UN-sponsored plebiscite. Pakistan strongly believes that the annexation of Kashmir as the logical culmination of the triumph of the ‘two nation theory’ and the basis of the birth of Pakistan that stipulated that Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent were two nations.”³¹

There is a common understanding among the Pakistan leaders that without any doubts that Kashmir would have come to them. The events that followed partition created a deep scar in their psyche. Pakistan's entire objective became the humiliation of India and the merger of Kashmir to Pakistan. A study of any move the Pakistani Government makes will prove that it will do all in its power to pull Kashmir away from India. In fact, Pakistan views taking over of Kashmir as pivotal to their very existence. To this end Pakistan has made the so-called ‘liberation’ of Kashmir the cornerstone of their domestic and foreign policies. Thus, they have gone all out to create and ferment trouble in the Valley.

Former Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan has noted that,

“Kashmir is very important, it is vital to Pakistan's security... the very position, the strategic position of Kashmir, is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.”³²

The prolonged Kashmir issue that has not shown any fruitful prospect for resolution has only sent a wrong message to the international community that resolution is the key to progress in bilateral ties between the two South Asian powers. This is not true in real sense because Pakistan on its part has not shown any eagerness to improve ties with India through discussion and instead they were engaged in illegal activities of proxy war that seriously

threatens India's security.³³ The resolution of the Kashmir issue would require both sides to make certain changes to their policies of the past. They need to adopt a positive approach in lieu to the changing scenario to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Their rigid stand and not showing any flexibility in their respective stand has only worsened the possibility of bringing fruitful solution.

The resolution of the Kashmir issue would require understanding and reduction of mistrust between the two countries. To ensure understanding, normalization of the conflictual situation has to be erased from their minds. Both sides must engage in economic and other cooperation that would no doubt bring close understanding between the two countries. Peace must be restored between the two countries. For which Pakistan on its side must abandon its support for militancy, ensure that it is not engaged in any kind of proxy war against India that has a serious consequences in the border region. India on its part must ensure that there is good governance in the state of Jammu and Kashmir that listens to the grievances of the citizens and work for the prosperity of the state. Lack of good governance has given way to agitation of the local people.

Pakistan in particular has not shown any political commitment in the past; instead they have promoted separatism and encourage militancy in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The militancy supported by Pakistan has led to increased violence in Kashmir. It seeks to resolve the issue by force and through the outside support rather than dialogue, while India on the other hand seeks to resolve bilaterally through consensus. Whenever India agreed to enter into a fruitful dialogue, but it was the Pakistan double standards stand that circumscribed the possibility of any success. For instance, the summit meeting between former Prime Minister of India and Pakistan, Mr. Atal Bihar Vajpayee and Mr. Nawaz Sharif respectively at Lahore in February 1999 was not able to bring out fruitful result due to alleged invasion by the Pakistan military into the Indian Territory. This was followed by the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 that comes just after the General Pervez Musharraf visit to India for the Agra summit in 2001. These events did not allow the climate to be created for the successful solution of the dispute.³⁴

Also, Pakistan military leadership obsession with the Kashmir dispute has also been one of the main determinants to creating a climate suitable for resolution. Too much of military influence and the resulting weakness in political leadership has not allowed for the Pakistan government to assert its political will for peace with India. Start from General Zia-ul-Haq to General Musharraf and even today there witnessed no change in their stand on Kashmir problem. It was General Zia-ul-Haq who began to call Kashmir as the core dispute and all other relations with India would be dependent on the solution of the core dispute. This was followed by what former Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf has said that 'even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, Kargils would happen.'³⁵ Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Shaukat Aziz during his visit to Hongkong has declared that until the Kashmir issue is resolved, economic relations with India could not fully restored. Such stand precludes the possibility of any resolution. For the sake of Kashmir, Pakistan wants to normalize the relations with India and nothing else.³⁶ Therefore the paper argues that the resolving the Kashmir issue will not bring peace, security and prosperity in the region. Also it sends a wrong message to the international community that Pakistan is not concerned about stability and security in the region.

Former Pakistan President, General Musharraf had during his visit to Muzaffarabad on December 27, 1999 stated that "Pakistan is Kashmir and Kashmir is Pakistan." He further added that, "I want to reiterate that there is a change in the policy towards India. Earlier we used to say that we will negotiate all issues, including Kashmir. But now we will discuss the Kashmir issue first." He is of the perception that Kashmir is the core issue and "there is no negotiations, with India unless the Kashmir issue is discussed".³⁷

Pakistan's Kashmir Policy and Strategy: Mixed Response

Pakistan has over the last seven decades maintained that its Kashmir policy of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. In support of this policy, it has continuously argued that Kashmir is indivisible and Kashmir's right to self-determination should be fulfilled in accordance with the 1948 United Nations Security Resolutions.³⁸ Since 1947, Pakistan has laid down the ideological nature of its claim over Kashmir, with a sharp rejection of any proposed solution that called for the division of Kashmir.³⁹ Against the consistent demand by the people of Kashmir since 1947, the right of self-determination has been denied through the forceful control of the state.⁴⁰ Pakistan had adopted a no-compromise Kashmir policy.

Pakistani well as Kashmiri leaders refuted India's claim of Kashmir as an integral part of India. Instead they declared the accession of Kashmir as the biggest fraud of 20th century. In support of the what Pakistani leaders have been claiming over the last many decades, Alaster Lamb, a well known political analysts, went on to say that the instrument of accession had not been signed between India and Kashmir.⁴¹

Unlike strategy, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has remained static since the partition of the Indian subcontinent. It is unlikely to change in the distant future because it is inextricably connected to Pakistan's struggle with its national identity, and the prolonged strategic rivalry with India. Pakistan's strategy is flexible and has shifted from conventional war to diplomacy and then to proxy war owing to different circumstances. The strategy adopted is influenced by a combination of internal and external factors.⁴²

Given Kashmir's territorial connectivity and its economic and political ties with Pakistan, Pakistan leaders held a firm belief that the Muslim majority should be part of Pakistan. Pakistan has often argued that Kashmir's accession to India was an attempt to weaken and eventually eliminate Pakistan.⁴³

When bilateral dialogue and over 14 years of diplomacy failed to provide the countries national interests, Pakistan took a decision to launch a military attack against a much stronger Indian side in 1965. Later, Pakistan initiated a strategy of proxy war against India in Kashmir.⁴⁴ Since the successive leaders of Pakistan have made it very clear that it would not abandon its Kashmir policy at any cost. Taking advantage of the situation within the state of J&K, growing militancy in the state, Pakistan have adopted a need based strategy of support Kashmir insurgency and the cross border terrorism. When Pakistan saw New Delhi's reluctance to sincerely negotiate, it sought to apply a military solution to the Kashmir dispute.⁴⁵

Under the so called proxy war strategy, Pakistan started to provide weapons, training, and assistance to insurgents infiltrating across Indian side of Kashmir. While doing so, Islamabad seeks to attract international attention to Kashmir issue. The idea is to keep Pakistan's claims to Kashmir intact thereby putting a pressure on India. In addition, the proxy war strategy had the added advantage that it provided Pakistan with plausible deniability and made the possibility of Indian retaliation against Pakistan more problematic.⁴⁶

India have time and again raised the issue of Pakistan supporting cross border terrorism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir at the bilateral and international level. To put a pressure on India, Pakistan seek to attract the international attention by revealing the worst human rights violations in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the name of fight against terrorism.⁴⁷ Pakistani believes that for the sake of right to self determination, the people of Jammu and Kashmir have made a lot of sacrifice over the last many decades. Pakistan as usual will continue to provide the much needed support to the Kashmiris cause without any hesitation. As expected, Pakistan raise the issue at the regional and global as a stakeholder.⁴⁸

From the Pakistan point of view, any solution to the Kashmir problem has to take place according to UN resolutions. Pakistan stands tall in support for the Kashmir people and is very much eager to engage in a fruitful dialogue with India. However India has a firm stand on its commitment that Kashmir is the integral part of India. However, at the same time India want to enter into the meaningful dialogue on Kashmir problem on the condition that Pakistan must stop cross border terrorism.⁴⁹ Highlighting the failed approach of Pakistan towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, Aqil Shah of the Department of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma, put forth an argument that although Pakistan has repeatedly asked for a plebiscite in Kashmir, in reality, Islamabad has not been serious in honoring its legal commitments concerning a plebiscite or any other resolution. As opposed to the UN resolutions of 1948-49, Pakistan has obstructed the process by refusing to meet its obligation to demilitarize the area unless India simultaneously withdrew its troops.⁵⁰

In his address to the people of the nation, Pakistan President had on 12 January 2002, reiterated that,

‘Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir... We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir... No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir... Let there be no attempt of crossing the border in any sector as it will be met with full force. Do not entertain any illusions on this count.’⁵¹

In response to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and its support for the Kashmiri people, India has made its stand clear to Pakistan and the international community that the real problem in Kashmir is one of cross border terrorism directed by Pakistan. In addition, India has also categorically ruled out any scope for international mediation in Kashmir by moving a unanimous resolution in a joint sitting of the two houses of Parliament which stated that Kashmir is an inalienable part of the Republic of India. Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to win international support for a UN-sponsored plebiscite in Kashmir proved to be unproductive which pose a serious setback for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.⁵²

Musharraf Four Step Proposal on Kashmir Dispute

Former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf put forward a four point proposal for resolving the Kashmir entanglement. The four steps proposal are envisaged as:

- a. Official talks commence.
- b. Centrality of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is acknowledged.
- c. Any proposal unacceptable to India, Pakistan or Kashmiris is taken off the table.
- d. Best solution acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris is taken.

The four-step proposal was discussed in length amongst the officials of both countries during the course of Composite Dialogue Process. In September 2004, General Musharraf and Manmohan Singh met in New York and signed a joint statement indicating their eagerness to look for options on Kashmir and take the peace process forward. On December 2006, Musharraf further refined his ideas and put forward the ‘four point formula’:

- a. Softening of LoC for trade and free movement of people.
- b. Self governance/ autonomy.
- c. De-militarization from whole of Jammu and Kashmir.
- d. Joint supervision/ management.⁵³

Conclusion

Despite being the oldest unresolved border dispute that exists in the present era, there is very little hope for resolution in the near future. Both India and Pakistan claimed Jammu and Kashmir as ‘an integral part of Indian union’ and ‘unfinished business of 1947’, respectively. The strategic importance of the dispute for regional and global peace and security has increased over the last many decades. From the view point of Teresita C. Schaffer, a renowned scholar who closely analyses the relations between India and Pakistan that, “The Kashmir problem began as a dispute over territory; what has made it toxic has been incompatible national identities.”⁵⁴

The Kashmir problem is a result of the long neglect and the callous attitude of the leaders of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s fishing in troubled waters and stoking of communal hatred was only to be expected given the long history of animosity. The challenge to the nation involves a firm hand to tackle the militancy and to win the hearts and minds of the populace by constructive involvement in developmental and political activities. Sumit Ganguly has in his book titled, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*, raised the argument that,

“any option that fails to recognise the fundamental territorial integrity of India will not meet the test of political feasibility. No government in India will concede Kashmir, even if it entails continuing losses in blood and treasure...”⁵⁵

Pakistan has so far blamed India for the lack of sincerity to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir, instead New Delhi insists to discuss on all outstanding issues with Pakistan. Victoria Schofield raises a sound argument that the grievances amongst the Kashmiris, which had been allowed to fester, the steady erosion of the ‘special status’ promised to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, the neglect of the people by their leaders, were clearly India’s responsibility. Another analysts from India says that Kashmir would not have become an issue ‘if the valley had not exploded on its own thanks to Delhi’s misguided policies’.⁵⁶ These viewpoints raised the lacklustre approach on the part of the successive Indian government towards the Kashmir issue and the demands of the people. The policy adopted by the successive government of our country have failed to win the heart and minds of the people of Kashmir. Very rightly, an analysts has pointed out that The central government appointed Governor Shri Jagmohan’s policy pushed the populace to becoming anti-Indian and turned the most apolitical Kashmiris into active supporters of militancy.⁵⁷

The central government handling of the militancy and rising terrorist violence in the state is also disappointing. It gives an opportunity for the leaders of Pakistan and Kashmir to raise an issue at the international level. The Amnesty International report of 1992 highlighted the widespread violations of human rights in the state in a way that,

“Widespread human rights violations in the state since January 1990 have been attributed to the Indian army, and the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)... Torture is reported to be routinely used during these combing operations as well as in army camps, interrogation centers, police stations and prisons. Indiscriminate beatings are common and rape in particular appears to be routine... In Jammu and Kashmir, rape is practiced as part of a systematic attempt to humiliate and intimidate the local population during counterinsurgency operations.”⁵⁸

Both India and Pakistan till now are playing a blame game over the resolution of the prolonged Kashmir conflict. Several proposals have been put forth by various stake holders to resolve the ongoing conflict in Kashmir but very little success could be seen. There was an occasion in which both sides came very close to reaching an agreement over the issue. Both sides have to be blamed for the lack of sincerity because none of them are ready to

give up the rigid stand taken up by them in the recent past. It is highly imperative that both sides develop a political understanding which would create a platform for conducting a bilateral composite dialogue over the Kashmir and other related issues.

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KASHMIR PROBLEM IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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Introduction

India and Pakistan got independence in August 1947. On the basis of two nation theory, India divided into two separate states - one with a Muslim majority (Pakistan) and the other with a Hindu majority (India) is commonly seen as the outcome of conflict between the nation's elites. India-Pakistan relations are grounded in the historical, geographic, demographic and economic links between the two important countries of South Asia. Soon after their independence, India and Pakistan established diplomatic relations, but the violent partition and numerous territorial claims would overshadow their relationship. Since their independence, the two countries have fought three major wars, one undeclared war and have been involved in numerous armed skirmishes and military standoffs. After partition Kashmir Dispute became the main irritant between India and Pakistan.

Kashmir Problem

Kashmir is the integral part of Indian state Jammu & Kashmir. It is very difficult to understand about Kashmir dispute without explaining the geographical location of Jammu & Kashmir.

Geographical Location of Jammu & Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir, situated between 32° 17' N and 36° 52' N latitude, and 73° 26' E and 80° 30' E longitude, constitutes the northernmost state of India. The height above sea level varies from 1000 to 28250 feet. It shares borders with Pakistan in the west, China in the north and east, and the Indian states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh in the south. It has a total area of 222,236 sq. km (78,114 sq. km occupied by Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War 1947-48, which is called POK, 37,555 sq. km occupied by China during the India-China War 1962, and another 5,180 sq. km handed over to China by Pakistan).

The state consisted of seven broad physiographic zones: plains, foothills, lesser Himalayas, greater Himalayas, Kashmir valley, upper Indus valley, and Karakoram. The Jammu region comprises the plains, hills and mountains south and west of the PirPanjal range. The Kashmir valley is located at an average elevation of about 5,300 feet above sea level. Ladakh constitutes the easternmost part. The Jammu-Srinagar national highway is the only road link between Kashmir valley and the rest of the country.¹

Historical Background of Jammu & Kashmir

The State of Jammu and Kashmir was the largest and the fourth most populous of the 565 princely states in British India. It consisted of five distinct regions: the Valley of Kashmir, Jammu Province, the district of Poonch, Ladakh and Baltistan, and the Gilgit region. The incorporation of 77 these different regions under a single administration took place in the mid nineteenth century. In terms of religion, out of a total population of a little over 4 million in 1941, approximately 77% were Muslim, 20% Hindu, 1.5% Sikh, and 1% Buddhist. Historically in Kashmir, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and other communities have lived in relative harmony. Over time, the existence

of communal harmony generated a spirit of humanism and tolerance in the region known as Kashmiriat, which gave the Kashmiri identity a unique quality. With the decline of Mughal power in India, Kashmir was conquered by an Afghan ruler, Ahmed Shah Abdali, whose rule was brutal and oppressive. Therefore, when the Sikhs ousted the Afghans from Kashmir in 1819, the Kashmiris welcomed them with open arms. The Sikhs soon turned out to be even greater oppressors; They were also religious zealots who sought revenge upon the Kashmiri Muslims who formed a majority of the population. In their various military expeditions to Kashmir, the Sikhs were helped by Raja Gulab Singh, a member of the Hindu Dogra family which ruled one principality in the southeast area of Jammu. As a reward for Gulab Singh's assistance, the Sikhs gave him control of the whole Jammu Province. In 1839, Gulab Singh extended his control over Ladakh and Baltistan by seizing these areas from Tibet. Thereafter, in 1844, when the British waged war against the Sikhs, Gulab Singh aided the British. As a reward for his loyalty, by the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), the British relieved the Sikhs of their hold over Kashmir and transferred the territory to Gulab Singh as his 78 'independent' possession for a sum of Rs. 7.5 million. Maharaja Gulab Singh's purchase of Kashmir thus placed a Muslim majority state under the political control of a Hindu dynasty. When the Dogras failed to exercise actual control over Gilgit, the British, being suspicious of Russian motives towards the Pamirs, created the Gilgit Agency in 1889 and placed it under the direct rule of a British political agent. When the British government announced that India's independence was to be granted in August 1947 and that power would be handed over not to one political entity but two-India and Pakistan-it profoundly affected the politics of the princely states. Since the Doctrine of Paramountcy, which had guided relations between the princely states and the British Crown, was to lapse with British colonial disengagement from India, in a technical sense this meant that the rulers of the princely states had the right to decide if they wished to accede to either India or Pakistan, or preferred to remain independent. However, Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy to India, acting under pressure from the Indian National Congress, made it clear to the rulers of the princely states that they must join either India or Pakistan not only as a practical matter but also to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. The two principal factors in this choice were to be the communal allegiance of the people and geographical contiguity.

All the princely states, except Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir, joined either India or Pakistan before 15 August 1947. In a technical sense, therefore, on 15 August 1947, Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir became 79 independent. Hyderabad and Junagadh, however, were forced to join India. But Kashmir posed a unique problem since the state was contiguous to both India and Pakistan and, hence, claimed by both sides for ideological and geostrategic reasons. The Pakistani claim was strengthened by the presence in Kashmir of a movement led by Ghulam Abbas and his All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference which wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. The Muslim Conference's view was challenged by the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference led by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The National Conference espoused a secular ideology and wished to create a secular, democratic but independent Kashmir with close ties to India. But the Dogra ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, had calculated that by not joining either India or Pakistan during the period of the transfer of power, he would emerge as the ruler of an independent Kashmir state.²

Historical Background of the Kashmir Problem

Kashmir dispute is a territorial conflict between India and Pakistan, which started just after partition of India in 1947, when the British government left the region after a 250-year period of rule categorized by exploitation and divide-and-conquer tactics. The British Empire's divisive policies, which were intended at creating a rift between Hindus and Muslims in order to dilute any potential organized opposing force, began in a large scale in the early 1900s, when it started to fear the perceived increasing strength of the Hindu nationalist movement. In order to

counterbalance this perceived threat, the colonialist British government began to aggressively support the Muslim League, a political unit spearheaded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah that aimed to represent the subcontinent's Muslim interests.

The British ruttled these two groups against one another, and after all the Muslim League was forced to demand the creation of a separate state, to be called Pakistan, because it felt its interests would not be represented in a Hindu-majority India after the British accepted the Subcontinent's independence. Consequently, the British Empire, under the direction of Lord Mountbatten, formed artificial geographical boundaries separating the newly created India and Pakistan. The formation of these new states produced a terrific amount of violent turmoil, dubbed the bloody partition. Due to violent turmoil thousands of people of both countries were killed and the land dispute of Kashmir was formed between India and Pakistan.³

In 1947, when India was divided into India and Pakistan, Hari Singh, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Muslim majority state, refused to go along with Pakistan or India because Hari Singh wanted to make Jammu and Kashmir as an independent country. Maharaja Hari Singh signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 16, and tried to sign a similar agreement with India. However, following the declaration of independence, communal rioting took place in Punjab between the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims when the state was being divided between India and Pakistan. In September 1947, the rioting spilled into Kashmir against the Muslims. At that time, Pakistan tried to occupy Kashmir by force. So Pakistan sent its military troops into Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh wanted India's military support, but India refused to help unless the Maharajah signed the instrument of accession, a standard procedure under which other princely states had acceded to join India or Pakistan. Hari Singh signed the accord on October 27, 1947 and on the same day Indian armed forces entered in Kashmir to protect it. Indian troops secured Jammu, Srinagar and the Kashmir valley itself, but the intense fighting flagged with the onset of winter, which made much of the state impassable. After weeks of strong fighting between India and Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared a ceasefire and sought U.N. arbitration with the promise of a plebiscite. Sardar Patel had disagreed against both, describing Kashmir as a bilateral dispute and its accession as justified by international law. Patel had feared that the U.N.'s involvement would stall the process and allow Pakistan to reinforce its presence in Kashmir. In 1957, Kashmir was fully integrated into the Union of India and the state of Jammu & Kashmir was created. After the war of 1947 Jammu & Kashmir remains divided between the countries by the Line of Control (LoC), which demarcates the ceasefire line agreed by both countries.⁴

Indian Perspective

The instrument of accession executed by the ruler of Jammu & Kashmir was the same as ones executed by nearly 560 other princely states in India. Their accession has not been challenged and a different standard cannot be applied to Jammu & Kashmir. Thus, once the instrument of accession was signed by the Maharaja and accepted by the Governor-General of India, the Kashmir became an integral part of India and the legality of accession is beyond doubt.

Pakistani Perspective

The perceptions of Pakistan and India about the constituents of the sub-conflict are altogether different. Pakistan considers it as an unfinished agenda of the division of India in 1947. Pakistan regards it as an issue of giving the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris, a principle also accepted by the UN Security Council Resolution. The importance of Kashmir for Pakistan lies in the two-nation theory upon which All India Muslim League based its demand for a separate Muslim homeland. The theory mentions that the Hindus and Muslims are two separate

nations who cannot live together and that the Muslims of the subcontinent cannot lead their lives in full accordance with their beliefs under Hindu domination. Indian control over Kashmir was problematic because it was the sole Muslim majority region that was not given to Pakistan. In contrast, the Hindu majority state of Junagadh, whose Muslim ruler preferred to join Pakistan, was incorporated by India in 1948 at the time of independence. It became a useful issue for Pakistani rulers to gain political support because it raises 'deep passions and emotions' that touch the heart of Pakistani identity. For the majority of Pakistanis, Kashmir is so central to their national identity that without it, partition of India and liberation of Pakistan still remains 'fundamentally incomplete.'⁵ Kashmir was significant for Pakistan practically in the strategic and economic fields. The strategic importance of Kashmir was the same as to India mentioned above. In a cable to Nehru, on 16th December 1947, Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan stated, "the security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir". Pakistan was as much concerned about the effects of leaving Kashmir because threats were there from India and Russia. Liaquat Ali made this clear in a 1951 interview: 'The very position of Kashmir is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend itself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.'⁶ Kashmir's river links with Pakistan were also vital. The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers all flowed through Kashmir before they reached Pakistan. The agriculture of the Punjab and Sindh that is the backbone of Pakistan's economy depended on the water of these rivers to a large extent. Pakistan had the fear of permanent switching off the water supply on behalf of India. This fear of Pakistan was expressed by Pakistan's first Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan: If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both economic and strategic points of view, become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign state'. The Pakistani concerns on the water issue that increase the significance of the Kashmir issue for Pakistan are still present. Asif Ali Zardari, the President of Pakistan, was also anxious in 2008 just like the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan, over the stoppage of water on behalf of India. Zardari, pointing to the ramifications of the violation of the Indus Water Treaty, said the Indian move to stop the water by building dams on the rivers flowing towards Pakistan would damage the bilateral ties, which the two countries had built over the years. In the UNSC Pakistan denied all Indian allegations of illegal action in assisting the tribesmen in Kashmir. It represented the situation in Kashmir in the start of the issue as essentially one of the popular revolts against the oppressive regime of Maharaja.⁷ Pakistan maintained that a standstill agreement was reached between Pakistan and the State of Kashmir in 1947. Under this agreement, Pakistan had become responsible for the defence, foreign and communication affairs of the State. Pakistan also stated that the accession of Kashmir to India was based on fraud and violence and therefore, could not be recognized.⁸

Pakistan stated that the accession of Kashmir by Maharaja is the main argument on which the Indian Government bases its claim on Kashmir. The letter of Maharaja and Lord Mount Batten's reply were never accepted by Pakistan as the valid basis for Kashmir's accession to India. Pakistan has been questioned and doubtful about Maharaja's capacity to offer accession while in flight, his authority to control the territory and the conditions within Kashmir. It has been widely acknowledged now, that there was a freedom movement at its peak in Kashmir, Maharaja had lost the control over large part of Kashmir, and he was not enjoying the support of the masses. His forces were dispersed and he himself was leaving Kashmir. In these circumstances the letter of Maharaja offering the accession of Kashmir to India and the acceptance of this offer by India does not constitute a valid reason for accession of the state to India. Pakistan argued that the majority of Kashmiris are Muslim, therefore, Kashmir must become a part of Pakistan. The premise is that the religion of a given person determines its nationality and its political affiliation. Other factors too linked Kashmir closely with Pakistan.⁹

India's Strategy to Resolve the Kashmir Problem

India perceived the Kashmir Dispute mainly through the prism of terrorism. Internally, the absence of militant attacks is seen as the presence of peace and political stability in Kashmir. Problems of governance are seen as an offshoot of militancy; hence, the government has believed that once the latter is brought under control, there would be better governance. Issues such as corruption and bad governance are carpeted under militancy. Counter-insurgency operations have assumed more significance, without understanding that militancy has been the product of certain political questions and that once these political questions are addressed; the militancy would automatically die down. These political questions raised by the Kashmiris may be real or imaginary or both; but it is the duty of the government to address them politically. Externally, cross-border terrorism was perceived as the main bilateral issue vis-à-vis Pakistan. India has long avoided discussing J&K with Pakistan and constantly emphasized that until the latter stops cross-border terrorism; there could not be any significant negotiation. Globally, Pakistan attempted to highlight the issue of human rights and political oppression in Kashmir. Pakistan blamed that Indian government working against the real gesture of Kashmiris. India attempted to flag cross-border terrorism as the main issue and obstacle in taking any further measures. As cross-border terrorism became the highlight of India's approach towards the conflict of Kashmir, two issues became prominent in the last two and half decades. Any dialogue on demilitarization or troop relocation in J&K became a nonnegotiable issue for New Delhi, as it was linked to cross-border terrorism. New Delhi repeatedly emphasized that unless cross-border terrorism is stopped, there cannot be discussion on troop withdrawal, as the latter is a response to the former.

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FAILURE OF DEFENCE, DIPLOMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR: IT'S IMPACT ON INDO-PAK RELATIONS

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Introduction

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has aroused the passions of kings, commoners and invaders since times immemorial. Geo-strategically located at the confluence of three major historical empires namely, India, Central Asia and China, the region provides the land bridge between them. Fabled for the beauty of its land and people, this region has been coveted by invaders leading to a most unkind history. Comprising of nearly one-third of the original sovereign state of Jammu and Kashmir, it represents one of the biggest human tragedies of the contemporary political map of the world. The most tragic aspect of this region, where the people literally have been living under the jackboot of the military, deprived totally of their democratic rights, is its total neglect by all concerned. The overall focus on what is generally understood as the “Kashmir Problem” on which much discussion has taken place, overlooks the actual occupation, albeit by illegal aggression, by Pakistan of this sizeable chunk of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.¹

The state of Jammu and Kashmir which was acceded to India in 1947 only after the Pakistani raiders were knocking at the doors of Srinagar continues to be an area of conflict between India and Pakistan. Defence, Diplomacy and Democracy seems to have failed leading to a sort of ‘Proxy War’ being waged between the two countries in the state. Terrorism as a means to destabilize the law of the land is being extensively sponsored by Pakistan. The people of the state have been reduced to a pitiable condition with murder, rape, extortion and rampant. The economy is in ruins with people barely being able to eke out a living. To analyse the Kashmir problem with special reference to India-Pakistan Relations and suggest ways and means to resolve it. The paper argues that the critical challenge in Kashmir can be met only by a reformed and rejuvenated India, with a new vision and a practical insight into ground-level realities. The paper has made an analysis of the reasons for the failure of defence, diplomacy and democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. It also throws light on the options for peace in J&K.

History of a Troubled Land

Hindu belief provides the most exquisite imagery for the origins of Kashmir. It is said that the valley was once a beautiful lake inhabited by the snake people, the Nagas. Legend has it that the sage Kashyap (born from the mind of Brahma, the creator of the universe) prayed for the deliverance of the Nagas from the demon Jaldeo. Answering his penance, Lord Shiva ripped a hole in the side of the mountain, draining the land and delivering the Nagas to safety. This land, in gratitude to the sage, was called Kashyapamar, which became gradually corrupted to Kashmir.

Initially a centre of Hinduism, Kashmir was first exposed to Buddhism. The earliest known chronicler of this land, Kalhana, who wrote his *Rajtarangini* in the twelfth century, described his people thus: ‘Kashmir may be conquered by the force of spiritual merit but never by the force of soldiers.’ It was thus Buddhism which first conquered Kashmir. Islam first appeared in Kashmir with the armies of Mahmud of Ghazni but did not make an

impact. However, the sufi missionary Bulbul Shah, brought Islam to Kashmir when Rinchana, a Tibetan prince who took the throne after the sack of Kashmir in 1320 by Dulchu Khan (a descendant of Chagatai Khan), converted. This was followed by a period of relative prosperity with Islam gaining ground. One of the more famous dynasties, the Saladinis ruled Kashmir for over 200 years from 1343 followed by the Mughals from 1585. In 1753 came the resurgent Afghans who, under Ahmed Shah Abdali, terrorized the land. In 1819 the Sikhs came to the rescue of the Kashmiris and the Valley was absorbed into Maharaja Ranjit Singh's growing empire.

Now into the scene arrived the Dogras with Gulab Singh, an unusually gifted ruler, with his eyes set on Kashmir. Initially in the service of the Sikhs, Gulab Singh took advantage of the Anglo-Sikh conflict by siding with the British. On the defeat of the Sikhs, Gulab Singh was rewarded by being given Kashmir for a paltry sum of Rs. 75 lakhs. Thus Kashmir passed on to the hands of the Dogras. The Dogra rule did not do much to improve the lot of the people. To be fair to them, they did not discriminate against the Muslims as such but were guilty of oppression of all people. The rich did everything to ensure that the poor did not prosper. It was only a matter of chance that majority of the rich were Kashmiri Pundits. This fact was realised by Sheik Abdullah and it influenced his decision of declaring his party as the 'National Conference' as opposed to the 'Muslim Conference'.²

A look at the map of Jammu and Kashmir would highlight the geo-strategic importance of the State. It was a natural bulwark against China to the North-East as also a land-link to China as well as the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. It was thus natural that both India and the State-to-be Pakistan would vie for this pristine land. Furthermore, the demography of the State was such that the decision facing the Maharaja would not be easy. Whereas the bulk of the population, nearly 75 percent, was in the Valley and mostly Muslim, one could not forget that the majority in Jammu, which accounted for over 20 percent of the state's population, was Hindu. The rest of the population in Ladakh, Gilgit and Hunza was again Muslim except in Ladakh which had a Buddhist majority. However population was very sparse in these areas.

At the time of independence, Jammu and Kashmir being a princely state had the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan. Whereas the majority of the population was Muslim, the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, was a Hindu. In addition, all routes to the Kashmir Valley passed through the new state of Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan was very confident that Jammu and Kashmir would accede to it. However, the people of Jammu and Kashmir were largely secular and did not ascribe to the two nation theory. Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir was also vacillating and not acceding to either of the countries. In fact, he was dreaming of an independent state.

Pakistan, in the meantime, felt that it could influence the Maharaja's choice by force. To this end, they sponsored a tribal invasion of Kashmir. Unfortunately for Pakistan, this invasion was opposed by the very people it was meant to liberate, that is, the Kashmiri Muslims. The Maharaja realized that the only option open to him was to accede to India to prevent the rape of the land. On 26th of October 1947, he signed the Instrument of Accession. Indian troops landed at Srinagar soon after and retook a majority of the territory from the invaders.

India took the matter to the United Nations Security Council. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolved on 13 August 1948 that it would determine the status of Jammu and Kashmir "in accordance with the will of the people" following an evacuation of Pakistani troops and nationals from the State. A phased withdrawal of Indian troops would follow Pakistan's total withdrawal. Though both nations accepted the resolution and a cease-fire was declared on 1st January 1949, the plebiscite was never held and passage of time made it redundant.³

After independence, Jammu and Kashmir was granted a special status as enshrined under article 370 of the constitution. The economy of the State which was centered on handicrafts, tourism and agriculture was given all possible assistance from the Centre. In fact, the State because of its special status, received vast funds from the country to develop it. However in spite of the special status, there were drawbacks and a series of events occurred which led to problems in the State. These are as discussed subsequently.

The Seeds of Discontent

Indian Stand on Kashmir

Once the State of Jammu and Kashmir had legally acceded to India, the geo-strategic importance of the State became an important aspect influencing Indian policy on Kashmir. Furthermore, this also vindicated the Indian stand that the two nation policy was not required to have been thrust upon is as well as that India was a truly secular nation where all citizens, regardless of race and religion had equal opportunity. This was also precisely the reason why Pakistan wanted Kashmir, to prove the correctness of the two nation theory. Given this background, India should have gone all out to ensure the proper integration of Kashmir and made extra effort to satisfy the people and win their hearts and minds. It must be remembered that prior to 1947, this State was for all practical purposes an independent state, so one could not expect automatic allegiance of the people to India. However, these efforts were not made in due earnest and the population was not won over. The people of Jammu and Kashmir had plenty to be unsatisfied about. History had not been kind to them and oppression and poverty was their wont. The new status under India should have brought about a marked change, but it did not. This was due to a plethora of reasons which are enumerated in the following paragraphs.

Feudalism

The riches in Jammu and Kashmir were with a select few. The vast majority, mainly Muslims were extremely poor and did not even own the land they tilled. Though Sheik Abdullah tried to relieve the suffering, he could not prevent the prevalent exploitation of the poor by the rich. The Sheikh signed the bill for land to tiller in 1948, but, could not wipe out landlordism with its centuries old exploitation. A main cause was the political uncertainty of the time and the fact that the other main party, the Congress, had its higher hierarchy full of Sayyids and urban Hindus. The perpetuation of land based exploitation was always a source of strength to both these communities.⁴

Government Indifference and Disproportionate Representation

The Central Government remained largely indifferent to the events in the State and therefore, did not take measures to alleviate the suffering of the people. Though the Government was pumping large sums of money into the Valley, it was doing nothing to ensure the money was reaching the place for which it was intended. To compound matters, the Government also did not take measures to ensure that the majority Muslims get a proportionate representation in central services. On the other hand the State machinery was completely handed over to the people of the Valley. This led to the power in the State being in the hands of a small section of people. The Muslims in power were quick to take advantage of their position and concentrated on personal gains, while the Kashmiri Pandits, who continued to wield considerable influence, thereby gave the uncalled for impression to their Muslim brethren that they continued to exploit them.

Corruption

With the small section in power concentrating on personal gains, the administration was unable to meet the aspirations of the people. Corruption was rife and it became impossible for the common man to achieve his goals fairly. This, more than anything else, led to the disenchantment of the people with the system. All this while, the

Central Government did not intervene. The endemic roots of corruption were more evident after the Kashmir accord of 1975. The main reason was sycophancy and power circles which grew closer and closer. A case in point is the sanction for construction of large hotels around Dal Lake when it was known that it would prove an ecological disaster.⁵

Lack of Development As a result of the extensive corruption, the development work planned by the Central Government suffered. Most of the funds were siphoned off into the pockets of those in power. In addition all contracts and such like were given to relatives and no checks on results were made. On the other hand, development proceeded in reverse gear with environmental degradation taking place at an alarming pace. Forests were being mercilessly cut without thought. It is indeed amazing that even after 43 years of freedom there is a total absence of a sewerage system in Srinagar.⁶

Article 370 - A Hindrance to Progress

The historical reasons for including this Article may or may not be justified. However, now this Article is no longer taken in its true spirit by anyone, least of all the Kashmiris themselves. On the part of the Central Government, the Article was an excuse to forego responsibility over what was going on in Kashmir. To the Kashmiri politicians and well-to-do, it was a tool to further their own interests, whip up passion and dream of an independent nation. To many Indians, the Article was like a festering sore on their idea of one nation amongst such stark diversity. To the Kashmiri masses, the article has brought nothing. The former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Jagmohan, has aptly described it as one of the strongest roots of Kashmiri separatism and alienation.⁷ It was due to this article that the Kashmiri leadership constantly harped on their 'different status' and felt that they were above the law of the rest of the country. This article was used as a tool to promise freedom to the Kashmiris and as a tool to further the ends of the politicians. It was due to actions taken in this direction by Sheik Abdullah, that he was arrested on two occasions, in 1953 and 1970. Being a popular figure in Kashmir, this caused some alienation of the people.

Pakistani Attitude

One of the most important factors in the current crisis is the Pakistani obsession with Kashmir. Given the genesis of the State of Pakistan, their leaders had no doubts that Kashmir would come to them. The events that followed partition created a deep scar in their psyche. Pakistan's entire objective became the humiliation of India and the merger of Kashmir to Pakistan. A study of any move the Pakistani Government makes will prove that it will do all in its power to pull Kashmir away from India. In fact, Pakistan views taking over of Kashmir as pivotal to their very existence. To this end Pakistan has made the so-called 'liberation' of Kashmir the cornerstone of their domestic and foreign policies. Thus, they have gone all out to create and ferment trouble in the Valley. Sad to say, they have succeeded to a large extent.

The Rise of Militancy

Pakistan Connection

All the above factors, alongwith the mishandling of the situation by the Government, led to a feeling of frustration in the population. The scene was set for exploitation by an adversary. It was at this stage that Pakistan stepped in. Never having reconciled to the fact of Kashmir's accession to India and still smarting from the humiliating defeat of 1971, Pakistan correctly smelt the opportunity to ferment trouble. As it had never ceased trying to subvert the population since independence, it just had to step up its activities which it did in the following manner.

Playing the Islamic Card

It started extensive propaganda to divide the Valley along religious lines. As Islam in Kashmir was of the tolerant *sufi* kind, Pakistan infiltrated the religious setup in a devious manner. A large number of mosques and ‘madarsas’ (religious schools) were set up to which few Indians, if any, paid any attention.⁸ With the help of these institutions, which were looked after by non-Kashmiris, Pakistan successfully propagated the fear amongst Kashmiris that ‘Islam is in danger’ in India, especially in Kashmir. This had a galvanizing effect on Kashmiri youth who went straight into indoctrination camps that Pakistan had set up in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.⁹ This process was speeded up by the influx of moulvis from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to whom the gentle sufism of Kashmiri Islam was alien. They taught of pride in militant Islam and branded Muslim children going to secular schools as *kaffirs*. This struck a chord with a population already stimulated by Islamic resurgence in the world, particularly the Islamic revolution in Iran.¹⁰

Subverting the Population

After the debacle of 1971, Pakistan was smarting from the crushing defeat at the hands of India. It therefore, stepped up its drive to recruit disenchanted youths to carry out anti-Government activities. Using the Islamic card as also by a slow and steady process of disinformation, Pakistan succeeded in recruiting a large number of disenchanted Kashmiris. They were helped no end by the efforts of local politicians to win votes on communal grounds, not to mention the ostrich-like attitude of the Indian Government which took absolutely no action against the rot setting in the country, and therefore in Kashmir. To quote an example, in post independence India, Shivaji is portrayed as a “*Hindu saviour*” who fought the ‘foreigner’ Muslim. No one cares to highlight that Shivaji was a truly secular leader who had a large number of Muslims, including some of his most trusted generals, in his army. Also, one seems to forget that the ‘foreigner’ Muslim, against whom Shivaji was waging a war was, in fact, a sixth generation Indian king albeit a Mughal, who had a large number of Hindus, including his most trusted generals, in his army.¹¹ In such an atmosphere, where a nation’s history shows a war against Mughals to be a Hindu-Muslim war, it is of little wonder that Pakistan found fertile ground to subvert the Muslims of Kashmir. Where this failed, force was resorted to, making the local population mute and helpless collaborators in the violence. Again, we failed to protect the Kashmiris from this coercion.

Providing Latest Weaponry and Training

With the help of experience and infrastructure gained in the Afghan War, Pakistan employed the same weapons to Kashmir. She also used the trained Afghan veterans to infiltrate the Valley and carry out attacks as also force Kashmiris, many of them unwilling, into the militants fold. The former Pakistani Chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg has confessed in November 1991 to noted American journalist, Selig S Harrison, that since 1986 onwards, thousands of Kashmiris were sent for battle inoculation to Afghanistan with a view to return and fight in the Valley.¹²

Propaganda and Misinformation

The Pakistanis also carried on a massive campaign of misinformation directed both, at the Kashmiri populace as well as the international fora. Having decided on carrying out a media war against India, Pakistan did not hesitate to carry out the most foul, vicious and false propaganda. Unfortunately, she received a sympathetic hearing both, in Kashmir as well as the Western and Islamic world. This was partly due to the complacent attitude of the Indian Government and partly due to the fact that India was, and is, emerging as a world power, a fact that neither the West nor certain Islamic countries can stomach. Therefore, it is the endeavour of all these nations, who do not wish to see India prosper, to bring down India at the smallest opportunity and excuse. Pakistani propaganda was

therefore, a heaven sent opportunity to these nations. Regarding India's response to these false reports, it can be summed up in one phrase - deafening silence. Though senior public officials point out these lapses time and again, no action is being taken. To quote an example pointed out by the former Governor, Jagmohan, an advertisement carried in 'The Independent' of London, accused Indian forces in Kashmir of atrocities, sexual torture and rape.¹³ Reaction of the Indian Government to these blatant falsehoods in a Western newspaper was just not there, and one can only wonder why.

In addition to spreading false and malicious propaganda, Pakistan has also mastered the art of twisting the truth in a most Machiavellian fashion. As we are aware, one of the reasons for which India gives Kashmir importance is because it nullifies the two nation theory and proves India to be a secular State 'par compare'. However, the Pakistani interpretation of these highlights the depths of deviousness they are willing to go to. According to MB Naqvi, supposedly a journalist, India's stand implies that "if Kashmir is allowed to leave India, India's secular policy would breakdown and then no one can guarantee the safety and security of 100 million Indian Muslims. India is therefore, treating the Indian Muslim minority as so many hostages for Kashmir's continued servitude".¹⁴

Engaging India in a "Proxy War"

Most importantly, Pakistan has fully involved herself into covert and overt support, backing and direction of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact there is now no secret that the hand of the infamous Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is behind nearly all the militant and terrorist groups operating in the State. The extent of Pakistani involvement is documented by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee, of the United States House of Representatives. In its report dated 1 Feb, 1993, it said ".....sponsoring international terrorism and separatist subversion is not new to Pakistan. Since the 1970's, Islamabad has been training Sikh and other Indian separatist movements as part of (former Prime Minister) Z.A.K. Bhutto's strategy of 'forward strategic depth'." It added, "Having witnessed the initial impact of the Islamist message in Indian Kashmir, Islamabad began to broaden its horizons and set its sights on bigger goals. Thus in 1986, with growing experience with training, organizing and running the Afghan Mujahedeen and with military supplies available (through the United States, Saudi Arabia and other foreign assistance), Pakistan began expanding its operations to sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism, primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long term programme."¹⁵ In the Pakistan Frontier Post of 29 May 1991, the noted Pakistani journalist, Mushahid Hussain admits, "The approach which Pakistan has adopted is the 'Afghan Model'; essentially a protracted war, which has made Kashmir a bleeding wound for India."¹⁶ The code name for this operation, christened by Late General Zia-ul-Haque was '*Operation Topac*'.¹⁷

Attitude of the Kashmiris

The recent decades have seen a shift in the attitude of Kashmiris from a peace loving people to a brutalized society. This to a small measure is our own fault. At a time when the people were raising their voice for their rights, which had been impinged upon by their own leaders, the Indian Government instead of "*righting the wrongs*", chose instead to clamp down on the people. This was in no small measure responsible for their alienation. Due to the attitude of the Government, the security forces, particularly the Border Security Force (BSF), were far removed from reality and were found to be unnecessarily harsh. With increasing awareness on the matter of human rights, the people gradually developed a confrontationalist attitude. This alienation was speeded up by the Pakistani activities as also the arrival of a militant form of Islam. A large number of terrorist and secessionist groups sprung up in the 1980's and slowly but surely, they took control of the people's lives.

By 1989, the militants had considerably negated two out of three priceless advantages a Government enjoys against the insurgents. These advantages, first articulated by Mao- Zedong of China are:- ¹⁸

- a. The existence of an army.
- b. The presence of an administrative apparatus which includes all the organs of national and local Government to collect revenues, gather information and provide a variety of services.
- c. The innate habit of obedience that most citizens have towards decrees of the State.

A Watershed of Events

1989 - A Turning Point

1989 marked the beginning of large scale terrorism in the Valley with a number of incidents in which a large number of Security Forces (SF) personnel and innocent civilians were killed. The first hint of times to come was on 27 Oct. 1988 when a Maruti van blew up at Lal Chowk, Srinagar. Next on 13 Jul. 1989, a bus carrying Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel was attacked leaving two CRPF personnel and four passerby's dead. On 17 Jul., the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) claimed responsibility and declared "...such attacks would go on till Indian tyranny and imperialism are ended".¹⁹ From this date onwards, Kashmir would be ruled by the gun. Emboldened, the militants kidnapped the then Home Minister's daughter, Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed. Her subsequent exchange for five hard-core terrorists was a major event of the year and caught international attention. This was the beginning of the international publicity blitz, mostly detrimental to India.

The Hazratbal Incident

The Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar is a place of great religious importance in the Valley as the sacred *moi-e-muqqadas*, a strand of hair from the head of the Prophet of Islam, is housed here. In October 1993, a group of terrorists took over the shrine and threatened the holy relic. Any damage to the relic would be the cause for great disturbances. With infinite patience, the Indian Government handled the situation with aplomb and finally gained the surrender of the militants after a month. This event proved to the world that India was definitely not a violator of human rights but, on the contrary, was a guarantor of the same in even the most trying circumstances. The manner in which the Supreme Court of India ordered that food be served to the holed up terrorists and that electricity and water be provided, when the strategy of the Security Forces was to cut off just those and thereby get the terrorists to surrender, was a show of concern for human rights with no parallel. However, even in such circumstances which demanded national collective action, vested interests did not hesitate to further their political aims. Even a distinguished soldier like Lieutenant General MA Zaki, then Advisor to the Governor was not spared. Though his dedication and determination was known to all, he was made a target of false propaganda and accused of being communal and soft on the militants.²⁰

The Charar-e-Sharif Incident

In another similar case in early 1995, the militants holed up in the holy Charar-e-Sharif shrine did not prove an easy nut to crack. The same strategy this time was to fail, resulting in the burning up of the shrine and most of the village with it. The reason was that the terrorists involved were Afghans who were much more brutal. They had scant regard for the holiness of the place as the shrine was a "Mazhar" and they believed that it had no religious value. In fact the terrorist leader, Mast Gul, holed up in the shrine had made an open threat to burn it down in a number of interviews to the media, including Zee Television's 'Ghoomta Aina'. They were well aware that it had immense value for the Kashmiris. By burning the shrine, Pakistan, who was the backers, wanted to accuse India of destroying an Islamic religious place. The result of Indian inept handling of the situation gave the India bashers a

golden opportunity to discredit the Indian Government and the Security Forces. However, in spite of professing the contrary, it is the opinion of many Kashmir watchers that majority of the Kashmiris were convinced that the militants were the guilty party, but are afraid to admit it.

The Hostage Crisis

The militants lost more of their support when they took five western tourists hostage and subsequently, murdered one of them. The manner in which India is handling the situation has earned the praise of the world and even the support of the more stable Kashmiri groups, getting them closer to the Government. Four of the tourists are still held by the militants, of the wild-card “Al-Faran” group. This action of the militants has, much against their wishes, managed to get some international support for India’s handling of the situation. Particularly, this crisis has gifted a chance to show the ill-informed Americans the real nature of terrorism in Kashmir.²¹

The Fratricidal War

The Perpetrators of Violence

Who are the culprits in this senseless violence? After more than a decade of lawlessness, there is no doubt that Pakistan is behind the situation in the State. But who are they using? Initially they got a small number of disenchanted youth. However on realizing that this was inadequate, they started forcing young Kashmiris to take to the gun by fear of death and destruction against them and their families. When they found that this too was not bearing the desired results, they have of late sent in mercenaries, men with no scruples, many of whom are veterans of the Afghan War. All of these have been equipped with the latest weaponry. In fact, as of now the battle to “liberate” Kashmir is being fought by foreign terrorists who indulge in rape, loot and mayhem of the local population, tearing the very fabric of the society they wish to “free”. Needless to say they have no support of the local population except at the point of a gun.

The Victims

Whichever way one looks at it, the only victims of this situation are the Kashmiris themselves, be they Muslims or the Pandits. The plight of the local population is evidently nowhere in the mind of the perpetrators of violence whose only aim appears to be to get at India, a task which is way beyond them. In their desperate machinations to create problems for India, Pakistan and her surrogate groups have no qualms about sacrificing the lives of the poor local populace. This is all the more evident when one reads about the number of militants who are captured by the Security Forces and who claim to have been forced to take up the gun by coercion.

The Groups

The various groups involved can be broadly classified into two as under:-

- a. The groups demanding independence.
- b. The groups demanding merger with Pakistan.

Groups Demanding Independence Of these the most prominent is the JKLF. These groups, of late, are beginning to talk of a dialogue with the Government. They are not likely to resort to senseless killings of civilians though SF personnel are likely to be targeted.

Groups Demanding Merger with Pakistan. These mostly comprise of the hard-core elements and foreign mercenaries. The major groups are Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen, though a large number of smaller groups such as Al-Faran also exist. These groups are totally controlled by ISI and are unlikely to be willing to discuss matters with the authorities. These are the groups which rely on coercion for their support and do not have

spontaneous local support. These have been responsible for nearly all the terrorist attacks on innocent people as also the majority of human rights abuses. It can be seen that Pakistan is the major culprit in most human rights abuses.

NO COMMON GROUND

Before tackling the vexed question of how the Kashmir problem can be solved, it is essential to know the views of the various parties in the conflict. This too is no longer the simple task of knowing the views of those who are directly involved. In today's world of power centres and super-powers, it is essential to know the views of everyone who counts.

The Aspirations of the People

As the situation around the world has changed dramatically in the past few decades, more so after the disappearance of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism; the aspirations of various ethnic groups and regional parties have come to the fore and they yearn for controlling their own destinies. Case in point is Chechenya, Palestine and the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The Kashmiris today have similar aspirations. The large majority which is silent does want a change for the better within the confines of the Indian Constitution. However, those who wield the gun would like to join with Pakistan and some elements prefer independence.

It is necessary to analyze this along with the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh region. Unfortunately, in this we have been carried away by our own rhetoric of conducting elections in the State, even though the ground situation is such wherein the Kashmiris in all probability may not turn up to cast their ballot.²²

The people of Jammu region would like to have a large measure of regional autonomy within the State. They believe that they have not been given their due by successive State Governments in the past.

The Ladhakis, because of inaccessibility have been neglected and in the past have successfully agitated against the then State Government. Their aspirations to a degree have been met by elections to the Ladakh Hill Council. In case of Kargil, the people, though of Ladakhi stock, profess Islam. They are Shias and follow Imam Khomeni. They may also opt for some measure of autonomy within the State.

The Central Government

The Central Government has not been able to appreciate and apply their mind to the following points in the Valley:-

- a. Unfortunately, the aspect of "*Kashmiri Psyche*" has not been understood either by the successive Governors, the Central leadership or the Security Forces. It is an age old dictum that we should influence the people by winning the battle of hearts and minds. Presently, only lip service is being paid to it and in reality, the Kashmiris more often than not, face extremely difficult and humiliating situations brought about by actions of the Security Forces.
- b. The Centre, in its analysis, thought that if insurgency is ruthlessly put down then it would be possible to conduct elections. Where we have gone wrong is that alongwith the military operations, we should have opened a dialogue with the various political parties in the State. We should have also initiated dialogue with groups such as the JKLF, Peoples League and now the All Party Hurriyat Conference.
- c. Instead of promising limited autonomy, the Centre should have mounted a massive recruitment drive for educated people of the State into various central organisations such as the police and administrative services. This would have firstly, undone the disproportionate representation of Kashmiris in central services.

Secondly, it would be easier for the locals to meet the threat of terrorism as they would have more confidence in the Centre backing them. Lastly, and most important, it would prove to the Kashmiris, that Kashmir's affairs were actually to be left to them - which in a way is a sort of autonomy in itself. Furthermore, if additional police battalions were to be raised from the Valley and Ladakh, it would reduce the effort the Government is making on inducting police from other regions. This would also reduce charges of human rights violations.

- d. Some measures should have been initiated to get the Kashmiri Pandits back to the Valley. Non Government Organisations should be used for this purpose.

The Aim of the Indian Government. In spite of all the drawbacks on the Government's view of the situation, the Government is looking for a speedy end to the conflict within the framework of the constitution. It cannot afford the expenses of dealing with the current militancy for very long without compromising on essential development. It wants to meet the aspirations of the people but will not compromise on the unity and integrity of the Nation. Any talk with Pakistan on the matter would have to be within the above mentioned parameters that is, as per the "*Shimla Agreement*".

The View from Pakistan

The Pakistani Design. As the major perpetrator of violence in the State, Pakistan wants that India should be discredited. As a consequence, she wants that Kashmir should come into her fold and only then should there be peace. To achieve her aim, she is likely to step up violence in the State with the help of her surrogate groups. She is not likely to permit India to achieve a peaceful solution in the State.

Likely Pakistani Strategy. To solve the Kashmir problem to its advantage, one likely option for Pakistan would be:-²³

- a. Continue to seek a plebiscite in Kashmir in anticipation that majority of population will vote for Pakistan.
- b. Continue to pay lip service to the Indian position that all outstanding issues between the two countries be handled in a bilateral manner and settled through peaceful means. At the same time try to internationalise the question of Kashmir by involving the United Nations, Islamic Organisations and other international bodies concerned with human rights and civil liberties. Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqui (Retired), editor of Pakistan Defence Journal said as much and added that his country should continue "...diplomatic efforts to project the Kashmir case as a challenge to world conscience".
- c. Keep a firm hold over Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and try to keep its political problems out of the world press.
- d. Continue its low cost war against India. This proxy war can be stepped up in its intensity but the commitment of significant numbers of Pakistani regulars must be avoided to maintain the facade of non-interference in India.
- e. Keep up so called Confidence Building Measures, while persisting on an aggressive but low key policy in Kashmir.

Demands of the Militant Organisations

View of the Groups Demanding Independence. Of these, the most prominent is the JKLF. Of late, due to the uncontrollable terrorist activities of the foreign mercenaries, these groups are slowly realizing the futility of their taking up the gun. Hence, these groups are likely to be amenable for talks. Though they would prefer independence,

they can be brought about to share the Governments point of view so as to ensure peace and stability. Due to this reason they are likely to be targeted by Pakistan.

View of the Groups Demanding Merger with Pakistan. These groups are extremely volatile and not likely to permit any meaningful actions to resolve the issue. They are only likely to do as their master, namely Pakistan, bids. They are not much concerned about the Kashmiris as they comprise mostly of mercenaries drawn from Afghanistan, Sudan and other such nations. Their aim will be to cause maximum damage to the Indian forces and infrastructure in Kashmir. They cannot be counted upon for any meaningful dialogue. Chief amongst these groups is the Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen.

Views of the International Community

The International Community. The International Community is likely to support India as long as human rights are maintained. They would also like a quick solution to the problem and peace. They may not press for the plebiscite as India has proved her authority on the State and they would not want Kashmir to serve as an example to other movements in other parts of the world. However, this view is not likely to be shared by the major players in the international fora due to their own vested interests.

The United States of America. Though, the United States keeps professing that they consider Kashmir to be a bilateral matter, their actions do not match their words. In fact, the general feeling is that the Americans have plans for Kashmir. This is because of the American belief that they must have their finger in every pie.²⁴ However, a more plausible explanation for American interest is given by some academicians who say that the road to Indian accession to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty runs through Kashmir.²⁵

Whatever be the compulsions for the United States, there is no doubt that it feels it has a role in Kashmir. This is evident from the diplomatic *faux pas* that take place from time to time, one being the then Home Minister, Mr. SB Chavan's accusation that the United States had evil designs in Jammu and Kashmir. The United States has long professed that its only concern was for stability in South Asia which was threatened by the Kashmir issue. Though the American Assistant Secretary for South Asia has agreed that a plebiscite will not work in Kashmir²⁶, the Americans continue their support to Pakistan on the issue.

However, keeping in view American desire to maintain hegemony over the world and prevent India from developing her might, this sort of double talk can be expected. In fact after the Brown Amendment, we can expect more weapons and mercenaries into Kashmir and elsewhere. Would not Pakistan feel confident when the world's policeman is patting its back for being a good boy? The entire world knows that Pakistan is sending mercenaries into Kashmir. There are about seventy terrorist training camps at any given time in and around Pakistan. Still the United States wants to label it a moderate Islamic State willing to fight fundamentalism.²⁷ This is another example of double standards of the American policy.

The Organisation of Islamic States (O.I.C.). They are likely to echo the sentiments of Pakistan. However, a few States, such as Iraq have traditionally supported India's stand on the issue. In view of good Indian relations with most Islamic States, particularly due to Indian support of Palestine, the O.I.C. is not likely to make a big issue out of Kashmir. However, Pakistan wields considerable influence and is likely to cause India some discomfort.

By internationalizing the issue, Pakistan has also been trying to carry the Muslim world with it.²⁸ But here the 53 member O.I.C. has played a key role in trying to convince Pakistan of the difficulty in garnering support for moving draft resolutions on Kashmir in the UN General Assembly sessions. Most of the O.I.C. members have been avoiding such a move given the expanding economic ties with India. Many of the Islamic States also believe that it

is absurd to project the India-Pakistan struggle over Kashmir as an issue of Islam against a Hindu majority country which is also home to 125 million Muslims.

China. China has also reacted adversely to the idea of an independent Kashmir on geo-strategic grounds. China has likened an independent Kashmir to another Israel in the heart of Asia. China accuses the USA of undermining them through Tibet and Xinjiang and feel that Kashmir would become another hotbed of anti-China activity. Xinjiang is the westernmost province of China, which borders Kashmir and is largely Muslim.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The near vicinity of the Central Asian Republics of the CIS gives rise to their interest in Kashmir. As most of these new nations have a mixed population and the possibility of ethnic tensions, they are interested in seeing a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, Pakistan is trying to make inroads into this region based on Islam.

Comparisons with Similar Conflicts

These days it is considered fashionable to compare a problem with similar problems in other parts of the world and draw lessons. However, no two problems are alike though one can draw comparisons or make examples to further one's cause.

Pakistan has been harping on equating Kashmir with Bosnia, though one finds no concern on their side for Kurds in Turkey or Chechens in Russia. This is because Pakistan does not want to rub these nations the wrong way even though covert support is provided. As far as Chechnya is considered, it must be remembered that the armies of the Tsar took three decades to capture it but were never able to integrate it into Russia. However, Kashmir has not been captured by force by India.

Equating Bosnia with Kashmir is a real danger. One must remember that the problem in erstwhile Yugoslavia is due to the principle of self-determination which has now resulted in five nations. It is this principle that Pakistan and their nefarious cohorts, as much as the West, are attempting to apply in Kashmir.²⁹

In the United Nations Commission for Human Rights meet at Geneva 1994, we were able to drive home the point that the problem we face in Kashmir today, if condoned by the world, could easily find clones elsewhere. If geographical and political boundaries are redrawn in our part of the globe, they will inevitably smudge other boundaries too. If religion is used as a carving knife to redesign politics, virtually the whole world will have to ready itself for the chisel.³⁰

OPTIONS FOR PEACE

A large number of solutions to the problem have been put forth by various interested parties. Needless to say, none have the capability of satisfying all the parties. As it is India which is without doubt the legal authority, she should seek a solution which meets the aspirations of the people as well as satisfies the Constitution. Having hit upon one such solution, she should go ahead and implement it using greater force against any opposition that may arise, which is likely to be only from Pakistan and its surrogate terrorist groups.

No suggested solution has so far met with immediate approval. However, a likely solution should satisfy the following conditions:-

- a. It should be within the framework of the Indian Constitution.
- b. It should meet the aspirations of the people.
- c. It should not compromise on the unity and integrity of the Nation.
- d. It should bring peace and development to the Valley.

- e. It should have maximum local participation in its implementation.
- f. It should deal effectively with the threat posed by terrorist groups.
- g. It should clear India's image effectively as regards accusations of human rights abuses.

When considering options to solve the problem of Kashmir, Indian and Pakistani strategists are locked in a mindless competition over tactical advantage and scoring diplomatic points.³¹ A solution cannot occur until it is supported the Kashmiris themselves. Some of the options for India which have been suggested by strategists are as enumerated below.

Option 1. To revert to pre-Shimla Agreement position, which is, that the whole state be reunified with the Indian Union.

Option 2. Build on Shimla Agreement and transform the Line of Control from *de facto* border agreed to by both countries to a *de jure* international border.

Option 3. Considering the Line of Control as international border, place the state at par with other states by abolishing Article 370.

Option 4. Accept a confederation between two closely interacting autonomous units that is, Indian and Pakistani Occupied Kashmir. Commenting on this option, Ayub Khan in his book "Friends, not Masters", states that only those who had neither knowledge nor appreciation of history could think on these lines.³²

Option 5. Convert the Line of Control to an international boundary, but the Kashmir Valley to be placed under a third party (United Nations?) control for a specified period, say ten years, after which its final status could be discussed.

Option 6. Secession to be accepted, as a result of a plebiscite, or any other mechanism.

For India, the first option is acceptable, the second a last resort and the others to be rejected outright.³³

ONE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

Notwithstanding the options listed, being convinced of the legitimacy of the Indian stand, any suggested solution should first satisfy India. Once such a solution is accepted, action can be taken to implement it. Analyzing the problem and its causes, certain suggestions come to mind.

Psychological Operations

This most major and important facet should be clearly understood and implemented by the powers that be. As of now, this is not being given the importance it deserves. It is truly said that a battle of the kind being waged in Kashmir is nothing but a battle of hearts and minds. There is no dearth of suitable themes for psychological operations to win back the people of Kashmir and defeat insurgency. Some of these are:-

a. The True Nature of Islam. True Muslims the world over are extremely averse to the use of such terms as 'Islamic Fundamentalism' and the like. The Islamist angle being given to certain movements whose roots do not lie in religion but, in vested interests is one of the main culprits for the coining of such phrases. So is it in Kashmir. The Islamist message in Kashmir is nothing but the twisting of the real meaning of Islam by interested parties and should be exposed as such. India, having a rich heritage of the better known Islamic scholars in the world, is best suited to prove to the Kashmiris that Islam is in no danger in the country and on the contrary to what they believe, Islam enjoins upon them to be good citizens and to fight against those who wish to disrupt their lives. The people in Kashmir, like any other people of India, are gullible and easy prey to any propaganda if it is garbed in religious terms. Therefore, it should be the endeavor of the State to educate the people on what is the actual meaning of their

religion. This should be done by well-respected Islamic scholars and not religious leaders, who are themselves often, prey to prejudice. A clear example is the Naib Imam of the Jama Masjid, Delhi who claims to be a spokesman for Muslims in India. In the case of the burning of the Charar-e-Sharif shrine, the militant leader Mast Gul had made statements claiming he would burn down the shrine in a number of television interviews, including one with Zee Television's programme *Ghoomta Aina*. However, the Naib Imam said he felt that the Security Forces were responsible for the burning down of the shrine as no Muslim would do such a thing.³⁴ These are the words of a rabble-rouser and certainly not of a good Indian citizen. The sad part is that we in India give undue importance to such people instead of the censure they deserve. What we need is to expose the duplicity of such stands which can be done by psychological operations.

b. Other Themes. In addition to the theme mentioned above, there are a number of equally effective themes just waiting to be exploited by a concerted effort on our part. These include :-

- a. Cause dissension in militant groups by exploiting their differences.
- b. Highlight common heritage of Kashmir and India as also the centuries of peaceful coexistence.
- c. Bring out the internal problems of Pakistan to prove that religion alone cannot be a binding force between people but, it is heritage, culture and traditions.

c. Organisation. The lack of an organisation for psychological warfare has been much lamented. Inception of an organisation is essential and it is necessary that the strategic plans identify and lay down clear policy objectives.³⁵

Socio Economic Reforms

As has been highlighted earlier, Kashmir has been the victim of neglect by the Central Government as also of the corruption in the administration. It is essential that concrete steps be taken to rectify the situation. Some suggested measures could be as given below:-

a. Recruitment. Kashmiri youth should be encouraged to join the central services. This will greatly assist in their joining the national mainstream as also help their lot to be improved. As brought out earlier, this will also assist in reducing militancy as well as bringing down the requirement of Security Forces from other states.

b. Introduction of Indian Frontier Administrative Service (I.F.A.S.). In the past, the I.F.A.S. proved to be a great success in the North East region. Given the current climate of militancy in Kashmir, we require to place extremely dedicated and fearless administrators to run the affairs of the state. This can be provided by resuscitating the I.F.A.S. to include a select lot of personnel who can be seconded from various central services, particularly the Army.

c. Development. The most important facet is to develop the essential services in the State. As of now, Kashmir is poorly developed and needs the attention of the Centre. We need to make a considerable effort to increase financing for the State's economy and social services, and improve the living conditions of the people, the educational system, and health care.

Political Revival

It has been quite obvious that any lasting solution to the Kashmiri problem will have to come from the Kashmiris themselves. It is therefore imperative that the political process be given a fillip in the region. To do so, we must first encourage the political parties to come forth for a dialogue and second, we must ensure the holding of free and fair elections. In the current situation, this does not seem possible, hence, we must aim to get normalcy back before holding such elections.

Human Rights and Transparency

These two issues are interlinked as all the accusations of human rights abuses come forth when there is no one to verify the facts. It is therefore very important to be transparent in all our actions. This will involve that we keep our own house in order and permit anyone, particularly the media, to observe our functioning within the permissible security constraints. This will help us in countering false propaganda spread by interested parties in the dispute.

Other Measures

Wiping Out Militancy. In addition to the above, India should take a firm stand against militancy in the state. Nations such as the United States, Russia and the O.I.C. feel they have a role to play in the region. That may be so, but the help they plan on giving should first be to support India's attempts to wipe out militancy. If they cannot do that, then they should be told in no uncertain terms that they have no role in Kashmir. Acknowledging that Pakistan is the main supporter of this militancy, certain measures to remove this militancy recommended are :-

a. Paying Back in the Same Coin. As Pakistan has its own share of problems including in the "Northern Territories" part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, India should fuel militancy in such regions.³⁶ As a large number of militants are actually foreign mercenaries, it will be quite easy to buy them off and make them work for us.³⁷

b. Stricter Military Action. As our operations are presently reactive in nature, we need to give a thought to the offensive option wherein a proactive stance is involved. This may include using all means to destroy militant training camps and stricter population control measures. If we are convinced of the existence of certain camps on Pakistani soil, we should launch covert and even overt operations to destroy these.

c. Arming Selected Persons to Combat Militancy. A large number of ex servicemen stay in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It would be worthwhile to induct some of these, particularly from the Jammu region into "Nodal Points" in the Valley and arming them. These would provide an effective counter to militancy and would also assist in rehabilitating the refugees who have left the Valley in fear.³⁸ It will be preferred to induct these persons from amongst the refugees who have fled the Valley and they should include a proportionate distribution of all communities.

d. Rehabilitation of Refugees. We should take adequate steps to ensure that Kashmiri refugees return to the Valley and provide them with security from militants. This is essential to ensure that the feelings of the rest of the Nation do not go against the Kashmiris and a peaceful solution is reached.

CONCLUSION

The Kashmir problem is a result of the long neglect and the callous attitude of the successive Governments of India. Pakistan's fishing in troubled waters and stoking of communal hatred was only to be expected given the long history of animosity. The challenge to the Nation involves a firm hand to tackle the militancy and to win the hearts and minds of the populace by constructive involvement in developmental and political activities.

The Security Forces have already taken a lead in creating a climate of reconciliation with the people and bringing home the futility of the Pakistani sponsored secessionist movement. The stage is now set for the people to decide their own destiny and grab the elusive peace now well within their grasp.

The problem can be met head on and solved once we cut the roots from which it draws its sustenance. It can be seen that this problem has taken a religious hue, hence, our first step should be to negate the exploitation of Islam by educating our citizens in general, and the people of the Valley in particular. Thereafter, all measures taken by the Government will yield better results. This is in the true sense, a challenge to the secular ethos of the great Indian nation.

With our rich and proud heritage, we are the nation most capable of taking on this challenge on our own. It is up to us, and us alone, to solve our problems and prove to the community of nations that we are a wise and balanced people and a force to be reckoned with in today's world.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FROM CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATION

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The relationship between India and Pakistan is critical to advancing peace and stability in South Asia. The Pakistan idea not came as a bolt from the blue. Its smouldering could be seen even towards the close of the last century. It was the consequence of the social, cultural, religious, educational and economic differences between the two communities.

The political situation in the last century made it difficult for the descendants of Muslim aristocracy to adjust themselves to changed realities. They nursed a grudge against the British for wresting political power from their ancestors. Their pride was deeply hurt when they found themselves poorly equipped for securing jobs under the British while competing with the Hindus on account of the latter's superior educational qualifications. The aloofness of the Muslims from the British adversely affected their political and economic position.¹

This realisation moved Syed Ahmed Khan to devote himself to strengthen his own community resulted in widening the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. Being conscious of the attitude of the British Government towards the Muslims after the first war of independence in 1857, Syed Ahmed strongly felt that a reconciliation between the British and the Muslims was the need of the hour. He realised that without the support of the British power in India, the Muslims would not be able to have their fair share in the jobs and the administration of the country. In 1883, at the time of the passage of a Bill in the Viceroy's Council regarding the establishment of a measure of self-government in the United Provinces, Syed Ahmed declared: "There should not be local bodies that were wholly elected in a country, in which there existed a caste system and the great differences in religion and language. In place of election there should be appointment by the government of some members so that a large community would be prevented from overriding the smaller community".²

This in fact was the basis of the demand for the separate electorate. Syed Ahmed Khan was averse to the Muslims joining the Indian National Congress and he succeeded to a great extent. The next step towards the divide was the demand for a separate electorate for the Muslims put forward in 1906 by the Muslim deputation led by Sir Aga Khan. It included a number of Muslim nobles, *Zainindars*, lawyers, merchants and officials. Toeing the line of Syed Ahmed, the deputationists demanded that they should be given representation in the legislatures not only on the basis of their municipal strength, but also on the basis of their political importance and their service to the Empire.

The deputation was received cordially by Lord Minto, the Viceroy. Toeing the British policy of "divide and rule", Lord Minto in his reply said: "You justly claim that your position should be estimated not merely on your numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of your community and the service, it had rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you". He further added: "The Mohammedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganisation with which I am concerned".³

In the assurance of Lord Minto, Aga Khan found the germs of Pakistan. In his words, “Lord Minto’s acceptance of our demands was the foundation of all future constitutional proposals made for India by the successive British Government and the final inevitable consequence was the partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan”.⁴ A significant impact of their policy was the birth of All India Muslim League to guard the exclusive interest of the Mohammedan community.

However, one point needs mention here, that all the Muslims were not in favour of separate electorate. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, Dr Syed Mahmud, Dr Zakir Hussain and a number of other prominent Muslim leaders and intellectuals did whatever they could to prevent the separate electorates. Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan, bar-at-law, said, “The principle of class and religious representation is the most mischievous feature of the (re-forms) scheme. It is not good for the Mohammedans to be taught that their political interests are different from those of the Hindus. From Muslim point, too, that principle is fraught with mischief”. Syed Mahmud criticised it in a league meeting at Aligarh in 1908 and accused the Muslim leaders of “selling the country for morsel.”⁵

There were certain events at home and abroad which modified the attitude of the Muslim elite towards Hindus and overshadowed their separatist outlook for some time. The Khilafat issue compelled them to seek the cooperation of the Hindus in order to put pressure on the British Government for the redressal of the wrongs done to them by its policy towards the Sultan of Turkey who was considered as the religious head of the Muslims in India. Several orthodox Muslims were drawn towards Pan Islamism. Similarly, the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1912 added to their suspicion about the British intentions and brought home to them the folly of fighting with the Hindus.

Hence the clause of loyalty to the British Government in the Muslim League’s Constitution was dropped and an important clause of attainment of self-government was added. In order to seek the cooperation of the Congress, the Muslim League chose Mazhar-ul-Huq, a prominent Congressman, as the President of League in 1915 and deputed him to come to permanent settlement with the Congress. The Lucknow pact was the result of these efforts. The All-India Congress Committee in consultation with the Reforms Committee of the League, prepared a scheme which was adopted by both the organisations at the Lucknow session in 1916. Jinnah, whom G.K. Gokhale termed as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, was the main figure behind the Lucknow pact. He presided over the Lucknow League session and tried to compose the constitutional differences in the best possible manner.

Laying stress on the need for unity, he said: “Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of goodwill and brotherly feelings. Cooperation to the cause of our, motherland should be our guiding principle. India’s real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities. With regard to our own affairs we can depend on nobody but ourselves.”⁶

The pact conceded the League’s demand for a separate electorate for the Muslims and provided weightage to them in all the five provinces where they were in minority. As a result, the Muslims got more seats than they were entitled to on the basis of their population in the provincial legislatures in Bihar, Bombay, Madras, Central provinces and the united provinces. Besides, they were given one-third of the seats in the Central Legislative Council. The Muslims, in turn, agreed to give better representation to the Hindus in Bengal and the Punjab.

However, certain sections in both the communities remained dissatisfied. The Congress agreed to the principle of communal representation and conceded separate electorate in order to woo the Muslims. The latter, however,

came to an agreement with the former not because of change of heart, but out of necessity as is evident from the historic development pre-ceding the Lucknow pact. Madan Mohan Malviya was of the opinion that the Lucknow pact was a surrender by the Congress, and if viewed from this angle, the roots of Pakistan were nurtured in 1916. Jinnah, too, was reported to have remarked privately in 1935-36: "How can the Hindus oppose Pakistan when they had recognised the separate identity of Muslim in 1916 itself."⁷

Gandhi too believed in Hindu-Muslim unity and took up the cause of Turkish caliphate which was close to the heart of Muslim India, vigorously supporting the campaign launched by the famous Ali brothers, Mohammad and Shaukat, in the process garnering Muslim support for the Congress. But he precipitately ditched the Ali brothers once Turkey abolished the Caliphate. That led to a bitter fall out.

Jinnah would have none of it. He vehemently objected to introduction of religion in public affairs, predicting that it would actually lead to parochial politics and dissension between communities and was a certain recipe for disaster. He disdained non-cooperation, civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes. Gandhi sidelined him easily and when he rose to dispute Gandhi's program in an annual session of the Congress of 1921, he was hooted down. Shaukat, the brawnier of the two brothers, threatened to lynch him. Gandhi did not move a finger to admonish the unruly crowd. Jinnah left town by the next train, repeating his dire warnings that religion and politics were not compatible and would end in great disruption. He was, tragically, to be proved to be too right. Jinnah had lost support among Muslims too. For their class and parochial interests, feudal lords and obscurantists of the creed, supported by the colonial power, were successful in marginalizing him. The clerics even called him "Kafir" (infidel), apostate etc. Prominent nationalist Muslims like Maulana Azad were acolytes of Gandhi. From the perspective of the rulers, Jinnah was a great threat to their paramount. They could not countenance a pillar of secularism and the most effective votary of Hindu-Muslim unity.⁸

Jinnah's predictions came true. The nightmare of reincarnation of a Hindu

theocratic state began to loom large on Muslim perception. Gandhi could not combat it; he could not swim against the tide of revitalized Hindu obscurantism. Among his close associates Nehru disdained overt religiosity; Patel, a rightwing rival to Nehru, was comfortable with it. Maulana Azad, the only Muslim in the highest counsels of the congress, was flabbergasted.

The Muslims were alienated. But they had no credible leader. Feudal lords whether Muslim or Hindu were scared out of their wits as the Congress planned to confiscate their lands, even though Gandhi, true to character, was ambiguous, preaching that the landowners should act as trustees of the land and should use it for the benefit of their peasants.

Nehru had always had an irresistible appeal for the young, and the passionate. Muslim youth started drifting towards the Congress. With no viable alternative, more mature Muslims also started having second thoughts. If the congress were eventually going to rule, they would be better off supporting it. If Hindu zealots got the upper hand, because Muslims had withheld support from the congress, India under Britain had two administrative divisions. Most of the country was ruled directly by Britain. About one third of the country comprising princely states was ruled through hereditary princes. The fiction of the princes having ceded certain discretionary rights to the paramount power was maintained. A British resident was, on paper, an "ambassador" from the mother country, but in effect supervised the state administration. The treaty agreements included a provision that if and when the British crown surrendered its paramount status, the ceded powers would revert to the princes. The Deputy Commissioner of the area supervised smaller states. If a small to middling ruler did not toe the line, he was easily replaced by a more

amenable relative or the state could be taken over by the Court of Wards. There were literally hundreds of states ranging in size from Hyderabad, which was slightly bigger than France with its own currency, police and armed forces, to virtually those of the size of a village. Kashmir was the second largest state. In addition there were tiny Portuguese and French possessions, which did not fall in the equation of British-Indian negotiations.

The Independence of India act passed by the British parliament contained the provision that major rulers could a) remain independent b) accede to India c) accede to Pakistan. The legislation provided that the desires of the population were to be taken into account. The legally valid claims that unfettered sovereignty had been restored to the states were thrown overboard by the British government. Mountbatten did go through the charade of calling a Durbar of the native rulers and affirming that Her Majesty's government would stand by them, but advised that reality on the ground dictated that they strike a deal with one of the succeeding governments.

Most of the states, surrounded by Indian or Pakistani territory acceded to India or Pakistan. Hyderabad and Junagarh, both with a Muslim prince and largely Hindu population, decided to opt for independence. The Hindu Raja of Kashmir with Muslim majority among his subjects was wavering, and was negotiating with India as well as Pakistan. He could not make up his mind, and signed a standstill agreement with both Dominions. The dominant political party in Kashmir, with its fiery leader Sheikh Abdullah, favored India. In the event the Raja's mind was made for him. Muslim Mujahids, drawn from the ranks of zealots and tribal elements, reinforced by irregular elements of Pakistan army, decided to force the issue. They marched into Kashmir.

The objective for which Partition was brought about has not been met. The objective was that once those Muslims who wanted a separate homeland got their homeland, the antagonism, apprehension and suspicion that underpinned the demand for Pakistan would disappear. The two countries would live in harmony and peace. This was the aspiration of both Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru, first heads of government in the two countries. Exactly the reverse has happened.

Locked in adversity, burdened by inadequacies in terms of territorial and political identities, devilled by misunderstanding, suspicion and animosity—Indians and Pakistanis have much to think about. Chaudhary Rehmat Ali, a young student at Cambridge University wrote a monograph in January 1933 titled "Now or Never". In it he advocated a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. He argued the future well-being of the Muslims in the region could not be ensured if they remained fragmented in different countries and particularly so in British India where the Hindus were in a majority. He talked of a Muslim homeland called "Pakistan" which would comprise Afghanistan (the North West Frontier Province), Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan. Significantly he did not talk of Muslim majority areas of Bengal and Assam as part of this "land of the pure and the faithful", though he hinted that other Muslim majority areas in the subcontinent could also unite as Muslim homelands and assume separate political identities.

The pre-Partition Muslim League of India rejected Ali's idea, describing it as chimerical and unpracticable. It was only towards the end of the decade of the 1930s, that the great Muslim philosopher and poet Alamma Iqbal recalled Ali's idea and speculated on his suggestion being a possible solution to the concerns and aspirations of Muslims in the British Indian Empire. It was only in 1940 at the Lahore session of the Muslim League, Jinnah formally proposed the idea and the "Pakistan Resolution" was passed. The territorial concept of Pakistan was expanded to Assam and Bengal. The rest is history.

Three specific events impelled me to undertake this longish analysis of how India and Pakistan have interacted in peace and war, influenced continuously by adversarial attitudes. The first was the Kargil war of summer 1999,

waged by Pakistan within three months of Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore, which on its part was a serious attempt by India to normalise relations. The India-Pakistan war in the Kargil sector on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir lasted from 6 May to roughly the end of July 1999. It was the fifth large-scale conflict between the two countries. The Kargil experience was instructive as far as many people of India were concerned. The second event was the hijacking of the Indian aircraft from Kathmandu in December 1999 and the manner in which Pakistan reacted to the hijacking and then treated the hijackers and the criminals whose release they managed to achieve. The third event was General Pervez Musharraf ousting Nawaz Sharif, the elected prime minister of Pakistan, in a military coup (mercifully bloodless) and Musharraf's subsequent rejection of the Lahore process in November 1999.

Among the key reasons that peace initiatives between these two nations have historically failed is the vexing problem of Kashmir. Jammu Kashmir has been at the vanguards in India-Pakistan relations since the abrupt withdrawal of Great Britain from sub-continent and formation of two nation states. Since 1947 Pakistan and India have gone to war thrice, Kashmir perceived to be the main dispute. In 1999 Kargil crisis again brought both newly nuclear rivals to the brink of war. The then US administration led by President Clinton intervened promptly and timely negotiated to deescalate the overwrought situation when both were at fighting an impromptu war at the peaks of Kargil in Jammu Kashmir.

After US led war against terrorism in Afghanistan (2001), the genre of global politics exclusively transformed and it also influenced the South Asia and anywhere else in the world. Due to the changing global political scenario and new fronts of confrontation after the end of cold war, both India and Pakistan advanced their bilateral relations during the Musharraf and Vajpayee's regimes in their respective countries. Backdoor diplomacy led them to take some Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) including a direct bus service across the Line of Control (LOC). South Asian politics of guns and arsenals was replaced by composite dialogues, negotiations, reconciliations, sports and exchanges of cultural, intellectual, academics and musicians.

But all this could not last long due to absence of a democratic system in Pakistan and history of mistrust among the rivals. Musharraf regime, which was already fragile and lacking public support, became weaker due to his confrontation with judiciary in Pakistan in the first quarter of 2007. The unfortunate and untimely death of Benazir Bhutto was a blow in the forthcoming regional politics of South Asia. As a result of February 2008 general elections in Pakistan, Musharraf lost the power but successive governments of President Zardari and then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could not show mature judgments on various key issues regarding the future of South Asia including the resolution of Kashmir conflict.

Kashmir's people have suffered immensely from the ongoing conflict between these two great nations. Their plight finally garnered international attention in the closing decades of the past century, although, unfortunately, only because they had revolted.

Pakistan suffered from feelings of territorial inadequacy, religious identity and an ambition to play the role of protector of the Muslims of India. The anxiety for creating a certain credibility of Pakistan's Islamic identity resulted in the emergence of extremist Islam as a factor consciously cultivated by Islamabad's power structure. Pakistan has argued that districts with Muslim majorities should have been assigned to the new state of Pakistan. . . . For India, this argument militates against the concept on which Indian nationhood is founded, namely, India as a multiethnic, secular nation-state.

At the cultural, intellectual and social levels, Pakistani decision makers resorted to another policy orientation, that of identifying Pakistan more with countries of the Gulf and West Asia. Consequently, Pakistan cut itself adrift

from its profound historical roots in sub-continental India, while at the same time it failed to find acceptance as an integral part of Islamic societies of the Gulf and West Asia. This was due to the simple fact that Islam in the subcontinent was different from Islam in West Asia and the Gulf region. Subcontinental Islam was a vibrant synthetic phenomenon resulting from hundreds of years of interaction between Arab, Turkic, Persian and Central Asian influences on the one hand and the equally rich and ancient Hindu influences. Pakistan diminished the content of its national identity by trying to narrow it down to West Asian and Gulf compartments. This has not been a very successful experiment at the social or emotional level.

Pakistan's objectives are clear: (1) it considers the acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir the unfinished part of Partition; (2) its claim to Kashmir is firmly rooted in the two-nation theory; (3) it desires to invalidate the provisions of the Indian Independence Act and the Instruments of Accession which the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed acceding the state to India; (4) it also questions the decision taken by Sheikh Abdullah to make Jammu and Kashmir a part of India; (5) it is of the view that continuing cross-border terrorism and violent intervention, including sending mercenaries and non-Kashmiri cadres to create a conflict situation in Jammu and Kashmir, will achieve the above objectives.

A contradiction permeating the approach of the parties to these discussions should also be noted. While India and a section of the people of Jammu and Kashmir are convinced that the final solution of the Kashmir dispute can only be through political means and negotiations, the opposition militant groups particularly those based in Pakistan, are convinced that their jihad, has to be continued. It will defeat India through either a process of attrition or by a direct military defeat inflicted by Pakistan on India; that will solve the problem.

Successive governments of Pakistan have been and are of the view that Pakistani objectives would be met by a combination of covert military operations and organising international pressure, intervention or mediation, the latter to be generated by raising the levels of violence in Jammu and Kashmir to the threshold of regional tension. This would compel international intervention in the context of the nuclear weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan.

These are the fundamental realities, in the context of which India has to fashion its policies on Jammu and Kashmir and towards Pakistan. Analysing what has happened recently, one must keep in mind the lessons for future action. The Hizbul Mujahideen announced the decision for a unilateral ceasefire and a willingness to negotiate with India on the basis of clearance given by the ISI and the military government of Pakistan. The reasons for this initiative was the apprehension that India's discussions with certain Hurriyat leaders and India's moves to devolve further powers to the state of Jammu and Kashmir would have marginalised the Pakistan-supported political and military elements in Jammu and Kashmir.

Some presumptions about Indo-Pakistani relations are often articulated. First, that common people in India and Pakistan want to come to terms with each other but it is governments that prevent this. Second, new generations of Indians and Pakistanis can break free of history. Third, normal economic and technological cooperation backed by cultural and intellectual exchanges will improve relations. The first two are not quite valid. This is the third generation of Indians and Pakistanis grappling with the challenges of normalising relations. One does not see memories of Partition fading away, neither disappearance of prejudices. The third assumption has potential. Pakistan has serious reservations about economic relations with India because it fears domination and possible exploitation by a larger neighbour. It will be rational to assume that the information revolution and economic globalisation will influence Pakistan and India to change their attitudes and policies.

Ever since the situation in Kashmir became volatile, in 1989–90, a number of proposals have been put forward for resolving the problem. Some of them given below would be relevant:

1. Acknowledging the current Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as the international border between India and Pakistan, thereby stabilising the situation and then allowing normal interaction between Kashmiris staying in what is now called Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and those on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. This was the proposal which the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reportedly gave general assurances to fulfil during the Simla talks in 1972.
2. UN resolutions should be revived, leading to a plebiscite.
3. Working out a new standstill arrangement on Kashmir between India and Pakistan and placing the territory of the state under some UN trusteeship mechanism to be followed a few years later by a plebiscite or referendum for ascertaining the views of the people there. A segment of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front leadership made this proposal in 1992. Two plebiscites could be held, one on the Indian side and other in PoK. The results of both plebiscites should form the basis of a solution.
4. Both India and Pakistan should renounce their claim and jurisdiction over Jammu and Kashmir and make it an independent state.
5. The Kashmir valley may be ceded to Pakistan, while India retains Ladakh, Jammu and other areas.

Except for the first proposal, which matches ground realities and safeguards the territorial integrity of both India and Pakistan, all the other proposals are bound to generate opposition on one count or another. The strategic environment specific to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and also to its neighbourhood has undergone profound changes over the past three decades, particularly after the overt nuclear weapons programmes of India and Pakistan. An uncertain situation prevails in Afghanistan, while China continues to hold large tracts of Jammu and Kashmir territory in its possession under its boundary agreements with Pakistan in 1963. Both Pakistan and China are well placed in the northern and northwestern flanks of Jammu and Kashmir as far as territorial control is concerned. Apart from these factors impinging on India's policies, some other highly relevant questions arise about the aforementioned proposals, barring the first one. Can Pakistan and India accept Jammu and Kashmir becoming an independent state? Can India maintain effective jurisdiction and control over Ladakh, Jammu and Punjab, if it were to accept the Valley and Muslim-majority areas acceding to Pakistan or becoming independent? Can India ensure its own internal unity in demographic, ethnic and religious terms if any of the proposals, except the first one, were given serious consideration?

The issue related to Jammu and Kashmir cannot be resolved by coercive force or military means alone. Second, India has to look at itself in the mirror and acknowledge the frustration and alienation of a section of its citizens who live in an area of paramount strategic and security interest to it. These frustrations have to be overcome by political means and positive responses on the basis of democratic principles. This can be done only by reviving the basis of democratic principles and political dialogue by all available means.

There are other several ways and options. All of them have apparently not been considered or tried till now, especially, the Gandhian ones. We can see and analyse them one by one.

Mahatma Gandhi will prefer a brave nonviolent action in this regard, provided it does not come out of cowardliness and one's helplessness.⁹ One such suggestion can be of finding a more political solution to the entire problem than largely a military option. The first option in this matter is to openly involve our political scientists for

finding political solutions in this regard. He was sure that Pakistan was short-lived. He believed he would come when the division would be undone and India once again a united country.¹⁰

This applies even to current—about more than a decade old—militancy in Kashmir. Military, in reality, should not be involved in dealing with a situation like that of Kashmir. When we have very clearly identified forces of invaders, only then our military can be given orders straightway to throw away the aggressors outside the Indian borders. Otherwise, involvement of military will prove to be quite fruitless. Continuous onslaught of terrorism further proves it.

What we need here is proper development of infiltration detection and counter-terrorism measures including commando operations at the behest of Indian Government. Such “counter-terrorism commando operations” can be planned regionally and sector-wise in view of strategic location, language, and overall attitudes of citizens of a particular area. However, at every stage of development of such counter terrorist forces and at every possible level of operations, the political scientists of the area concerned must be continuously consulted because they are the best judge in all matters relating to political strategy, war, peace, order and disorder in society, etc.¹¹

Other social scientists cannot do this job; for, that sharp edge of political acumen rests with a political philosopher and academic only. Politicians are merchants of political perversions in the main today. Our military and politicians, therefore, need *deeper and real political expertise* for having positive and meaningful scenario before them. Real politics is away from perversions and manipulations.¹²

Another option for resolving the Kashmir question is of opening all borders freely for the respective citizens of all the South Asian nations. There is an inherent people’s political-psychology in such cases which works and resolves the immediate problems threatening the socio-political order. Obviously, some strategic and political vigil will be needed for a very long time in the beginning. This aspect can be taken up at the level of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s (SAARC’s) Foreign Ministers’ meet and at a Summit meeting.

There is nothing wrong in conducting a plebiscite in the whole of Jammu & Kashmir. According to the relevant United Nations resolution, such a plebiscite can be conducted only when all Pakistani foreign troops move out from there. Otherwise, plebiscite cannot be conducted. Since Pakistan has not removed its forces from Kashmir till today, it is incumbent upon India to fight these foreign forces tooth and nail until they are pushed out of our territory. If we are not doing it for the last fifty-three years, then we are clearly not performing even our national duty.

However, Pakistan must never be merged militarily with India completely in order to save the nation, region, and the world from ultimate ruin. Yet Pakistan must be stopped from spreading fear and terror in the name of Jihad otherwise, increasing foreign interference in South Asia will soon transform this land of traditional peace into a region worse than West Asia.

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DYNAMICS OF BOUNDARY ISSUES BETWEEN NEPAL, CHINA AND INDIA

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“Now we have had from immemorial times a magnificent frontier, that is to say the Himalayas. . . . Now so far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on the other side of Nepal. . . . Therefore as much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which either permits that barrier to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier.”

Nehru speech to Indian Parliament on December 6, 1950

INTRODUCTION

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal lies between China and Tibet in the North and India in the South sharing its borders with five states of India namely Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim. The International boundary of a nation helps in defining the sovereignty of the nation and is important in all international relations. In the North, Nepal has **1414 kilometers** of close border (requiring Visa to cross the border) with China. Nepal-China boundary is as old as the history of the two countries and the present boundary demarcation and arrangement was ratified by Joint Boundary Commission on October 5, 1961. However, in East, South and West, Nepal has **1751 kilometers** of open border with India (Open border had helped British in recruitment of Gorkha soldiers, selling of products, buying raw material in Nepal to cater for huge demand of wood for the railways), which has served its purpose of mutual economic benefit after India's independence.

The present boundary demarcation and delimitation took place after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16. Nepal and China have boundary dispute on just 6 hectares of land at only one place, while Nepal and India have numerous disputes. After more than 70 years of Independence of India, the boundary issue remains one of the sore points in the Nepal-India relations and is one of the factors in deceleration of the economic prospects between the two countries providing opportunity to China to fill in the space left by India.^{1,2} China on the other hand had a great foresight in its foreign policies when it decided to solve boundary dispute with 12 countries including Nepal to make a base for its Economic Drive and continued to maintain its border dispute with the balance two countries i.e. India and Bhutan.

NEPAL-CHINA BOUNDARY & TREATIES

Nepal had relations with Tibet for centuries, before unification of Nepal. The historical relations between Nepal and Tibet are blend of trade, economic and monetary reasons with frequently changing boundaries. One of the first *Trade agreement* known as **Khasa Agreement** was signed between Nepal and Tibet at Khasa on 5 *September 1775* when Gorkhali troops expanded their territory inside Tibet to resolve issue of Silver coin (Owing to a dispute between Nepal and Tibet regarding the **fineness of the silver coins supplied by Nepal**, the export of these coins was disrupted by the Tibet.).

Nepal and Tibet entered into the *second Treaty of Kerung agreement* on 2 June 1789 after Nepali troops captured trekking passes like Kerung and Kutli and expanded Nepal's borderline northward up to Sigatsche

(Tashilhunpo) which is located on the south-west of Lhasa. As per the treaty, Tibet had to pay a tribute of Rs 50,001 every year to Nepal in return for giving back to Tibet all the territories acquired during the war.

The *third Treaty* came into being when Nepal captured Digarcha, the capital of Tashi Lama as Tibet failed to pay annual tribute. Tibet, with Chinese help recaptured area but failed to cross the Betrawoti River, 30 kilometers north of Kathmandu amidst strong counter attack by Nepalese Forces. Nepal then recaptured much of its land area but failed to cross the Betrawoti River, 30 kilometers north of Kathmandu amidst strong counter attack by Nepalese Forces. Nepal then recaptured much of its land and ratified **Nepal-Tibet Treaty (Betrawoti Treaty)** of 1792. Under this treaty, Nepal had to send tributes to the Qing emperor every five years.³

Nepal's defeat in Anglo-Nepalese war led to Tibet again stopping use of Nepalese coins for trade from 1840 onwards. Nepalese Kingdom, under Jung Bahadur Rana once again invaded Tibet in 1855 during the Second Nepalese-Tibetan War, and raided the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, home to the Panchen Lama at that time. Combined Tibetan and Chinese forces couldn't stop the Nepalese forces resulting in a stalemate and culminating into the **Treaty of Thapathali** on *March 24, 1856*.⁴

In 1955, Nepal restored diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on behest of India. In 1956, both nations signed a new treaty terminating the Treaty of Thapathali of 1856 and Nepal recognized Tibet as a part of China. In 1960, Nepal and China signed a boundary settlement agreement and a separate 'Sino-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Finally, **Boundary Treaty** was ratified on *5 October 1961* by the King of Nepal and Chairman of the PRC, after delineating a physical boundary line. During the joint boundary demarcation of the Sino-Nepal borderline, there were disputes, conflicts, debates, controversies, claims and counter-claims at 32 places including the status of Mount Everest. The Everest dispute was later settled and ended while the visiting Prime Minister Chou En-Lai made a statement in Kathmandu on 28 April 1960 that '*Mount Everest belongs to Nepal*'.

Boundary Demarcation

Under the Boundary Treaty, the border areas between Nepal and China have been adjusted to either country according to its acceptance of *traditional customary boundary*, possessions and its convenience. This adjustment was made on the basis of 'give and take' and the inclusion of some pasture land within the Nepalese territory. With this principle, Nepal had given 1,836.25 square kilometer of land to China and Nepal had taken 2,139.00 sq km, adding **302.75** square kilometer of Chinese territory into Nepal.

The joint teams demarcated and established pillars and markers, from serial number 1 to 79 from West to East. Among them, there were 48 larger and 31 smaller sized pillars. In addition, they had established 20 Offset Pillars, to cater for destruction of pillars due to natural circumstances. The total length of the Demarcated Borderline was 1414 kilometers with 99 pillars.

The start and end point of Nepal-China boundary is the Tri-Junction of the boundary between Nepal, China and India. However, because of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute as well as Nepal-India dispute over the Kalapani on the source of the Mahakali River, the demarcation between Nepal and China started *Five* kilometers short of the tri-junction in the West and the East.⁵

Existing Status

After joint inspection, repair and maintenance of damaged pillars, boundary protocol of 1961 between Nepal-China was renewed firstly on 20 November 1979 and again on 6 December 1988. To formulate the Fourth and the last protocol, joint inspection and border survey mapping commenced on 9 May 2005. The joint teams

inspected, repaired and maintained 99 boundary pillars and markers. All the technical works, including the preparation of digital strip-maps have been completed. It has prepared 57 sheets of border maps based on GPS technology. The fourth Boundary Protocol is yet to be finalized due to some issues on **Boundary Marker No 57**.

INDIA-NEPAL BOUNDARY

King Prithvi Narayan Shah had started unification of 56 small kingdoms and principalities into the strong Himalayan State of Nepal in 1769. His successors completed the unification campaign and the territory of Nepal was extended from Tista to Kangra as Greater Nepal by 1806. The British East India Company government was looking for an opportunity to expand trade to Tibet.

East India Company and British Influence

The border of the then Kingdom of Nepal had extended West to East covering the Northern Frontier of British India. All easy access transit points to enter into Tibet from India were through Nepal. Hence the East India Company under Lord Hastings officially declared war against Nepal on 1 November 1814. Nepal lost the war and “**Treaty of Sugauli**” was signed on **4 March 1816**, which decreased one-third of Nepal’s territory. It shrunk Nepalese border to Mechi River in the East and the Mahakali River in the West. The foothills of the Siwalik Range represented the Southern border of Nepal. A **Supplementary Boundary Treaty** was made on 11 December 1816 which restored to Nepal the Tarai lowlands from Koshi to the Rapti River. In 1860, as a reward for putting down the Sepoy Mutiny in India, Western Tarai lowlands (Naya Muluk) were gifted back to Nepal. The Treaty of Sugauli and Supplementary Boundary Treaty provided the base for present-day Nepal boundary. The Southern border of Nepal with India now runs through fertile plains, jungles, rivers and settlements as well.

Surveying and demarcation of the border with the erection of pillars commenced just after the monsoon season of 1816. The boundary line between the two countries was surveyed and demarcated from 1816 to 1860; from 1882 to 1885; in 1906; and from 1940 to 1941. This process led to erection of 913 boundary pillars.

Border Disputes

15. During demarcation, Nepal and the East India Company government had disputes at several places. The status of boundary at Siwalik Range i.e. whether it should run from the crest (ridge) or otherwise, origin of River Mechi is from north-east of Antoo Hill or from north-west, Dunduwa range boundary should be along North of Arrah Nala to Talbagauda or not, remained some of the unanswered questions. In addition, ownership of the villages and settlements of Ramnagar Zamindari area, lands adjoining the districts of Tirahoot and Sarun, land area of Sharada Barrage constructed by India on the River Mahakali, boundary of the river and rivulets to follow old course or the new channel and boundary demarcation along agricultural land, forest areas and village areas with no geographical features created frictions.

Boundary Demarcation


During demarcation from 1816 to 1906, border pillars had been placed at a distance of one to 2.5 km according to ground layout. Strip maps were prepared in connection to the border demarcation. It was not possible to erect sufficient boundary markers on the winding/bending boundary and river courses, hence, the actual line of demarcation remained obscure in some segments. A no-man’s land with a ten-yard width (Das Gaja- 9.2metre) on both sides was not maintained in those areas. This was the cause of future disputes and conflicts in some spots.

Nepal’s Claim

Nepal claims that there are encroachment (shown in map-page no 7), cross-holding occupation, dispute due to divergence of opinion on basic materials such as maps and old documents for demarcation, conflict, claims and

counter-claims in 71 spots having approximately 60,660 hectare over 56 km. The prominent areas have been identified as Kalapani-Limpiyadhura, Susta, Mechi riverine area, Tanakpur, Sandakpur, Pashupatinagar, Hile and Thori. The largest single chunk of encroachment as alleged by Nepal is Kalapani-Limpiyadhura (37,000 hectare) of Darchula district and smallest portion is Fatak 0.025 hectare (240 square metres) in

Pashupatinagar of Ilam district. ⁶



Map - 1. Refers to Para 17

Current Boundary & Disputes

Susta. The Gandak River, also known as Sapt Gandaki and Narayani in Nepal, originates at the Nhubine Himal glacier in Nepal. It flows across Nepal and enters India near the Valmiki Tiger Reserve in Bihar, from where it flows down another 300 km to meet the Ganga near Patna. ⁷

19. The 1816 treaty took the Gandak as the international boundary between India (Bihar) and Nepal. The right bank (West) of Gandak came under Nepal's control along with Susta, and the left bank (East) became Indian

Territory. But, over the years, the Gandak changed its course and Susta moved to the left bank (East), i.e. on the Indian side of the river. Susta has been left out of all boundary working group meetings.

The conflict is in Nepal's claim that Gandak's course of 1816 to be taken as the fixed international boundary whereas India believes that land on the left bank of the river is Indian Territory. Gandak River, during heavy floods of 1845, 1954, 1972, 1980 and 1989, shifted from East to West on the border resulting in Nepalese territory gradually shifting inside India resulting in encroachment.^{8,9}



Map - 1. Refers to Para 19, 20

Kalapani & Lipulekh Pass. Kalapani is situated on the Kailash Manasarovar route, at an altitude of 3600 meters and is on the tri-junction of the international boundaries of India, Nepal and the autonomous region of Tibet in China. The Kalapani area borders the Nepalese province of Province No. 7 and the Indian state of Uttarakhand. Lipulekh Pass leading into Tibet is 17 kilometers from Kalapani.

The 1816 Sugauli treaty provided that the Kali River would mark the western border between India and Nepal. Nepal claimed Kalapani since mid-1996, shortly after ratification of the Mahakali treaty with India by Nepal's Parliament. Dispute of 372 sq. km (37,800 hectares) of Kalapani area is due to Kali River origin- whether it originated from nearby Lipulekh Pass (India's Claim) or Limpiyadhura (Nepal's Claim) or an artificial pond, south of Pankhagad Khola. This dispute continued from the British Era when British India conducted the first regular surveys of the upper reaches of the River Kali, in the 1870s. Subsequent maps drawn by British surveyors show the source of the boundary river at different places leading to dispute.¹⁰



Map - 3. Refers to Para 21, 22

SETTLING THE DISPUTES

Nepal-India Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee (JTC)

Both Nepal and India have been conscious of the boundary disputes and efforts have continued to resolve the issues. During inspection of border pillars and conditions of the no-man's land from 1965 to 1967 hundreds of boundary pillars were found missing, destroyed, dismantled or smashed and many places in the no-man's land had been cultivated. After almost a decade, the two sides finally agreed in 1981 to form JTC. The JTC was mandated to prepare strip maps guided by the GPS, find data on encroachment of the no-man's land (10 yard width) or Dash Gaja, fix boundary pillars maintaining the line of sight, and number them East to West.¹¹

The JTC worked for 26 years and prepared 182 sheets of strip maps in December 2007 except at Susta and Kalapani-Limpiyadhura areas, thus, delineating 98 per cent of the border. "Agreed and initiated strip maps" were signed at the technical level by Foreign Secretaries. JTC found 1,325 pillars missing and 1,956 pillars damaged out of total of 8,553 pillars along the border. However, Nepal's insistence on solving all issues simultaneously stopped further progress of JTC. Some Nepalese experts have questioned the competence of the Nepalese officials in the JTC for accepting to adopt the 'Persian Map' (maps with Urdu script made in 1874) for delineating the border. They allege that in doing so Nepal has lost 1630 hectares of Nepalese territory to India.^{12,13}

Current Status and Boundary Working Group (BWG)

During PM Modi's visit to Nepal in August 2014, India and Nepal agreed to set up the Boundary Working Group (BWG) to settle the boundary row within three years besides Susta and Kalapani. The BWG is mandated to progress on JTC's work as JTC's mandate expired in 2007. BWG are led by Surveyors General of India and

Nepal to provide inputs to respective foreign secretaries. Old maps of Sugauli Treaty, new modern strip maps signed in 2007, pact accords and agreements with Indian sides and some historical facts for boundary negotiations with India have been made the primary basis of resolving the bilateral boundary. BWG works through two technical committees- Survey Official Committee (SOC) and Joint Field Survey Teams (FST).

In 2016, BWG decided to install all 8,553 border pillars with the Boundary Global Navigation Satellite System (NIBGNSS). The GPS system enables finding the location, longitude, latitude and positioning of the pillars. GPS coordinates of all border pillars will help to avoid further disputes in case of destruction of pillars. ¹⁴

The FSTs could install only 600 of the total 2,583 new pillars in first three years. Hence the mandate to complete the boundary demarcation was postponed. However by 2017, FST have finalized technical issues in boundary field works. The two countries have deployed four FSTs working in different stretches adjoining West Bengal, Bihar, UP and UK. More than 6000 pillars have been installed/ repaired out after mutual consensus. However, due to various technical glitches, lack of adequate budget and other problems, the BWG had reset its target to resolve all boundary issues apart from Susta and Kalapani by 2021. Survey officials from both countries met between 19 Sep -21 Sep 2018 for the Fifth BWG discussions and approved 2022 as the new timeline to complete bilateral boundary work. ¹⁵

IMPLICATIONS OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Nepal- China: Closed Border

Clearly demarcated and closed border between Nepal and China has led to Strong Friendly Relations, Faith, Trust and positive perception for each other in both the countries but with not much people to people relations. With no border encroachments and disputes along India-Nepal border, the Strategic, Economic, Geopolitical and Political relations have strengthened. Hence, with no negatives, even a small positive step between two countries amplifies hugely for future relations.

The Chinese government however closed the Tatopani border soon after the April 2015 earthquake, citing anti-Chinese activities in bordering areas. Kathmandu-Lhasa bus service which operated twice-weekly, since May 2005, by Sajha Yatayat company of Nepal was stopped in 2006. China's decision to close Khasa border, attempt to open Kerong border, and promises to facilitate trade from other possible border points do not seem to be new. It was China which opened Khasa point and helped construct Kodari highway as per its' interest to eliminate the role of the private Nepali trader in Tibet with direct State to State trading. *Single Most Important Reason for having a closed border is to avoid Tibet Uprising* by restricting not only people to people trade but also human movement and other cultural relationship in bordering areas. ^{16,17}

Nepal-India: Border

The Nepal – India border is an open border and has more impact in Terai region than Northern Hilly and Himalayan region. Nepal-India open border system has its positive impacts as well as challenges for both the nations.

Positive Impact. Open Border has led to easier life for locals by easy movement of people of both the countries, strengthening people to people relation on both sides, allows cultural exchanges, immediate disaster relief during calamities and disasters, offers utilization of best health services on both sides, supplements shortage of local labour on one side from the other side, benefits consumers due to competition between businessmen of both sides, prompt supply of food grains and daily foodstuff from either side and open-roof border markets or Hat Bazaars to purchase livestock products, vegetables and daily kitchen items.

Challenges. The major problem due to open and unrestricted border is aggression of boundary line and encroachment. Open border provides safe passage to the terrorists, Pakistani ISI agents and Indian Maoist who are infiltrating into India via Nepalese territory. The high jacking of Indian aircraft IC 814 from Tribhuvan international airport in Dec 2000 was an example of exploitation of open border by terrorists. The human trafficking particularly women, smuggling of unregistered/unlicensed arms & ammunitions, market goods and merchandise including archeological materials and medicinal plants through illegal entry points and cross-border crimes are on the rise. The peace and security of people on both sides of border is jeopardized due to unrestricted movement of people including people of other countries of similar races posing a viable threat to both the countries. The strained relation between India & Nepal due to aspect of boundary issue has resulted in Chinese involvement in economic, political and infrastructural development in Nepal.

India-Nepal Boundary Solution

Continuing boundary dispute has been an irritant in Indo-Nepal relations since the Treaty of Sugauli. This needs to be addressed keeping the contiguity of geographical features, population and sentiments of the people.

A model of Land Boundary could be on lines of Agreement between India-Bangladesh ratified on June 2015 which led to India losing around 40 square km to

Bangladesh and the enclave residents were allowed to either reside at their present location or move to the country of their choice significantly improved Indo-Bangladesh relations. Similarly the Nepal-China boundary Treaty added **302.75** square kilometer of Chinese territory into Nepal improving the bilateral relations. The final agreement between India-Nepal can be only made by some *give and take*. The two countries have already established a BWG to demarcate the border by 2022. This process needs to be completed with sincerity and within the timelines. The requirement of required funds and staff should be made available by both countries. However, the BWG shouldn't be left to complete border demarcation on its own but need to be monitored by both the countries. Susta, Kalapani and Lipulekh Pass disputes also needs to be cleared at the earliest, keeping the sentiments and strategic requirements of both the countries in mind. A holistic approach with direct Government to Government talks is the only way ahead.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

Initially Open Border between India-Nepal led to boom in economic activity of Nepal and at the same time strengthened people to people relation, however, in the present times with terrorism looming large in Indian Subcontinent, China considering Nepal as one of its *Five Fingers*, Pakistan and Nepal finding renewed military friendship, and Nepal's growing inability to see good intentions of India, it is necessary to change the status quo. Open Border, though a boon to both countries should also be seen from security, Geopolitical and strategic angle for India. A detailed analysis and review needs to be carried out at the National level on the pros and cons of Open Border. Border disputes can lead to continued friction and deterioration of bilateral relations. The solution lies in speedy implementation of the delineated boundary on strip maps and an early resolution of the Kalapani and Susta disputes. Only once the boundary is demarcated, other issues of border management between India and Nepal can be tackled effectively in the interest of both the countries and further improving the straining relation and reducing Chinese influence in the Himalayan Kingdom.¹⁹

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PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KASHMIR

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South Asia comprises more than 20 percent of world population and also a reservoir of poverty and illiteracy. At the same time region has made many achievements in Science and technology. India, the biggest country in the region both in terms of land area and population is bigger than all the other countries of the region put together, India's' achievements in science and technology is stupendous .Recently it has entered the space race by launching a missile to the mars. Similar to the development in China, India's development in confined to certain areas. Elimination of illiteracy is still to be achieved. The literacy remains around sixty five percent of the population. Poverty still remain high both in urban and rural areas. India has one of the biggest - net work of railways but need an overall improvement to cope with the present day need, accidents, derailing with overcrowding trains a frequent occurrence.

South Asia of late is often being quoted in political and academic analyses of the West as one of the world's highly sensitive conflictual regions. This more so after 1998 when India and Pakistan emerged as overt nuclear weapons powers. Pakistan emerging as an independent nation in 1947 after an undesirable division of India, has been in perpetual conflict with India. It launched four aggressive conflicts against India in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 with the interregnum marked by proxy war and low-intensity conflict. Despite adverse results in each war that it launched, Pakistan continues in a conflictual mode with India and in armed confrontation.

Pakistan too still remains backward with high rate of illiteracy. Tribal provinces such as Baluchistan is so backward with very low literacy rate less than twenty percent. Among the women it is still low as less than ten percent. Pakistan suffered badly owing to the wars in Afghanistan-first with the invasion by "former Soviet Union" and later by NATO forces. Afghanistan suffers immensely as they face attack both from Talban on one side and the NATO forces on the other. Now the Pakistani tribal areas suffer regularly owing to the drone- attacks, conducted by the U.S. led NATO forces.

Since the carving out of Pakistan from the British India territory to form a Muslim State, both India and Pakistan were at logger head for the possession of Kashmir. Both countries fought three wars with huge destruction to both countries. The war fought in 1971 was as a result of India helping the Bangladesh liberation movement when East Pakistan became an independent state. Coupled with their animosity and rivalry, both countries entered the nuclear race with developing nuclear weapons. The bone of contention has been "Kashmir State". When British India was partitioned in 1947, both parties came to an agreement with the British Empire that the "princely states" ruled by the "Maharajas" which remained semi-independent should decide themselves to accede to either India or Pakistan. In the case of Kashmir, the Maharaja of the state was a Hindu though the majority of the population were Muslims; Maharaja wanted to remain independent but with tribal forces from Pakistan side attacking Kashmir after partition to annex it to Pakistan; Maharaja proclaimed to accede to India which resulted in

a war between the newly freed two dominion states of India and Pakistan ultimately ended in a ceasefire arranged by the U.N. to hold a plebiscite to determine the accession which had never been held owing to different interpretation of plebiscite rules advanced by the two states.

Today Kashmir remained divided by the ceasefire line known as the “line of actual control”. The “state of Jammu and Kashmir” is controlled by India has been integrated as part of India and administered according to Indian law. The other part is known as “Assad Kashmir” is ruled by Pakistan. Both sides accuse each other of border skirmishes which results in death of their soldiers. India accuses Pakistan of training “Mujahidin” and suicide attack against India. Ten years back several of them had attacked Indian Parliament in New Delhi and also the Taj Hotel and vicinity in Mumbai killing many including foreign tourists. Infiltration into Indian Territory is a regular occurrence in Indian cities such as Hyderabad, Delhi, Agra, and Patna.

Both countries spend enormous amount on building huge armies with sophisticated military hardware .Animosity between India and Pakistan has affected the smooth functioning of the SAARC and also the stability of the region. Pakistan in addition has a huge burden of 12.5 million refugees from Afghanistan left over more than three decades. This is a bigger destabilization factor in Pakistan facing huge internal conflicts and instability affecting the neighboring SAARC countries.

Several attempts made by the leadership of both countries to settle the dispute over Kashmir had not been successful. India proclaimed Kashmir to be integral part of India. Pakistan considers it a “disputed” territory. Pakistan says that the U.N. need to hold the “plebiscite” where as India says that Pakistan need to withdraw their forces from Pakistan held Kashmir area before plebiscite is held. This dillydallying only intensifies conflict which is a common feature in Kashmir territory, increasing the number of casualties and refugees.

Pakistan was created to fulfill the aspiration of Muslims in undivided India for a viable Muslim state but it led later to three states- India; Pakistan and Bangladesh. Within Pakistan there are conflicts in Baluchistan and Pakhtunkhwa (North-West Frontier Area) Baluchistan is campaigning for a separate state with Iranian Baluchistan. In addition U.S. drone attack in the tribal region of Pakistan has become a pestering wound in Pakistan politics .NATO military hardware passes through the territory of Pakhtunkhwa was blocked by the state government as they want the drones to be stopped. Some believe that Pakistan is ungovernable and it is disintegrating. South Asia is sitting on a “powder keg” as both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with two armies faced to each other with intermittent border clashes. On the other hand nuclear China borders the northern region with territorial claims. Even a mountain area in Kashmir bordering is now under the control of China and the latter has constructed a large highway across it to pass through Pakistan territory to the Arabian sea. India also has border problem with Bangladesh and also the international rivers with both Pakistan and Bangladesh. South Asian regions development is shattered owing to the rivalry between India and Pakistan.

In the past during the bi-polar world, India had close relation with Moscow and Pakistan with Washington. Now with the rise of China, Himalayan border and Tibet. Today India is also a rising power and with rapid economic growth may step into be a world power. With the religious extremism and ethnic sectarianism developing in the sub-continent, development is hindered. What is absolutely needed is peace and stability which will give massive boost to the region.

Jammu Kashmir has been at the vanguards in India-Pakistan relations since the abrupt withdrawal of Great Britain from sub-continent and formation of two nation states. Since 1947 Pakistan and India have gone to war thrice, Kashmir perceived to be the main dispute. In 1999 Kargil crisis again brought both newly nuclear rivals to

the brink of war. The then US administration led by President Clinton intervened promptly and timely negotiated to deescalate the overwrought situation when both were at fighting an impromptu war at the peaks of Kargil in Jammu Kashmir.

After US led war against terrorism in Afghanistan (2001), the genre of global politics exclusively transformed and it also influenced the South Asia and anywhere else in the world. Due to the changing global political scenario and new fronts of confrontation after the end of cold war, both India and Pakistan advanced their bilateral relations during the Musharraf and Vajpayee's regimes in their respective countries. Backdoor diplomacy led them to take some Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) including a direct bus service across the Line of Control (LOC).

South Asian politics of guns and arsenals was replaced by composite dialogues, negotiations, reconciliations, sports and exchanges of cultural, intellectual, academics and musicians.

But all this could not last long due to absence of a democratic system in Pakistan and history of mistrust among the rivals. Musharraf regime, which was already fragile and lacking public support, became weaker due to his confrontation with judiciary in Pakistan in the first quarter of 2007. The unfortunate and untimely death of Benazir Bhutto was a blow in the forthcoming regional politics of South Asia. As a result of February 2008 general elections in Pakistan, Musharraf lost the power but successive governments of President Zardari and then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could not show mature judgments on various key issues regarding the future of South Asia including the resolution of Kashmir conflict. On the other hand victory of Hindu nationalist BJP led by Narendra Modi in 2014 general elections in India altered the Indian politics and secularism. Even the major party to the conflict could not stand for the "Ownership Building Measures" and trusted the CBMs which was a colossal error on behalf of Kashmiri leadership across the LOC.

The real question is: what would be best for both countries, for the South Asian Region at large and for the wider world would be a peaceful negotiated solution. However, we should not expect any more from bilateral talks than a replay of leisurely, theoretical and protracted CBMs leading nowhere practically. Peace in South Asia is a long way off and there is no adequate political will on either side to change the impasse. One could argue why not India and Pakistan negotiate in a positive way to finally sort out the Kashmir conflict which has held both the countries hostage for more than six decades and give Kashmiris, caught in the crossfire, the rights and peace they deserve? Pakistan has an alp of domestic and foreign policy impediments, beginning with the unstable border region with Afghanistan and its liaison with the United States' war as well as increasing political instability with home-grown armed militia.

India inclines to be self-righteous about Pakistan's wobbly condition; sometimes whispering about a failed state, but it should also have a close look at home - where not all is well either although politicians and media is portraying to hoodwink the world. Increasing poverty, declining social mobility, an increasing segregated gulf between haves and have nots, identity crisis and social diseases like discrimination on caste basis are the severe internal challenges India is going through. New Delhi has been flooded by a sequence of corruption disgraces and many of India's rural areas are under some form of insurgency. Poverty and rising differences are prevalent in both countries and both need all likely possessions to sort out the domestic and the international issues.

Kashmiris have a shared history of peaceful co-existence. The struggle over Kashmir is enduringly rooted in national identity, political, cultural and economic rights of Kashmiri people across the Line of Control under three interim administrations, Srinagar, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit. The Kashmir conflict has also influenced the politicization of Pakistan's army, religious radicalism, and nuclearization in both countries. The governments in Delhi and Islamabad have their own contradictory agenda over Jammu Kashmir.

At the crucial juncture of history, when the regional and international politics is becoming violent for the benefit of “privately owned enterprises” the working class of the region needs to understand the dangers and stand firm towards ending the tense environment between the two nuclear rivals of sub-continent. There is always a ray of hope and a faded light at the end of the tunnel and this vital point needs to be resonated. At the heart of any sustainable peace is the condition and process of reconciliation: the restoration of entirety. There are structural conditions that can promote reconciliation, but integral to the process is that elements of compassion, assistance, understanding and clemency; the capacity to let go of the hatred and hurt of the past and begin to envision common futures. Peace in sub-continent will not be lesser than any blessing after the decades of stress, strain and destruction. The poor masses of both the rival countries must demand for some solid measures taken by their rulers to bring dawn on the dusk of sub-continent. No matter, as a Kashmiri, one can still doubt the transparency and sincerity of the debating actors. Because both are fragile regimes with their own domestic problems and contradictory claims over the future of the state of Jammu Kashmir. Our commitment to a sustainable and durable solution to Kashmir issue during the negotiations should be crystal clear that there can be no bilateral solution imposed on Kashmiris. The only one solution can open the doors of peace, prosperity and democracy in sub-continent and that is to accept the Kashmiris living in all the three regions as one nation and to accept their basic right to be a free nation. A secular, democratic and peaceful Kashmir can guarantee the peace in the region. The entryway leading towards the solution of all the problems passes through the Himalayan region of Kashmir and any oversight at this sensitive brink of history can alter the corridor of future in South Asia. .

South Asian region is the least peaceful region in the world owing to, war on terror in Afghanistan and historic conflict between India and Pakistan. Nuclearisation in the region has deteriorated the situation furthermore. The peace and prosperity in the region can be ensure through confidence building measure, more trade and people to people contact between India and Pakistan. The conflicts among the South Asian countries are inflicting injuries to the socio political and economic development of the people living in the sub cotenant. Indeed peace is linchpin for development and prosperity in the south Asian region. Changing governments in India and Pakistan appears to be a positive sign for the peace and stability of the region. Where Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attended the oath taking ceremony of Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi seem a good omen for both the states. The strategic calculus suggests that India has superiority over Pakistan interims of military capability, economic growth and technological advancement. In this scenario Pakistan at the one hand is engaged in counter insurgency and on the other hand Pakistan’s armed forces are engaged on Afghan border to fight against terrorist and Al Qaida. In such sordid situation the state of Pakistan needs to take India engaged through dialogue and track 2diplomacy. It has been observed that increasing trade between the states decreases the conflicts; so both India and Pakistan must increase their trade relations. Pakistan has declared India as “Most Favorite state” for increasing trade and bilateral relation between the two states. Both the states should resolve their outstanding issues through the dialogue. There are facets of issues as Kashmir, Siachin, Waller Barge, Sir Creek, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. South is in deep quagmire of desperate lack of education, extreme poverty, lack of health facilities and malnutrition issues. South Asia has 23 percent of population but 39 percent poor are living in this region. The hug resources of both India and Pakistan are being used for military build up The India-Pakistan conflict, which began in 1947 after the independence and the subsequent creation of the two states, has assumed an international character in the past couple of decades. The two veritable outcomes of the conflict, nuclear proliferation and terrorism, have not only destabilized the region but have also posed a threat to international peace and security. What was originally a bilateral conflict, now, has unpleasant international implications.

For a stable and peaceful South Asia, both Pakistan and India need to carry on the peace process by which they can lessen tensions and also may even resolve some of the contesting issue” The ball is still in the court of the leadership of India and Pakistan to decide the fate of the People of one of the biggest and densely populated region. Both the countries must sit inn and discuss the matters until resolved through dialogue. It is still not too late to resolve the issues on bilateral agreements and stop spending on nuclear arms that could escalate hazardous war anytime.

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CHINA-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

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Introduction

The “all-weather” and time-tested China-Pakistan strategic relationship has been taken further forward recently. Their joint interest of containing India from becoming a regional power in South Asia and gaining increasing weight on the international stage has contributed to strengthening the China-Pakistan strategic partnership, based on the premise that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s friend. The Indian strategist *Kautilya*, who propounded this maxim, added that “whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another.”¹

Against the wish of India, China has supplied Pakistan with conventional arms, nuclear weapon capability and ballistic missile know-how. Besides, there are also credible reports about the presence of Chinese troops and personnel in Pakistan-controlled in India’s state of Jammu and Kashmir. The paper argues that their common interest to contain India is driving the China-Pakistan strategic partnership – and not the growing India-United States relations. The United States is expanding defence and security ties with India, but it is maintaining high-notch relations with Pakistan and China: even today, China enjoys better relations with the United States than India does.

The China-Pakistan strategic partnership is aimed at foiling India’s bid to emerge as a major power in the world and to maintaining a balance between the two South Asian rivals. China, for example, attempted to ruin the India-US civil nuclear agreement when the process was in the final stage of exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); recently, China has offered thermo-nuclear reactors to Pakistan. Today, China is an important aspect of Pakistan’s foreign policy and vice-versa. The paper seeks to examine the ground realities behind the China-Pakistan cooperation and to evolve India’s policy options against it. It also analyses the possible adverse implications to India’s security and strategic environment arising from the phenomenon of long-term China-Pakistan strategic partnership.

Factors Contributing to Strategic Partnership

India in the current century has gained significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military prowess, but Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India’s progress in this direction. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic coordination, advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. The close strategic partnership between the two countries has been based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. Pakistan’s search for a country that can help sustain a sufficient military capacity for itself against India coalesces with China’s intention that “a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping India preoccupied on two fronts, thereby safeguard their national security interests.”² The China-Pakistan strategic partnership is getting further strengthened on account of the following factors:

- a. Go-strategic location of Pakistan close to India and Central Asia and West Asia.
- b. India’s rise on the global scene on various power indicators.

- c. India's close strategic relationship with the United States.
- d. Pakistan's dilemma about the United States' reliability as a strategic partner.
- e. Mutual China-United States suspicions on many strategic issues.
- f. India's growing footholds in Afghanistan and Central Asia.³

China-Pakistan Converging Interests

China and Pakistan are India's traditional threats because of historical memories and existing differences, and their abilities to interrupting New Delhi's rise to becoming a great global power. The Strategic partnership between China and Pakistan is based on the convergence of their mutual interests. China seeks reunification of Taiwan with the motherland and has historical claims on some groups of islands off its coast, which it would like to resolve through peaceful negotiations. Pakistan supports China's stance on the issue of Taiwan. Pakistan itself makes a claim on the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is currently part of the Indian Union. The UN Security Council, to which India referred the issue six decades ago, adopted resolutions that the will of the people of the state be ascertained through a plebiscite, but India held that the resolution was nullified by Pakistan's continued illegal military presence in part of the state. China favours a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue.⁴ China also appreciates Pakistan's long-term and staunch support to it on issues concerning China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁵

Historical Background

The China-Pakistan partnership started way back in 1950. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC). The partnership gathered momentum when China had defeated India in 1962 war over the border issue. Islamabad gave away 5180 square kilometres of India's disputed Kashmir territory to China. In response, China's Premier Zhou Enlai is reported to have assured the Pakistanis that "China was prepared to put pressure on India in the Himalayas for as long as necessary." This was followed by the Chinese diplomatic support to Pakistan in the UN over the issue of Kashmir.⁶

During the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, China provided military assistance to Pakistan. China also played a key role in the release of more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war who were in Indian custody: it threatened to veto the entry of Bangladesh into the UN unless they were released.⁷ Pakistan also extended key support to China in securing a place for it in the UN Security Council as a permanent member between 1961 and 1971.⁸ When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua assured Pakistan that if the Soviets invaded it, China would come to its defence.⁹

China provided Pakistan with intelligence on nuclear weapon technology as early as 1976. It also armed Pakistan with advanced arms and equipment to deal with India, which was equipped much better with conventional arms. Between 1978 and 2008, China sold military equipment worth roughly (US) \$7 billion to Pakistan, which included short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, small arms and conventional weapon systems. Defying the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, China transferred M-11 short-range missiles to Pakistan; M-11 can deliver a 500-kilogram warhead up to 300 kilometres, a fact that China disputes. Further, China provided Pakistan with blueprints on how to build a missile production plant.¹⁰

Under an agreement signed in September 1986, China sold two mini-research reactors to Pakistan in November 1989 and February 1990. In November 1989 China agreed to sell a 300-megawatt pressurized-water plant to Pakistan. In August 1990 China agreed to export uranium fuel for the nuclear reactors in Pakistan.¹¹

Partnership Post Cold War

While the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to some loss of Pakistan's strategic relevance for the United States, it brought Pakistan closer to China to compensate for this loss. The post Cold War global strategic developments have its impact on the relationship between China and Pakistan. Both countries enjoy a multifaceted partnership which ranges from political to economic and trade and from defence and security to nuclear cooperation. In 1996, during the state visit of President Jiang Zemin to Pakistan, the two countries decided to establish a comprehensive friendship. They signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to the effect that "neither party will join any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity" of either nation and "would not conclude treaties of this nature with any third party." However, the suitable environment was created when China had equipped Pakistan Air Force with F-7P fighter in 1992. On the very same year, China also supplied to Pakistan 34 M-11 battlefield missiles, a solid-fuel variant of the Soviet Scud-B missile.¹²

As the relationship gets stronger with every passing year and the Beijing's ensuring security guarantee for Islamabad has only brought significant change in the latter perception towards the former. Pakistan gives strategic importance to its partnership with China. This was very well reflected in the words of Dr Shireen Mazari, "The Peking has not only repudiated to back down on its defence pledges to Islamabad, in spite of Western pressure, but has been about especially responsible for permitting Pakistan a modicum of sufficient defence ability and nuclear development clearly makes China absolutely essential for Pakistan's survival., Pakistan has become extremely casual about its relations with China." Despite U.S. imposition of Pressler Amendment upon Islamabad, China continue to extend support to Islamabad nuclear weapons programme. China was closely working with Pakistan over the development of 9300 Mw power plant at Chasma. Moreover, China has been accused for transferring 500 ring magnets for Pakistan's nuclear facilities.¹³

Partnership at the Turn of 21st Century

President Pervez Musharraf during his visit to China in November 2003 said that the China- Pakistan strategic partnership was "deeper than the oceans, higher than the mountains."¹⁴ Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said, while inaugurating a two-day international conference on "China and Emerging Asian Century" at Islamabad's Institute of Strategic Studies on 27 September 2005:

Pakistan and China enjoy all-weather friendship based on complete trust and confidence. Our friendship is rooted in the psyche and ethos of our people. From Khunjrab to Gwadar, the symbols of Pakistan-China friendship dot the landscape. The mega projects that we have undertaken with China's help are like anchors that hold the two countries together in trusted friendship.¹⁵

Continuing in the two countries' anti-India stance, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said in 2010 that "Pakistan and China strongly feel that India should not become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, as it would disturb the balance of power in the region."¹⁶

However, the roadmap for a sustained 'future-oriented all-round cooperative partnership between the two countries was laid during the visit of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan to China wherein they concluded the 'Joint Declaration on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation. China on the one side reaffirms that it respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, and appreciates and supports the efforts of Pakistan for peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues with neighbours and to safeguard its state sovereignty and independence. While, Pakistan on the other side reaffirms that it will continue to consistently adhere to the one-China policy, and recognize

the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China and Taiwan an inalienable and indivisible part of Chinese territory, and fully support China's cause of peaceful reunification.¹⁷

The events of 11 September 2001 were, however, a turning point in India-United States relations. Since then, the security understanding between the world's two largest democracies has improved significantly. The United States offered civil nuclear cooperation to India and rejected similar cooperation with Pakistan. It has also encouraged India to play a significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which detracts from Pakistan's objective of gaining strategic depth in that country. For Pakistan, this increases the value of the Chinese friendship that today Islamabad considers China to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy.¹⁸

In April 2005 China and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourly Relations. The agreement binds the two countries to desist from joining "any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side." China will continue to view China-Pakistan relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and make joint efforts with Pakistan to lift China-Pakistan strategic partnership of cooperation to a new high.¹⁹ Pakistan's Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad stated in a TV interview that Pakistan would stand behind China if the United States ever tried to "besiege" it. From Pakistan's perspective, China is a far more reliable partner than the United States, given that the latter in the recent past has been much more committed to strengthening its ties with India.

Since the dawn of the current century, the two countries have committed themselves to further strengthening their economic ties. The visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in December 2004 and the subsequent visit by the Chinese Premier in April 2005 to Pakistan paved the way for future cooperation. The two sides signed a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU), after which China provided Pakistan a preferential credit of \$500 million, out of which \$150 million was for Phase II of the Chashma nuclear power plant. Also, a new Pakistan consulate was opened in Shanghai. The two sides have also taken initial steps towards establishing a free trade area, by cancelling tariffs on 767 items. China-Pakistan trade has expanded rapidly from \$1.4 billion in 2001 to \$5 billion in 2006.²⁰ China is engaged in 120 projects with Pakistan such as heavy engineering, power generation, mining and telecommunications, and expects its investment in Pakistan to grow from \$4 billion in 2007 to \$15 billion by 2010.²¹ During the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Pakistan in 2011 the two sides signed agreements for thirty-five new pacts. These pacts may bring \$30 billion investment to Pakistan over the next five years from China.²²

The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the visit on 19 December, 2010 expressed the shared view that "the China-Pakistan all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation has gone beyond bilateral dimensions and acquired broader regional and international ramifications." The two sides agreed to step up personnel training, joint exercises, training and cooperation for national defense, science and technology, and collaboration in defence production. The two sides also agreed to give further impetus to maritime security cooperation.²³

Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan and Proliferation Concerns

By entering into a civilian nuclear agreement, the United States has not strengthened India's missile and nuclear programmes because India has agreed to separation of civilian facilities from that of the military facilities, thereby voluntarily placing all the civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards. By entering into the civilian nuclear initiative, India's interests do not lie in undermining the non-proliferation regime, but to strengthen the regime. India's commitment to preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) is justified by its impeccable

record of not transferring any of its nuclear related technology and materials to the third countries.²⁴ Regardless, China supported Pakistan in its ambitions of acquiring nuclear and missile programmes by violating international commitments. And as such China is a member of the Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSGs) which prohibits the transfer of technology to countries that have not signed Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even after joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 China has engaged in nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan.²⁵

By supporting Islamabad in its nuclear weapons programme, Beijing has sent an indirect message to Washington that if you can do this for your partner (India) then why I should desist from doing the same for my long time ally (Pakistan). Shen Dingli, a nuclear security expert and Vice President of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University accused Washington of “contributing to nuclear proliferation” as “New Delhi can now devote its resources and energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons... Wouldn't it be possible for other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy? Pakistan... has a need to develop civil nuclear energy and the right to do so...”²⁶

Pakistan, it may be noted, has an execrable record of nuclear proliferation. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang has repeatedly dismissed such concerns by claiming that “Civilian nuclear energy cooperation between China and Pakistan is completely in line with international obligations of non-proliferation, and is completely meant for peaceful purposes.”²⁷

In future too, the possibility of Pakistan proliferating nuclear components and technological know how cannot be ruled out. Therefore, China should think twice before moving ahead for any kind of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, because it would face a serious threat to international peace and security. Expressing concerns over the issue of nuclear proliferation and the need to address it, Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, while delivering a lecture at Harvard University has said that, ‘We believe that the challenges of nuclear terrorism and nuclear security have to be addressed. We have been affected by clandestine nuclear proliferation in our neighbourhood. We are, naturally, concerned about the possibility of nuclear terrorism, given the security situation in our neighbourhood.’²⁸

India's Concerns over the Recent Development

The recent Chinese stand on Jammu and Kashmir in support of Pakistan and the former's frequent incursions into the disputed territory with India is a serious security concern for India. China has questioned India's legal status in Jammu and Kashmir by declining the visit of the Northern Army Command Chief, Lt. General B.S. Jaswal, for defence talks in Beijing and by issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir. Such a posture reflects Beijing's reluctance towards closer ties with New Delhi.

In response to China's stance on Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has allowed China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enter into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. India cannot remain silent on this issue as it would mean a double blow for our country, first to block its increasing influence in Afghanistan; secondly, India's control over Leh and Siachen would come under threat.²⁹ Selig Harrison, a well-known expert on South Asia, has in an article in the *New York Times* stated that 11,000 PLA troops have been stationed in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Chinese soldiers have undertaken construction activities such as building dams, roads and other projects in that region.³⁰ Actually the possibility of Chinese forces encroaching into India's northern border with the knowledge of Pakistan was first highlighted in the 2008-09 annual report prepared by the Ministry of Defence. This is follow-up to Islamabad's giving away of more than 5,000 km of territory in northern Kashmir to China in 1963.

Lt Gen KT Parnaik, heading the Northern Command has warned that China's military presence in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was too close for India's comfort. "It poses military challenges to India and not only along the Sino-Indian border but also along the LoC." He further added that "We hear many people who are concerned about the fact that if there were to be hostilities between us and Pakistan what would be the complicity of the Chinese. Not only because they are in the neighbourhood but the fact that they are actually stationed and present on the LoC." Besides, "The Chinese Links with Pakistan through PoK lend strength to the China-Pakistan nexus which has been of great security concern for us. It jeopardises our regional and strategic interest in the long run...the Chinese footprints are too close for comfort."³¹

Moreover, China has also strengthened its move towards modernisation of the Karakoram highway, and plans to construct a new rail line and oil pipeline from Kashgar in Xinjiang to the Gwadar port on Pakistan's Makran coast.³² This move is aimed at reducing its dependence on oil supplies through the Malacca Straits and instead have that routed through Gwadar.³³ This also brings China in close proximity to Gulf oil supplying countries and Central Asia while scattering India's hopes for expanding its influence in Central Asia, Middle East and the Indian Ocean.³⁴ This way China will be following a secret strategy of steadily expanding its influence close to India's borders, requiring India to strengthen its horizons of vigilance.

The latest Annual Report of the US Department of Defence on Military and Security Developments Involving the PLA states that in order to improve regional deterrence, the PLA has replaced older liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable CSS-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with more advanced and survivable solid-fuelled CSS-5 medium range ballistic missiles close to the Indian border.³⁵ With growing understanding between China and Pakistan to halt India's leap forward to global powers and the increasing influence of the former close to our borders, the possibility of setting up a military bases in Islamabad in future cannot be ruled out. Based on the past experience and the current developments, anything can happen in Pakistan.³⁶ The recent developments and the close Sino-Pakistan collaboration demonstrate their intentions to put pressure on India.

Implications for India

What are the implication of the growing strategic partnership between China and Pakistan for India? This growing strategic partnership has deep-rooted security implications not only for India but also for the world peace and security at large. Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation is bringing China's military forces close to India's border, in itself a serious security threat to India. China's pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian policy without addressing the regional issues sends a message that China is not seriously concerned about ensuring peace, stability and security in Asia, and South Asia in particular. It may be noted that China has not shown any seriousness in resolving the longstanding border disputes with India.

China's growing engagement with Pakistan has been further motivated by Beijing's desire to extend its influence into South Asia and block New Delhi from enjoying regional preeminence in the region. This partnership has every potential to threaten India's ambitions of becoming a world power by not allowing it to move freely for the internal developments of our country. It is in the long-term interests of China and Pakistan that India be handicapped from playing a global role in the changing world scenario. This can be one of the important reasons as to why China has not shown any seriousness in resolving the long-standing border disputes with India.

Moreover, China and Pakistan are closely watching India's immediate area of interest extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits in the east, and from Antarctica in the south to Central Asia in the north. India's interests around the Indian Ocean have been followed by increasing Chinese military activities, including

naval build-up and ability for regional power projection.³⁷ The Chinese attempt to control events in India's geographic vicinity by following a string-of-pearls strategy – by building bases at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Myanmar and Gwadar in Pakistan – is reflective of its desire to make use of these countries to contain India. In the long-run, this will have far reaching implications for India. This would also help keep India engaged and divert its attention from the Indian Ocean.³⁸ Such a strategy will have long-term implications for New Delhi's maritime security.

Concluding Remarks

Keeping in mind the changing world scenario, India's foreign policy interests would seek to have close cooperation with the major powers of the world including China so that it can peacefully grow its own international status. China has contributed more than that of its close partner to cement this strategic partnership. The commitment from both sides to strengthen the level of the partnership is much stronger than ever before in the past. For which China will continue to be a long-term strategic and military ally of Pakistan, regardless of the status of the India-United States strategic relations. The Chinese anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan policy is to keep India engaged with certain outstanding issues deliberately created by it. Continuous border disputes, ties with Pakistan and its growing influence in India's sphere of influence would remain a constant source of mutual mistrust and suspicion, thereby restricting the prospect of closer cooperation between China and India. The strength of this partnership lies in their mutual interests of impeding India from significantly increasing their presence on the global geopolitical landscape and at the same time not to allow any issue to obstruct the partnership from gaining its status further.

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN - CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

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CPEC will be a strategic game changer in the region, which would go a long way in making Pakistan a richer and stronger entity than ever before.
—Firstpost, 22 Apr, 2015.

Introduction


Gilgit-Baltistan lies in the North of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and is a sparsely populated mountainous region. It has enormous strategic significance for both Pakistan and India. It is the region that connects Pakistan with China and provides it with most of its fresh water resources. The region is rich in mineral resources, with abundance of precious metals and important radioactive material. Geo-politically, it is one of the most sensitive areas for Pakistan and has assumed additional political and strategic importance with the opening of the Karakoram Highway (KRH) which links China to Pakistan and reportedly generates trade worth billions of dollars.

Pakistan is keen to prolong its control over the region and any clamour for autonomy is dissipated by creating divisions amongst the local populace and instigating sectarian disturbances. Indian concern for Gilgit-Baltistan lies in the fact that this region, legally a part of India occupied by Pakistan, has not received its due attention by the international community. The region provides India a gateway to Central Asian Region (CAR) and the markets of Middle East and beyond upto Europe.

China has embarked upon a colossal project called “**One Belt, One Road**” (OBOR) with CPEC as one of the six eco corridors envisaged. The dynamics of this strategic region are evolving again with this project. China and Pakistan have unveiled plans to create a trade corridor through Gilgit-Baltistan, linking the two countries for regional trade and commerce. These plans entail building a railway link between Kashgar and Gwadar, and develop energy and mineral resources. These developments offer unprecedented opportunities for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, but there are risks involved.

Perspective on Gilgit-Baltistan

History. Gilgit-Baltistan evolved as two separate political entities, namely, Dardistan or Gilgit and Baltistan, though there were times when they were part of the same political entity. Gilgit, also known as Dardistan, is the land of the Dards or Dardic speaking people. The region was part of the Mauryan and Kushan Empire. During the subsequent period almost all the present-day parts of the state of J & K were under the same rule. Baltistan was well known as *Tibet-i-Khurdor* “Little Tibet” in the medieval age. The early




history of Baltistan began with the spread of Buddhism under the Kushanas. The region was part of Lalitaditya's Empire in the 8th century and had close interactions with Gilgit and Kashmir. With the ascension of the Mughals, Kashmir came under the Mughal rule barring Gilgit and surrounding areas. The two political entities were eventually united during the Sikh rule and remained so during the subsequent Dogra rule. After the defeat of the Sikh Army in 1846, British made Gulab Singh the Dogra ruler of full-fledged sovereign of the regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, as well as Gilgit, Chilas and Baltistan.

Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan Control. The accession of Gilgit-Baltistan was formalised by signing an agreement between the Presidents of 'Azad Kashmir' and the Muslim Conference on 28 Apr 1949. Gilgit-Baltistan was directly controlled by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) introduced by the British were retained in Gilgit-Baltistan. In 1963, Pakistan gave away 2,500 sq miles of the territory to China which was utilized by China to construct *Karakoram Highway* linking Kashgar in China to Islamabad in Pakistan. In 1970, an Advisory Council with 14 elected members was set up, which was subsequently converted into the Northern Areas Council in 1975, but continued without any legislative or executive powers and was presided over by the Administrator appointed by Islamabad. On 29 Aug 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 was passed by the Pakistan Cabinet which granted self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, by creating, among other things, an elected Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and Gilgit-Baltistan Council. In response to concerns raised by Beijing about the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, in Mar 2017, Pakistan Government committee headed by Sartaj Ajij had introduced a proposal for granting Gilgit-Baltistan the *status of fifth province*.



Demography. The population of the region comprises numerous ethnic groups & tribes and is believed to have grown by 63.1 percent from 1998 to 2011, according to the 2011 Census of Pakistanistan. The population consists of 39.85% Shias, 30.05% Sunnis, 24% Ismaili and 6.1% Noorbakshis. This is the only region in Pakistan having Shia domination.

DEMOGRAPHY : GILGIT BALTISTAN




- Faultlines in Gilgit-Baltistan.** Since 1948, there has been continuous jostling over the ownership of this strategically important region amongst various ethnic and sectarian groups either indigenous or those migrated from outside. In the recent past, there has been a serious sectarian divide and there have been numerous reports of mass discrimination of people following different strands of Shiaism. Resentment against being deprived of any ‘say’ in policies governing the region has also caused open protests by locals against Pakistan government.

CPEC & Proposals for Gilgit-Baltistan

CPEC is a collection of projects currently under construction at a cost of **\$46 billion** which are intended to upgrade and expand Pakistani infrastructure. In addition, the Exim Bank of China would lend the Government of Pakistan approx \$11 billion to overhaul the country’s transportation infrastructure at heavily-subsidized concessionary loans with an interest rate of 1.6%. These projects will span the breadth and width of Pakistan, and would eventually link the Pakistani city of Gwadar Port in southwestern Pakistan to China’s northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang via a vast network of highways and railways. **On 20 Apr 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to commence work on the \$46 billion agreement, which is roughly 20% of Pakistan’s annual GDP with approx \$28 billion worth of fast-tracked “Early Harvest” projects to be developed by the end of 2018.** On 12 Aug 2015 in the city of Karamay, China and Pakistan signed 20 more agreements worth \$1.6 billion to further augment the scale and scope of CPEC.

CHINA- PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR



Major Infrastructure Projects - CPEC

Projects in Gwadar Port and City. Gwadar forms the crux of the CPEC project, as it is envisaged to be the link between China's ambitious One Belt, One Road project, and its Maritime Silk Road project. In total, more than \$1 billion worth of projects are to be developed around the port of Gwadar by Dec 2017. Under CPEC, China will grant Pakistan \$230 million in order to construct a new international airport in Gwadar which is to be operational by Dec 2017. The city of Gwadar is further being developed by the construction of a 300 MW coal power plant, a desalinization plant, a new 300 bed hospital, and an expressway along Gwadar's East Bay.

Road and Railway Infrastructure Projects

Under the CPEC project, China has announced financing for \$10.63 billion worth of transportation infra. Under the *Northern Alignment* a portion of National Highway 35 (N-35) is to be completely rebuilt and upgraded between Gilgit and Skardu. Roadway infrastructure to be built as part of the CPEC's *Eastern Alignment* will consist of the Karachi-Lahore Motorway. In total, the CPEC project envisages re-construction of 870 kms of road in Baluchistan province alone as part of the **Western Alignment**.

The CPEC "Early Harvest" plan emphasizes major upgrades to Pakistan's railway system, including rebuilding of the entire Main Line 1 railway between Karachi and Peshawar by 2020. In addition, upgrades and expansions are slated for other railway lines. The railway will provide direct access for Chinese and East Asian goods to Pakistan seaports at Karachi and Gwadar by 2030.

Energy Sector Projects

Energy generation will be a major focus of the CPEC project, with approx \$33 billion expected to be invested in this sector. An estimated 10,400 MW of electricity are slated for generation by March 2018. In addition to LNG projects, the Chinese government has also announced its intention to build a \$2.5 billion 711 kms long liquid natural gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah. *The project will not only provide gas exporters with access to the Pakistani market, but will also allow China to secure a route for its own imports.*

Projects in Gilgit Baltistan

In *Gilgit-Baltistan* the CPEC project design is set to include a major expansion of Karakoram Highway, establish industrial parks in Special Economic Zones(SEZ), construction of hydropower projects, railway line & road building. Sost town and Gilgit city in Gilgit-Baltistan will be among 12 economic zones to be established along the CPEC.

Gilgit-Baltistan despite being resource rich area has failed to find recognition under the aegis of CPEC project. The expansion of Karakoram Highway if unaccompanied with the economic development of the region is clearly indicative of intent of Pakistan and China to exploit the natural resources of the illegally occupied region.

Implications of CPEC On Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan has an anomalous position within the overall political structure of Pakistan because this region does not fall within the constitutional ambit of Pakistan. Owing to its absence in the power dispensation, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan has always been ignored in major decision-making process. On the other hand, with the introduction of mega infrastructure and economic projects, its political and economic vulnerabilities also increase. Policy of exclusion for 67 years has led to a series of deficits, including stunted political development, and a lack of faith and interest in political participation, leadership and capacity development. CPEC will make Gilgit-Baltistan the meeting ground for a volatile osmosis of two supremacist projects Wahhabism and Hanism.

Change in Political Status of Gilgit-Baltistan. Unlike Pakistan's four provinces, the region has no political representatives in the parliament or the federal cabinet and no status under Pakistan's constitution. The people of the region also do not have any redressal available to them under the Pakistan legal system. This had been done in consonance with the legality to Pakistan's stand on Jammu & Kashmir. Owing to the increased Chinese pressure for giving legality to the utilization of this region under CPEC, Pakistan government is mulling constitutional amalgamation of this region within Pakistan by giving it status of a province. The move could signal a historic shift in the Pakistan's position on the future of the wider Pakistan Occupied Kashmir which it has historically insisted is semi-autonomous and has not formally integrated them into the country, in line with its position that a referendum should be carried out across the whole of the region.

Prevailing Security Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan and its effect on CPEC. Gilgit-Baltistan strategic location on the trade route connecting East Asia with CAR and Europe also makes it vulnerable to spill-over of conflicts from active militant activities in surrounding areas.

- o **Sectarian Violence in Gilgit-Baltistan.** Being the only Shia dominant region in Pakistan, tensions between Shia and Sunni communities have emerged since the 1980s after the construction of the Karakoram Highway. The first serious sectarian violence in Gilgit broke out in 1983 when a rumour alleging a Sunni massacre at the hands of Shias resulted in an attack by thousands of armed tribesmen from the south, the killing of nearly four hundred Shias, and the burning of several Shia villages.
- o **Militant Activities in Gilgit-Baltistan.** On 23 Jun 2013, militants killed 11 people including nine foreign tourists and two Pakistanis at Nanga Parbat tourists' base camp in revenge for US drone attacks and the killing of Tehrik-e-Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) chief, Waliur Rehman Mehsud. This was followed by shooting of three security force officials, including an army Colonel, a Captain and the Superintendent of Police in Chilas. These attacks in recent years on security forces and foreigners have revealed the vulnerability of the region to TTP and other militant organisations.

The prevailing environment of insecurity, militancy and violence in Gilgit-Baltistan may pose serious threats to the construction of the CPEC in future. However, the absence of militant bases and support structures in Gilgit-Baltistan suggests the threat level to the CPEC in this region will be low for the time being. However, sporadic attacks on the CPEC-linked sites and personals cannot be ruled out.

Infrastructure Development in Gilgit-Baltistan v/s Political and Economic Exploitation. CPEC brings in opportunities in the neglected region with the development of infrastructure in terms of road, railway and SEZs. However, it is important to note the **complete absence of local representation** in this initiative. As of today, major economic activities are being conducted by people who have migrated from outside Gilgit-Baltistan. Economic development should lead to more freedom and enable local communities to achieve basic civil liberties and political rights. This requires political initiatives preceding economic arrangements. Pakistan has till now not planned to provide legal protections and political rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. This may result in emergence of an economic zone in an area which is a political non-entity in the political system of Pakistan.

Increase in Trade. With the CPEC passing through Gilgit-Baltistan and associated infra development, the route would open business opportunities for people of the region. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Gilgit-Baltistan produces over 1,00,000 metric tons of fresh apricots annually. Diverting agricultural products especially fruits to China/Middle East would be more profitable for local farmers. Further with CPEC, there will be a boost in tourism to the 73,000 sq km region, which is a mountaineer's paradise. The region also has infinite water

resources to tap. Hydropower projects if developed will allow Pakistan to sell clean energy to China and use it for itself.

Enhanced Calls for Freedom of Gilgit-Baltistan. Opening a politically marginalised region to a mega economic project without clearly and democratically defining its legal status, its role in the process and its involvement in the project, and at the same time ignoring the aspirations of the local populace is likely to invoke more people in the demand for freedom in the region. After 67 yrs of neglect and stunted development, Pakistan's attempt to change political status of Gilgit-Baltistan has resulted in increased calls for freedom from Pakistan and India. Groups such as the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) have rejected the idea of amalgamation in Pakistan and are instead demanding freedom from Pakistan control. Conceding a stronger political framework could transform local politics in Gilgit-Baltistan from submissive to assertive, and this could possibly come in conflict with Pakistan's wider strategic objectives vis-a-vis the region.

Demographic Shift. There is also the fear that the CPEC may lead to widespread displacement of the locals. Of the 73,000 sq kms of land in Gilgit-Baltistan, cultivable land is just 1%. If that is allowed for purchase by rich investors from outside the province, the local population shall become a minority and economically subservient to outsiders once they have no farmland or orchards left to earn their livelihood. Along with this demographic shift a concomitant increase in threat of sectarian divide/riots cannot be ruled out.

Concerns for India

For a long period, indeed, beginning in 1947 itself, India had tended to play down, if not ignore, its own legal claim over what Pakistan used to term as the Northern Areas and now calls Gilgit-Baltistan. As a result, the world assumed the '**Kashmir Problem**' only pertained to the Kashmir Valley which was in India's possession.

In 2009 and 2010, India responded sharply to reports of the presence of Chinese soldiers and workers in the region. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in June last year had termed the CPEC project "unacceptable" for passing through POK. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval raised eyebrows when he reminded an audience of BSF officers to factor in 106-km-long non-contiguous border with Afghanistan in a clear reference to Gilgit-Baltistan's Afghan frontier. Ministry of External Affairs has unequivocally emphasised that entire state of J & K including Gilgit-Baltistan is an integral part of India in recent press releases. With upgradation of Karakorum Highway through Gilgit-Baltistan, the collousivity of China and Pakistan and likelihood of two front war especially along POK and Aksai Chin increases.


Implications for India

Substantial increase in Strategic Value. Historically since 1947, Indian posturing in the Ladakh Region (region in India opposite Gilgit Baltistan) has been status-quoist. India has not attempted to make any substantial changes in the alignment of the Line-of-Control as she had considered the region to be of low economic value to Pakistan. Pakistan had also until recently not attempted to legally include the region into its polity, both economically and culturally. However, **CPEC has completely changed the situation**, strategically for Gilgit-Baltistan. Territorially, its strategic significance due to the construction of CPEC has now made it the most critical. Its proximity to India and the fact that it is an integral part of India greatly **increases India's leverage** both with Pakistan and China, **militarily and legally**.

Consolidate Pakistan-China Relations. CPEC is considered a significant project that seeks to increase Chinese-Pakistan bilateral ties and further consolidate their strategic ties. The corridor running through Gilgit-Baltistan could potentially impinge upon India's geo-political calculations and pose a strategic challenge.

- Allows PLAAF to overcome all up weight restrictions on aircraft.
- Allows more weapons to be carried by PLAAF.
- Swifter transfer of resources from mainland to LAC in shorter time frame.

CPEC and Indian Security Concerns: Chinese Gains. The focus of Chinese spending in Pakistan, besides trade, economic aid and infrastructure development, will give China *direct* and beyond, boosting its influence in immediate Indian neighbourhood of Central, South and Middle East Asia. **Construction of approx 19 tunnels** between Hunza and Khunjerab Pass is being exclusively handled by Chinese nationals. The tunnels afford ideal facilities to store high-value military weapons like missiles. Presence of Chinese troops has already been confirmed in Gilgit-Baltistan. In event of Pakistan declaring Gilgit-Baltistan as its fifth province the legality of their presence in Gilgit-Baltistan is emboldened and China may use this excuse as an alibi to **open the 2nd front** in case of any Indo–Pakistan conflict or may actively assist Pakistan in conflict. China has further revealed plans to construct an airport on the strategically located Pamir plateau in the city of Tashkurgan on Karakorum Highway. This will help China to **swiftly transfer resources** to the remote but strategically important region of Aksai Chin as well as POK. This will help them to **overcome the drawback of having just two major airbases** at Kashgar and Khotan which are 520 and 270 km away respectively from the nearest Indian air base of Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO).



Inevitability of Pakistan-China Strategic Collusivity. The CPEC can be seen as an extension of Chinese tentacles into Pakistan. The high value of this extension is evident in the quantum of investment that the Chinese are putting into the region despite its volatility. It is natural therefore that China will do everything possible in order to protect its investment. The routes that sustain CPEC will pass through disputed territory and a **region within the operational and strategic reach** of the Indian forces. This aspect highlights the **inevitability of assured collusivity** between Pakistan and China to deal with any Indian military actions in India's Western front including Gilgit Baltistan.

Strategic Implications. The **vast improvement in communication infrastructure** especially in Gilgit-Baltistan will enable Pakistan to sidestep forces in a much faster rate and quantum compared to India, hampered by external and poorly developed lines-of-communication. This implies that Pakistan will effectively be able to **increase force-ratios** in theatres to her advantage in a much reduced timeframe.

Conclusion

The advent of CPEC is considered economically vital to Pakistan helping it drive its economic growth. China and Pakistan intend that the massive investment plan will transform Pakistan into a regional economic hub and further boost the deepening ties between the two countries. The Pakistan media and government called the investments a “game changer” for the region. However, the same may not be true for Gilgit-Baltistan unless the local aspirations and expectations are incl and pol & eco measures are put in place to allow the fruits of this development to be enjoyed by the local populace. A positive approach may further integrate Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan and alienation of world community from Indian interest in region. However, a neglect of these concerns may lead to a turbulent state in the region which may lead to non completion of the CPEC and greater call for autonomy for the region.

India must leverage her advantages in the region. It must act as a medium for sounding the concerns of the people of the region and their marginalisation to the international community. The proximity of the CPEC to Indian military reach must be exploited by India to relieve pressure from other points of confrontation with China or Pakistan. Indian planners must realise the changed dynamics and opportunity in Gilgit Baltistan region and plan ahead.

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Preface and Acknowledgement

Concept Note:

An attempt has been made in the present International Seminar Proceedings to analyze the contemporary issues and challenges in India's adversarial relations with its close neighbor Pakistan in an Indian perspective. India's relations with Pakistan have been aptly described by former India's Prime Minister, Sh. Inder Kumar Gujral as 'tormented one'. Pakistan has been one of the major concerns for India's foreign policy for many decades. The relations between India and Pakistan have seen great uncertainty and ambiguity for both the countries have adopted divergent approach for their respective national interests. India and Pakistan are the two largest countries in South Asia wherein there exists a very low level of engagements. These two South Asian regional powers remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance in maintaining close relation for the mutual benefit.

Since independence, India and Pakistan have failed to come out of mutual suspicion and discord of each other. It has its implications on the decision-making process and policy formulation of both the countries. It has also promoted the image of each other as an enemy with minimal hope for constructive politico, strategic and economic engagement. Both India and Pakistan have so far failed to develop cordial relationship from the long-term perspective with each other due to various issues which includes border dispute, cross border terrorism and clash of interests over Afghanistan etc. The relationship between the two sides has been marked by suspicion, hatred and distrust. Tense and hostile situation which existed since 1947 has resulted in three wars and many crises between them. They have made significant efforts in past to resolve some of the key issues by holding peace talks and even by concluding various agreements. But this situation could not last long owing to suspensions in the peace process which had further enhanced suspicion and mistrust on both sides. By adopting antagonistic approach towards each other, both sides have failed to develop consensus on the need to develop the atmosphere of peace and security as key to achieving mutual interests. Misperception developed in the minds of policy makers of both states regarding different issues. The hostile attitude towards each other has severely undermined the prospect of socio-economic development of both countries. It argues that lasting security

and other development pursuits of both India and Pakistan would considerably rely upon cordial and cooperative relations between these two neighbours.

India's Predominant Position in South Asia and beyond:

India enjoys strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic connections with the neighboring countries of South Asia. Among the countries of South Asia, India is the largest which accounts for 70 per cent of population, nearly 80 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and about 75 per cent of the regional economic output. India shares boundary with all the South Asian neighbours. Since India plays a crucial role at the global stage so it becomes imperative to maintain stability in its relations with its neighbours. From the geo-strategic and geo-political point of view, India's relations with the South Asian neighbours have been guided by – first, its desire to protect the sub-continent from the adverse external forces that might destabilise India's security environment and secondly, its desire to ensure that geographical proximity and ethno-religious affinities do not lead to instability on or near its border, particularly as they inevitably may affect its domestic, ethnic, religious and political relationships. This could even give rise to secessionist demands within the country.

India enjoys a predominant position in South Asia and beyond owing to its large size, economic capabilities, military powers and geographical standing. India has a huge stake in not only playing a pivotal role in the region but

also keeping it free from external powers' presence and interference. According to Stephen Blank, a well-known expert who has written extensively on Asian security, India is definitely an extra-regional power. The U.S. Quadrennial Review published in 2010 has described India as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Bhabani Sen Gupta has argued in favour of India playing a crucial role in the region when he said that, "The Indian elephant cannot transform itself into a mouse. If South Asia is to get itself out of the crippling binds of conflicts and cleavages, the six will have to accept the bigness of the seventh. And the seventh, that is India, will have to prove to the six that big can indeed be beautiful." India shares a land border with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and a maritime border with Sri Lanka and Maldives. India accounts for 72 percent of the land surface in South Asia. The economic potential and military capabilities of India have made the country a primary regional force in South Asia to be reckoned with. India is being referred to as the 'key to the development and progress of SAARC. India's responsibility in shaping and directing the cooperation drive was recognized by extra-regional powers. The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. However, Pakistan has blamed India for playing dominating behavior in the region of South Asia in the past and present which creates an environment of insecurity for the latter. India started to deter, coerce or influence Pakistan.

India's Political Relations with Pakistan:

The political understanding between India and Pakistan has witnessed more ups and downs ever since their independence. The political environment between the two neighboring countries continues to be marred by mutual distrust and suspicion. Despite significant potential, the relationship between the two has seen no significant improvement. The healthy relations is very beneficial in various areas of interests including security, economic, energy and socio-cultural aspects. The two South Asian regional powers, India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals competing for regional influence and engage in contradictory and counterproductive acts. There exists a serious politico-security conflict between the two South Asian rivals which pose a hindrance in maintaining close relation for the mutual cooperation.

Underlying Key Issues Constraining India-Pakistan Relations:

This section of the proposal will discuss the key issues that prevent Pakistan and India from reaching their full potential of bilateral engagement which definitely would have both regional and global significance. **There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue, terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues and China issue.** These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well. Besides, it will also affect the process of their rise and the peace and stability in and outside the region.

Kashmir Issue:

Kashmir has been and continues to remain the main cause of friction between India and Pakistan. That's why many have termed it as a 'nuclear flashpoint'. Kashmir issue has gained both regional and global significance. The geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the Kashmir has made India and Pakistan to believe that the control of Kashmir is so important, thereby making it difficult for both sides to come to the terms on resolving the issue which has cost thousands of lives. It is surrounded by a number of foreign countries such as Tibet in its east and Pakistan, China and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its west. The southern part is bordered by Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Such a geostrategic location makes the Kashmir valley very important from strategic angle for both India and Pakistan. Having fought three wars over the Kashmir issue in 1947, 1965, and 1999, there is still no hope of resolving it in the near future.

India and Pakistan have totally different perception about Kashmir issue. From the Pakistan perspective, Kashmir issue is more of an ideological rather than a territorial dispute, whereas India perceives Kashmir as a symbol of its secularism and composite nationalism. The strategic importance of controlling Kashmir from the Indian point of view can be reflected from the statement of Indian's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he asserted that "India without Kashmir would cease to occupy a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia. Its northern frontiers...are connected with important three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Thus, strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India~ it has been so since the dawn of history."

While from the Pakistan point of view, the occupation of Kashmir is of security significance. As Liaquat Ali Khan, the former Pakistani Prime Minister has noted that “Kashmir is very important, it is vital to Pakistan’s security. Kashmir, as you will see from the map, is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on our head, then I am always at the mercy of India. . . The very position, the strategic position of Kashmir, is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.”

Therefore, the proposal argues that resolving the Kashmir issue will not bring peace, security and prosperity in the region. It also sends a wrong message to the international community that Pakistan is not concerned about stability and security in the region.

Terrorism Issues:

Terrorism has been another major issue of concern in India’s bilateral engagement with Pakistan. One of the key challenges India faces at present, is the one posed by terrorism from beyond its borders. India is seriously challenged by the menace of terrorism in multiple forms for the past many decades. It is facing the most unique, difficult and gruesome faces of terrorism. No other country in the world is so deeply entangled in this problem as India face at present. Eradicating the menace of terrorism poses a serious challenge to international community in general and in particular to India. It has been facing this problem for the last many decades and has lost thousands of innocent lives fighting the menace. Terrorism poses a serious threat not only to peace and security but also hinders economic development of our country.

Afghanistan Issues:

Indian interests clash with Pakistan over Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have been trying for strategic influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is seriously concerned about India’s efforts to expand its strategic influence in Afghanistan post 9/11. India’s long-term strategic interests entail the re-establishment of a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. Taking account of the ground realities, India has effectively pursued proactive diplomacy and has to a large extent been successful in creating pro Indian lobbies in Afghanistan. India firmly believes that an unstable and fragile Afghanistan would pose a serious threat to India’s national security. Pakistan expresses apprehension over the growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan in the socio-economic development and military build-up. This has resulted in close political understanding between New Delhi and Kabul.

Afghanistan is central to India’s closer economic and security engagement with Central Asian Republics and Persian Gulf. India is closely working with the international community to bring lasting socio-economic and security stability in Afghanistan which continue to face lots of domestic problems. India seeks to build indigenous Afghan capacity and institutions covering multi-dimensional sectors. Reconstruction work and development programmes have been designed to support the priorities of Afghan government and people. India has made significant investment in mineral, industrial, agricultural and other sectors of Afghanistan to help in building sustainable economy.

China as a Factor in Indo-Pak Relations:

China looms large on India’s relations with Pakistan. India has in recent years gained significant weight on the international stage by virtue of its growing economic and military powers but Pakistan and China share a very strong desire to halt India’s progress in this direction. In fact India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan policies toward each other. The two sides have a close understanding on the need to enhance strategic and advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development. Pakistan in particular viewed India as a potential challenger leading to use China to counter Indian power in the region.

The close strategic partnership between the two countries has been based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. Pakistan’s search for a country that can help sustain a sufficient military capacity for itself against India coalesces with China’s intention that “a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping India preoccupied on two fronts, thereby safeguard their national security interests.”

Beijing is fuelling that arms race between the two South Asian rivals. It has in the past and even today helped Pakistan in maintaining conventional military balance of India

Challenges Ahead of Indo-Pak Relations

From the above analysis, it can be observed that the Kashmir issue and the problem of cross border terrorism pose a serious challenge to India's bilateral engagement with Pakistan. It is an unprecedented threat to overall development requiring political will and commitment on the part of the both sides on a sustained basis. It is imperative for both South Asian neighbours to engage in dialogue and discussion with each other if they want to attain peace and prosperity in the region. With the formation of the new government in both countries, there is a dire need for common understanding between the two sides over the need to closely engage with each other for mutual benefits. Both sides will need to maintain transparency in their policies with each other in order to bridge the gap of distrust and hostility and to maintain regional peace and trust-worthy bilateral relations.

The key challenge before India and Pakistan would be as to how in spite of the conflicting geo-political and geo-strategic interest, both side have cast aside their difference on a series of issues and concerns of the past and make way for cooperation in the areas where their interests converge. For instance, economic cooperation offers tremendous scope for cooperation wherein Pakistan has a lot to gain. Bilateral trade between the two countries can prove to be an effective tool in order to increase mutual dependency for sustainable and stable bilateral relations. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif have huge responsibility of restoring peace process between India and Pakistan. Besides, the present government of both countries will need to explore opportunities and areas where their interests converge.

When will the time come for both India and Pakistan to realize the need to reduce the trust deficit that continues to serve as the key roadblock to constructive bilateral engagement? From the geo-strategic, political, economic point of view, it is imperative for both the countries to have close and cordial relations. Establishing cordial relations between these two can contribute a lot in making this strategically important region prosperous. However, it is very difficult to make a prediction of how the relations between India and Pakistan would look alike in the coming years or so. But one thing is sure, for bilateral relations between any two countries to improve, it becomes imperative for a positive response from them. India and Pakistan will need to first change the perception about each other as strategic rival. In doing so, Pakistan has to change track on its 'Kashmir first' policy and shifting gear to a process of building co-operation and confidence in other areas. Similarly, India too, has to show a big brotherly attitude and offer some liberal concessions to the Pakistan without compromising any security needs. Such a positive attitude will reduce tension and ease the way for cordial relationship between the two countries. Ayesha Siddiqi, a well-known scholar from Pakistan has very rightly pointed out two factors which hinder the prospect for peace between India and Pakistan – first, outstanding political/territorial disputes between the two countries; and second, historical perceptions of each other, especially Pakistan's perception of India.

The two countries have maintained a patchy ceasefire over the LoC in Kashmir since 2003. Current spate of ceasefire violations began in January, 2013; by the close of year such incident could be around 200, far exceeding last year's total of 117. Things came to a crisis situation in September, 2013 when, just short of high-profile talks between Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of 68th UNGA session, militants of unknown identity killed eight Indian security personnel and a civilian. The attack was deliberately timed, and follows a pattern of attempts by vested interests to frustrate the bilateral peace process. Dr Singh, despite domestic electoral compulsions, could not be provoked to the level of calling off the talks. However, the bilateral was grossly de-scaled... from a breakfast meeting to a display of glass of water. Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate at the time advised Dr Singh to skip his meeting with Nawaz Sharif.¹ Pakistan and India are neighbouring countries whose future is entwined and dependent upon each other. It is up to the two countries to find a way that leads to peace and prosperity of not only the two countries but also of the region.

International Seminar objectives:

- 1. To examine various issues, and challenges between India and Pakistan.**
- 2. To explore factors responsible for tension and peace between these countries.**
- 3. Military history is not of war only for it should not be a source of fresh bitterness.**
- 4. Lack of political will to search amicable solution to India- Pakistan problem out of Military scenario.**

5. **Increasing Military expenditure in view of HDI.**
6. **Projection of Warm neighbors vs. Cold friends.**
7. **International players willing to mediate the peace process.**
8. **To study retrospective and prospective linkages in terms of strategic, economic and cultural cooperation between these countries.**
9. **To analyze the governmental role for development of strategic, economic and cultural relations.**
10. **To suggest yardsticks for further strengthening the bilateral strategic, cultural and economic relations between these countries.**

Sub Themes of the International Seminar:

1. India – Pakistan Relations -Issues and Challenges.
2. Key Issues –Kashmir Problem, Article-370, Terrorism, Afghanistan and China Factor
3. Factors responsible to changes political and security relations between these countries.
4. Retrospective and prospective linkages in terms of security, political, economic and cultural relations.
5. Policy of the both governments regarding bilateral relations

Since the independence of the two South Asian neighbours, India and Pakistan in 1947, relations between the two has witnessed inflexible, conflictual, distrustful and very risky political standoff in global context in general and in South Asia particular. Moreover, both are closest and bordering neighbors with close literary, social and cultural bonds but remained at great distance from each other. There are many reasons and factors behind such turbulence situations and unstabilized political environment but Kashmir issue remain the primary factor that has hindered the prospects for peace between the two sides. However, India and Pakistan have always been caught in enduring conflicts, but in recent time, there are certain changes took place due to the change in the leadership and misadventures/infiltration/proxy war in Kashmir valley as their relations seem to be bitterer than ever before which give the space to international organizations to intervene in their disputes and state of affairs. In such situation, Kashmir is being seen as decider factor to Indo-Pak relations. In the recent past, both sides have made several attempts to restore peace and understanding, but have failed. Shimla agreement, Agra agreement and Lahore declaration are some of significant efforts which have been made in the direction to improve their relationships.

In such context, the present volume attempts to touch upon several key issues especially Kashmir problem, China's factor and other. It also tries to explore the future of Indo-Pak relations while examining attempts made in the direction to normalize their relations.

We express our gratitude to the *Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi* for providing the grant for the International Seminar. Without financial support from the ICWA, this Seminar Proceedings would not have seen the light of day. The completion of this proceedings was made possible through the support of people whom we would like to acknowledge. We would like to acknowledge the unwavering support of

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Dr.Sanjay Kumar
Dr.Ravinder Nirwal
Dr.Neelam Kumari

About the Special Issue of Shodhmanthan

India and Pakistan since their independence have shared a long history of conflict. The two countries have witnessed few ups and more downs in their overall engagement during the last many decades. Both have a clash of interests at the geo-strategic and geo-political levels. As a result of which these two countries have always found themselves to be on the opposite sides. Besides, both have suffered from a security dilemma regarding each other's military strength. The relations between Pakistan and India directly have an impact on regional security and stability. There are factors within and outside between India and Pakistan which still impacts their relations, for instance, border issue, terrorism issue, Afghanistan issues and China issue. These bilateral issues will not only effect on their present relations but is most likely to have a negative impact on their future relations as well.

This book is a collection of contributions by scholars and experts from various University and colleges of India. The present book is an attempt to analyse underlying key issues and challenges in India's relations with its immediate neighbour, Pakistan, in the light of the recent development. The book argues that better ties between the two most significant neighbors in the South Asian region, Pakistan and India, symbolize enhanced cooperation in the South Asian region on the whole. This book is a comprehensive collection covering various facets of India relations with Pakistan encompassing political, economic and strategic issues.

The book is likely to generate immense scholarly and public debate on issues and challenges in India's engagement with its immediate neighbour Pakistan. The book would be of great interests to scholars, experts, policy makers and all those interests in the study of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the context of the development that have taken place in the recent past.

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